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RELIGION AND THE ECONOMICS OF FERTILITY IN SOUTH INDIA 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides an account of the interplay between the economic, demographic and religious 
factors which influence women's age at first marriage, their adoption of contraception and their fertility, 
in a group of rural communities in southern India. In so doing, it also assesses possible implications for 
state-level population policies in India, which may need to take into account differences in nuptiality, 
contraceptive adoption and fertility across religious groups. 
Religion is conceptualised as affecting demography in two ways: first, through its philosophical content 
or 'particularised theology', and second, in terms of `characteristics' or socio-economic differences 
between members of different religious groups. The focus of this study is Hindu-Muslim demographics 
in south India. Hence, the 'particularised theology' component is dealt with by undertaking, in Chapter 
I, a detailed comparison of the philosophical content of Islam and Hinduism on marriage, birth control, 
the position of women, and the importance of children within the family. The main finding is that with 
the exception of provisions on birth control, there is little difference between Hinduism and Islam in 
their theological positions on demographic issues. The 'characteristics' component is dealt with by 
including socio-economic variables in the econometric models. The aim is to investigate whether there 
are any differences across religions in the age at marriage, fertility and the decision to use 
contraception, after controlling for various economic, social and biological factors. 
I spent 1995-96 conducting micro-level fieldwork and collecting primary data in a cluster of 
communities in the south Indian state of Karnataka. The communities were Ramanagaram town and five 
villages in the taluk of Ramanagaram in southern Karnataka. The core of my fieldwork consisted of 
detailed interviews of a sample of 201 rural Hindu, Muslim and Christian women. The interviews 
involved 93 questions administered from a carefully designed questionnaire. Descriptions of 
Ramanagaram, the questionnaire and the dataset are presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Chapter 4 analyses the determinants of the age at first marriage using OLS methods and economic, 
biological and socio-cultural explanatory variables. These include both demand-side and supply-side 
factors: income, education of the women and their husbands, their occupations, the year of marriage 
(as a measure of `ideational change'), marital consanguinity, the age at menarche, religion, and caste 
status (for the Hindus only). The results of the analysis show that there was no statistically significant 
difference between Hindus and Muslims in the religious and socio-economic factors which affected 
their age at first marriage. 
In Chapter 5, a logit model with interaction variables is used to explore the influence on contraceptive 
adoption of a variety of variables: women's and husband's education, their occupations, family 
expenditure, ownership of a television (to measure `diffusion'), the influence of female extended 
family members, the ease of access to a contraceptive method, religion, and caste membership (for 
Hindus only). The analysis concludes that there was no statistically significant difference between 
Hindus and Muslims in the effect of different socio-economic factors on the decision to use 
contraception. 
In Chapter 6, the analysis of fertility using OLS methods and interaction variables explores the effect 
on children ever born of nonproximate influences such as education, expenditure, occupation, 
consanguinity, woman's age, son-preference and access to water and fuel infrastructure. The analysis 
shows that while religion did not exert a pure theological effect on fertility, there were statistically 
significant differences in the effects of different socio-economic factors such as access to education 
and fuel infrastructure, on the number of children ever born between Hindus, Muslims and Christians. 
The most important implication of this analysis is that the socio-economic factors which affect fertility 
decisions in south India may not necessarily be uniform across religious groups, and that the socio- 
economic 'characteristics' of different religious groups may need to be targeted differently by policy- 
makers in order to influence demographic decision-making in south India. 
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situations (Arabic) 
Long gold earrings, usually worn by brides (Hindi and Kannada) 
Desire and enjoyment (Sanskrit) 
Actions in present and past births (Sanskrit) 
Prestige (Sanskrit) 
Black cream used for eye make-up (Hindi) 
Holy book of Islam (Arabic) 
Man of power (Sanskrit) 
To discover the world's potential for virtue and to derive happiness 
therefrom (Sanskrit) 
School for religious teaching (Urdu) 
Hindu epic poem about the 'great war' between two sets of 
cousins, the Pandavas and the Kauravas of Hastinapura (Sanskrit) 
Dower paid to the bride under the Islamic marriage contract (Arabic) 
Unit of measurement for firewood (Kannada) 
Market or group of stalls/shops (Hindi and Kannada) 
Man learned in religious scriptures (Arabic and Urdu) 
Salvation or spiritual freedom (Sanskrit) 
Jurist (Arabic) 
Xll 
mullah 
nallah 
Nitimanjari 
panchayati-raj 
puja 
pundit 
purdah 
purusartha 
qadi 
ragi 
Ramayana 
Rg Veda (or Rig Veda) 
rishi 
sadaq 
sahadharmini 
sannyasin 
Sharia 
shilanya 
sloka 
sraddha 
sudra 
Sunna 
talaq 
talaq-al-bida 
taluk 
tapahpradhanya 
ulema 
Upanishads 
vaisya 
vanaprastha 
vargeeti 
varna 
Vedas 
vidya 
vriddhashram 
yajnapradhanya 
Man learned in religious scriptures (Arabic and Urdu) 
Small drain for flowing water (Hindi) 
Hindu philosophical text (Sanskrit) 
Local self-government institutions (Hindi) 
Hindu ritual for religious worship (Sanskrit) 
Hindu learned man (Sanskrit) 
Seclusion and observing the veil in public (Arabic and Urdu) 
Fourfold objects of life in Hindu philosophy (Sanskrit) 
Judge (Arabic) 
Green finger millet, a coarse grain grown in southern 
Karnataka (Kannada) 
Hindu epic poem about the life of the Hindu king Rama of 
Ayodhya, believed to be a reincarnation of the Hindu god 
Vishnu (Sanskrit) 
The first and oldest of the four Vedas or Hindu holy books 
(Sanskrit) 
Sage or learned man (Sanskrit) 
Dower paid to the bride's guardian under the Islamic marriage 
contract (Arabic) 
Concept in Indian philosophy which views the woman's earthly 
role as mainly to be a helpmate to her husband in his pursuit of the 'path 
of truth and righteousness' (Sanskrit) 
Free suprasocial man (Sanskrit) 
Islamic law (Arabic) 
Foundation-laying ceremony (Sanskrit) 
Couplet or verse (Sanskrit) 
Hindu rituals performed to honour deceased ancestors (Sanskrit) 
Man of service (Sanskrit) 
Prophet Muhammad's interpretations of the Koran and its 
application to various situations (Arabic) 
Divorce (Arabic) 
The 'divorce of innovation' under the Islamic marriage contract 
(Arabic) 
Revenue sub-division, consisting of 100-300 villages (Kannada and 
Hindi) 
Self-control or self-denial (Sanskrit) 
Learned men (Arabic and Urdu) 
Hindu religious scriptures (Sanskrit) 
Man of skilled productivity (Sanskrit) 
Forest recluse (Sanskrit) 
A woman's husband's brother's wife or 'co-sister'(Kannada) 
Fourfold organisation of society in Hindu philosophy (Sanskrit) 
Hindu religious scriptures (Sanskrit) 
Learning (Sanskrit) 
Old-age home (Kannada and Hindi) 
Worldly pursuits (Sanskrit) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Those who move neither forward nor backward are not 
men of the Word, nor refiners of essence. 
Poor craftsman, misunderstanding the Word, they are those 
who spin useless thread for themselves. ' 
The conflict between the sacred and the secular has always rested at the heart of India's 
chequered history. The former defines the role for ideology, religious beliefs and their 
expression, value systems and their position in society. The latter follows the impulse toward 
economic betterment and is mirrored particularly in the competitive nature of India's political 
process. 2 For most in the Indian sub-continent, deep spirituality coexists with competition, 
and both factors routinely govern day-to-day living. Religion is linked intimately with the 
economics of survival. 
However, where these two factors are inter-linked to generate divisions along religious lines, 
the outcome has been manifest in the resurgence of what is termed `communalism', which 
has been largely, though not entirely, a feature of the post-colonial period. Communalism is 
defined as a phenomenon which uses religion not merely as a set of beliefs or ethical values 
but as a means to establish the identity of a social community, to attain economic and 
political ends. This has involved sometimes authoritative postures which seek to impose 
cohesion and uniformity over diverse members of a religious community in the process of 
identity-formation, coupled with antagonistic attitudes towards members of rival religious 
groups in the quest for economic `rents'. Though communal conflict in India has taken place 
between Hindus and Sikhs, and Hindus and Christians, it is mainly Hindu-Muslim conflict 
which has recurred the most over the decades. 
1 Le Mee, 1975: g Veda verse X. 71.9, p. 147. 
2 Although it is recognised that political competition is also often about religion, a factor that is evident 
in India and in other countries characterised by religious pluralism. 
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In the process of identity-formation and the common quest for issues which emphasise 
difference between religions, disciplines which are often thought unrelated to religion are 
routinely brought in as part of the armoury in the confrontations (verbal and otherwise) over 
seats in educational institutions, government jobs or political office. A major issue, which has 
been the subject of many different claims and counter-claims, is fertility, and demographic 
and economic differences have been shown to have exacerbated communal conflicts in the 
past.; In a country of such a large population as India, where some members of virtually all of 
the main religious communities can claim to be a party to high fertility, it seems, at the 
outset, absurd to stress fertility differentials by religion. However, many political leaders 
(and others) have made statements about the fertility behaviour or demographic experiences 
of members of other religions. Most of these statements have been pure rhetoric and rabble- 
rousing, at best, or blatant untruths, at worst. 4 In fact, there has not been very much academic 
or scientific work which has dealt specifically or explicitly with the existence or causes of 
demographic differentials by religion in India. 5 This issue has not been dealt with in detail by 
the Indian Census, which only in 1995 made public demographic information by religion, but 
which mainly restricts itself to state- and district-level comparisons. 
The demographic information made available by the Indian Census of 1981 and 1991 suggest 
that Muslims have higher fertility than Hindus, that this may outweigh differences in 
mortality, and that without controlling for the effect of any other factor which might affect 
fertility, such differences will persist, mainly because the process of demographic transition 
3 Iyer, 1994. 
4 For an example of some of these blatant untruths, M. V. Ramamurthy writes, `Muslims arc by and 
large emotional and aggressive. Often in communal troubles they take the initiative though ultimately 
they are the worse sufferers. The Muslims, have not, till now, taken up the family planning programme 
with zeal and hence their population is growing at a higher rate than that of the Hindus. ... 
At this rate 
their population may become considerable in relation to the total population of our country. This is 
creating alarm in the minds of Hindus. ' This extract is taken from the forward to a book (originally in 
the Telugu language and now translated into English) by Subbamma, 1988: vi. 
s Two exceptions are Sharif, 1993; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997. 
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has started earlier for Hindus than for Muslims. 6 More recent data provided by the Human 
Development Report on age-specific fertility rates by religious groups in India also suggests 
that age-specific fertility varies between Hindus and Muslims in India today. 7 Consider Table 
1. 
Table 1: Age-specific fertility rates by religious groups, all-India (1999) 
Age in completed years TFR 
Religion 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 15-49 
Hindu 0.06 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.02 4.2 
Muslim 0.09 0.34 0.30 0.21 0.15 0.04 0.03 5.8 
Christian 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.03 --2.1 
Others 0.02 0.23 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.03 3.9 
(Source: India: Human Development Report 1999, NCEAR, Appendix A. 8.5, p. 331) 
The data suggest that the total fertility rate for Muslims in all of India is considerably higher 
than for Hindus. Age-specific fertility rates also indicate that Muslim women are bearing a 
larger number of children at earlier ages than are Hindu and Christian women. However, the 
Census information and the data provided by the Human Development Report consider mean 
levels in fertility only, and with the exception of the woman's age, do not control for the 
effect of other socio-economic influences on fertility. 
The present study is an attempt to redress this deficiency. It adopts the micro-demographic 
approach to studying the determinants of fertility in a small cluster of communities in south 
India (which have witnessed communal conflicts in the past), yet it combines this approach 
with economic and econometric analysis. This study does not, and cannot, claim to be 
representative of the behaviour of all of India's population. However, it does hope to capture 
the behaviour and demographic decision-making of some Hindu, Muslim and Christian 
women in rural Karnataka. Further, by integrating the discussion of economic factors such as 
income with social and historical factors such as consanguinity, and the change in social 
6 Goyal, 1991 
7 
NCAER, 1999. 
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norms occasioned by 'ideational change', it hopes to illustrate the necessity for such a multi- 
pronged approach (or 'synthesis') to the study of fertility determinants in India. Finally, this 
study seeks to provide an account of the interplay between the economic, demographic and 
religious factors which influence women's age at first marriage, their contraceptive adoption 
and their fertility, in a group of rural communities in southern India. In so doing, this study 
also hopes to assess the possible implications for state-level population policies in India, 
which may need to take into account differences in nuptiality, contraceptive adoption and 
fertility across religious groups. 
I. The historical roots of communalism in India and its relevance to the study of fertility 
Religion performs many roles in a society. First, it can be a powerful means of expressing 
unfulfilled aspirations. Religion may also function as a means to construct an identity and as 
a tool of dissent. Historically, religion in India has long been used as a tool of dissent. For 
example, the Bhakti movement in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries mobilised 
popular support against the emphasis on rituals and the dogmatic finality characteristic of 
Hinduism and Islam at the time. If we examine the history of communalism in India, we find 
that communal incidents are not unique to post-Independent years, but are evident as early as 
the eighteenth century and in the colonial period as well. " The historical roots of 
communalism illustrate that organised caste hierarchies, the ability of religion to aid in 
identity-formation, and the fact that economic success depended on rent-seeking vis-ä-vis the 
colonial state, were the three factors which initially contributed to the rise of communalism. 
In particular, the origins of communalism as we see it today have been linked to `predatory 
commercialisation' due to imperfect markets in land and labour which developed in the 
colonial period. 9 
8 Bayly, 1983; Pandey, 1990. 
9 Bagchi, 1991: 193-218. 
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In the twentieth century, communal organisations, which numbered less than a dozen in 1951, 
today number more than 500 with many millions enrolled as members. Whereas only 61 
districts in 1961 were affected by communal riots, this rose to 250 out of a total of 350 
districts in all of India by 1987.10 Compared with earlier decades, the 1980s and the 1990s 
have witnessed a new phase of communal confrontation characterised by great loss of life 
and property, detailed planning, and a particular concentration in industrial or commercial 
centres. Moreover, in the late 1980s, there has been an exacerbation of military postures 
around two major issues: first, the disputed mosque in Ayodhya, and second, Muslim 
personal law, centred around the Shah Bano case. " Thus, in the 1980s and 1990s, and most 
recently following the demolition of the Babri Masjid mosque on 6 December 1992, be it in 
Punjab, Assam, Bhiwandi, Telangana, Hyderabad, Meerut, Surat, Ahmedabad or Hyderabad, 
communal confrontations have left no corner of India untouched. 12 In the 1990s, and the 
disputed mosque at Ayodhya is a case in point, religion has come to be used not merely as the 
reflection of personal ideology but also as a theological weapon to highlight the insecurity of 
the poor or inequality between classes, or for `rent-seeking' purposes due to group 
competition, which enables religious groups to gain legitimacy both in the eyes of the masses 
and in the eyes of the state. Perhaps this is the consequence of recognising that in the specific 
context of India's caste and social structure, group mobility is essential for individual 
10 Figures taken from India today, 15 June 1987: 38. 
11 On 23 April, 1985, the Supreme Court of India upheld an order granting maintenance to a Muslim 
woman, Shah Bano of Indore, from her divorced husband under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code (Cr. PC). The Muslim orthodoxy reacted virulently, claiming that the court had interfered with 
Koranic interpretations of Muslim personal law. The then Rajiv Gandhi government issued the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986, which legislated that Muslims were to be kept 
out of the purview of Section 125 of the Cr. PC. This was soon followed by the government placating 
Hindu communalists by granting permission to open the disputed Babri Masjid at Ayodhya for Hindu 
worship and to perform shilanyas (foundation-laying ceremonies) on the disputed site for construction 
of a temple to Rama in October 1989, just prior to the general elections. Both injudicious concessions, 
motivated primarily by political considerations, resulted in widespread communal riots thereafter. 
12 Pandey, 1991; Sarkar, 1981; Chandra, 1984; Engineer, 1984; Engineer, 1986; Engineer, 1991; 
Engineer, 1993; Engineer, 1994; Vanaik, 1991; Balagopal, 1992. 
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mobility. 13 This is because in such a variegated country as India, both under the colonial and 
the post-colonial state, control of the legislative process has been essential for economic gain; 
religious affiliation provides a unified way of reducing the transactions costs of forming rent- 
seeking groups. ` 
One way of strengthening the `group' may be greater fertility; this is the `minority group 
consciousness' hypothesis for explaining high fertility among some ethnic or religious 
groups, which will be discussed below in Chapter 1. Another way may be to gain mass 
support by suggesting that for any one group, members of other religious groups might soon 
come to outnumber the group due to their high fertility, different marriage practices, or low 
contraceptive use. Much of this debate, however, at least among religious or political leaders, 
has masked the fact that there may be real demographic differences between members of 
different religious groups in India, but differences which have more to do with socio- 
economic disparities than with the content of different religious beliefs per se. Consequently, 
it is necessary to examine from an academic perspective if this has any consequences for 
fertility decisions. In order to do so, the present study looks at the role of religion, compared 
to other factors, in influencing three major aspects of demographic behaviour - nuptiality, 
contraceptive use and fertility - in one taluk of south India. 
13 For example, one Muslim woman interviewed in the present study mentioned that the main 
community rivalry in Ramanagaram town was between the Gowdas and the Muslims, and this was 
especially marked at election time. These are the two relatively prosperous communities in the town, 
which very often fought for seats to the local panchayat, the municipality and the state legislature. At 
present, Ramanagaram has a Gowda man representing it in the Karnataka state legislature's lower house 
of Parliament. In Ramanagaram, the local committees of the political parties both mobilised residents 
for political activities and helped them to obtain benefits under slum improvement and welfare 
programmes. 
14 For more on transactions costs and rent-seeking, see Stigler, 1993: 258-273. It is recognised also that 
while rent-seeking to some extent explains why people seek religious affiliation, this does not explain 
entirely India's few but large movements of socio-religious protest conversion to Buddhism, 
Christianity or Islam, where converts sought to escape the dogmatic finality of the caste system and 
avoid ascriptive rent-paying. Rent-seeking also does not explain also why a majority of religionists stay 
on for many consecutive generations in the religion of their ancestors' affiliation. I am grateful to 
Michael Lipton for alerting me to these considerations. 
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II. The theoretical framework 
Following Bongaarts, I begin by distinguishing between the proximate and nonproximate 
determinants of fertility. 15 I then try to identify the factors which, in south Indian society in 
the 1990s, might theoretically influence both fertility itself and two of the proximate 
determinants (the age at first marriage and the decision to use contraception). In modelling 
the determinants of nuptiality, contraceptive choice and fertility, I take into account the 
socio-economic variables which are postulated in the theoretical literature to exert an 
influence on these demographic decisions, such as education, income, age, caste and access 
to infrastructure. However, as I am particularly interested in Hindu-Muslim demographics, 
my main focus is on the role of religion. I conceptualise religion as affecting demography in 
two ways: first, through its philosophical content (or `particularised theology' following 
Chamie), and second, in terms of `characteristics' or socio-economic differences between 
members of different religious groups. 16 
In order to study these issues, I spent 1995-96 conducting micro-level fieldwork and 
collecting primary data in a cluster of communities in the south Indian state of Karnataka. ' 
The communities were Ramanagaram town and five villages in the taluk of Ramanagaram in 
southern Karnataka. The core of my fieldwork consisted of detailed interviews of a sample 
of 201 rural Hindu, Muslim and Christian women. The interviews involved ninety-three 
questions administered from a carefully designed questionnaire. The questionnaire collected 
information about the respondent's personal characteristics, the structure of her household, 
the decisions made by her and her husband on contraception and reproduction, and the 
15 Bongaarts, 1978: 105-132. 
16 Chamie, 1977: 365-382. 
17 I undertook my fieldwork in a region studied in previous decades both by the Mysore Population 
Study, and by Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, enabling me to make effective comparisons with these 
two studies. See Mysore Population Study, 1961; Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 343-361. 
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importance of religion to the respondent and her family. Chapter 1 of this dissertation 
presents a discussion of the relationship between religion and demography. Chapter 2 
discusses information about Ramanagaram taluk, its population distribution, its infrastructure 
facilities, the data set and the sampling methodology. Chapter 3 presents the `census' 
information on the 201 women interviewed. 
Chapters 4 through 6 of this thesis present the results from the main empirical analysis of the 
data, which was undertaken both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative component 
involved testing models of marriage age, contraceptive choice and fertility decisions using 
multiple regression analysis with ordinary least squares (OLS), and logistic regression 
(LOGIT) techniques. The aim was to investigate whether there were any differences across 
religions in marriage, fertility and the decision to use contraception, even after controlling for 
various economic, social and biological factors. The qualitative component of the analysis 
focused on women's descriptions of their religious observance, their opinions on their 
families and their views about contraception. This was done in order to provide ethnographic 
evidence to substantiate and give interpretative depth to the quantitative findings. Chapter 7 
puts forward the major conclusions of the present study. 
111. Overview of the key findings and paps in the analysis 
In India as in the Ramanagaram sample, Muslim marriage age is higher than Hindu marriage 
age, Muslim contraceptive use is lower than Hindu contraceptive use, and Muslim fertility is, 
on average, one child higher than Hindu fertility. Most studies of fertility differences in India 
stop with such comparisons between average values. The analysis undertaken in the present 
study decomposes the potential influence of religion into two effects (as discussed in Chapter 
1). First, this study considers the `pure religion effect' which deals with women's beliefs 
about the teaching of their religion and its influence on reproductive decisions; the influence 
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of priests and women's opinions about their teaching; and women's consequent religious 
practice. Secondly, this study examines the `characteristics' effect, i. e. the extent to which 
religious differences in fertility are dependent on variations in other factors such as 
differences in female education, and their consequent impact on fertility. The analysis 
concludes that neither the pure religion effect nor the characteristics effect differs 
significantly between Hindus and Muslims as regards their marriage age (as discussed in 
Chapter 4) or their decision to use contraception (as discussed in Chapter 5). However, there 
are differences between Hindus and Muslims in the effect on their fertility of some socio- 
economic characteristics such as education, access to fuel infrastructure and son-preference 
(as discussed in Chapter 6). Religion also appears to account for some of the difference in 
age at marriage between There are also differences in the effect of religion between Hindus 
and Christians, and between Muslims and Christians. Furthermore, education has a different 
effect on contraceptive practice for Christians than it does for the other two religious groups. 
The study therefore concludes that Hindu-Muslim differences in age at marriage, 
contraception and fertility outcomes results from differences between these two groups in 
characteristics such as female education, and the manner in which these characteristics affect 
demographic outcomes. However, the conclusions derived from the present study do need to 
be qualified by acknowledging that there may exist other effects of religion on fertility which 
this study does not attempt to address, and certain characteristics of Ramanagaram taluk and 
the sample which may not render the findings universally applicable to populations in all of 
India. 
A. Omitted effects of religion on fertility 
In addition to the pure religion effect and the characteristics effect, there are five other ways 
in which religion might affect fertility or its proximate determinants, but which are not dealt 
9 
with explicitly in the present study due to the limitations of the data, either because some 
information is extremely sensitive and is therefore difficult to uncover in fieldwork, or 
because the data was collected in five villages and the town of Ramanagaram all of which lie 
in close proximity, and may therefore be too homogeneous to test certain hypotheses (as 
discussed below and in Chapter 2). 
The five ways in which religion might exercise an impact on fertility which are not 
considered in this study are the following. Firstly, there are ecological effects. Competition 
between Hindus and Muslims in a multi-faith area might lead both Hindus and Muslims to 
have higher fertility, marry earlier, or use contraception less than in villages which contain 
members of one religious group only. This could not be tested explicitly for the 
Ramanagaram data set because the Christians and Muslims resided only in Ramanagaram 
town and villages B and C, but not at all in villages A, D and E. 
The second way in which religion might influence fertility is through `variability effects'. 
That is, Hindus, Muslims and Christians could differ significantly not only in the mean 
values of demographic variables but also in distributional features of these variables. This 
possibility is examined in detail in the summaries of findings at the end of Chapter 3. 
Religion may also affect fertility through its effects on other proximate determinants, for 
example, through influencing length of breastfeeding, duration of couple separation during 
the fertile period because of divorce or migration, or willingness to resort to abortion. The 
mean levels of these variables and their distributions might also affect the fertility of couples. 
For example, if the number of months of breastfeeding is longer for one religious group than 
for another, and if this is due to religious considerations, this could reduce fertility for the 
former because it increases the gap between successive births. If couples face long periods of 
separation due to some influence of religion on divorce (as may be the case for some sects of 
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Islam) or due to economic compulsions such as migration, this could reduce fertility. Finally, 
religious injunctions concerning abortion could theoretically affect fertility, if, for example, 
abortion is disallowed by the religious scriptures. Differences between Hindus, Muslims and 
Christians with respect to the proportions of women remaining single or the number of births 
that take place out of wedlock may be influenced also by religious norms, and this would 
have an impact on total fertility. The present study does not deal with these issues because 
such information is very sensitive and attempts to collect it through fieldwork are notoriously 
difficult. 
There may also be differences in society's treatment of Hindus and Muslims that cause 
different acquisition of socio-economic and other characteristics. This possibility is 
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to quantify and must therefore be left unanalysed in a 
study such as the present one. 
Finally, this study does not consider the impact of infant and child mortality as a proximate 
determinant affecting either the age at first marriage or the decision to use contraception. 
This decision is justified because infant mortality did not vary perceptibly between Hindus 
and Muslims in Ramanagaram. As is evident from Table 2, the mean and distribution of 
infant and child deaths did not vary significantly between Hindus and Muslims in the 
Ramanagaram sample. The sample of Christians was too small (N = 14) to make comparisons 
with the other two religious groups meaningful, given that none of the Christian women 
interviewed reported any child deaths. 
Table 2: Infant and child deaths, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Reported infant and child deaths All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Mean 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.00 
Standard deviation 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.00 
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It is possible that the higher level of education for Christian women relative to the Hindu and 
Muslim women accounts for the lack of child deaths reported among them. This may also 
explain in part the lower fertility of the Christians (as discussed in Chapter 6). However, such 
a conclusion is largely speculative, as the number of Christians interviewed is very small 
relative to the number of Hindus and Muslims. The small number of child deaths reported for 
all three religious groups may also reflect the positive role being played by the maternal and 
child health-care programme in the state of Karnataka. 
It is also necessary to understand that the role of infant and child mortality in an analysis of 
religion and fertility is very complex, a factor that is evident clearly when we look at all-India 
data. Consider Table 3. 
Table 3: Infant and child mortality by religion, all-India (1999) 
Infant mortality Under-5 mortality 
Marital duration of ever-married women Marital duration of ever-married women 
Religion 0-9 10-19 20+ All 0-9 10-19 20+ All 
Hindu 69 79 99 86 88 110 139 119 
Muslim 52 65 93 75 69 97 136 110 
Christian 32 56 88 61 36 67 103 71 
Others 83 79 82 81 92 114 112 109 
(Source: India: Human Development Report, 1999, NCEAR, Appendix A. 8.6, p. 333) 
The data show that not only is infant mortality across the Indian states lower for the 
Christians than for the Hindus, but that it is also much lower for the Muslims than for the 
Hindus. Moreover, this difference is also apparent for under-5 mortality, where the 
performance of the Muslims is distinctly superior to that of the Hindus. The differences in 
infant and child mortality between Muslims and Hindus is even more marked among women 
who are married more recently. This suggests that the interrelationships between religion and 
fertility are complex, and may need to be explored independently of changes in infant and 
child mortality. 
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B. Special features of the sample area 
As discussed in Chapter 2 below, the sample of women analysed was selected from the 
population in Ramanagaram taluk in Bangalore rural district in southern Karnataka. There are 
some features of this district which are unique and which may not necessarily reflect the 
situation in other parts of India. These features may qualify some of the conclusions of the 
present study. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, the villages covered in the sample are really 
peri-urban. Both here and in the urban areas, one could possibly expect more homogeneous 
fertility-related behaviour than in other parts of rural India. As shown in Chapter 2, the 
villages also have much higher male-female ratios and different age structures to that of some 
other parts of India. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Muslims who live in Ramanagaram are 
better off and more urbanised compared to some Muslim communities in other parts of India. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the sample was chosen specifically to examine whether religion 
exercised an impact on fertility even at a relatively high socio-economic level, and in areas 
where poverty did not compound demographic differences. However, it must be 
acknowledged that the conclusions which emerge from studying religious differentials in 
fertility in the Ramanagaram sample may not be applicable universally to more typically 
rural, demographically structured and poorer populations. 
After taking into account these caveats, this study nevertheless hopes to serve two major 
purposes. First, it seeks to identify the determinants of two proximate influences on fertility 
(nuptiality and contraceptive choice) and of fertility outcomes in south India. Second, it 
attempts to assess the implications which taking into account religious differences in 
marriage age, contraceptive choice and fertility have for the formulation of state population 
policies in India, as well as in other countries characterised by religious pluralism. 
Ultimately, I hope to contribute to the discussion and the debate on the determinants of 
fertility in Karnataka in particular and in India more generally. In so doing I hope also to 
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present a realistic account of the demographic decision-making of the women of 
Ramanagaram taluk, who have so generously shared with me their views and their 
experiences. 
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CHAPTER I 
Religion and Reproduction: An Examination of the Impact of Religion on Demography 
Religion is the soul of soulless conditions, the heart of a heartless world, 
the opium of the people. ' 
At the outset, it is important to examine the ways in which religion is hypothesised to affect 
demographic outcomes, particularly in terms of theological content. In section I we first 
discuss the two hypotheses which propose certain links between religion and fertility, the 
`pure religion effect' hypothesis and the `characteristics' hypothesis. 
A discussion of the impact of religion on fertility needs to be placed in the wider historical 
context of the role of religion in economic development. As early as 1905, Weber put 
forward his now-famous theory of the influence of the `Protestant ethic' on the `spirit of 
capitalism' and the rise of modern industrial society in Europe? However, discussions of 
religion and development soon went beyond looking at the impact of religion in terms of its 
effect on entrepreneurial spirit, to address broader issues such as religion's role as a 
fundamental factor in society's moral base, which may impose a `social limit' on 
development. In this context, three main issues emerged: first, further debate on the 
Protestant ethic, which looked at the religious sources of thrift, hard work, saving and 
reinvestment; second, the corollary of this belief, i. e. that some religions (such as Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Islam) impeded economic growth; and third, either viewing religion and 
development as independent phenomena' or viewing religion as a dependent variable of 
development .4 
1 Karl Marx, quoted in Radhakrishnan, 1939: 314. 
2 Weber, 1992; Käsler, 1988. For a recent discussion of the Weber thesis, see also Landes, 1998: 174 - 
181. 
3 For example, Taft Morris and Adelman concluded that in a sample of 55 non-communist under- 
developed countries, the cross-association between religion and modernisation could not be attributed 
to interactions between religion and the socio-economic indicators (such as crude fertility rates), but 
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As a variable which lies at the core of human development, fertility too may be affected by 
non-economic factors such as religion. Religion has two main components which may 
influence fertility: first, it articulates a set of normative values of a community, which will be 
called the pure `religion effect'; and second, it is associated with other socio-economic traits 
which affect reproductive behaviour (which will be called the `characteristics' effect). 
I. Hypotheses about the impact of religion on fertility 
Chamie has argued that there are three hypotheses about why one might observe fertility 
differentials by religion. These are briefly: the `particularised theology' hypothesis, that the 
intellectual content of religion influences fertility irrespective of socio-economic and 
demographic contexts; 5 the `characteristics' hypothesis, that fertility differentials reflect 
socio-economic differences between members of religious groups; and the `minority group 
status' hypothesis, that the political and social insecurity of minority religious groups 
increases their fertility compared to the majority group. In discussing the theoretical literature 
on religion and fertility, this chapter will reduce Chamie's three hypotheses to two. The first 
is the `pure religion effect' hypothesis on fertility, and the second is the `characteristics' 
hypothesis, which reflects socio-economic differences between members of religious groups, 
but which treats minority group status as one more `characteristic' of the population. 
rather was the outcome of complex historical processes in religious configuration and socio-economic 
development, spread over many centuries. See Taft Morris and Adelman, 1980: 491-501. 
° For example, the Sarvodaya movement led by Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka provided a positive 
impetus to development. Religion and development also came into focus in Iran in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. See Nash, 1980: 555-561. More generally, on the linkages between religion and 
development see Wilber and Jameson, 1980: 467-479; Goulet, 1980: 481-489; Taft Morris and 
Adelman, 1980: 491-501. 
5 Chamie, 1977: 365-382. Chamie used the phrase 'particularised theology'. However, in keeping with 
other terminology from economics used in the present study, we use the term 'pure religion effect' to 
describe the same factor. 
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A. The `pure religion effect' hypothesis 
Real religion can exist without a definite conception of the deity but not without a 
distinction between the spiritual and the profane, ... religion generally refers to something 
external, a system of sanctions and consolations 6 
In the standard model of fertility that considers the demand for and supply of children and the 
costs of fertility limitation (such as in the classic models in Bulatao and Lee7), ideas, attitudes 
and knowledge can diffuse geographically within religious, ethnic or linguistic boundaries. 
The content of a religion comes into play because it can take positions on issues that create 
either resistance or barriers to diffusion of attitudes and knowledge. Alternatively, it may in 
fact encourage diffusion of attitudes and knowledge (e. g. through literacy). The way this 
works is that religion may epitomise `sanctions and consolations', and thereby affect 
conduct. 8 
A pure `religious effect' on fertility can operate in a number of ways. Religions often adopt 
positions on the moral acceptability of birth control and abortion. They often have norms 
about `desired' family size. Religious rituals often provide for distinct roles for children (as is 
the case with son-preference and religious roles for sons in South Asia). Religions can 
impose religious vows and practices of celibacy, either lifelong or outside marriage. Religion 
may take positions on the acceptability of contraception. And religion may encourage literacy 
in order to read the scriptures, which in turn may lead to indirect effects on fertility. 9 
A number of empirical studies have argued that Catholics show different fertility than 
Protestants and that this is due to differences in the content of their religious beliefs. 10 For 
6 Radhakrishnan, 1939: 21. 
7 Bulatao and Lee, 1983. 
s Weber, 1992: 97-98. 
9 See Gellner, 1981. In Chapter 1, Gellner discusses the effect of Islam on the spread of literacy in 
pastoral Arabian societies in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 
10 Mosher, Johnson and Horn, 1986: 367-379; Westoff and Ryder, 1977;. Westoff, 1979; Sander, 1995. 
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example, Catholic norms on contraception and family size have been thought to influence 
fertility. Janssen and Hauser argued that religion affected Catholic fertility in the United 
States. " Similarly, it is often argued that the particular philosophical content of Islam affects 
demographic behaviour. 12 
1. Islam 
Generally speaking, Islam is optimistic and transcendental, it does not favour either 
asceticism or extremes of ecstasy, but it does admit the concepts of gainful work, family 
ownership, earthly happiness and comfort. 13 
`Islamic' fertility has been the subject of many theoretical and empirical writings which have 
discussed the normative values associated with Islam and their relation to fertility. In this 
section we will discuss the main tenets of Islam and their relation to the family, drawing 
mainly on the works of Coulson and Hinchcliffe, Youssef, Qureshi, Gellner, and 
Obermeyer. 14 
a. The basic tenets and structure of Islam 
Philosophers and sociologists have argued that the content of Islam is essentially bounded by 
a written document, the Koran, and the written words of the Prophet Mohammad. 15 Gellner 
has argued that of the world's religions, `only Islam survives as a serious faith pervading both 
a folk and a Great Tradition. "6 He argues that the presentation of the written word in the 
Koran is very important in Islam and has considerable influence on human conduct and 
society. 
"Janssen, and Hauser, 1981: 511-528. 
12 Youssef, 1978: 69-99; Qureshi, 1980: 563-575; Obermeyer, 1992: 33-60. 
13 Herbert, 1965, as quoted in Uppal, 1986: 22. 
14 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 37-49; Youssef, 1978: 69-99; Qureshi, 1980: 563-575; Gellner, 
1981; Obermeyer, 1992: 33-60. 
15 Radhakrishnan, 1939; Gellner, 1981. 
16 Gellner, 1981: 4. 
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A second feature of Islam is that happiness is derived not from personal spiritual experience 
alone, but rather 
It lays an equal emphasis on the social, economic and political arrangements under 
which people live and function ... 
it envisages a personal salvation that cannot be 
sufficiently realised except through the `right' institutional arrangements. Both aspects 
require the same degree of adherence by a Muslim. So, it is as sinful for him to charge 
or pay interest on a loan as it is for him to neglect doing his five daily prayers or his 
fasting 
... 
Observing them is not merely a social duty but an act of faith in God. 17 
These institutional requirements of Islam are specified in the Sharia or Islamic law, which is 
derived from two main sources: first, the Koran, and second, the Prophet Mohammed's 
interpretations of the word of God, and their application to various situations. 18 These rulings 
are collectively termed the Sunna. The Koran and the Surma were codified over several 
centuries along with interpretations of Islam by Muslim scholars such as Ibn Taymiah and 
Ibn El Kayim who undertook the task of i'tý ihad or 'finding rules for novel situations', all of 
which collectively comprise the Sharia. However, the codification of the Sharia continued 
only until the eleventh century, which, according to Ragab, has subsequently robbed the 
Sharia of its vitality because it did not dynamically change in accordance with new situations 
which arose in later centuries. 19 As Coulson and Hinchcliffe emphasise, the 'classical 
formulation of Islamic law interpreted Quranic provisions "in the light of prevailing 
standards of tribal law". 20 For our discussion of religion and fertility, the Sharia is important 
because for devout Muslims, this 'is not merely a set of laws that affect the Muslim on some 
specific occasions, but rather, it is the keynote of his existence; his religious, political, social, 
domestic and private life is completely bound up and regulated by the precepts of the law. '21 
The Sharia was made applicable to all Muslims in India in 1937. 
17 Ragab, 1980: 517. 
18 Ragab, 1980: 513-521. 
19 Ragab, 1980: 513-521. 
20 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 38. 
21 Landau, 1958: 128. 
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Officially, Islam has no formal organisation and no church, and unlike Hinduism, in Islam the 
community of the faithful cannot be split up into `lay society' and the `extra-specially 
faithful', i. e. Islam has no concept of priesthood. 22 According to Qureshi, 'A Muslim's duty 
is to God and neither to any individual nor to any church. '23 However, Islam does possess a 
plethora of small religious groups, termed `orders' or `brotherhoods', some of which revolve 
around specific saints. There are also groups of people who dedicate their lives to the study 
of Islamic texts such as the Koran, or the performance of religious duties, and who occupy a 
position of respect among Muslims. These include the mufti (jurist), gadi (judge), maulana 
and mullah (learned men) and others, who are collectively termed the ulema, because they 
are `learned in such subjects as fiqh (jurisprudence), Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) along 
with subjects of classical learning. '24 The ulema occupy an important place in Muslim 
society and Qureshi argues that `Temporal rulers in Muslim society have generally avoided 
antagonising the ulema and instead have sought to establish a working relationship with 
them. ' 25 
Obermeyer argues that Islam gives importance to kinship structures and `the mutually 
reinforcing authoritarianism of state and family. '26 She asserts that the absence of a religious 
hierarchy in Islam enables it to embrace people in regionally very diverse contexts so that no 
effort has been made to change local laws as long as they are not in conflict with the Sharia. 
22 Gellner, 1981: 48. 
23 Qureshi, 1980: 564. 
24 Qureshi, 1980: 564. 
25 Qureshi, 1980: 564. The ulema are men learned in Islamic scriptures. It must be emphasised that they 
are not 'priests' in the traditional sense of individuals through whom members of a religion may 
communicate with God. 
26 Obermeyer, 1992: 33-60. 
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A majority of Muslims in India are Sunnis, as are a majority of the Muslim women 
interviewed in the Ramanagaram sample. 27 
How is the structure of Islam hypothesised to affect women's fertility? Coulson and 
Hinchcliffe argue that `the Ouran is ... a 
declaration of the fundamental Islamic ethic - the 
general moral terms it lays down with respect to the position of women are .. of greater 
importance than its specific legal rules. Thus, injunctions that wives should be treated fairly 
and equitably, that divorce should take place only with due consideration, and that in general 
women's rights should be respected, abound . '28 According to 
Qureshi, the Sharia deals with 
interpersonal relations and family issues. Islam is hypothesised to affect fertility directly by 
its position on the moral acceptability of birth control, and by its views on marriage, 
polygyny and divorce. 9 It is popularly believed that because Islam permits a man to take 
multiple wives, father large numbers of children and unilaterally divorce his wife, this 
collectively encourages high fertility in Islamic populations because men do not bear equally 
the cost of having to rear their own offspring. This is also the view that has been repeatedly 
put forward by Hindu right-wing political parties in the Indian sub-continent. 
b. Islam on marriage, polygyny and divorce 
Youssef argues that in the Koran all Muslim males are encouraged to marry, early and 
universal remarriage of widowed and divorced women is highly encouraged, and the purpose 
of marriage is explicitly stated to be not only procreation but the gratification of spiritual and 
physical needs'. 30 In this context, it is important to recognise that for Hindu-Muslim 
differences in widow remarriage to affect completed fertility, a precondition is that 
27 There are, of course, other Muslim sects in India such as the Shias and the Alawites. However, there 
is little difference between Shias, Sunnis and Alawites in their theological attitudes towards 
contraception and fertility. 
28 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 37-38. 
29 Qureshi, 1980: 564. 
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significant proportions of men die before their wives' fertile period ends and that remarrying 
women's babies are born after remarriage. 
Coulson and Hinchcliffe argue that in most Muslim countries, the minimum female age at 
first marriage is 18 years, but that marriages which are contracted between parties below the 
minimum age are still considered legally valid. '' They point out that though Hanafi and 
Shiite law allows women who are past puberty to contract their own marriages, all sects of 
Islam recognise the right of `marriage guardians' to arrange marriages for female infant 
wards without their prior consent. An important feature of all Islamic marriage contracts is 
the mahr, sada or dower, which is paid to the bride, or her guardian, and which constitutes 
women's right to property. The tight control of parents and guardians over the selection of 
marriage partners and strict seclusion before marriage are features of Islamic societies. 32 
Youssef argues that alternatives to marriage, such as employment, may even act as potential 
threats to the likelihood of marriage. She points out that early marriage is particularly striking 
in Libya and Pakistan where, among 15-19 year olds, three out of four girls are married. 
Coulson and Hinchcliffe argue that Islamic law does not require a husband to obtain 
permission from a court or from current wives in order to have another marriage. ss Although 
the Koran stresses that a man is urged not to take on a second wife unless he is in a position 
to treat all wives equally, the law interprets this as a matter for the man's own conscience and 
does not recommend legal intervention in this decision. Although Muslim men are permitted 
to take more than one wife, in some interpretations of Islam they can only take a second wife 
with the consent of the first wife. There is also evidence that in some Islamic countries, such 
as in parts of Malaysia and Iran, the man does need to obtain permission from the courts 
before contracting a second marriage. In Pakistan, a polygynous marriage has to obtain 
30 Youssef, 1978: 88. 
31 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 37-38. 
32 Youssef, 1978: 78. 
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sanction from an arbitration council which consists of, among others, representatives of both 
the husband and the current wife. Moreover, in many Muslim countries today, some wives 
adopt the Hanbali interpretation which allows wives to insert stipulations in their marriage 
contracts which restrict the rights of husbands to contract additional marriages, and which 
may also give Muslim women the right to work outside the home, a right they are denied 
under traditional Muslim law. 34 Obermeyer also refers to empirical evidence from the Arab 
nations that polygyny is not widespread because supporting more than one wife is costly. . 35 
Studies by Ghallab and White find that levels of polygyny are 1% in Damascus, 2% in Cairo 
and no more than 10% for all the Arab nations taken together. 36 
In India and in the Ramanagaram sample, there is little evidence of polygyny. The Census of 
1961 outlined that polygyny was highest among the tribal communities of India, and was 
practiced least by Muslims. In fact, polygyny among Hindus was found to be higher than 
among Muslims. It was estimated that in 1931-41, polygynous families in India as a 
percentage of total families was 6.8% for Hindus and 7.3% for Muslims. This percentage fell 
in 1961 to 5.1% for Hindus and to only 4.3% for Muslims. 7 This suggests that the incidence 
of polygyny is not significant for fertility behaviour in India. In the Ramanagaram sample, 
only four out of the 187 marriages were polygynous unions. Furthermore, as Obermeyer 
points out, polygynous marriages are not always more fertile than monogamous unions. 
Moreover, given the degree of female monogamy and the low degree of non-marital sexual 
activity within the religion, polygyny on its own may not necessarily raise fertility, as it 
implies that some men inevitably marry later or not at all. It may also be that the main impact 
of polygyny on fertility is expressed through women's roles. As argued below, the impact of 
Islam on fertility may be a consequence of low autonomy for women which the religion 
33 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 37-38. 
34 Youssef, 1978: 41. 
35 Obermeyer, 1992: 33-60. 
36 Ghallab, 1984: 232-24 1; White, 1978: 52-68. 
37 Indian National Social Action Forum Manual, 1994: Chapter 4. 
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encourages and which has been shown empirically to be associated with high fertility in 
Islamic populations. This is reinforced by the fact that in many poor societies children act as 
a form of social insurance and hence women achieve bargaining power within the family only 
by having many children. Thus, the extent to which Islam directly impacts on fertility by 
enforcing norms concerning marriage and polygyny, is strongly debated in the literature. 
The issue on which scholars of Islam are most unanimous, and which academics believe 
requires the most urgent reform, is the fact that Islam permits a man to divorce his wife, in 
some situations, unilaterally. As Coulson and Hinchcliffe argue, `It is a fundamental principle 
of Islamic law that the power of divorce is in the hands of the husband, and may be exercised 
at will, however blameless she (the wife) may be, without having recourse to a court of law' 
(emphasis added). 38 Although many Muslim countries do require pronouncements of divorce 
to be made in a law court, an important aspect of divorce under Islamic law even today is that 
the power to divorce remains solely in the hands of the husband, considerably weakening the 
bargaining position of the wife. 39 In addition, a divorced or widowed woman retains custody 
of any children only for a limited period after divorce, after which custody passes either to 
the father or the nearest male agnate. Even during the limited period of the mother's custody, 
the father or male agnate remains the official `guardian' of the child, reserving the right to 
control both the child's education and his or her marriage, without the mother's consent. The 
provision for unilateral divorce by the husband is an aspect of the Sharia which is particularly 
important in India, because in the late 1980s and early 1990s an issue which is at the 
38 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 42. 
39 For example, the talaq al-bida or `divorce of innovation' consists of the husband pronouncing three 
talags at a time, immediately dissolving the marriage. However, according to Coulson and Hinchcliffe 
in some Islamic countries such as Iran and South Yemen, this power of the husband to undertake such 
unilateral repudiation has been completely abolished. Also, some Islamic schools such as the Shiite 
sect Ithna 'Ashari do not recognise this form of divorce. In other forms of divorce, where the talaa may 
be pronounced over several months, there is a waiting period (called the idda), in which women are 
entitled to some maintenance. However, all responsibilities of the husband towards the wife are 
completed either with the pronouncement of the talaa or the termination of the idda. See Coulson and 
Hinchcliffe, 1978: 37-49. 
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forefront of the `communalism' phenomenon is the debate over the Muslim woman's right to 
maintenance after divorce. 
c. Islam on birth control and abortion 
Islam has traditionally been portrayed as not permitting birth control or abortion in any 
situation. However, Obermeyer challenges this view and argues that the position of Islam on 
birth control and abortion depends very much on the interpretation of the different schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 0 According to her, Islam does permit family planning, an inference 
she draws from the absence of any reference to prohibition of birth control in the Koran. 
Sunni and Shia positions on birth control are, in fact, derived from the writings of Al- 
Ghazali, a medieval Islamic theologian, who outlined five situations where birth control 
within Islam is permissible: first, if one of the partners is afflicted with a disease which may 
be passed on to children; second, if the wife is predisposed to too many closely spaced 
pregnancies; third, concern for the effect of too many pregnancies on the wife's health; 
fourth, `the husband's impecunious condition'; and, fifth, perhaps surprisingly, `concern for 
the wife's beauty. 01 Obermeyer also argues that some schools of Islamic jurisprudence do 
permit abortion. While the Malikis school prohibits abortion outright, most other schools 
permit abortion up to the time when the foetus is regarded as being `ensouled', a definition 
which varies to include the 40th, 80th or 120th day of pregnancy, depending on the school, 
after which abortion is prohibited by all schools. Moreover, these positions have been upheld 
by fatwas issued in Egypt in 1937,1953 and 1959.42 
40 Obermeyer, 1992: 33-60. 
41 Obermeyer, 1992: 43. 
42 Obermeyer, 1992. 
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d. Islam on women's status in the family, children and son-preference 
It has also been hypothesised that Islam traditionally awarded men a more prominent place 
than women within the family. Sons were given twice as large an inheritance as daughters 
and a man's testimony in court was worth twice that of a woman. Coulson and Hinchcliffe 
argue that `Quranic provisions concerning women's status and position were dissipated and 
largely lost over time. Islamic law has continued to reflect the patriarchal and patrilineal 
nature of a society based on the male agnatic tie. Within the scheme of family law which 
developed in this way, woman, whether as daughter, wife, or mother, occupied an inferior 
position. '43 Obermeyer argues that regardless of ethnic origin, women in Islamic societies in 
the past have been restricted to a lifestyle that guaranteed preservation of family honour and 
prestige. 4 Youssef has argued that in Muslim societies there are strict institutional 
mechanisms which prevent much contact between men and women. There is strict 
segregation of the sexes in schools, at work and an informal separation of the sexes in all 
recreational activities. Landes also argues that the economic implications of gender 
discrimination observed particularly in the Arab Muslim nations is serious, because it not 
only restricts the opportunities of women, but undermines the `drive to achievement of boys 
and men 45. ' However, it should also be pointed out at this stage that women were restricted 
in many ways in Christian and Hindu societies in the past as well. 
Youssef argues that one of the features of Muslim societies which tends to increase fertility is 
that Muslim women gain respect and status within their own kin group and community when 
43 Coulson and Hinchcliffe, 1978: 38. 
as However, in India, the role of the Muslim woman has not always been to observe the veil and be 
restricted to the home. As Engineer argues, there are instances in Indian history where Muslim women 
who belonged to the ruling dynasties fought and led battles on the battlefield. Among them are Gul 
Bahisht against the Raja of Jalore in the time of Alauddin Khalji; Noorjehan (the wife of Jehangir) 
whose hunting exploits included killing lions and mounting elephants, and are described in the Tuzk -i - 
Jahangiri; and Chand Khatun (also called Chand Sultana), who defended the kingdom of Ahmednagar 
against the Mughal emperor Akbar's army. For more on this, see Engineer, 1997: 12. 
45 Landes, 1998: 412. 
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they marry and have children, and that this is the only role which gives them a bargaining 
position in the social structure 46 This is because children represent a form of social insurance 
against the threat of divorce or polygamy, since women derive status from motherhood even 
when divorced or rejected for a second wife. Accordingly, `Offspring guarantee to the 
woman status and respect that extends far beyond her position in the conjugal home and 
reaches into the heart of her own family's and the community's valuation of her. Hence, we 
may expect women to continue childbearing activities throughout their reproductive years - 
whether they are happy in their marriage or not. '47 Youssef argues also that this applies to 
those women who live in modem Muslim societies as well because `In Muslim society, 
modernity is often a struggle to incorporate higher female education and occupational 
emancipation within the traditional boundaries that define roles in terms of marriage and 
motherhood, rather than an attempt to restructure relationships between the sexes in relation 
to society. '48 
Regarding the position of Islam on children, Youssef argues that pronatalist tendencies in 
Islam do not emanate from direct Koranic injunctions to procreate, but from factors within 
the wider society. 49 She argues that children are not considered the `primary values' of life in 
Islam, and that high fertility stems more from the streak of fatalism, `a strong belief in the 
active providence of God'50, and the belief that `Allah creates sexuality and determines 
procreation and barrenness. i51 Thus, the literature seems agreed that Islam involves low 
female autonomy compared with men, and that there are a number of ways in which this may 
encourage high fertility in Muslim societies. 
46 Youssef, 1978: 69-99. 
47 Youssef, 1978: 79. 
48 Youssef, 1978: 79. 
49 Although it is recognised that son preference as such has no effect on total fertility or indeed on sex 
ratios. For more on this see Dasgupta, 1993: Chapter 12*; Cassen, 1978: 54-55. 
So Youssef, 1978: 87. 
51 Youssef, 1978: 87. 
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e. Empirical evidence for the influence of Islam on fertility 
Empirically, most studies which have dealt with Islam and fertility have focused on the Arab 
countries in North Africa and West Asia, such as Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. They comprise one-quarter of the world's Muslim 
population, a total of 220 million people in 1991. Between 1950-56 and 1985-90 these 
nations collectively showed a total fertility rate of 6.9 children per woman. 52 Nagi argued that 
Arab fertility was high due to the low status of women in this region. 53 Caldwell argued that 
the influence of Islam on societal values related to women was reflected in the high 
proportion of Arab countries which he rated as being among the world's `poor health 
achievers. 54 Gallagher and Searle, and Lutz also argued that in Arab countries, religious 
factors were significantly associated with fertility, even when controlling for socio-economic 
status 55 However, Obermeyer argues that `The "fateful triangle" model that sees an 
inevitably ill-fated association between Islam, women and demographic outcomes is 
inadequate because it ignores the diversity of Islam ... such a model 
is inappropriate because 
it is inattentive to the contradiction between norms and behaviour, and to ambiguities within 
'56 the normative structure of a society. 
In this section we have examined the content of Islam in general and then looked at its 
position on marriage and polygyny, birth control and abortion, role for children and women's 
status in the family. We have also considered empirical studies of Islam and fertility. The 
arguments do not appear to provide unambiguous support for the `traditional' view of Islam 
and fertility (according to which Islam fosters high fertility because of polygamy and 
unilateral divorce). However, there seems to be some persuasive evidence that the content of 
52 World Bank, 1991; Farid, 1987; Omran, 1980. 
53 Nagi, 1984: 189-204. 
54 Caldwell, 1986: 171-220. 
55 Gallagher and Searle, 1983; Lutz, 1983: 15-35. 
56 Obermeyer, 1992: 50. 
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the Islamic religion encourages high fertility because of low autonomy for women and son- 
preference. However, it is not clear whether this is any different from the effect on fertility of 
the content of other religions, such as Hinduism. One way of assessing the extent to which 
the theological content of Islam is likely to be playing a role in the social and demographic 
situation of Islamic societies is to compare and contrast it with the content of Hinduism. 
2. Hinduism 
Hinduism, like the curate's egg, is good only in parts. It is admirable and abhorrent, 
saintly and savage, beautifully wise and dangerously silly, generous beyond measure 
and mean beyond all example 57 
Hinduism is a difficult religion to analyse because of its diversity of gods, sects, philosophies 
and cults. In order to draw out the main tenets of Hinduism that are relevant to our 
discussion, we will rely on a philosophical articulation of the `Hindu view of life'. 58 
a. The basic tenets and structure of Hinduism 
Unlike in the case of Islam, there is no one religious book which contains all the teachings of 
Hinduism. However, there is a large number of writings and scriptures which put forward 
Hindu beliefs. These include the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the epic 
poems Ramayana and Mahabharata. 
Philosophically, the main religious experience of Hinduism is the common quest for salvation 
(moksha) of the human soul, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the infinite real self 
(aatman and the finite or empirical body na . The gap is bridged when the empirical self 
( una is disciplined to tread the path of righteousness (dharma). Until that point, the 
57 Radhakrishnan, 1939: 338. 
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empirical self is believed to follow a cycle of births, with life in each birth determined by the 
actions karma in the past birth and in the present. 
However, in this common quest, Hinduism does not preach asceticism. Rather, it exhorts 
followers to engage in `worldly' activities, but to do so in a detached manner. Thus, 
Hinduism lays out a `code of conduct' for the individual, particularly in relation to the 
society in which he/she lives, in order to achieve the religious goals of changing `body into 
soul, to discover the world's potentiality for virtue, and derive happiness from it 
(lokasam rg aha)'. 59 In essence, this Hindu conception of a `code of conduct' is similar to the 
way in which Islam prescribes a `way of life' for its followers. 
The Hindu code of conduct encapsulates the fourfold objects of life, the fourfold succession 
of the stages of life, and the fourfold ordering of society as follows. The fourfold objects of 
life (urusartha are desire and enjoyment kama , 
interest artha ), ethicaliving dharma , 
and spiritual freedom moksha . In order to achieve these, the 
individual has to progress 
through four stages aasrama : student (brahmachari), householder rihastha , forest recluse 
(vanaprastha), and the free suprasocial man sann asin . 
However, individuals are organised 
within society into a fourfold order varna : `the man of learning brahmin , the man of 
power kshatri a, the man of skilled productivity vais a and the man of service (sudra . 
'60 
The spirit behind this fourfold order is essentially that learning, power, skills and service are 
the indispensable elements of any social order. Moreover, this scheme is meant to provide a 
framework for guidance for the individual, with an emphasis on conduct (karma) rather than 
belief bhakti , but strictly within a social context. Thus, while the theory of varna 
emphasises the social aspects, the theory of aasrama dwells on the individual. The 
implications for fertility of this ordering of society and caste endogamy is that social mobility 
58 T_-jL_I__"_L____ lhrl"1_ 1hA'l_T_M__I_ "1 . "..... . -. . .- -n ". n 
lcaunaxnsnnan, iyc/; rcaurraKllsnnan, 11'f/; naunaKrlsnnan, 1y-iy; liopal, lyöy: /J-/z5. 
" Radhakrishnan, 1939: 353. 
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of the individual may be dependent on caste mobility, with fertility influenced by the norms 
of the caste, or by the restricted socio-economic opportunities of certain castes. 
b. Hinduism on marriage, polygamy and divorce 
In a discussion of Hinduism and its impact on fertility, the grihasthaasrama (or householder) 
stage of the `Hindu view of life' is particularly relevant. Similar to the Koranic position on 
marriage, Hindus are encouraged to enter married life. 1 Moreover, marriage is important in 
Hinduism. 62 This is indicated by the fact that the Hindu gods are always depicted as being 
married (unlike the cases of Christianity and Islam), and that no god in the Hindu pantheon is 
ever depicted in a temple or other place of worship without at least one consort, which in 
itself may provide evidence for the sanction of polygyny. However, the perfect marriage, 
which is repeatedly idealised in the Hindu scriptures, is the monogamous one, epitomised by 
the relationship between the gods Rama and Sita or Savitri and Satyavan, where both stand 
by each other through various trials. Polygyny was tolerated in the Hindu scriptures as well, 
but only in the absence of male offspring. 63 The religious epic poem Ramayana does in fact 
highlight the evils of polygamy. 64 Polygyny became illegal for Hindus in India in 1955 with 
the Hindu Marriage Act legislation. Moreover, in scriptural Hinduism, the indissolubility of 
marriage is the ideal, but in certain circumstances, divorce is permitted. As Kautilya argues in 
the Arthasastra, `if the husband is of bad character, or is long gone abroad, or is guilty of high 
60 Radhakrishnan, 1939: 351. The earliest reference to these four classes is found in the Purusa sukta 
verse in the RR Veda. 
61 Radhakrishnan, 1939: 379. The Hindu scriptures outline eight different forms of marriage - aip sacs, 
rakshasa, asura, gandharva, arsa, daiva, prajapatya and brahma. For more on this, see Radhakrishnan, 
1947: 165. 
62 For example, the Nitimaniari argues that 'Home is not what is made of wood and stone; but where a 
wife is, there is a home. ' See Radhakrishnan, 1947: 149. 
63 This may be construed as an indication of son-preference, which is dealt with in a subsequent section. 
64 For more on this, see Radhakrishnan, 1927: 61. 
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treason, or is dangerous to his wife, or has become an outcast, or has lost virility, he may be 
abandoned by his wife. '65 
c. Hinduism on birth control and abortion 
Hinduism does not explicitly say anything about limiting births. Abortion and the decision to 
use contraception are regarded as women's personal matters which are not within the 
purview of religious injunction. One explanation for this may be the notions of `purity and 
pollution' in Hinduism, which are strictly upheld in the day-to-day practice of traditional 
Hinduism. For example, matters pertaining to the reproductive functions of women, such as 
menstruation or childbirth, are viewed as making women temporarily `impure' 
66 In scriptural 
Hinduism, the only reference to the control of births is indirect, in the context of norms about 
abstinence. For example, Vyasa argues that, `He [the householder] should avoid intercourse 
with his wife when she is old or barren or ill-behaved, when her children die or when she has 
not yet attained maturity, when she gives birth to daughters only or has many sons. '67 Thus, 
strict notions of `purity and pollution' may be one reason why abortion and birth control 
issues are not specifically addressed in the Hindu scriptures. In contrast, the role for children 
and the importance of the family ideal are repeatedly stressed. 
d. Hinduism on women's status in the family, children and son-preference 
In Hinduism, the role of women in the family is considered very important. As 
Radhakrishnan argues, the `general Hindu view of woman is an exalted one - it regards the 
woman as the helpmate of man in all his work: sahadharmini. ' He cites Sayana, a 
65 Arthasastra: 111.3, as quoted by Radhakrishnan, 1947: 181-182. 
66 This is reflected in the Hindu custom that no members of a family in which a birth has just taken 
place are allowed to visit a temple or to engage in auspicious religious occasions such as weddings, 
from a minimum of ten to a maximum of up to forty days after the birth. This is also true of deaths, 
though the period of mourning extends for one whole year. 
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commentator on the Veda, who said that `The wife and the husband, being the equal 
halves of one substance, are equal in every respect; both should join and take equal part in all 
work, religious and secular'(emphasis added)68. In one form, the god Shiva is androgynously 
depicted as ardhanarisvara, (half-man and half-woman), emphasising the importance of the 
masculine and the feminine in the Hindu faith. 
Women's position in the family in Hinduism is slightly different to women's position in 
Islam. In scriptural Hinduism, women are regarded as being equal to men within the family to 
a greater extent than is the case in scriptural Islam. However, as in the case of Islam, for 
devout Hindus establishing a household is considered a fundamental duty. On the position of 
women in the family, and the functions of the householder as a step towards spiritual growth, 
Hindu thought essentially argues that `The wife has an equal position with the husband in all 
domestic and religious concerns ... 
Every woman has. a right to marry and have a home. '69 
It is interesting that when compared with Islam, where the role for women was mainly to 
`uphold family honour', the role for women in Hinduism is much more clearly defined to be 
`equal in every respect'. However, though Radhakrishnan does not explicitly comment on 
this, the Hindu scriptures mainly see the woman only in relation to the man, and give her an 
`equal', `exalted position', as a `helpmate' only within marriage and the family. It is 
important to note that though women are not considered inferior to men within the family in 
Hinduism (unlike in the case of Islam), there are few independent roles assigned to them 
outside the domestic sphere. 
A separate issue that can be important in some contexts but which is not relevant to the 
present study is that of women's rights to land. Traditionally, the Hindu law of land 
67 As quoted by Radhakrishnan, 1947: 189. 
68 Radhakrishnan, 1927: 61. 
69 Radhakrishnan, 1939: 379. 
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inheritance implies that women cannot inherit land. Furthermore, as Agarwal argues, even in 
parts of India which have established rights in land, women may not exercise effective 
control over land, even when they own it. 0 This question is not pursued further in the present 
study because there was no variation across women in Ramanagaram with respect to land 
ownership rights and hence this factor cannot account for differences in their demographic 
behaviour. 
The lack of independent roles assigned to women outside the home is justified by the Hindu 
scriptures using notions of women's supreme `self-sacrifice' of which they are seen as being 
more capable than men. 7 ' The Hindu scriptures also put forward the view that because child- 
rearing takes up parental time, women need not be `burdened' by having to work outside the 
home in order to shoulder the economic responsibilities of the family, but that the latter is to 
be undertaken by men: `While man has to take to worldly pursuits (yajnapradhanya), woman 
is capable of self-control and self-denial (tapahpradhanya). '72 It must be noted here that this 
essentially religious notion of `women's self-sacrificing nature' is reflected, even today, in 
the unequal distribution of food and health-care allocations between men and women, sons 
and daughters, high birth-order and low birth-order children, which many economists and 
others have observed in analysing intra-household resource allocation in rural households in 
India 73 It is thus easy to see that as far as the content of Hinduism is concerned, women 
appear to be unequally `equal', and that their consequent lack of autonomy may have 
implications for fertility. 
70 Agarwal, 1994. 
71 This is similar to ideas of women's ability to sacrifice for the family in Victorian England. See 
McNay, Humphries and Klasen, 1997. 
72 Radhakrishnan, 1927: 61. 
73 Dasgupta, 1993a: 343-370. Although it is important to note that some evidence suggests that intra- 
household nutritional discrimination against women is confined to parts of north India. See Harriss, 
1990. 
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This is reinforced by the great emphasis in Hindu philosophy on children and especially the 
role for surviving sons. 74 In Hinduism, marriage is `prescribed for the development of the 
personality as well as continuance of the family ideal ... At the end of the 
Sraddha 
ceremony the performer asks, "Let me, 0 fathers, have a hero for a son! "' 75 A common 
Vedic blessing for newly-married Hindu women is `May you be the mother of a hundred 
sons'. The Mysore Population Study described one of the traditional Vedic blessings for 
married women popularly used in Karnataka `May she bear ten sons, and make of her 
husband an eleventh! '76, which is a good example of how the `pure religion effect' may have 
operated to encourage high fertility in traditional Hindu societies in the past. Thus, 
philosophically, the emphasis of Hinduism on marriage and having children (especially sons), 
may provide a purely religious motive for high fertility. 
e. Empirical evidence for the influence of Hinduism on fertility 
Empirical evidence for the impact of the Hindu religion on fertility is scarce. The Mysore 
Population Study noted differences in fertility by religion in erstwhile Mysore state. In its in- 
depth study of attitudes towards family size, it concluded that Hindu religious traditions in 
Indian society favoured having many offspring 77 This study also showed that after childbirth, 
Hindu women spent on average, a 53-week interval away from their husbands in their 
parents' home, and that this was connected with Hindu religious beliefs about women's 
`purity and pollution' after childbirth, while Muslim women stayed away from their husbands 
74 For example, `The Hindu scriptures speak of the three debts we have to pay: to the rishis by Vedic 
study, to the gods by sacrifices, and to the ancestors by offspring. ' See Radhakrishnan, 1947: 150-15 1. 
75 Radhakrishnan, 1927: 59-60. 
76 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 130. 
77 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 130-156. 
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for an average of only 28 weeks. 78 The study argued that this may have explained higher 
fertility among Muslims than Hindus in Mysore state at that time. 79 
3. Islam and Hinduism compared 
A cursory look at the philosophical content of Islam and Hinduism suggests significant 
dissimilarities: a monotheistic Islam with a closed line of Prophets versus a polytheistic 
Hinduism with a pantheon which is continually admitting new deities; an egalitarian view of 
the ordering of society versus the socially structured hierarchy of caste; the creation of one 
mind versus the amalgamation of diverse beliefs and philosophies; the Islamic emphasis on a 
`common creed', the Hindu experience of the `common quest'. 
However, a more detailed look at the main tenets of Islam and Hinduism, in the specific 
context of religion and fertility, suggests significant similarities between the two religions, 
especially with regard to their positions on marriage and the value of children. Essentially, 
both Hinduism and Islam view religion similarly: in Islam as a way of life, in Hinduism as an 
experience which prescribes a code of conduct. Second, both religions espouse a degree of 
fatalism and put a high value on asceticism and/or renunciation as the true path to spiritual 
growth. Thirdly, though in theory neither religion has a `church' or a `priesthood', both 
religions have evolved classes of people (the religious up ndits of Hinduism and the ulema of 
Islam) who dedicate themselves to interpreting religious scriptures and applying them to real- 
life situations. More particularly, in India there is a caste system among Muslims with the 
same rigidity of endogamy as that found among Hindu castes. Fourth, scripturally, the 
position of women in these two religions is similar. In the case of Islam, though women are 
assigned a lower status than men, women are expected to `uphold family honour and 
prestige'. In the Hindu scriptures, women have an `exalted and equal' position, but only in 
78 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 137. 
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the domestic sphere. Moreover, neither religion assigns an independent role for women 
outside the family. Fifth, both religions emphasise the importance of marriage and actively 
encourage it. Sixth, both religions set great store by children as a way of glorifying the family 
ideal, especially emphasising the role of sons in continuing the lineage. Perhaps where the 
two religions do differ most is in terms of their attitude to birth control and abortion. 
Hinduism does not explicitly express any religious opinion (at least scripturally) for or 
against birth control or abortion. Indeed, Hindu concepts of `impurity' may reduce fertility if 
they lead to longer sexual abstinence during menstruation and after childbirth. In contrast, 
various schools of Islamic thought have argued that birth control is permissible but only in 
restricted situations. However, this is subject to wide variation, leaving considerable room for 
alternative interpretations of what Islam does say on these matters at a practical level. 
Finally, it must be understood that in countries such as India, there is a `meeting of religions', 
and a pruning of Islam's more dogmatic aspects, where the Shia Muslim sect is closer to 
Hinduism than the Sunni sect, and Muslim sects such as the Khojas have tenets which are a 
mixture of Vaishnava and Shia doctrines. 80 This `meeting of religions' is best seen in Islam 
which, `borrowed its idea of Messiah from Judaism, its dogmatism and asceticism from 
Christianity, its philosophy from Greece, and its mysticism from India and Alexandria. '81 
Moreover, Sufiism is similar to the Advaita Vedanta, with Sufis abstaining from meat and 
believing in reincarnation, like orthodox Hindus. 
Thus, despite the theologically different points of the spectrum from which Islam and 
Hinduism emerge, there appear to be some significant similarities, at least in terms of their 
beliefs about the influence of religion on conduct, and their positions on the importance of 
marriage and the family. In terms of content alone, both religions would appear to foster high 
79 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 119-120; see also Chandrasekaran, 1952. 
80 For example, the Khojas believe that one of their Prophets is the tenth incarnation of Vishnu. 81 Radhakrishnan, 1939: 339. 
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fertility, with little practical difference between the two. This is not meant to imply that the 
content of these two religions does not or cannot affect demographic outcomes. Rather, this 
suggests that any differences between Hindu fertility and Muslim fertility is more likely to be 
the result of different interpretations and differing degrees of adherence to religious precepts 
by individual Hindus or Muslims in real-life situations. It must be noted also that this is 
influenced by the institutions through which these religions operate: for example, in matters 
relating to birth control or abortion, the ulema are in a position to interpret Islam for 
followers, whereas in the case of Hinduism, the lack of explicit scriptural injunctions may 
mean that priests are not consulted on these matters. This difference in the role of religious 
institutions in influencing decisions about contraception was clearly evident in 
Ramanagaram, in an interview with the local mullah, who was educated in a madrasa in 
Bihar, and who was personally opposed to family planning. He said clearly that he would not 
advocate birth control or abortion (and, in fact preached against it) to the townspeople 
because it was against the tenets of Islam. On the other hand, the two Hindu priests 
interviewed said that they were not consulted about personal matters such as birth control; 
and that they were usually approached by the townspeople only if a family member was 
suffering a grave illness. 
B. The `characteristics' hypothesis 
A second, and distinct, view of how religion may affect fertility is the `characteristics 
hypothesis'. This hypothesis argues that fertility differentials between populations reflect 
socio-economic differences between members of different religious groups. 82 It is thus 
possible that the fertility of one religious community may differ significantly from that of 
another, but for reasons other than the philosophical content of religion, such as differences 
in income or educational levels. In addition, there are situations in which both the `theology' 
82 Riccio, 1979: 199-228. 
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and the `characteristics' mechanisms may work in combination. For example, religion may 
act to discourage investment in `child quality' if it translates into low autonomy or status for 
women. This is partly the pure religion effect in operation, but it might work through a 
`characteristics' effect as well. 
One important characteristic of a religious community may be its minority group status. It is 
hypothesised that fertility for a minority community may be higher if it feels threatened by 
the majority community in political, economic or social spheres. 83 This is also likely if 
identification with a religious organisation can be used for economic gain and rent-seeking 
activities. This is particularly relevant in countries such as India where religion has been used 
in the past as a means of gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the state in order to corner some 
portion of the gains from development. For example, at the level of local government 
institutions, election to political office in religiously segmented populations (such as in 
Ramanagaram) depends not merely on economic affluence and high social status but also on 
numerical preponderance. A second example is that members of particular religions may be 
prevented from engaging in certain occupations. Thirdly, there may be differential access to 
education or types of educational system for those belonging to different religions. 
Empirical evidence for the `characteristics' hypothesis is widespread. As with the `pure 
religion effect' hypothesis, this literature focuses on differences in fertility between Catholics 
and others, or Muslims and others. Empirical evidence for the `pure religion effect' 
hypothesis is found in studies that consider the demographic experience of Catholics and 
Protestants in the Unites States and Australia. It has been argued that from the 1940s to the 
1960s in the United States, white Catholic couples consistently had more children than white 
83 Van Heek, 1966: 125-138; Stinner and Mader, 1975: 53-59. 
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Protestant couples, even after controlling for socio-economic factors such as education . 
114 
Using data from the 1973 Social Mobility Survey in Australia, Miller argued that Catholics 
had larger families than did people who belonged to other denominations. RS Other 
multivariate analyses of Catholic samples which have found a positive association between 
religion, devoutness and high fertility are Westoff and Ryder, Mosher and Hendershot, and 
Sander. 86 
Other studies of Catholic-Protestant differentials have emphasised socio-economic factors in 
accounting for differences. These factors include education, occupation and residence. 
Galloway, Hammel and Lee argued that in Prussia between 1875 and 1910, while religion 
was an important indicator of fertility level, loss of religion contributed little to fertility 
decline. 87 Golde's cross-sectional study in 1971 of two neighbouring Catholic and Protestant 
villages in Baden-Württemberg in Germany suggested that Protestantism, by stressing 
literacy for religious reasons, enabled Protestant farmers to read technical agricultural 
journals, leading to earlier mechanisation than among the Catholics, a decline in children's 
labour value and hence a diminished incentive to have high fertility 88 
One main concern in the debates on Catholic/non-Catholic fertility in the context of the 
`characteristics hypothesis' has been the increasing divergence between Catholics and non- 
Catholics between 1945 and the mid-1960s, followed by more rapid convergence during the 
1970s. 89 Westoff and Jones, in a study of white women in intact first marriages in the USA in 
84 There are very few studies using economics methods which explicitly consider religion in models of 
fertility. The few which have done so include Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985: 992-1015; Boulier and 
Rosenzweig, 1978: 487-497; Sander, 1995: Chapter 4. 
85 Miller, 1988: 65-79. 
86 Westoff and Ryder, 1977; Mosher and Hendershot, 1984: 671-677; Sander, 1995. 
87 Galloway, Hammel and Lee, 1994: 135-158. 
88 Golde, 1975. This is relevant to India as well, where some upper caste Hindus had access, initially, to 
religious education, and then to western scientific education more easily than others. 
89 Westoff and Jones, 1979: 209-217; Westoff and Ryder, 1977: 431-453; Janssen and Hauser, 1981: 
511-528; Mosher and Hendershot, 1984: 671-677; Blake 1984: 329-340. 
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the 1960s and 1970s, attributed this pattern of divergence and convergence to five factors. 90 
The divergence was caused by social, economic and residential differentiation between 
Catholics and other Americans; by strong minority group feelings among the Catholics; by a 
tendency of Catholic schools and institutions to contribute to minority group consciousness; 
and by church sanctions against contraceptive use. The subsequent convergence in the late 
1960s and the 1970s was caused by secular forces, such as the rejection of. church teaching 
on birth control, the great increase in the proportion of Catholics in the middle class, and the 
suburbanisation of Catholics. Another study, by Mosher and Hendershot, of white women in 
the USA found that while the fertility of Catholics and non-Catholics was converging, the 
differential was larger than that found by Westoff and Jones9' 
Evidence for the `characteristics hypothesis' is also to be found in studies of Islamic 
populations. In one of the few studies which considered religion by sectarian denomination, 
Chamie conducted a study of five religious groups in Lebanon. 92 These were Shia Muslims, 
Sunni Muslims, Druze Muslims, Catholic and non-Catholic Christians. The total fertility 
rates for these groups varied from 6.5 to 3.3. Chamie pointed out that within the Muslim 
community there was wide variation, and that Druze Muslims had similar fertility to the non- 
Catholic Christians. He also concluded that religious differentials in fertility were only 
significant at low levels of the wife's education, so that religion is an important characteristic 
in differentiating fertility behaviour only at certain socio-economic levels. Though this study 
provides support for the characteristics hypothesis, more importantly, it illustrates that there 
may be an interaction between the `pure religion effect' and the `characteristics' effect. As 
observed above, the experience of the Arab countries supports both the `characteristics' 
hypothesis and, to some extent, the `particularised theology' hypothesis. 
90 Westoff and Jones, 1979: 209-217. 
91 Mosher and Hendershot, 1984: 185-191. The differences in the Mosher and Hendershot analysis is 
probably due to the inclusion of Hispanic women who are mainly Catholic. 
92 Chamie, 1977: 365-382. 
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There are also a number of empirical studies which support the hypothesis that minority 
group consciousness is an important `characteristic' which affects fertility. Van Heek and 
Day argued that Roman Catholic fertility was observed to be higher than Protestant fertility 
only in areas where Catholics believed they were being threatened by Protestant 
domination.; Stinner and Mader studied family planning in two Muslim populations in the 
Philippines . 
94 One research area was 94% Muslim, the other was only 20-35% Muslim. 
Stinner and Mader discovered that family planning was more popular in the area having a 
higher proportion of Muslims. Another study by Heer and Youssef compared demographic 
indicators for six predominantly Islamic republics of the former USSR with the non-Islamic 
nationalities 95 They found that ideal family size in 1975 for the Islamic nationalities was 
6.05 while the expected number of children was 6.24. For the non-Islamic nationalities, the 
corresponding figures were 2.68 and 2.16. These authors also argued that economic 
development may have increased Islamic fertility, with the minority status argument 
exacerbating the situation, because Marxist ideology was at variance with Islamic ideology. 96 
Evidence for the characteristic of `minority group consciousness' is also found in the case of 
Sri Lanka in the 1960s, where there was latent Buddhist opposition to contraception. Ling 
has argued that this was the result of heightened Sinhalese-Tamil conflicts, in which the 
ethnic and cultural identities of both groups were perceived as being threatened. 97 Ling found 
that in the 1960s, Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka were conducting a vigorous campaign against 
contraception on the grounds that it would substantially reduce the Sinhalese population 
relative to Tamil Hindus and Muslims. 
93 Van Heck, 1966: 125-138; Day, 1968: 27-50. 
94 Stinner and Mader, 1975: 53-59. 
95 Heer and Youssef, 1977: 155-173. 
96 This is similar to the argument that economic development has direct effects encouraging fertility and 
indirect effects which discourage it. See Heer and Turner, 1965: 279-292; Heer, 1966: 423-444. 
97 Ling, 1980: 581. 
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In conclusion, both the `particularised theology' hypothesis and the `characteristics' 
hypothesis suggest that differences in fertility by religion reflect the influence of organised 
religion on fertility. The `pure religion effect' operates through the religion's norm-enforcing 
abilities and its ability to impose sanctions. However, differences in fertility by religion may 
merely reflect differences in the socio-economic characteristics of a religion's members. 
Among these characteristics, a particularly important one may be minority group 
consciousness. Empirical evidence for both these hypotheses has been mainly observed from 
(though not restricted to) fertility differentials between Catholics and non-Catholics, and 
those between Muslims and non-Muslims. This empirical literature has suggested that over 
time, as identities become less distinctive and the economy develops, there is convergence in 
fertility between religious communities. For example, some countries, such as Malaysia and 
Indonesia (and more recently Bangladesh) - all Islamic countries by political orientation - 
have witnessed declines in their total fertility rates. However, it should be pointed out that 
Malaysia and Indonesia are not wholly Muslim in terms of population, and that family 
planning may be more readily available in these countries, either due to the needs of the other 
religious populations or due to government efforts 98 This illustrates the way in which the 
effect of religion is heavily dependent on its being supported (or opposed or counteracted) by 
other institutions such as the state. This implies that though we need to consider the norm- 
enforcing strength of religion, we must also look towards its ability to interact with social 
arrangements and other institutions in society over time. 
Finally, it is necessary to examine briefly trends in fertility over time by religion in India as a 
whole and in Karnataka state in order to see if there is empirical evidence from India 
supporting either the characteristics hypothesis or the pure religion hypothesis. In 1995, 
98 Cleland, 1993: 345-352. 
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Census data on religion were published by the Government of India. These data provided 
statistics on selected demographic indices by religion, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Selected demographic indices by religion for India (1995) 
Religion Total Sex ratio % of total % of total % decadal % decadal Urban % of urban % of total 
population (females population population growth rate growth rate population population urban 
pre 1000 (1981) (1991)" (1971.81)+ (1981-91)r to total population 
males) population 
Hindu 687.6 925 82.63 82.00 24.14 22.78 164.7 24.0 76.35 
Muslim 101.5 930 11.36 12.12 30.69 32.76 36.0 35.5 16.70 
Christian 19.6 994 2.43 2.34 16.83 16.89 6.1 31.1 2.85 
Sikh 16.3 888 1.96 1.94 26.15 25.48 3.8 23.3 1.75 
Buddhist 6.3 952 0.71 0.76 22.52 35.98 2.3 36.5 1.05 
Jain 3.3 946 0.48 0.40 23.17 4.42 2.4 72.7 1.09 
Others --0.42 0.38 26.61 13.19 --- 
Religion --0.01 0.05 66.88 573.46 --- 
not stated 
*Excludes figures of Jammu and Kashmir where the Census was not held 
+Excludes figures of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir 
(Source: Census of India 1991, Paper 1 of 1995 on Religion) 
The data show that while the decadal growth rate of population increased for the Muslims 
between the 1970s and 1980s, it has decreased for the Hindus and remained constant for the 
Christians. However, the proportion of the population belonging to different religions 
remained almost unchanged between 1981 and 1991. 
In this context, it is also useful to examine data taken from the 1991 Census on the 
distribution of the population by religion among the Indian states, which is shown in Table 2. 
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The table shows that over the 1981-91 period, Hindu fertility has grown less than Muslim 
fertility in states where Hindus predominate. However, in states where Muslims predominate, 
Muslim fertility has grown less than Hindu fertility. 
It is instructive to compare these figures with those for Karnataka, shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Distribution of population by religion, Karnataka state (1991) 
Religion % of total population % of total population % decadal % decadal 
(1981) (1991) increase increase 
(1971-81) (1981-91) 
Hindu 85.77 85.45 25.74 20.66 
Muslim 11.21 11.64 33.74 25.71 
Christian 2.08 1.91 26.18 11.12 
Sikh 0.02 0.02 -6.28 57.80 
Buddhist 0.11 0.16 198.83 72.81 
Jain 0.77 0.73 29.99 14.62 
Other religions 0.04 0.01 32.95 -50.97 
Religion not stated 0.00 0.08 375.82 8242.03 
(Source: 1981 Census and 1991 Census of India, Paper 1 of 1995 on Religion 
Hindus are the majority religious community in Karnataka to an even greater extent than in 
India as a whole. Although the proportions of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists 
remained more or less constant between 1981 and 1991, there was a fall in the proportion of 
Christians. Compared to 1971-81, decadal growth rates have fallen for all religious 
communities in Karnataka except the Sikhs. This is consistent with the general decline in 
fertility figures for the state as a whole. 
Finally, we can compare these figures with those for Bangalore rural district, in which 
Ramanagaram is located, shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Distribution of population by religion, Bangalore rural district (1991) 
Religion Total % of total Total urban % of total Total rural % of total 
population population population urban population rural 
population population 
Hindu 1520520 90.88 218281 71.97 1302239 95.06 
Muslim 144337 8.63 81656 26.92 62681 4.58 
Christian 6559 0.39 2429 0.80 4130 0.30 
Jain 1147 0.07 779 0.26 368 0.03 
Buddhist 24 0.001 8 0.003 14 0.001 
Sikh 197 0.01 85 0.03 112 0.008 
Others 47 0.003 47 0.02 0 0.00 
Religion not stated 365 0.022 1 0.0003 364 0.03 
Total 1673196 100 303286 100 1369908 100 
(Source: 1991 Census of India, Paper I of 1995 on Religion 
Hindus are the majority community, forming over 90% of the population in the district. 
Minority communities such as the Muslims and Christians form a greater proportion of the 
urban population than the rural population of Bangalore rural district. In particular, the 
Muslims make up nearly 27% of the urban population, but less than 5% of the rural 
population. 
It is instructive to compare these findings with those presented by the Mysore Population 
Study conducted by the United Nations in 1961.99 That study found that for Mysore state as a 
whole in 1961, the crude birth rate was 40 per 1000, the crude death rate was 18 per 1000, 
and the rate of natural increase was 22 per 1000.100 At the time this was well above world 
averages, and very high in comparison with India as a whole, a fact attributable mainly to the 
very low death rate at the time. 10' The total number of children ever born in the category 
`towns', under which Ramanagaram was included, was 3.9.102 Average family size for 
women over 45 in that survey was 5.6 for women in `towns', 6.7 for Muslims and 5.2 for 
Hindus. 103 The study attributed this difference to the shorter periods of sexual separation after 
childbirth between husbands and wives for Muslims compared with Hindus, and to taboos on 
99 Mysore Population Study, 1961. 
100 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 78. 
101 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 78. 
102 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 110-111. 
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sexual relations for prolonged periods during lactation for Hindus, and abstinence on a larger 
number of religious days for Hindus, which were widely observed in the local population. 104 
The study observed that `the relatively high percentage of Muslims in the towns is a factor 
tending to raise the average number of children there'. 105 The study found that the non- 
backward castes showed slightly higher fertility (4.0) than the scheduled castes (3.3) and the 
backward castes (3.1). 106 
More recently, the National Family Health Survey calculated the total fertility rates and mean 
number of children ever born for women aged 40-49 for the three years preceding the survey, 
and reported their results by religion. 107 The figures for Karnataka are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Total fertility rate and children ever born, Karnataka (1992-93) 
Religion Total fertility rate (for women Mean number of children Total wanted fertility rate 
aged 15-49 years) ever born to women aged 40- 
49 years 
Hindu 2.73 4.57 2.10 
Muslim 3.91 5.82 2.88 
Christian 2.25 (3.50) 1.98 
Other (1.54) * (0.92) 
Total 2.85 4.65 
() rate based on 125-249 person-years of exposure and mean based on 29-45 cases 
* mean not shown, based on less than 25 cases 
(Source: Compiled from the National Family Health Survey 1992-93, Karnataka, 1995: Table 5.2: 62 
and Table 7.9: 126. ) 
The differences in fertility by religion are very large. In terms both of current fertility and of 
cohort fertility, Muslims appear to have the highest fertility of any religious group, followed 
by the Hindus. The difference is one child per woman, on average. More recent estimates 
from the Human Development Report of 1999 also suggest that the total fertility rate for 
ever-married Hindu women in Karnataka is 2.3 while that for ever-married Muslim women is 
103 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 119-120. 
104 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 120. 
los Mysore Population Study, 1961: 120. 
106 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 120-121. 
107 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 62-63. 
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3.9.108 The difference between the total `wanted' fertility rate (a concept discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 below) and the total fertility rate is greatest for Muslim women, at one child on 
average. The available demographic indices for India as a whole and Karnataka in particular 
therefore suggest considerable differences between religious groups, especially between 
Hindus and Muslims. 
A review of the literature suggests that it would be desirable to have more quantitative 
studies of the impact of Islam on fertility. This is an important area for future research and is 
particularly relevant for comparing the impact on fertility of Islam and of Hinduism. One of 
the earliest anthropological studies which looked at fertility issues at the micro-level, and still 
one of the very few studies to do so, was that conducted by Dandekar in 1959 in six rural 
communities in the state of Maharashtra in western India. 109 Yet, even though this study was 
conducted in a population having members belonging to different religions, it not only failed 
to place any emphasis on the issue of religious differentials in fertility, but hardly mentioned 
religion at all. Instead, it simply examined the use of contraception in the villages, and 
investigated how it was related to fertility outcomes. Modem sociological analyses of 
religion and fertility in the Indian context have used religion mainly as a means of 
categorising the population than as an explanatory variable. Almost none have used 
multivariate analysis. An outstanding example, and therefore one of the most valuable studies 
of religious differences in fertility, is that conducted by Jeffery and Jeffery in north India, a 
study discussed in detail in Chapter 4.110 It is partly these exogenous gaps in the existing 
literature - the paucity of micro-studies, of quantitative data, and of those using multivariate 
analysis - that has led the present study to seek to combine a multivariate analysis of religion 
and fertility with an anthropological exploration of the qualitative factors that affect religion 
and fertility in south India today. 
1°S Shariff, 1999. 
109 Dandekar, 1959. 
110 Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997. 
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In the debate about the relationship between religion and fertility, there seem to me to be four 
basic questions. First, should the observed higher fertility of minority communities (mainly 
Muslim) in India be attributed to socio-economic characteristics or to theological beliefs? " 
Does the frequency or intensity of religious observance influence fertility? How does 
women's status vary across religions and is this significant for fertility? Finally, might 
`convergence' between religious groups (as in the case of Catholic and non-Catholic fertility 
in the 1970s in the USA) take place in any society? In the present study, an attempt is made 
to answer these questions by examining attitudes towards religion, religious observance and 
their effect on nuptiality, contraceptive choice and fertility in the taluk of Ramanagaram in 
southern Karnataka. 
"' Mandelbaum, 1974: 46. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Ramanagaram: Mythical Origins, Present-Day Realities 
The town of Ramanagaram, lying on the Bangalore-Mysore highway in the south Indian state 
of Karnataka, is named from the hill that partly surrounds the town, called Ramagiri (see 
Maps 1 and 3). Popular myth explains that when the Hindu god Rama was banished from his 
kingdom in Ayodhya, and wandered in the forests of the Deccan for 14 years, he chanced one 
day to rest on the hill of Ramagiri, so named as the `hill of Rama'. His wife, the Goddess 
Sita, was thirsty, and so Rama procured water for her by piercing the surrounding rocks with 
an arrow. The resulting pool of water was then kept within by the large boulder-like 
formations that may still be seen in Ramanagaram today. ' 
The name Ramanagaram itself was a post-Independence invention, as the town was always 
named `Closepet' in the colonial period. This name was derived from the name of a British 
colonel named Close, who stayed one night on the hill of Ramagiri with his troops and the 
town was named to mark his halt there. Closepet or Ramanagaram as we know it today is a 
bustling town of 50,437 people according to the 1991 Census. Located in Ramanagaram 
taluk2 that is itself nestled between Kunigal taluk in the north-west, Chennapatna taluk in the 
west and Kanakapura taluk in the east, Ramanagaram is one of the main silk towns in the 
sericulture belt of southern Karnataka, producing the raw silk yarn that is required for India's 
large and diverse silk weaving industry (see Map 4). The yarn is then transported to all the 
major weaving centres such as Kancheepuram, Dharmavaram and Hyderabad in south India 
and to Varanasi in the north. 
' This episode is narrated by Narasimaiah, 1994: Chapter 1. 
2A taluk is a revenue sub-division and consists of about 100-300 villages. It is served by a number of 
revenue inspectors. The latter is usually in charge of a hobli, comprising a group of 20-30 villages 
within a taluk. 
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The town is watered by the River Arkavati, a tributary of the River Cauvery, which has its 
origins in the Nandidurga hills and, flowing from the north-east to the south-west in 
Ramanagaram, cuts right across the body of the taluk and the town and in so doing parallels 
the Bangalore-Mysore state highway that also runs through the town (see Map 4). The river 
provides the soft water which facilitates the silk-reeling process and thereby sustains the silk 
industry at Ramanagaram. This prized natural endowment has favoured Ramanagaram's silk 
industry, at least until recently. 
I. Profile of a south Indian town 
Before considering the details of my field study which focuses on a sample of 201 
Ramanagaram women, it is essential to familiarise ourselves with the environment in which 
the women covered in the sample live, in particular some general information about 
Ramanagaram taluk, the town, its main sources of economic activity and its infrastructure. 3 
A. Structure 
Ramanagaram is situated on the state highway (SH 17) between Bangalore and Mysore, 48 
kilometres from Bangalore (see Map 3). Table 1 shows the size of Ramanagaram taluk and 
Ramanagaram town in terms of area and population. 
3A study of Ramanagaram was carried out in 1995 by the Government of Karnataka in association with 
the Asian Development Bank, GHK/MRM International Ltd and the Tata Economic and Consultancy 
Services as part of the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Project. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the most thorough and comprehensive survey of the town and taluk in recent years. 4 Ramanagaram is also directly on the broad-gauge railway line between Bangalore and Mysore. 
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Table 1: Location and distribution of households in Ramana2aram taluk (1991) 
Ramanagaram Area of village Number of Number of Total Males* Females* 
and hectares of occupied and households population* 
town in sq. kms. residential 
houses 
Whole taluk 630.64 38630 39057 205956 106467 99487 
Rural 625.68 29559 29792 155519 80262 75257 
Urban 4.96 9071 9265 50437 26205 24232 
*includes institutional and homeless population. 
(Source: 1991 Census, district/taluk primary census abstract, row 02.80) 
By Indian standards, Ramanagaram' is a medium-sized town with a moderate rate of growth 
of population. 5 The annual compound growth rate of population between 1981-91 was 1.4% 
for the town alone and 3.2% including the outer growth areas. The growth rate for the town 
alone is low compared to the 1.92% for Karnataka and 2.14% for India as, a whole over the 
same period, mainly because of the substantial amount of out-migration that is continually 
taking place from Ramanagaram to Bangalore, and to other cities in south India and 
elsewhere. In 1995, mean household size in Ramanagaram was estimated to be 5.6, and 
nuclear families comprised some 66% of total households. 7 
The breakdown of the population in Ramanagaram taluk, by religion, residence and sex is 
shown in Table 2. $ 
sA proposed boundary extension for Ramanagaram is being considered. According to the 1991 Census, 
60,660 people live in the total area (i. e. the town and villages around it that will form a part of the 
boundary extension scheme) while the figures for 1994 are 53,273 and 66,381 for the town and total 
areas respectively. These figures are taken from the Outline Structure Plan for Ramanagaram, Final 
Report, 1995, Chapter 4, section 4.5.3: 4.27. 
6 This is defined as the city limits plus the villages that form a part of the proposed boundary extension 
programme for Ramanagaram. 
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Project 
, 1995: appendix E. 1: section 2.1-2.2: E. 1.2. 8 See also the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 56. The breakdown of the population by religion in 
1961 was 70.8% Hindu, 25.9% Muslim, 3.0% Christian and 0.3% Others. 
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Table 2: Breakdown of population by religion, sex and residence (Ramanagaram taluk, 1991) 
Category Demographic index Whole taluk Rural Urban 
Total population 205956 155519 50437 
Males Numbers 106467 80262 26205 
Percentage 51.69 51.61 51.95 
Females Numbers 99489 75257 24232 
Percentage 48.31 48.39 48.04 
Hindus 
Muslims 
Christians 
Numbers 172745 145942 26803 
Males 88964 75089 13875 
Females 83781 70853 12928 
Percentage 83.87 93.84 53.14 
Numbers 32101 9174 22927 
Males 16879 4926 11953 
Females 15222 4248 10974 
Percentage 15.59 5.90 45.46 
Numbers 838 218 620 
Males 455 132 323 
Females 383 86 297 
Percentage 0.41 0.14 1.23 
Other religions Numbers 277 185 87 
Males 169 115 54 
Females 103 70 33 
Percentage 0.13 0.12 0.17 
(Source: 1991 Census, village/town primary census abstract). 
The most important feature of Table 2 is the religious composition of the population. Hindus 
form 84% of the population in the taluk, but only 53% of the population in the town. In 
contrast, the Muslims form 16% of the population in the taluk, but 46% of the population in 
the town. The Christians form approximately 0.4% of the population of the taluk and about 
1.2% of the population in the town. Thus, the non-Hindu communities seem to be 
concentrated in Ramanagaram town. 
In the Government of India Census of 1991, the total workforce is defined as the total number 
of main workers and marginal workers .9 In Ramanagaram, the total number of workers (main 
plus marginal) was 16,932 in 1991. Of these, the majority, 13,423, are male. The total 
9 The main workers are those that are employed more than 183 days per year while the marginal 
workers are those that are employed up to 183 days per year. 
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number of workers expressed as a percentage of the total population in Ramanagaram is 
33.6%. Main workers form 99.7% of the total workforce, although this percentage is a 
proportion of the sample covered in the KUIDP survey and, as with all workforce data, 
should be interpreted with caution. 10 
In the past ten to twelve years, Karnataka has been consistently lagging behind India as a 
whole in growth and industrial development. This is mirrored in Ramanagaram, which has 
only four medium-scale industrial units and no large-scale ones. As the 1995 urban 
infrastructure study remarked, `no medium- or large-scale unit has been established at 
Ramanagaram for almost two decades'. " There is no public sector manufacturing unit in the 
area. The report identified 650 small-scale industrial units in the taluk, employing a total of 
5,400 persons. Of these, 300 are reported as being in the silk-producing sector. 12 Silk-related 
activity is confined to the cottage and small-scale industries. The reeling and twisting units, 
in particular, employ a total of 3,683 people, with an average of 12 persons per unit. 13 The 
level of capital employed is Rs. 50,000 per firm, which is very low by national standards. The 
main small-scale units operated - apart from in the silk sector - in the areas of agricultural 
implements, chemicals, food and tobacco, glass and ceramics, repair and servicing works, 
leather-based units, mechanical engineering units, plastics, printing, silk and wood-based 
industries. 
Sericulture is the economic life-blood of Ramanagaram taluk, and women (and to some 
extent children) are the mainstay of many stages in the process of silk manufacture. Also, in 
the models presented in later chapters, we examine whether employment in the silk industry 
10 
nuiur rinai iceport, tyyx appenuix v: sections : ). 3-J. b: ll. Z. /. 
" The four medium-scale units are the Chamundi Textiles and Silk Mills that specialises in silk 
manufacture; Senapathy Whitelays Ltd. that produces electric insulation paper; Valliappa Textiles Ltd 
that produces cotton yarn and fabric; and Lakshman Isola Ltd. that manufactures mica paper and 
products. There is one KSSIDC industrial estate for small-scale industries. Interestingly, the silk reeling 
and twisting units are not a part of this estate. 
12KUIDP Final Report, 1995: section 5.5. 
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affects women's decisions about contraception and fertility. It is therefore worth looking 
more closely at this industry. 
India is the second-largest producer of silk in the world, after China. Karnataka accounts for 
nearly half of national silk production. Ramanagaram is one of the chief centres in Karnataka 
for cocoon trading and produces 90% of the silk thread that is later woven into cloth by the 
nation's major weaving centres. 14 Hindu, Muslim and Christian women in Ramanagaram are 
all involved actively in different stages of the silk manufacture process. 
The silk manufacture process begins with mulberry growing and silkworm rearing. It 
progresses through marketing of the cocoons, reeling the cocoons, twisting the silk yarn, and 
dyeing the yarn. This yarn is later woven into cloth and finally the cloth is fashioned into 
garments. At every stage, women in Ramanagaram have an important role to play. 
The production process begins with silkworm rearing. According to the Karnataka Silk 
Association, there were 8206 mulberry cultivators in the taluk in 1994. Multivoltine 
silkworms are reared in Ramanagaram to produce mulberry silk. 15 Mulberry trees are grown 
throughout the year for the silkworms to feed on. The silkworm eggs are normally obtained 
from the three Government grainages and 28 private licensed seed producers in the taluk. 
The sericulturists first keep the eggs in circular trays with concentric circle partitions called 
chandrikas with mulberry leaves in anticipation for the worms to feed on when the larvae 
emerge. Ten days later the larval stage begins and the mulberry leaves are the chief food of 
the worms as they build their cocoons. Rearing the silkworms is a full-time activity, as the 
13 KUIDP Final Report, 1995. 
14 Information provided by K. Seshagiri Rao of the Karnataka Silk Board Association and a long-time 
resident of Ramanagaram. 
IS Silkworms are differentiated into bivoltine and multivoltine according to the number of generations 
the silk moth passes through during the year. The bivoltine breed produce one or two generations a 
year. The multivoltine race may produce up to six generations a year. Bivoltine cocoons yield 800- 
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temperature and humidity levels have to be carefully controlled. The trays have to be kept 
safe from insects and flies which can infect the worms with disease and result in considerable 
economic loss to the rearers, as the diseased worms produce inferior silk filament in the 
cocoons. Therefore, the trays are arranged on wooden slats, often in the rearer's home, and 
are covered with netting. The women of the household have a major role to play at this stage 
because it is they who primarily look after the worms in the chandrikas in addition to their 
household duties, ensuring the requisite standards of hygiene, temperature and humidity. This 
stage of the silk process is relevant to our analysis of fertility because silk rearing is an 
income-earning occupation for women, but one which is compatible with child rearing, since 
it is performed in the home. 
The cocoons, once formed, are taken, mainly by the women's husbands, to be marketed at the 
cocoon markets. By law, marketing of the cocoons may only be done in the Government 
Cocoon Market in Ramanagaram, by open auction method. The cocoons are then taken to the 
reeling units where they are first dried either in the sun or in steam, to kill the silkworm and 
retain the continuous filament in the cocoon. Then they are boiled so that the sericin in the 
cocoon shell is softened. This enables the silk thread to be unwound in a process known as 
`silk-reeling'. 
Ramanagaram has evolved into a major silk-reeling centre mainly due to the availability of 
soft water which facilitates the reeling process. The devices used for silk-reeling are the 
country charkha, the cottage basin and the filature reeling basin, though the charkha and the 
cottage basins are the most popular. Of the reeling units in Ramanagaram 50% operate using 
the charkha, 45% use cottage basins and only 5% use filatures. 16 
1500m of filament (the fibre in the cocoon shell) apiece a year, while multivoltine cocoons yield only 
400m of filament apiece. 
16 KUIDP Final Report, 1995: appendix D: section 3.5: D. 37. 
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The silk-reeling is done mainly by adult women and the boiling of the cocoons is mostly done 
by young boys and girls. Some of these women are the ones I met on my first trip to 
Ramanagaram, working in dingy rooms, with their hands immersed in scalding water, heated 
to 45°C. The very hot water both softens the cocoons after boiling and enables the thin thread 
to be extracted. Working in these darkened rooms, the women suffer from diminished 
eyesight, from bruised hands from keeping them continuously immersed in hot water for so 
many hours a day, and from asthma from the noxious fumes that emerge from the cocoon- 
boiling process to soften the sericin. The women need to combine threads from about 7-8 
cocoons to form silk thread of the appropriate denier for twisting. There is usually a male 
supervisor, continuously checking the denier and quality of the reeling and the 
skeining/twisting into diamond formations that follows the reeling process. The twisting 
process involves combining several silk threads together to form skeins. The skeins are 
packed in 2-kilogram bundles called books, which are then packed in bales. The bales are 
eventually dyed elsewhere (non-locally) and later woven into finished silk cloth. Twisting 
and sale of finished silk is done privately and is not subject to any government regulation. 
However, raw silk is only allowed to be sold through the Government Silk Exchange at 
Ramanagaram. 
Thus, women have a major role to play in many important stages of the silk process, and 
especially at the rearing and reeling stages. The rearing of the worms is entirely a household 
activity; 95% of the reeling activity is undertaken in the household sector, as is 50% of the 
weaving activity. The other 5% of the reeling is done in large-scale government units called 
`filatures' and some of the women I interviewed worked in these filature units. 
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The main challenge facing the Ramanagaram silk industry in the 1990s is competition from 
Chinese silk, which is 30% cheaper than Indian raw silk and of superior quality. " Until now, 
heavy import duties on bivoltine Chinese silk have resulted in weavers elsewhere in India 
using Indian silk. However, as import duties on Chinese silk are further reduced, Indian 
weavers seem likely to substitute Chinese silk for Indian silk. This could have serious 
repercussions on the economy of Ramanagaram by threatening the silk-rearing and silk- 
reeling industry in the taluk, and consequently employment for women who sustain this 
industry. 
Moreover, the Ramanagaram silk industry has so far proved unable to diversify into other 
stages of the silk process, such as weaving or garment-making; there are no weaving mills in 
the town. The greatest value added in the silk process occurs at the weaving and garment- 
making stage, and the silk economy of Ramanagaram might survive the substitution against 
Indian silk by diversifying its industries to include those that are the most lucrative in terms 
of value-added. Other problems facing the silk industry currently are frequent power 
shutdowns and water shortages. Moreover, a large-scale silk producing unit, and suitable 
marketing and co-operative facilities to obtain the cocoons and sell the yarn, are also 
required. A further advantage would be a suitable silk waste disposal system that will not 
pollute the environment as does the present one, nor cause the employees suffering due to the 
close contact with the fumes emitted during the silk process. 
Thus, the silk manufacture process in Ramanagaram is one in which women play a vital 
economic role. Further, the challenges which this industry faces in the 1990s, both due to the 
lack of infrastructure and from cheaper imports of silk yarn from China, may have important 
repercussions on employment for women in Ramanagaram, and consequently perhaps also on 
17 KUIDP Final Report, 1995: appendix D: section 5.7. 
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their demographic decisions. However, this lack of infrastructure is not restricted to the silk 
sector, but is mirrored in the town more generally. 
Road quality is bad in Ramanagaram, with roads that require widening, inadequate 
pavements, inadequate streetlighting which is not properly maintained, and shortages of 
buses, bus stands and truck terminals. Mahatma Gandhi road, one of the main arteries of the 
town, requires continual upgrading and roadworks. Only one train stops at Ramanagaram in 
the mornings, and one in the evenings. 
In terms of power infrastructure, there is a massive shortage of electricity, which the women I 
interviewed continually complained about. There is only 12.5 mw of power made available to 
the town, with 8 to 10 hours of electricity shutdowns daily. At times, the power cuts 
amounted to as many as 50 times a day. This particularly affected industrial equipment and 
water supply. 
In terms of water infrastructure and sanitation, the river Arkavati is used mainly for washing 
clothes, bathing and irrigation. The northern part of the river within the city limits harbours a 
series of government-constructed wells to provide water to the town. There are only two 
water-tanks in the whole town, and there is no proper water-distribution system. Borewells 
are the main sources of water supply. Water is inadequate particularly in the summer, for 
domestic and industrial use, and especially in poor neighbourhoods, and this was evident to 
me during my fieldwork. The women interviewed complained bitterly about the lack of water 
infrastructure in their town, and a look at the water infrastructural facilities in Ramanagaram 
justifies their dissatisfaction. 
As regards sanitation, certain areas such as Mehboobnagar, Tipunagar, Gottipur, Gasainagar, 
Mohalla and extension areas of Ramanagaram are severely affected by flooding in the rainy 
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season. The slum areas are particularly badly affected by the lack of adequate infrastructure, 
and housing and water are key problems here. Mangalvarpeth was declared a slum by the 
municipality in 1986, but has not yet been relocated. 
The lack of suitable infrastructure in Ramanagaram is relevant to an analysis of fertility 
because (as we examine in Chapter 6), the lack of adequate water and fuel infrastructure may 
contribute to greater fertility, if children are the cheapest way of obtaining the labour to 
perform water and fuel collection tasks which are time-consuming for the household. Another 
way in which poor water infrastructure and sanitation facilities may contribute to greater 
fertility is by raising infant mortality. 
As regards educational infrastructure, there are only 6 primary schools, few high schools, and 
no training colleges or professional colleges. There is only one arts college in the town. 
According to the 1995 Infrastructure report, a science college, a polytechnic and a typing and 
computer class are urgently needed. This lack of educational infrastructure is reflected in the 
low mean level of education for the women interviewed in the sample (5.5 years), especially 
those belonging to the low and scheduled castes. Moreover, as we explore in later chapters, 
more years of education has been linked to lower fertility for women, higher age at marriage, 
and increased adoption of contraceptive techniques. 
There is also an informal system of education in Ramanagaram which co-exists with the 
formal sector. This is the `Anganwadi' or `courtyard teacher' movement. In this movement, 
educated women, who are specifically trained for the purpose in the town, conduct primary 
school level teaching in the courtyards of their homes aan ans in the nearby villages. This 
system of instruction has an advantage over the six primary schools, in that mothers who 
cannot afford to send their children to one of the larger schools because of monetary 
disincentives such as the inability to pay fees, buy school uniforms, or meet other demands 
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such as requests for donations, or because of psychic disincentives such as these schools 
demanding regular attendance, instead can send their children to study in the Anganwadi 
schools. There are altogether 205 Anganwadi teachers in Ramanagaram taluk and each 
school is managed by a single teacher. There are altogether 12,500 students enrolled in these 
schools, of which 5,600 are girls. The average number of students per school is 61. The 
women of Ramanagaram taluk were comfortable with this system because the courtyard 
teacher was an educated woman from their own neighbourhood, who was trustworthy, highly 
motivated, and whom the mothers also consulted for information on infant and child care. 
The disadvantage of the Anganwadi system of education was that though the courtyard 
teachers were provided with some basic training at the Anganwadi centre in the town, they 
were not well-qualified teachers, and did not have the superior educational facilities of the 
six primary schools in their courtyard classrooms. However, the Anganwadi teachers did 
manage to supplement the educational activities of the six schools in the town and provided 
an important source of primary school teaching for many of the children of the women 
interviewed in the Ramanagaram sample. 
In terms of health infrastructure in Ramanagaram, there is only one public hospital, with 50 
beds. There are only two doctors in this hospital and no specialists. There are no clinical 
laboratory facilities, and the private doctors are few, far between and very costly. Catholic 
missionaries run the Our Lady of Lourdes Health Centre at Ramanagaram. The urban family 
welfare centre at Ramanagaram and the maternity hospital there are recognised as M. T. P. 
(medical termination of pregnancies) centres. There are 14 chemists and druggists and 24 and 
20 `pharmacists and related establishments', as defined by the Municipality of Ramanagaram. 
The latter essentially include those establishments that are legally recognised by the 
Municipality to stock medicines and other pharmaceutical drugs. The facilities in 
Ramanagaram for health-care, though poor, are about average for an Indian town of its size. 
The women I interviewed recognised that the high-level health infrastructure in their town 
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was lacking. However, there were many lower-level facilities, such as the health-care 
provided by the `Anganwadi' movement. In addition to educating children, the Anganwadi 
teachers also educated the mothers of their neighbourhood in Oral Rehydration Therapy 
(ORT) procedures for their infants. These `courtyard teachers' distributed anti-polio tablets 
and provided free instruction to the neighbourhood women on the benefits of breastfeeding, 
as well as information on infant and child care. It has been hypothesised that such low-level 
health care is even more important than high-level medical facilities in reducing both fertility 
and mortality (especially infant and child mortality) and the usefulness of having this system 
in Ramanagaram emerged from the interviews carried out in this study. 
B. Reasons for choosing Ramanagaram for field study 
I chose Ramanagaram for my field work for several reasons. Firstly, this study essentially 
revolves around fertility and its socio-economic and religious determinants. Karnataka has 
seen a steady decline in fertility rates over the past decade, mainly due to the co-ordinated 
literacy and family planning programmes in the state. Yet, both in Karnataka as a whole and, 
as I found subsequently, in Ramanagaram in particular, there is a mean difference in fertility 
of nearly one child on average between Hindus and Muslims. This is a significant differential 
and needs investigation. 
However, it seemed desirable for me to study these fertility differentials in an area where 
there were not wide differences in the levels of living between the religious communities, as 
there are for example in the north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh or Bihar and even in the 
northern districts of Karnataka such as Bidar or Gulbarga, which also have significant 
minority populations but where poverty compounds demographic differences. 
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The town, moreover, is moderately sized, with one major industry (silk) dominating the area. 
All religious communities are involved with this industry in one way or another, so there is a 
common point of reference for all. However, as there is no major large-scale unit in the area, 
the environment in which the town operates is still very 'rural'. 
As mentioned, Ramanagaram has been exposed to family planning and literacy programmes 
and there are some schemes operating in the area towards this end. These include the 
National School Health Programme and the Comprehensive School Health Programme. The 
Health Training Centre was started in 1936 by the Mysore Government in co-operation with 
the Rockefeller Foundation. In fact, the first Family Planning Health Centre in Karnataka was 
set up in Ramanagaram in 1952, when India first started its government-sponsored National 
Family Planning Movement and was the first country in the world to do so. Moreover, 
Ramanagaram was one of the `towns' of 10,000-25,000 population covered by the Mysore 
Population Study in 1961 undertaken by the United Nations. 18 This study covered a sample of 
10,744 households. Ramanagaram is therefore a good test case as one area which experienced 
the inception of coordinated thinking and official policy on family planning in India. It 
seemed interesting to see if there were religious differences in fertility in an environment 
where contraceptive technology was freely available and heavily advertised. 
Moreover, the town and the taluk, situated in the prosperous silk belt of Karnataka, is 
expected in the next fifty to seventy years to function as a `counter-magnet' to Bangalore. At 
present, the very low annual rate of increase in annual population figures of 1.4% in 
Ramanagaram is due to large-scale out-migration to Bangalore and elsewhere. 
Bangalore rural district, in which Ramanagaram is located, is also very important for the 
socio-economic development of the state of Karnataka in the future, both because of its 
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proximity to Bangalore city and because of the importance of the performance of this district 
for socio-economic and demographic indicators. Table 3 presents data on selected socio- 
economic and demographic characteristics of Bangalore rural district and compares these 
data with those for Karnataka state. 
Table 3: Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of Bangalore rural district and 
Karnataka state 
Index Bangalore rural district Karnataka state 
1. Socio-economic indices 
GDP per capita (in Rs. ) GDP per 
capita (in Rs. ) 
4788 5357 
Population below poverty line 
1993-94 as a proportion of total 
population 
38.17 33.16 
% of households using polluting 
fuel (wood, cow-dung, kerosene 
and coal) for cooking 1991 
96 90 
Agricultural wages 
Male 19.32 18.80 
Female 16.26 14.40 
Share of earned income 
Male 0.71 0.71 
Female 0.29 0.29 
Adult literacy rate 1991 
Male 55.5 63.8 
Female 28.1 37.5 
% child labour to total child 
population (aged 5-14) 1991 8.58 8.80 
2. Demographic indices 
Proportion of population 
Male 0.51 0.51 
Female 0.48 0.49 
Mean age at marriage 
Male 26.71 26.21 
Female 19.69 20.14 
Difference in mean age at marriage 
between males and females 1991 6.41 6.07 
Life expectancy at birth 66.69 62.07 
Child mortality under-5 67 90 
Infant mortality rate 
Male 51 74 
Female 49 72 
Total fertility rate 3.76 3.87 
Eligible couples protected by all 
family planning methods 1996-97 
66 58 
(Source: Government of Karnataka, 1999, selected figures from statistical appendices, pp. 217-378) 
18 The Mysore Population Study, 1961: 12. Interestingly, the field training for the Mysore Population 
Study was conducted in one of the villages which was surveyed in the present study as well. 
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The most interesting feature of Table 3 is that infant mortality and under-5 mortality in 
Bangalore rural district is much below the levels for Karnataka state as a whole. Also, the 
percentage of couples protected by family planning methods in this district is much higher, 
and the total fertility rate lower than that found in all of Karnataka. However, the district 
performs less well on economic indicators such as the percentage of people living below the 
poverty line (which is much higher in the district compared to all of Karnataka), and in the 
percentage of households using polluting sources of fuel for cooking (which is also very 
much higher in this district than in the rest of Karnataka state). Finally, Table 3 illustrates 
strikingly how, both in Bangalore rural district and. in Karnataka state, a very high proportion 
of children aged 5-14 are used for their labour, particularly in the silk-reeling industry. 
The prospects of a town such as Ramanagaram being able to divert migration away from 
Bangalore in the next few decades is an important question, and the fact that this town (and 
the villages around it) and Bangalore rural district may play an important role in the socio- 
economic development of the state of Karnataka in future, made the choice of this area for a 
demographic field study more interesting. 
II. The data set 
In this second part of the chapter I outline the data used in the study: the manner in which the 
sample was selected, the sample size, and the distribution of the sample between 
Ramanagaram and the surrounding villages. I also discuss the questionnaire that was 
administered to the women in the sample (a copy of which is included in this dissertation as 
Appendix A. 1). In subsequent chapters, the responses of the women will. be analysed in 
depth. 
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A. Methodology: sampling procedure, sample size and method of interview 
In October 1995, after my first visit to Ramanagaram, I made a series of preliminary trips to 
the town and several villages in the taluk. Eventually I decided to include in my sample both 
Ramanagaram and five other villages. 
The sampling procedure adopted was a two-stage quota sampling technique. First, I identified 
the first four villages to be used: these will be referred to as villages A, B, C, and D in 
Ramanagaram taluk (see Map 4). I chose to interview some women from both the town of 
Ramanagaram and the surrounding villages because the villages were intimately connected 
with the rural and small-scale economy of Ramanagaram. Their proximity to the town (all 
within a radius of 20 kilometres), coupled with their involvement in the silk-rearing industry 
that sustains the silk-reeling in Ramanagaram town, made them suitable choices. In fact, 
many of the villagers came to the town for employment in the silk units as well. I also 
selected a fifth village, which I call village E, a bit further away on the 
Ramanagaram/Chennapatna taluk border. Table 4 shows the size of the five villages and the 
number of households in each village. 
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Table 4: Location of villages, area in hectares and distribution of households, (Ramanagaram 
taluk, 1991) 
Village/town Area (village Number of Number of Total Males* Females* 
hectares, town occupied and households population* 
in sq. kms) residential 
houses 
A 381.95 287 289 1495 769 726 
B 1015.56 710 712 3753 1967 1786 
C 204.24 308 308 1756 915 841 
D 425.17 234 234 1245 640 605 
E 572.83 734 734 3339 1638 1701 
Ramanagaram town 4.96 9071 9265 50437 26205 24232 
* includes institutional and homeless population: 
(Source: Village/town primary census abstract, 1991 Census) 
Depending on the size of the town or village, I adopted a proportional sample size, with the 
largest sample being from Ramanagaram town itself. Within the town, I randomly identified 
households in each of the major neighbourhoods, so as to cover the widest spectrum of levels 
of living. That is, I selected women from both the slum areas and the more affluent localities. 
However, as my study deals specifically with religion, among the households first identified 
within the villages/town, I eventually selected 111 Hindu households, 75 Muslim households 
and 15 Christian households. The total number of households covered was 201. The Hindus 
who were included in the sample resided in the town and all the villages chosen, but the 
Muslims who were interviewed resided only in the town and three other villages. The 
Christians in the sample lived in the town and one other village. The number of Christian 
households sampled is much fewer than the number of Hindu and Muslim households, 
mainly because the population of Christians in the taluk is much smaller than the population 
of Hindus and Muslims. As in other studies based on sample data, it is acknowledged that 
there is always a trade-off between the depth of information collected and the number of 
households sampled. The sample for this study was selected in a manner which was 
proportional to the distribution of the population in the taluk. However, as will emerge from 
later chapters, the demographic differences between the Christians and the other two 
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religious groups in Ramanagaram taluk are so very striking that the contrasts between the 
demographic behaviour of the three religious groups emerge even when Hindus and Muslims 
are compared to the very small sample of Christian households selected. 
A total of 187 adult married women and 14 adult single women were interviewed for this 
study. It must be emphasised again that the villages covered in the sample are large by Indian 
standards, with unusually high male-female ratios, and are close to Ramanagaram town. The 
villages are also associated actively with socio-economic activity in Ramanagaram town. 
This may imply that fertility, contraceptive use and marriage age between Hindus and 
Muslims may be more homogeneous in the Ramanagaram sample than might be expected in a 
more purely `rural' area of the Indian countryside. 
The interviews were conducted mainly on an individual basis but seven were attended by two 
persons (especially with the presence of elderly mothers, mothers-in-law or young sisters, 
some of whom were also interviewed). Each interview lasted a minimum of 45 minutes, but 
many were as long as one and a quarter hours, depending on the discussions generated and 
the interest of the respondent. I also conducted some group discussions. This was for two 
reasons. Firstly, I did so in order to corroborate what the individuals had said by raising the 
same issues which were asked in the questionnaire in a general discussion with groups of 
women. Secondly, I thought it important to observe the women that we had earlier 
interviewed in a group setting to judge the extent to which they would articulate and vocalise 
their beliefs among their peers. The group sizes varied from 4 to 8 depending on the locality 
and the religious community. I also interviewed five of the women - two Hindus, two 
Muslims and one Christian - in depth and more than once, in order to carry out case studies 
of their lives. These women were specifically chosen by me to illustrate aspects of the typical 
Ramanagaram woman's lifestyle. They all belonged to different castes and localities. 
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A universal problem with survey data is that it is difficult to induce people to reveal their 
preferences and private choices to a researcher. Economists routinely distinguish between 
agents' `stated preferences' and their `revealed preferences'. Anthropologists often comment 
on the difficulties of approaching a society as an outsider, particularly when it is rural, and 
trying to determine lifestyles, incomes or the manner in which the people in these 
communities make choices about aspects of their lives. '9 It is even more difficult for a young 
urban woman, who is perceived by the community she is researching as `educated' or as an 
`alien', to persuade predominantly rural women to reveal their views on extremely sensitive 
issues such as their sexuality or religious beliefs that form the core of their personal lives. All 
too often what is deemed personal is kept strictly private. Therefore, both to lend 
`respectability' to myself in the eyes of the women I eventually interviewed and to allay their 
inherent suspicions of one `young enough to be my granddaughter' as one elderly woman 
remarked to me, I deliberately adopted the research strategy of taking my mother with me to 
interview the women in Ramanagaram. I found that this was an excellent means of 
interviewing the women, especially on sensitive issues such as fertility histories and 
contraception. Identifying with a sari-clad Indian woman, who was a wife and mother like 
themselves and who was putting herself through a great deal of inconvenience to help her 
daughter, perhaps similar to their own experiences with their children, always struck a chord 
of sympathy with the women. They empathised with my mother and replied eagerly to 
questions that I do not honestly feel they would have spoken either frankly or freely about 
with me. Moreover, they thoroughly approved of my studies being thus chaperoned. As many 
as 40% of the women interviewed remarked to me at the end of the interview that they 
`approved' of my having brought my mother when I interviewed them. In this context, after 
we had been speaking to her for about one hour, Devamma from village C, an elderly though 
illiterate woman, asked pointedly, 
19 See Srinivas, 1976; Christensen, 1992: 124-137; see also Lipton and Moore, 1972. 
71 
Amma (mother), I definitely approve of you coming here to help your daughter with 
her work, but I have a question. You sent her all alone, unchaperoned, across the seas 
and far away from you to study in England; yet within our own country, you chose 
to come with her to Ramanagaram. Why? 
For these reasons, therefore, my mother was present during all the discussions and 
interviews. 
Finally, the individual interviews were conducted in Kannada, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, English, 
or a combination of these languages, depending on the individual respondent's preference. I 
personally translated and recorded the response in English on the questionnaire. Where no 
English equivalent could be found, I recorded the word or phrase in the vernacular and have 
subsequently attempted to find the word/phrase in English that most accurately fits (or at the 
very least comes close in meaning to) what the respondent was trying to convey. 
B. The questionnaire 
The questionnaire administered to the women was divided into five sections, Sections 1.1 
through to Section 11.3.20 Section I. 1 covered personal information regarding the respondent. 
This part was a mini-census which recorded all persons living in that house; their ages; 
primary and secondary languages spoken; religion; educational background in terms of 
number of years of primary, secondary and university education, if any; and marital status 
including age at menarche, age at first marriage and age at cohabitation with spouse. This 
section also asked questions about the husband's age, education and occupation, and the 
extent of consanguinity between spouses. Details regarding the children, specifically about 
their ages, education, occupations and current residence, were also covered in this section. 
Finally, the women were asked if their families possessed any land, and its acreage. They 
20 The questionnaire was initially devised between February 1995 and June 1995 in Cambridge. 
Subsequently, it went through a series of revisions in India. 
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were then asked to list their main items of monthly expenditure and their ownership of 
particular items of consumer equipment. 
Section 1.2 covered decision-making within the family. This section asked about rapport 
between family members and decision-making within the household, specifically with regard 
to housework, income-earning work and spending money. This section also discussed 
nutrition decisions, and information concerning the value of daughters to the household. The 
women were asked about their married daughters' ages at marriage and unmarried daughters' 
proposed ages at marriage. 
Section 11.1 dealt with the economic value of children in terms of costs and benefits, 
contributions of children to current and future income, and the direct and opportunity costs of 
childbearing. These questions dealt with children's hourly contributions to the time budget of 
the household, both in terms of helping their mothers and in performing income-earning 
work. Questions pertaining to old-age security motives for child-bearing and son-preference 
were also discussed at this stage. 
Section 11.2 dealt with reproduction, contraception and health-care, including fertility 
decisions and attitudes towards contraception and health-care. The women were asked a 
range of questions about their desired family size, their preference between boys and girls, 
and their opinions about large families compared to small ones. They were also asked about 
their attitudes towards contraception, inter-spousal communication regarding family-planning 
issues, the position of their religion on contraception, and the ease and frequency of health 
care in their town/village. 
Finally, Section 11.3 involved questions pertaining to religious observance, religious beliefs 
and the extent of piety in the family and in the community. These questions were personal 
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evaluations by the women of the importance of religion in their lives and in those of their 
families. There were also questions on the extent of communal interaction between religious 
groups in the town/village. 
Finally, this section also included several questions on women's status in the town/village 
and the respondent's view of how variables relevant to women's well-being had changed 
over the past five years. These variables included, among others, the woman's assessment of 
the economic position of the family, the incidence of communal violence and domestic 
violence in the town/villages, and the status of women in general locally. Altogether ninety- 
three questions were asked of each woman who was interviewed. The next chapter discusses 
in depth the census information provided by the women through their answers to the 
questions in Section I. 1 of the questionnaire. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The `Census' Information on the Sample 
In this chapter, we examine the `census' information on the 201 women. 
1. Rural vs. urban residence 
Table 1. Rural vs. urban residence, Ramanaearam sample (1996) 
Rural/urban residence All women Hindus Muslims 
Ramanagaram town 124 46 64 
Village A880 
Village B 24 19 4 
Village C 17 10 7 
Village D 10 10 0 
Village E 18 18 0 
Christians 
14 
0 
1 
0 
0 
The respondents came from 5 villages and the main Ramanagaram town. As is evident, the 
minority populations are mainly concentrated in the town. As explained in chapters 1 and 2, 
the villages sampled in the present study are really peri-urban and hence there is little to 
distinguish the manner in which women lived in these villages, compared to their lifestyle in 
the town. Hence, although it is important to be aware of the distribution of the women by 
religion between Ramanagaram town and the villages, it was not regarded as necessary to 
include a rural-urban dummy in the regression models presented in chapters 4 through 6. 
II. Caste and . 
iati 
The Hindu women interviewed fell into 23 different jatis or sub-castes. Broadly, the four 
major castes within Hinduism are divided into numerous sub-castes or jatis, which are of 
more importance in a local setting than the major caste. The Mysore Population Study found 
that the number of separate Hindu caste groups in Mysore state was over a hundred, of which 
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14% were `scheduled', 20% were `backward' and 66% were `non-backward' castes. ' The 
corresponding percentages for the Ramanagaram sample are 20% scheduled castes, 35% 
backward castes and 45% non-backward castes. The same three caste groupings are used in 
the analysis in later chapters, though they are referred to as scheduled castes, low castes and 
high castes respectively. 
Disaggregated, the numerically strong castes in the sample were the Gowdas (24), the 
Scheduled Castes (21), the Brahmins (12), the Lingayats (7), and the Okkaligas (7). There 
were 5 Ekesus, 4 Aswajanas (those that belong to the Ursu community that trace their 
ancestry to the royal family at Mysore), 4 Bestru (the fishermen's caste), 4 Kuruba and 4 
Lambani (the minstrel/gypsy caste), 3 Marathi, 3 Mudaliar, 2 Vishwakarmas, 2 Kumbhar (the 
potter's caste), and 2 Balija. There was also one each of the Gamsettu, Ganigas, Gangemata, 
Gwaladuru, Maduvar, Nayak, Reddy and Upasadu castes. The Muslims were either Sunnis 
(49) or Mehdavis (26). All the Christians were Protestants and of the same denomination (the 
Church of South India). 2 This variable is relevant to an analysis of fertility, as there may be 
differences in fertility by caste even among those that share the same religion. 
III. Age 
The mean age of the women interviewed was 33.4 for Hindu women, 36.3 for Muslims and 
35.5 for Christians. The mean age of the woman for the entire sample as a whole was 34.7. In 
the study, the women were randomly selected, and no overt effort was made primarily to 
select women from particular age groups. However, as it turned out, most of the women were 
in the 30-40-year age decile. This is a happy coincidence because in a study of fertility, it is 
particularly useful to have a large sample of women who are of reproductively active age but 
I Mysore Population Study, 1961: 56-57. 
2 This is probably because the Church of South India which is dominant in the area is Protestant in its 
leanings. 
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have more or less completed their childbearing, in order to make comparisons between 
groups more meaningful. Additionally, it is good that the women completed their 
childbearing recently so that the factors which influenced them are more relevant to 
contemporary decision-making. 
IV. Language 
Table 2. Languages spoken, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Language All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Kannada 104 103 10 
Urdu 73 0 73 0 
Tamil 16 20 14 
Marathi 3300 
English 
.1001 
Gujarati 1100 
Konkani 1100 
Telugu 1100 
I Urdu/English 1010 
The women spoke a variety of languages as their primary language of communication. This 
reflect both the unique geographical position of Karnataka state (which shares its borders 
with four other Indian states) and its history of Hindu, Muslim and British rule. Kannada, 
Urdu, Tamil, Marathi, English, Gujarati, Konkani, and Telugu were all reported as the 
primary language of communication by some women in the sample. For the 111 Hindu 
women interviewed, the primary language of communication was overwhelmingly Kannada. 
The 75 Muslim women interviewed spoke primarily in Urdu. A majority of Christian women 
interviewed spoke in Tamil. ' 
Apart from their primary languages of communication, the women spoke a wide variety and 
varying combinations of other languages. English, Hindi, Kannada and combinations thereof 
were the most popular `other' languages that the women spoke, probably because these three 
3 These women spoke Tamil at home because the Christian women in this region are mainly Tamil 
Christian migrants from Tamil Nadu. 
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languages were the main medium of instruction in the schools, and the languages most 
popularly used in this area. 
V. Literacy 
This variable is interesting because it is widely argued that there is an inverse relationship 
between fertility and literacy 4 Of the 201 women in the sample, 126 (62.7% of the sample) 
said they could read and write in their primary language of communication. This does not, 
however, imply that the levels of education are very high in Ramanagaram taluk: in fact, the 
mean number of years of education for all 201 women was only 6.0, while that for the 187 
married women was 5.5 years. Many who had been educated no further than 4th Standard 
(four years of primary education after two years of kindergarten), still said that they could 
read and write their primary language, though their knowledge of reading and writing was 
quite elementary. Among the Hindus, 49 (44%) could not read, as compared with 24 of the 
Muslims (32%) and 2 Christians (13.3%). Consider Table 3. 
Table 3: Percentage of population that is literate in India, Karnataka, Bangalore rural 
district and the Ramanagaram sample 
Place/group Male Female Total 
India 1991* 67.3 44.3 52.2 
Karnataka 1991* 64.1 39.3 32.9 
Bangalore rural 1991* 52.2 32.9 42.8 
Ramanagaram sample 1996 69.5 62.7 66.1 
Ramanagaram Hindus 66.2 66.0 66.1 
Ramanagaram Muslims 70.0 68.0 69.0 
Ramanagaram Christians 92.9 86.0 89.5 1 
* Figures taken from the 1991 Census 
In comparison with the female literacy figures for India, Karnataka and Bangalore rural 
district, in percentage terms, a much greater proportion of the women in the sample said that 
they were literate. However, it must be remembered that the women were only asked if they 
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could read and write their primary language, and that if they said that they could, this was not 
explicitly tested. Moreover, it was my impression that many of the women may have felt 
embarrassed to admit that they could not read or write their primary language of 
communication fluently, and that even a few years of attendance in school was believed to 
constitute `literacy'. However, in order to cross-check the veracity of the women's answers, 
they were also asked how many years of schooling they had actually had. In response to this 
question, and despite the optimistic percentages in Table 3, the mean number of years of 
education for the women : of the Ramanagaram sample was still (as already remarked) very 
low at only 5.5 years for the 187 married women. Therefore, in the present study we measure 
women's education by the number of years of education, rather than by whether they said 
that they were literate. However, Table 3 does illustrate the interesting finding that in 
Ramanagaram today, women do feel that education is a `good thing', and something to be 
aspired to. 
In the sample as a whole, 76 women (37.8%) had no education at all, 21 (10.4%) had 
between 0 and 5 years, while 69 (34.3%) had between 5 and 10 years of learning. It is 
interesting that of the women who had been to school, 47 (23.3%) had completed their 
Secondary School-Leaving Certificate (SSLC) Examination, equivalent to ten years of 
schooling after two years of kindergarten. I observed in my fieldwork that women either had 
not been to school at all, or if they had, those who went up to secondary school studied till 
the tenth-grade level. However, after attaining this level of education, most women appeared 
to stop. Only 35 (17.4%) women in the sample actually went on to higher education in excess 
of ten years of schooling. 
Education levels also varied across religious groups, as is shown in Table 4. 
° See, for instance, Cochrane and Farid, 1990: 144 -54; Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1985: 29-51. 
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Table 4: Mean level of years of education by religion, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Mean Years of Education All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Mean years of education (all women) 6.0 5.9 5.6 9.2 
Mean years of primary education 3.0 2.8 3.1 4.3 
Mean years of secondary education 2.6 2.6 2.3 4.1 
Mean years of university education 0.4 1.4 1.1 3.3 
Mean years of education (187 married women only) 5.5 5.3 5.4 9.0 
The Christians in the sample are the best educated in terms of primary, secondary and 
university education. They have 9.2 total mean years of education (9.0 years for married 
women) as opposed to 5.9 (5.3 years for married women) and 5.6 years (5.4 years for married 
women) for the Hindus and Muslims respectively. In fact, the Christians are also the most 
likely of all the religious communities to go on to higher education. Interestingly, the 
Muslims had higher rates of mean primary school enrolment, but lower mean secondary 
school years of education than the Hindus. This may be explained by girls' education being 
the first casualty as the size of the family increases, or this may be because of the code of 
purdah which the Muslim families observed. The difference between the mean total years of 
education between Hindus and Muslims was tested at 95% confidence level and was not 
found to be statistically significant, which suggests that the code of purdah was not important 
in this respect. However, there was a statistically significant difference between Christian and 
Muslim mean levels of education, and between Hindu and Christian levels of education. 
VI. Primary and secondary occupations 
Of the sample of 201 women, 66.7% worked outside the household. In Table 5, the main 
occupational categories, so grouped so as to be relevant to an analysis of fertility, are listed. 
`Farming and allied activity' covers all those activities concerned with agriculture and agro- 
based processes. `Home-related activity' deals with all those activities that are undertaken by 
the women from their homes and includes house-work and income-earning work such as silk- 
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rearing. The latter are compatible with child-rearing. `Sole trader/small-scale/cottage 
entrepreneur' refers to instances where the woman was involved in managing and running a 
shop - for example, as a sweets seller or a betel-shop owner. `Small-scale/cottage unit 
worker, other labourer' refers to those occupations where the women were either hourly-rate 
workers in a small-scale unit (such as agarbatti workers or silk reelers), or daily-wage 
labourers such as bricklaying and construction workers. `Government department employee' 
refers to those women who were working in offices connected with the government, such as 
clerks and stenographers in the Zila Parishad Office, or women officers in the Block 
Development Office. `Service-related and others' refers to occupations connected with the 
service industries. These included Anganwadi and other school teachers, domestic servants, 
cooks, nurses, and tailoring class teachers. Women who were seeking jobs, but were 
unemployed at the time of interview come under the `unemployed' category. Those women 
under the `none/not applicable' category were those who were not employed and who were 
not seeking work. 
Table 5: Primary occupations of women, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category of employment All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Home-related activity 68 33.8 31 28.0 30 40.0 7 46.7 
Small-scale/cottage unit workers and other labourers 50 24.9 25 22.5 23 30.6 2 13.3 
Service-related and others 49 24.4 27 24.3 17 22.7 5 33.3 
Government department employee 14 7.0 10 9.0 4 5.3 0 0.0 
Farming and allied activity 14 7.0 12 10.8 1 1.3 1 6.7 
Sole trader and small-scale/cottage unit entrepreneur 5 2.5 5 4.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Unemployed 1 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
None/Not applicable 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 201 100.0 111 100.0 75 100.0 15 100.0 
For all women, home-related activities predominated, followed by work in small- 
scale/cottage units and service-related occupations. In later chapters, we use various 
measures of women's occupations based on the data from Table 5. 
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Some of the women (about 20% of the total) also had secondary occupations, the most 
popular of which was coolie work (bricklaying/construction work), farming, housewife, silk 
rearing and tailoring. The major secondary occupational categories depicted in Table 6 show 
that farming and allied activities form the main secondary occupations for women in the 
sample. 
Table 6: Secondary occupations of women, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category of employment All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Home-related activity 8 4.0 8 7.2 
Small-scale/cottage unit workers and other labourers 7 3.5 6 5.4 
Service-related and others 11 5.5 7 6.3 
Government department employee 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Sole trader and small-scale/cottage unit entrepreneur 1 0.5 1 0.5 
Fanning and allied activity 12 6.0 10 9.0 
Unemployed 0 0.0 0 0.0 
None/not applicable 161 80.0 78 70.2 
Total 201 100.0 111 100.0 
VII. Husband's characteristics 
o 0.0 0 0.0 
1 1.3 0 0.0 
1 1.3 3 20.0 
0 0.0 0 0.0 
0 0.0 0 0.0 
2 1.8 0 0.0 
0 0.0 0 0.0 
71 94.6 12 80.0 
75 100.0 15 100.0 
Information about the women's husbands sheds light on the links between the husband's 
characteristics and the couple's fertility. For example, it is hypothesised that greater 
educational attainment by the husband contributes to lower fertility for the woman. 
The mean age of the husbands in the sample was 39.4,37.9 for the Hindus, 41.4 for the 
Muslims and 40.3 for the Christians. On average, there was a difference of about 5 years 
between the ages of the women and those of their spouses, and this was uniform by religious 
group. 
The mean educational level of the husband was 5.7 for the whole sample, 5.5 for the Hindu 
men, 5.2 for the Muslim men, and 8.0 for the Christians. Thus, for the sample as a whole, 
husbands had marginally higher mean years of education than their wives. However, if we 
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consider all 201 women, which includes the single women, the mean years of education for 
women was 6.0 years. This suggests that women who had remained single went on to pursue 
higher education, compared with women who married, who tended to do so much less. At the 
95% confidence level, there was no statistically significant difference in husband's education 
between Hindus and Muslims and between Hindus and Christians, although there was a 
statistically significant difference between Muslims and Christians. 
The husbands also performed a wide variety of occupations, as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Primary occupations of husbands, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category of employment Total Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Home-related activity 
Small-scale/cottage unit workers and other labourers 
Service-related and others 
Government department employee 
Sole trader and small-scale/cottage unit entrepreneur 
Farming and allied activity 
Unemployed 
Total number of ever-married men 
9 4.9 6 5.9 3 4.3 0 0.0 
41 21.9 25 24.3 16 22.9 0 0.0 
38 20.3 15 14.6 16 22.9 7 50.0 
17 9.1 9 8.7 6 8.6 2 14.3 
31 16.6 16 15.5 14 20.1 1 7.1 
44 23.5 30 29.1 11 15.7 3 21.4 
7 3.7 2 1.9 4 5.7 1 7.1 
187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 
The most popular occupational categories among the husbands were farming, small-scale and 
cottage unit labourers and sole traders, and service-related occupations. Among these, the 
most popular individual occupations were `business', coolie, factory worker, farming, silk 
filature, silk merchant, silk rearer, silk reeler and toymaker. This reflects the dominant 
agricultural and small-scale economic interests of the area. There were no major differences 
in occupational profiles between the three religious communities, except perhaps that the 
Christians were in higher-status occupations on the whole. 
The secondary occupations of the women's husbands by general category are listed in Table 
8. 
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Table 8: Secondary occupations of husbands, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category of employment Total Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Home-related activity 
Small-scale/cottage unit workers and other labourers 
Service-related and others 
Government department employee 
Sole trader and small-scale/cottage unit entrepreneur 
Fanning and allied activity 
Unemployed 
None 
Total number of ever-married man 
5 2.7 5 4.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
6 3.2 2 2.0 4 5.7 0 0.0 
3 1.6 1 1.0 1 1.4 1 7.1 
1 0.5 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
3 1.6 0 0.0 3 4.3 0 0.0 
13 7.0 12 11.7 1 1.4 0 0.0 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
156 83.4 82 79.6 61 87.1 13 92.8 
187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 1 
Of all husbands in the sample, 83% did not have a secondary occupation. Among those 
husbands who did have a secondary occupation, these were in farming, small-scale labouring 
work and home-related activity. Among the husbands there was a negative (although small) 
correlation between having a secondary occupation and the level of education, suggesting 
s that those with less education more often had a secondary occupation. 
VIII. Income 
In this study, several questions were asked for the purpose of estimating the families' 
incomes. This was because direct questions on income (of the nature `What is your total 
monthly income? ') rarely yield reliable answers in a questionnaire survey and have to be 
backed up by extensive cross-checking as to their reliability. This is for several reasons. First, 
respondents are usually hesitant to reveal figures pertaining to their earned income to urban 
interviewers who are far removed from their sphere of life 6 Second, there may be a tendency 
to understate incomes. 7 For poor households, detailed questions on income may 
`unintentionally expose the extent of their poverty in a humiliating manner, especially where 
the interviews are conducted in a "public" setting. i8 There may also be a natural reticence 
5 The correlation coefficient between education and existence of a secondary occupation was negative 
and took a value of -0.14. 
6 Nag, 1985. 
Christensen, 1992: 124-137. 
8 Christensen, 1992: 126. 
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about disclosing precise measures of economic status; this is particularly observed among the 
very rich and the very poor, because if this information were widely known, 'it could lead to 
increased demands on wealth for those who were rich and/or prejudice access to resources to 
those who are poor'. 9 
It is necessary to discuss the theoretical justification for using income or consumption 
measures as the most appropriate measure of household welfare. The role of expenditure as 
an appropriate measure of consumption has also been debated. This issue is particularly 
relevant for countries such as India where poverty measurement to determine household 
welfare and distribution issues has been the subject of much debate. 1° 
Using income as an indicator of household welfare has been criticised. If short-run income is 
used to measure long-run income, it is likely to show great variability because, as Anand and 
Harris outline, particularly in poor countries, there may be an absence of regular employment 
for many people, there may be great seasonality in employment (particularly in agriculture), 
and there may be lifecycle effects. " Moreover, `the direct information on expenditures 
provided by household budget surveys may be of more value, since a household's chosen 
level of expenditure presumably reflects its own evaluation of its long-term economic 
position. ' 12 
There is some consensus that consumption (measured by expenditures) may be a better 
indicator of household welfare than income 3, because individuals engage in consumption 
smoothing over time. The degree of smoothing will depend on the intertemporal pattern of 
real interest rates, on current tastes, and on future tastes. Moreover, as households undertake 
9 Christensen, 1992: 126. 
10 Sen, 1976: 219-31; Lipton, 1997; Thimmaiah, 1977; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995: 2572-2575. 
11 Anand and Harris, 1989. 
12 Kay, Keen and Morris, 1984: 169-181: 169. 
13 Blundell and Preston, 1994. 
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child-bearing and child-rearing, their tastes and needs may change. Consumption then reflects 
this change in household composition. The basic problem facing all those who attempt to 
measure, firstly, household welfare by consumption and, secondly, consumption by 
expenditure is that household consumption is almost impossible to observe. Thus, any 
assessment of household living standards needs to be gleaned from observed expenditures. 
However, there are also certain problems with using expenditure to proxy consumption in 
order to assess household welfare, as we will be attempting to do in the Ramanagaram study. 
A first problem is that typically, expenditure data show the purchase of commodities at a 
point in time whereas consumption itself is continuous. A second problem is that durable 
commodities such as transistors, cycles, televisions and so on, which do contribute to the 
household's long-term welfare but which are not purchased continuously, may not have been 
purchased in the period covered by the interview. Typically, respondents are asked about 
`total monthly expenditure' reckoned from the month preceding the interview and therefore, 
purchases of durable items need to be treated carefully. Nevertheless, despite these problems, 
and in situations where one can assume that the respondents are not indulging in systematic 
misreporting, a household's aggregate expenditure is still an unbiased estimator of its 
aggregate consumption, though the variance of this estimator may be considerable. 14 In the 
Ramanagaram sample, own-grown cereal consumption was very small, and any food grown 
and consumed was in the form of fruits and vegetables rather than grain. In fact, all the 
women interviewed stated said that they purchased their supplies of rice, wheat and ragi 
needed by the household from the `ration' (or fair-price) shops in Ramanagaram town. 
Another measure of household welfare is that suggested by Anand and Harris, using Sri 
Lankan data from the Consumer Finance Survey 1981/82.15 Since long-run average income is 
unobservable, they test four potential indicators as proxies for it: income per capita, total 
14 Kay, Keen and Morris, 1984: 169-181. 
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expenditure per capita, food expenditure per c_ apita, and foodshare (the proportion of food in 
total consumption). The measure which they recommend to predict long-run income is per 
capita food expenditure because, as they argue, it is the only stable element of household 
consumption, it is least likely to be adjusted in the face of short-run income fluctuations, and 
because they find no evidence of variability when this measure is used to rank individuals. 16 
Finally, for developing countries, Chaudhuri and Ravallion argue that consumption 
smoothing arrangements tend to work imperfectly for the poor in developing countries due to 
the existence of liquidity constraints. 17 The problems with expenditure and consumption are 
measurement errors: first, expenditure may include durables expenditure, and second (a 
particular problem for agricultural households) the value of consumption from own 
production has to be calculated. They raise the interesting policy issue that for best targeting 
of redistributive schemes, the ordering of households in terms of long-term living standards is 
what is most important. Therefore, they argue that identifying the most stable intertemporal 
indicator, which has been the focus of the Anand and Harris study and other studies, may not 
necessarily be the best method to indicate the ordering of households that is essential to 
identify those which are the poorest. In fact, in their analysis they conclude that short-run 
income is probably a better measure to identify the chronically poor than is per capita food 
expenditure. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, information was collected in the Ramanagaram 
study on five different variables which may act as proxies for income. These variables are 
total expenditure in rupees, per capita expenditure in rupees, total foodgrains expenditure in 
rupees, per capita foodgrains expenditure in rupees, a dummy variable for whether the family 
owned land or not, and an index of the number of items of consumer equipment owned by the 
15 Anand and Harris, 1989. 
16 Anand and Harris, 1989: 43-44. 
17 Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 1994: 367-394. 
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family. This index was calculated as the sum out of a total of eight possible consumer items 
(transistor, bicycle, television, chair/bench, watch, fan, cot, and scooter/moped). These 
variables are discussed in turn. 
A. Land ownership 
In the survey, a basic question on land ownership was posed to the respondents: `Do you own 
any land? If yes, is it self-owned or leased-in? '. In the sample as a whole, 115 women 
(57.2%) said their families had no land, 86 (42.7%) said they possessed land, 1 (0.5%) said 
they had land but that it was part of the joint family and undivided, 2 (1.0%) did not know 
and 1 (0.5%) refused to answer. 18 The land owned ranged in size from 0.5 to 18 acres. 
Altogether, 95.3% of the families that had some land said that it was self-owned. Land- 
ownership varied across religions: 61 Hindu women (55%) came from families with land, 19 
Muslim families (25%) had land, while 7 Christian families (46%) owned land. The average 
amount of land owned per household was 1.57 acres for the Hindus, 0.38 acres for the 
Muslims, and 0.77 acres for the Christians. Thus the Muslims, who had a higher mean 
fertility than the Christians, also owned less land on average than the Christians. Altogether, 
of the 86 families that possessed some land, 3 families (3.5%) said that the land they 
cultivated was leased-in, 1 woman (1.2%) did not know, while 82 (95.3%) said that their land 
was self-owned. Among those households which leased land, one was Muslim and the other 
two were Hindu. 
Ownership of land is often deemed an important variable because there is a demand for child 
labour in order to work the land. However, in the Ramanagaram sample, as will be observed 
in the section on children's occupations, the demand for child labour is not so much for 
tilling the land as for employment in cottage industry. The unimportance of land ownership 
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as a variable affecting demographic decisions is also borne out by the fact that the Muslims, 
who have the highest mean level of fertility, possess the least amount of land of all three 
religious groups in the Ramanagaram sample. 
B. Consumer expenditure 
The women interviewed were acutely aware of the money that they spent per month, and 
were able to give accurate descriptions of the amount spent on food, their children, and 
themselves. I therefore would place considerable reliance on these figures (except for those 
relating to alcohol, as discussed below). " In many cases, the women reported the amount 
they spent in terms of the quantities of goods that they bought per month. I have multiplied 
these quantities by the local prices prevailing in February 1996 in the main mandi (market) in 
Ramanagaram in order to obtain estimates of the women's expenditures in rupee terms at 
current prices. The information on mean total and per capita monthly expenditure 
volunteered by the women is reported in Tables 9 and 10. 
"s The question in the questionnaire on land ownership related to ownership of land, and not to land 
operated. 
19 One reason why it is justified to place considerable reliance on the figures relating to women's 
expenditures is that the estimates provided by the women correspond very closely to one another. This 
is particularly true of responses given by women who belonged to the same religion, and who also 
belonged to the same socio-economic class. Given that the interviews were conducted on an individual 
basis, this suggests that the women's ability to recall information relating to their expenditure was 
accurate, even if it might have been subject to recall bias. If recall bias was present, it seems likely that 
it affected all respondents similarly. 
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Table 9: Mean monthly total expenditure by religion, Ramanagaram sample (1996). (Rupees) 
Category of All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
expenditure 
Expenditure % Expenditure % Expenditure % Expenditure % 
Rent 64.7 4.4 37.4 3.7 355.2 14.8 150.0 7.8 
Foodgrains 
Rice 297.2 20.3 246.9 24.2 368.8 15.4 333.0 17.3 
Ragi 88.6 6.1 100.5 9.8 70.6 3.0 84.3 4.4 
Wheat 103.7 7.1 32.8 3.2 207.6 8.7 124.0 6.5 
Pulses 5.4 0.4 6.4 0.6 3.8 0.2 5.8 0.3 
Foodgrains total 494.9 33.8 386.6 37.8 650.8 27.2 547.1 28.5 
Other food items 
Vegetables/fruits 36.4 2.5 27.9 2.7 50.2 2.1 32.5 1.7 
Meat/fish 505.5 34.5 339.7 33.2 779.2 31.5 568.6 29.6 
Milk 7.2 0.5 6.6 0.7 8.6 0.4 5.4 0.3 
Other foods total 549.1 37.5 374.2 36.6 838.0 35.0 606.5 31.5 
Leisure 
Alcohol/tobacco 18.8 1.3 6.7 0.7 40.4 1.7 3.5 0.2 
Cinema 9.7 0.7 11.0 1.1 11.4 0.5 12.4 0.7 
Leisure total 28.5 1.9 17.7 1.7 51.8 2.2 15.9 0.9 
Children 231.7 15.8 129.7 12.7 373.5 15.6 478.6 24.9 
Miscellaneous 
Soaps/saris/hair oil 96.5 6.6 76.5 7.5 125.1 5.2 125.1 6.5 
Total* 1465.4 100.0 1022.1 100.0 2394.4 100.0 1923.2 100.0 
*Prices are those prevailing in the market of Ramanagararn town in February 1996. 
Table 10: Mean monthly per capita expenditure by religion, Ramanagaram sample (1996). 
(Rupees) 
Category of All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
expenditure 
Expenditure % Expenditure % Expenditure % Expenditure % 
Rent 14.4 5.0 9.5 4.6 21.8 5.9 13.9 3,2 
Foodgrains 
Rice 55.9 19.6 47.6 22.8 63.8 17.2 78.2 18.0 
Ragi 18.2 6.4 22.4 10.7 12.3 3.3 17.4 4.0 
Wheat 17.4 6.1 5.7 2.7 32.4 8.8 29.2 6.7 
Pulses 1.1 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.2 1.9 0.4 
Foodgrains total 92.6 32.4 76.9 36.9 109.2 29.5 126.7 29,2 
Other food items 
Vegetables/fruits 7.4 2.6 6.2 3.0 9.0 2.4 8.0 1.9 
Meat/fish 100.4 35.1 69.4 33.3 138.6 37.5 138.9 32.0 
Milk 1.4 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.6 0.4 1.8 0.4 
Other foods total 109.2 38.2 76.9 36.9 149.2 40.3 148.7 34.2 
Leisure 
Alcohol/tobacco 2.6 0.9 1.2 0.6 4.9 1.3 0.9 0.2 
Cinema 2.1 0.7 2.2 1.1 1.6 0.4 3.1 0.7 
Leisure total 4.7 1.6 3.4 1.6 6.5 1.8 4.0 0.9 
Children 43.8 15.3 24.7 11.8 59.2 16.0 108.4 25.0 
Miscellaneous 
Soaps/saris/ hair oil 20.9 7.3 17.2 . 
8.3 24.1 6.5 32.7 7.5 
Total* 285.7 100.0 208.6 100.0 370.0 100.0 434.5 100.0 
*Prices are those prevailing in the market of Ramanagaram town in February 1996. 
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These estimates of per capita income are lower than the national per capita income figures, 
probably because (as discussed below) the savings and alcohol estimates do not reflect actual 
levels. Muslims have the largest mean total consumer expenditure, followed by the Christians 
and the Hindus. If we look at per capita consumer expenditure, the Christians have the 
highest per capita consumer expenditure, followed by the Muslims and then the Hindus. The 
differences between Hindus and Christians and Hindus and Muslims were statistically 
significant at the 95% level, but the difference between Muslims and Christians was not. 
These findings suggest that the Hindus had the lowest expenditure per capita compared to the 
Muslims and the Christians. Of all three religious communities, Christians spent the most 
(25% of per capita expenditure) on children, perhaps reflecting a `quantity-quality' trade-off 
in Christian fertility because, as we will see in Chapter 6, the Christians had the lowest 
fertility of all three religious groups. 
Some of the women explained that they did not deliberately save money and in the event of 
ill-health or a daughter's wedding, would borrow money at the required time. For those who 
did save, I was unable to determine exactly the extent of their savings, if any. Nevertheless, I 
was able to ask a qualitative question to establish what the women would do for extra 
income, which was `What do you do about income in the event of an unforeseen occurrence 
such as illness? ' This question had six options which the women were asked to give `yes/no' 
responses to. These were: the children leave school, son/daughter sends you money from the 
city, use savings, borrow from neighbours, pawn jewellery and other strategies such as 
someone else helps out. Using savings was not the most popular recourse. Rather, borrowing 
from friends and neighbours was preferred: this response was given by 38% of Hindus, 25% 
of Muslims and 53% of Christians. 
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The women were very happy to reveal their monthly expenditure on betel leaves and tobacco. 
However, they were extremely reluctant to speak of alcohol consumption either by 
themselves or by their husbands. The reticence of all but a very few women about revealing 
their expenditure on alcohol is one drawback of the estimates of consumer expenditure 
derived from the responses to the questionnaire. Alcohol accounts for 0.9% of total consumer 
expenditure per capita, which is very low compared to the scale of the alcohol problem which 
emerged in qualitative evidence collected during my fieldwork. Therefore, the figures in the 
alcohol/tobacco category of Tables 9 and 10 mainly refer to tobacco consumption, rather than 
to alcohol. 
Cinemas were popular, as well, and an average of about Rs. 10 in total or Rs. 2.1 per capita 
was spent per month on entertainment. However, these cinema shows were attended by the 
Hindu and Christian women, but not at all by the Muslim women, mainly due to Purdah 
restrictions. The price of a cinema ticket in February 1996 was about Rs. 6 per person, 
implying that women went to the cinema on average about once or twice a month. The 
expenditure on cinema=going is relevant to questions of fertility because messages about 
infant and child care were advertised at the cinema, prior to the screening of a film. 
Women also allocated 7.3% of their monthly expenditure per capita to miscellaneous items 
for themselves personally. These chiefly included clothes for themselves (usually bought 
once or twice a year at festival times), soap (both for clothes and for bathing), white talcum 
powder, coconut oil and flowers, face cream, kohl, and the stick-on bindis for Hindu women. 
Three products - hair oil, talcum powder and face cream - essentially formed the core 
cosmetics for the Ramanagaram women. 20 My impression was that the unusual level of 
expenditure on these items (35.4% of the total expenditure on miscellaneous items), was 
caused by the influence of the media through radio, television and billboards, in promoting 
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these products through advertising. However, the bathing soap, hair oil, powder and face 
cream were used not just by the women of the household, but also chiefly by their adult sons 
and a bit less frequently by elderly relatives living in the household. 21 
One reason that it is important to describe and discuss the composition of consumption 
expenditure in detail is that it provides qualitative evidence about women's lives in the taluk. 
It is important to know how much women spend on basic necessities for the household 
compared to expenditures on themselves or on their children. One important qualitative 
finding from the breakdown of consumer expenditure is that the Christians, on average, spend 
more on their children than do the other two religious groups. As Christian fertility in the 
taluk was also lower than the fertility of Hindus and Muslims, this is consistent with a view 
that Christians favoured child-quality over child-quantity and were investing more in their 
children. Given the enormous academic literature which has been devoted to the quantity- 
quality trade-off and the relationship between income and fertility, it seemed worthwhile to 
analyse in detail the composition of consumption expenditure in the Ramanagaram sample. 
C. Consumer equipment 
The questionnaire also posed questions concerning ownership of certain consumer durable 
assets: a transistor, a bicycle, a fan, a cot, a moped/scooter, a watch, a television and a 
chair/bench. The number of families owning these items of consumer equipment is shown in 
Table 11. 
20 The powder was made by Ponds India Ltd. and called 'Pond's Dreamflower Talc' while the cream 
was rather enticingly named 'Fair And Lovely', produced by Hindustan Lever Ltd. 
21 During the interviews, the women would meet me only after they had applied their creams and 
powders and tidied their hair. No amount of coaxing that they should not waste their cosmetics on me 
seemed to deter their resolve to literally put `best faces forward' to strangers. If I did not inform them 
earlier that I was coming, this invariably meant that I would have to wait about 5-10 minutes on the 
doorstep while the women prepared themselves to be interviewed. Frequently, when I sought interviews 
with women, they would be at home oiling their daughter's hair or their own with the coconut oil. 
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Table 11: Ownership of items of consumer equipment by religion, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Consumer item All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Transistor 103 51.2 64 57.7 27 36.0 7 46.7 
Bicycle 83 41.2 47 42.3 31 41.3 5 33.3 
Fan 86 42.8 39 35.1 38 50.7 9 60.0 
Cot 83 41.3 35 31.5 39 52.0 6 40.0 
Moped/scooter 33 16.4 21 18.9 8 10.7 4 26.7 
Watch 115 57.2 64 57.7 40 53.3 11 73.3 
Television 100 49.6 50 45.0 40 53.3 10 66.7 
Chair/bench 124 61.7 69 62.2 42 56.0 13 86.7 
For the sample as a whole, televisions, transistors, watches and chairs or benches were the 
most popular items of consumer equipment in Ramanagaram. 
The ownership of a transistor might indicate the extent that the family would be aware of 
outside influences, as well as its relative prosperity. This is related to fertility because most 
public information about contraception and family planning in rural areas of India is provided 
via the radio and television. In the sample, 51% of the total possessed a transistor, 58% of 
Hindus, 36% of Muslims, and 47% of Christians. At the 95% confidence level, while the 
differences between Hindu and Muslim mean ownership of transistors was found to be 
statistically significant, the difference between Christian and Hindu and Christian and 
Muslim mean ownership of transistors was not. 
Ownership of a television in Ramanagaram is a sign both of wealth and of prestige. This item 
is particularly interesting from the perspective of contraceptive choice because the media in 
Karnataka play an important role in the dissemination of information about family planning 
services. Televisions were very popular in Ramanagaram, particularly within the Muslim 
community. One Muslim woman interviewed explained to me that since the Muslim women 
were not allowed to go to the cinema due to the strict code of purdah their main source of 
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entertainment was the television at home. Of the total number of households, 50% had a 
television: 45% of Hindus, 53% of Muslims and 67% of Christians. 
A bicycle was much prized in Ramanagaram, mainly because one of its primary uses was to 
carry water. 22 Because, as my fieldwork revealed, nearly 27 pots were required on average 
per family per day, with 2.2 hours on average per person per day devoted to water collection, 
a bicycle considerably reduced the number of hours spent collecting water. This is relevant to 
an analysis of fertility, because it has been hypothesised that children may be used for water 
and firewood collection in areas which lack suitable infrastructure 23 Of the families in the 
sample, 41% had a bicycle: 42% of Hindus, 41% of Muslims and 33% of Christians. A 
reason for the smaller percentage of Christian households who owned a bicycle may have 
been that many Christian homes possessed water taps. However, at the 95% confidence level, 
there was no statistically significant difference between religious groups. Moreover, a greater 
percentage of Christians owned mopeds and scooters. 
Fans are another indicator of relative prosperity of the family, even though most of these 
were not ceiling fans but cheaper table fans. Indeed, insofar as they may be regarded as 
oriented toward personal comfort rather than economic necessity, they may be assessed as a 
measure of the ability to afford a luxury. In the sample as a whole, 43% had a fan in their 
homes, 35% of the Hindus, 51% of the Muslims, and 60% of the Christians. This is another 
indication that the Christians were comparatively better-off. This fact is also reflected in the 
higher proportion of Christians who owned a chair or bench (87% compared to 62% for 
Hindus and 56% for Muslims). 
Ownership of a cot may again be considered a luxury, in that it is meant for comfort, rather 
than economic necessity. In most rural homes in this region, people sleep on the floor. 
22 Normally eight pots of water could be strung with rope across the body of the bicycle. 
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Therefore, the ownership of a cot probably indicates a higher income level for the family. In 
the sample as a whole, 41% of families possessed a cot. A greater percentage of Muslims 
owned cots, followed by Christians and Hindus. This suggests that something other than 
merely income influences this aspect of consumption, since the Christians were the 
wealthiest group. Perhaps it is because Muslim women are compelled to spend almost all 
their time in the house because of the purdah restrictions, and consequently would make 
more continuous use of this consumer item. 
Time-keeping in the Ramanagaram economy was typical of most Indian towns. There were 
no public clocks except in workplaces or schools, and therefore many families did possess at 
least one watch, in order for both men and women to get to work for the morning shift. Of the 
families in the sample, 57% had a watch, 58% of the Hindus, 53% of the Muslims, and 73% 
of the Christians. It is interesting that this pattern concerning watch-ownership does not 
appear to follow precisely differences in other measures of income between communities, 
either, since by other measures Hindus appear poorer than Muslims yet more of them owned 
watches. 
Correlation coefficients among these various possible measures of income were calculated, as 
shown in Table 12. 
23 See Dasgupta, 1993a: 343-370. 
96 
Table 12: Correlation coefficients between different measures of income, Ramanagaram sample 
1( 99 6) 
Measure of income Total Per capita Land Total food Consumer Per capita 
expenditure expenditure ownership expenditure equipment food 
expenditure 
Total expenditure 1.00 
Per capita expenditure 0.77 1.00 
Land ownership -0.16 -0.04 1.00 
Total food expenditure 0.56 0.23 -0.21 1.00 
Consumer equipment 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.10 1.00 
Per capita food expenditure 0.38 0.57 -0.11 0.65 0.05 1.00 
Most of the measures of income were highly correlated with each other. The exceptions were 
land-ownership and the ownership of items of consumer equipment. Total monthly 
expenditure in rupees was highly correlated with per capita expenditure in rupees and 
expenditure on foodgrains. There was a low correlation between land-ownership and total 
expenditure, and between ownership of consumer items and total expenditure. This may be 
because better-off families were not necessarily land-owners, but instead earned incomes 
through cottage industry or services 24 Moreover, ownership of consumer items may not have 
been related to current total monthly expenditure because the items were one-off purchases 
obtained from past savings. 
In the models of marriage age, contraceptive choice and fertility presented in chapters 4,5 
and 6, one of the measures of income used is total expenditure. However, in order to control 
for the fact that some households' expenditure might be greater not because they are richer 
but because they have more members, the number of female extended family members 
(which is very highly correlated with total household size), is used as an additonal regressor 
in the models. Measures of der capita expenditure are not used, on the grounds they take into 
24 As Janakarajan and Seabright argue, increased landlessness can be interpreted as a sign either of 
greater poverty or of better opportunities outside agriculture. In their survey, households which reported 
improvements in economic circumstances possessed less land and were characterised by a greater 
decrease in landowning and livestock ownership than average, but showed greater improvements in 
ownership of consumer durable goods. See Janakarajan and Seabright, 1996. 
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account completed family size, and are endogenous in a model of fertility. In some of the 
models, an alternative indicator of well-being, an index of items of consumer equipment 
possessed by the household, is also used. 
In conclusion, the census information on the sample shows that Ramanagaram women are, on 
average, poorly educated and very often perform more than one occupation. Their husbands 
are, on average, slightly better-educated than they are, and mainly perform only one 
occupation. Higher proportions of men, compared with women, perform skilled occupations. 
Measures of income in terms of consumer expenditure and ownership of consumer 
equipment show that the Christians in Ramanagaram are better-off than Hindus and Muslims. 
In later chapters these measures of education, occupation and income are three major 
variables incorporated into our models of age at marriage, contraception, and fertility. 
IX. The nature of the dependent variable: age at first marriage, the decision to use 
contraception, and children ever born 
Before considering in detail the econometric analysis of the determinants of women's age at 
first marriage, their decision to use contraception, and their fertility, it is important to 
examine the characteristics of the dependent variables used in the multivariate analysis. This 
question will be examined first in terms of the average values and standard deviations of 
these three demographic characteristics, and then in terms of the distributions of these three 
variables in the Ramanagaram sample. We first consider women's age at first marriage. 
Table 13 shows the means and standard deviations of the woman's age at first marriage for 
the whole sample and for Hindus, Muslims and Christians separately. 
98 
Table 13. Woman's age at first marriage, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category Mean Standard deviation 
All women 17.27 0.28 
Hindus 16.94 0.35 
Muslims 17.66 0.51 
Christians 17.64 0.82 
It is evident from the table that that there was little difference in mean age at first marriage 
between Muslims and Christians, although there was a difference between Hindus and 
Muslims and between Hindus and Christians. Interestingly, the mean age at first marriage for 
all women in the Ramanagaram sample is lower than the prescribed legal minimum age at 
first marriage which is 18 years for women in Karnataka. 
Another useful way of looking at age at marriage is by examining the number of years since 
the woman's first marriage, and this is shown in Table 14. The reason this is important is that 
theoretically, if the sample of women belonging to one religious community in the sample 
have been married, on average, for a longer duration than women belonging to another 
religious group, this might be manifested by the first group of women showing higher fertility 
than the second group. 
Table 14. Years since first marriage, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category Mean Standard deviation 
All women 17.59 0.82 
Hindus 16.46 1.00 
Muslims 19.00 1.02 
Christians 18.78 1.03 
The Muslims and Christians interviewed had been married longer than the Hindus. Mean 
number of years since first marriage differ between Hindus and Muslims and between Hindus 
and Christians, although not between Muslims and Christians. 
An important preliminary to deciding on the appropriate method of econometric analysis of 
the determinants of women's age at first marriage, is to consider the characteristics of the 
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distribution of the dependent variable. The variable is measured in years, and is more-or-less 
normally distributed as can be seen in Table 15 and Figure 1. A majority of the women 
interviewed were married between the ages of 11 and 25. Only 1 woman was married 
between the ages of 1 and 10; only 1 woman was married between the ages of 31 and 45. 
There is no heaping of the variable at `favourite' ages to marry, and hence no justification 
for defining the dependent variable as a `count' variable or a categorical variable. The 
distribution of the variable is continuous across practically all values between 11 and 30. It is 
for this reason that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods are used in the econometric 
analysis of the models of marriage age presented in Chapter 4. 
Table 15: Distribution of the age at first marriage, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Woman's age at first marriage in years Frequency 
0-10 1 
11-15 68 
16-20 86 
21-25 23 
26-30 4 
31-35 1 
36-40 0 
41-45 0 
More than 46 0 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the age at first marriage, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
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The second of our dependent variables, the one whose determinants are analysed 
econometrically, in Chapter 5, is the decision to use contraception. In the survey, the 
Ramanagaram women were asked if they had ever used any method of birth control. The 
question was answered in the affirmative by 53% of ever-married women in the whole 
sample, 86% of Christians, 57% of Hindus and 40% of Muslims, as can be seen in Table 16. 
Table 16. Women's decision to use contraception, Ramanaaaram sample (1996) 
Category Mean Standard deviation 
All women 0.54 0.04 
Hindus 0.57 0.04 
Muslims 0.41 0.05 
Christians 0.92 0.07 
In the econometric analysis of the determinants of contraceptive use in chapter 5, the 
dependent variable used is whether or not the woman had ever used a method of 
contraception, where the variable takes a value 1 if the woman had ever used a contraceptive 
method and 0 otherwise. This variable follows a binomial distribution, as evident in Figure 3 
and Table 17. A logistic regression procedure is therefore used in chapter 5 in order to 
estimate the determinants of contraceptive adoption in Ramanagaram. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the decision to use contraception, Ramanagaram sample 
(1996) 
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Table 17: Distribution of the decision to use contraception. Ramanagaram sample 
1996 
Whether the woman had ever used a 
contraceptive method 
Frequency 
0 86 
1 100 
Our dependent variable in the econometric analysis of fertility outcomes in Chapter 6 is the 
number of children ever born to a woman. The means and standard deviations for each 
religious group are shown in Table 18. 
Table 18. Children ever born, Ramanaearam sample (1996) 
Category Mean Standard deviation 
All women 3.05 0.14 
Hindus 2.66 0.16 
Muslims 3.72 0.27 
Christians 2.46 0.33 
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The mean number of children ever born varied by religion, with the Muslims having one 
child more, on average, than the Hindus. The Christians had the lowest fertility of all three 
religious groups. 
The distribution of total children ever born has the shape of a truncated continuous 
distribution between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 9. As can be seen from Figure 2 and 
Table 19, there is no heaping of this variable at `favourite' numbers of children, and 
therefore there is no case to be made for defining the variable as a `count' or `categorical' 
dependent variable. The moct appropriate econometric approach to use is therefore Ordinary 
Least Squares, and consequently that was the approach used to estimate the determinants of 
the number of children ever born, as described in Chapter 6. 
Figure 2: Distribution of children ever born, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
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Table 19: Children ever born, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Number of children ever born Frequency 
1 38 
2 45 
3 38 
4 25 
5 18 
6 6 
7 11 
8 2 
9 2 
10 0 
More than 10 0 
The means and standard deviations presented raise the following issues. First, the number of 
children ever born differs between Hindus, Muslims and Christians, with the Muslims having 
one child more, on average, than women of the other two religious groups. However, 
women's age at first marriage does not differ significantly between Hindus and Muslims. The 
decision to use contraception differs significantly between Hindus and Muslims at the mean 
level, before we have controlled for other factors, and it is this which may account for the 
difference in fertility. 
Chapters 4 through 6 discuss those variables which have been argued in the literature to act 
as determinants of female age at first marriage, contraceptive choice, and fertility, 
respectively. Each chapter then models the determinants of the dependent variable in 
question, in order to investigate whether it is a 'pure religion effect' or the influence of socio- 
economic 'characteristics' which influences fertility and its two major proximate 
determinants. OLS methods are used in order to estimate the determinants of the age at first 
marriage and the determinants of children ever born, and a logit model is used to estimate the 
determinants of the decision to use contraception in Ramanagaram. The quantitative findings 
are compared and contrasted throughout both with the qualitative findings which emerge 
from the statements of the women interviewed, and with data from other parts of India. 
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CHAPTER4 
The Determinants of Nuptiality: The Age at First Marriage in Ramanagaram 
The age at first marriage is an important demographic variable that is a vital aspect of a 
woman's fertility decisions. Economists postulate that marriage occurs when the utility of 
being married exceeds the utility of staying single, taking into account the costs of finding a 
mate and the opportunity costs of being married. ' The most important aspect of the economic 
theory of marriage is that male and female earning abilities determine household production 
and the gains from marriage. An increase in men's earning abilities increases the gains from 
marriage for them because high-quality (or high-wage) men can attract higher-quality 
women; this is Becker's `positive assortative mating' theorem. 2 This implies that higher-wage 
men will marry earlier than other men. On the other hand, the earning ability of the woman 
reduces the gains from marriage for her because those women who have higher earnings gain 
less from marriage than other women, since their higher earnings reduce the couple's demand 
for children and, as Becker argues, `the advantages of the sexual division of labour within 
marriage's Moreover, Sander argues that higher wages for women also reduce the shadow 
price of divorce for women. 4 It is also significant that the wage-opportunity costs of being 
married are normally positive for women and negative for men, due to the gender division of 
household work and the effect of child care. This theoretical reasoning suggests that women 
will marry only when the utility of being married exceeds the utility of staying single after 
taking into account the costs of searching for a partner. The possible factors, both economic 
and social, which may influence the woman when she contemplates the marriage decision are 
elaborated below. 
Becker, 1974b: 299-344; Becker, 1991. 
2 For more on this see Becker, 1981: Chapter 4 on 'Assortative mating in marriage markets'. 3 Becker, 1981: 231. 
4 Sander, 1995. 
105 
I. Factors influencing the age at first marriage 
The age at first marriage can be influenced by a number of different factors. 
A. Education 
Theoretically, the educational level of the woman can influence the age at marriage in five 
ways. 5 First, there may exist more opportunities for the woman outside marriage if she is 
educated, specifically in terms of opportunities for higher education or employment outside 
the home. This may delay her marriage. 
Second, education may enable a woman to obtain a better-educated husband or one with an 
urban job, increasing the search time for finding a suitable partner, and delaying marriage. 
This clearly influenced some women in Ramanagaram, as shown by the remark of a Hindu 
woman, Padmabai, age 40, who said, `I want my daughter to do her B. Ed. [teacher's training 
degree] first, become a teacher and then only think of marriage - find a good educated 
husband, and marry only after 20. I don't save aside any jewellery for her because I am 
giving her an education. Vidya [education] is the jewel I am giving her. ' This was echoed by 
a Muslim woman, Sofia Banu, also age 40, who remarked, `I have given my daughter an 
education so that she can do employment and find a good husband - it is a better investment 
than jewellery. ' 
Third, the returns from investment in education are reflected in increased productivity in both 
household and market production. Increased household productivity affects the opportunity 
cost of marriage through increased labour market opportunities for women, which increases 
the returns to marriage. Moreover, since acquiring education involves a considerable amount 
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of time, there is less gain to be had from specialising in the home and rearing children as a 
result of marriage. Thus, education will delay marriage because the education-related 
increment to the gains from marriage can only be reaped when education is complete. 
Fourth, as the employment prospects of women are better if they are better educated, they are 
able to support themselves economically while being single and spend a greater amount of 
time in searching for a suitable partner - i. e. they can finance a longer search-process. 
6 
Finally, education may also influence women's ideas about marriage, via `learning values'. 
However, the manner in which schooling is supposed to affect marriage empirically is not 
always clear-cut. In their empirical analysis of one Hindu and one Muslim caste in two 
villages in north India, for instance, Jeffery and Jeffery argue that women's schooling is seen 
more as a means to enhance a woman's prospects in the marriage market because education 
helps women with the discharge of `status production' duties and in the management of 
household accounts 7 `Status production' work refers to those aspects of women's domestic 
duties which enhance the status of the family. Jeffery and Jeffery argue that an educated wife 
is regarded as having better manners, being more socially competent, and being better able to 
teach her children good manners and good habits, than an uneducated one. An educated wife 
is also perceived as being able to help with children's schoolwork, go shopping by herself, 
make records of exchanges with the extended kinship network, and visit her natal home alone 
$ and without difficulty. 
For Karnataka, there is evidence that education is associated with a later age at first marriage. 
The National Family Health Survey 1992-93 showed that for the state as a whole, the median 
5 See Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 343-361; Shapiro, 1996: 89-103; and with particular 
reference to Karnataka the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 98-99. 
6 See Keeley, 1977: 238-250. 
7 Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997: 186-192. 
8 Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997: 203-206. 
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age at first marriage for women in 1993 was 6 to 7 years later among women who had 
completed high school than among illiterate women in all five-year age cohorts from age 20 
to age 49.9 Empirical evidence is also available from many other countries. 10 Singh found that 
between 1950 and 1990 there has been a rise in the age at marriage of rural women in 
Himachal Pradesh from less than 12 years to 19 years, and his findings suggest that this is 
mainly due to the rise in education in this area. " Because women's education has emerged as 
an important determinant of age at marriage in other studies, its effect on marriage age in 
Ramanagaram was also investigated. 
Primary schooling in Karnataka spans five years (from Standards 1 to 5), and secondary 
school spans another five years (from Standards 6 to 10). At the end of the tenth year of 
schooling are SSLC examinations. After this, girls are allowed either to read for Standards 11 
and 12 in school, or the option of a two-year pre-university course. After this, there are 
undergraduate degrees, lasting either three or four years, followed by Master's courses 
lasting two years. 
In the questionnaire, the women were asked separately about their primary, secondary and 
university-level education. In Chapter 3 we looked at the distribution of educational levels in 
the Ramanagaram sample. It may be recollected from that discussion that the mean years of 
education for the sample as a whole was 6.0 years. In the multiple regression models tested 
later in this chapter, the various measures of education used are the woman's total years of 
education, her primary education, her secondary education, and her university education. 
9 National Family Health Survey 1992-93, Karnataka, 1995: 50-5 1. 
10 There is a voluminous literature on this issue. For example, see Birdsall, 1989: 23-50; Cochrane, 
1979; Carlson, 1979: 341-353; Keeley, 1977: 238-250; Summers, 1994; Appleton, 1996: 139-166; 
Brien and Lillard, 1994: 1167-1204; Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1985: 33. 
"Singh, 1992: 123-130. 
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The educational level of her husband is another variable which may influence a woman's age 
at marriage. 12 The way in which this influence might work would be that a better educated 
man prefers to marry a woman who is older, whether because he wants a better educated 
spouse, because he believes that it is better to marry someone who is more mature, because 
he believes that a better educated wife will earn more, or because he believes she will cause 
their children to be better educated. This is Becker's theorem about `positive assortative 
mating' or the `mating of likes'. " Becker argues that the mating of likes occurs when such 
marriages maximize aggregate commodity output over all marriages, irrespective of whether 
the traits of men and women are financial, biological or psychological. The theorem is as 
follows: Assume men and women differ only in their quantitative traits (A,, and Af) and each 
trait has a positive marginal productivity. This implies that 
Dz (A,,,, Afl >0 and az Am, 
ArZ 
>0 (1) 
aAm aAf 
A sorting of large A. and large Af and small Am and small Af maximises aggregate output if 
and only if increasing both Am and Af adds more to output than the sum of the effects of 
separate increases in Am and Af. In this case, an increase in Am reinforces and raises the 
effect of an increase in Af. Positive assortative mating is optimal when 
a2, Afj >0 (2) 
aAn, aA f 
because aggregate output is then maximised. Further, the gain to a man M; from marrying a 
woman Fj rather than staying single is 
Gi = (Z, i - Z, S) - Zi i3) 
12 Sander, 1995. 
13 Becker, 1981: Chapter 4. 
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where Zfj is the given income of woman F,, Z; j is the output of the ith man married to the jth 
woman, Zi, is the income of man M; if he stays single, and the term in parentheses increases 
with the quality of M1 when A,,, and Af are complements and decreases when A. and Af are 
substitutes. In this case, the gain from marriage to a women of a given quality is greater for a 
superior man when traits are complements and greater for an inferior man when traits are 
substitutes. A higher quality women marries a higher quality man because she raises the 
productivity of a superior man and vice versa. Thus, for the market, positive assortative 
mating or the mating of likes is optimal when aggregate output is maximised over all 
marriages. 14 
In the Ramanagaram sample, the husband's education variable was measured in a similar 
manner to the number of years of the woman's education. However, one could justifiably 
expect the education of the woman and her husband to be highly correlated with each other. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the correlation coefficient between wife's and husband's 
education in the Ramanagaram sample was high and positive at 0.63. This suggested the need 
to investigate the effect of these two variables, holding each other constant, and that was in 
fact done in the multivariate models estimated below. 
B. Women's employment 
The availability of better employment opportunities for women outside the home increases 
the opportunity cost of women's time in marriage. Labour market participation and better pay 
levels may enable women to contribute to the costs of marital search for a longer period, 
enabling women to find more suitable grooms. This may work to delay female marriage age. 
In this context, there is evidence that the age at marriage for women rises markedly when 
14 For more on this see Becker, 1981: Chapter 4. 
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women and men are employed in skilled rather than unskilled jobs. '5 This variable was not 
included in the multivariate models estimated because a majority of the ever-married 
Ramanagaram women interviewed took up an occupation only after their marriage, and 
because full employment histories of all women before marriage were not available. 
C. Income 
A third primary influence on marriage age is income. 16 However, the manner it which it is 
supposed to affect marriage age is complex. It is possible that income is positively associated 
with marriage age, in the sense that a greater income earned by a woman herself will reduce 
her expected gains from marriage, thereby increasing her marriage age. However, increased 
income earned by a man may enable him to afford the expenses of supporting a wife who is 
not earning an income, as well as the costs of possible children, thereby enabling him to 
marry earlier. A higher-income man may also be able to afford to marry a young woman who 
has not already received an inheritance from her parents, and who has not had a long time to 
save up for marriage. It is this reasoning which lies behind the claim that as a general rule in 
pre-industrial Europe, wealth and income were negatively associated with marriage age, with 
richer farmers marrying younger than poorer ones or landless people, and with the gentry and 
nobility marrying the youngest of all. '7 
However, the relationship between income and marriage age is still more complex than this. 
In some societies, at the time of their marriage, children have a claim on a proportion of the 
savings of parents and this takes the form of dowries. 18 Where a dowry system still operates, 
IS Anderson, Hill and Butler, 1987: 223-34. 
16 Ermisch, 1981: 347-356. 
17 See Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm, 1981: Chapters 2 and 3 by Medick; see also Ogilvie, 1997: 
Chapter 8. 
18 Dowries in Karnataka (as perhaps in much of South Asia) do not typically involve land or other 
fixed assets. As Agarwal argues, dowries are in fact `movable'. They usually take the form of gold 
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as in India, the ability of parents to meet dowry payments may influence the daughter's age at 
marriage. In south India since the 1950s, the main shift concerning marriage payments has 
been from bridewealth to dowry. Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell argue that in India dowry 
payments `order' a marriage market characterised by hypergamy (the practice of women 
marrying into wealthier families of the same caste). This is because dowry serves as a 
compensation to the richer family for contracting the alliance. 
19 Thus, if parents feel that they 
are unable to afford the costs of a wedding (and this is quite likely if there is more than one 
daughter to be married), marriage for the daughter (especially if she is of lower birth order) 
may be delayed and hence her age at marriage higher. 
20 Naturally, this complicates the 
postulated relationship between income and age at marriage. In Ramanagaram, for example, 
wedding costs were quite high. Sakamma, age 42, a scheduled caste woman from village C 
remarked, `I want to perform a grand wedding for my daughter. I would need one lakh 
(hundred thousand rupees) to marry my daughter' 21 Having said that, parents may also 
expect dowry demands to become even higher in the future and hence decide that if they can 
afford it, it is better to marry daughters as soon as possible. 
The `search time' required for finding a suitable partner may affect the age at first marriage. 22 
Taking a cue from option theory, ceteris paribus, the search time for finding a partner will be 
long when the option of being single is highly valued. This is important in societies such as 
India, where marriage, though near-universal, is usually irreversible, and for the woman the 
cost of divorce, both social and economic, is very high. The cost of remaining unmarried is 
also very high. The search time is influenced by the ability to finance the `search costs' of 
finding a partner. This will be influenced by the income and other characteristics of the 
jewellery, utensils, items of consumer equipment, small farm animals and money. For more on this, see 
Agarwal, 1994. 
"'Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983; Rao, 1993: 666-677. 
20 Scarlett Epstein, 1973: 193. 
21 For evidence that the `marriage squeeze' in South Asia has manifested itself in rising dowries, see 
Rao, 1993: 666-677. 
22 Sander, 1995. 
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woman and her parents. 23 A woman who is more highly educated and perhaps also employed 
may be in a position to delay marriage by being able to finance the costs of searching for a 
partner whom she regards as more suitable (e. g. more educated). If her parents are also highly 
educated and in employment, they may also be able to take on the search costs of finding a 
more suitable partner for their daughter, thereby delaying her marriage. In societies such as 
India, where daughters stay at home with their parents until marriage, parents are more likely 
to decide how many resources to allocate to search costs and to assist in paying them. 
Ideally, in order to assess the impact of income on marriage age, it would be desirable to 
consider the `income of origin' for the woman prior to her marriage rather than the `income 
of destination' i. e. the income of the family that the woman marries into. However, although 
the income of the family after marriage is an ex-post factor, given the strict codes for 
marriage in Ramanagaram, whereby marriages were mainly arranged among families of a 
similar socio-economic class, it is not unrealistic to assume that the `income of destination' is 
highly correlated with the `income of origin'. 4 In the Ramanagaram sample, out of a total of 
187 marriages, only one was an inter-caste marriage by choice. All the other marriages were 
arranged by parents and took place within the same lati. 25 Though not all jatis in 
Ramanagaram are economically homogeneous, one of the central features of these arranged 
marriages is that the economic status of both families is taken into account in the marriage 
negotiations. 26 For example, referring to the marriage negotiations for her sixteen year-old 
daughter, which were taking place at the time of interview, Chandramma of village A 
stressed, `We are looking very carefully. It is important for us to find a "good house" for our 
23 Sander, 1995. 
24 Rao, 1993: 674. 
25 Although marriages were `arranged' in a traditional sense, there was some degree of choice for the 
marriage partners in that they were consulted for their consent, after meeting with each other in the 
presence of other relatives. 
26 In this context, it should be noted that an economic analysis of the arranged marriage system has an 
intrinsic principal-agent problem, and that the standard Beckerian framework needs to be modified. 
This is because in the case of arranged marriages, it is the parents of women and men who undertake the 
search for marriage partners for their children, and who attempt to optimise that decision. 
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daughter. After all, they must be in a position to take care of her well. ' Thus, we have good 
reasons for believing that most women married into families which belonged to a broadly 
similar income bracket. It is also reasonable to assume that women's husbands' incomes as 
married adults were positively correlated with their own `incomes of origin'. Other 
researchers have made similar assumptions in their models of marriage and have shown them 
to be empirically justified. 27 However, it must be acknowledged that the lack of information 
on the income-generating characteristics of the women's original households is a deficiency 
of the Ramanagaram dataset. 
This deficiency. was unavoidable for several reasons. The married women settled in 
Ramanagaram, who formed the basis for the sample, were acutely aware of the income 
generated in their households (once they were wives), but were unable to provide accurate 
data on the income generated in their parental homes. Moreover, not all of the women's 
parental homes were in the Ramanagaram area. Collecting information on their incomes of 
origin would therefore have been difficult due to geographical distance and because in some 
cases the parental homes did not exist due to the demise of one or both parents since the 
woman's marriage. In the absence of any reliable source of information on women's incomes 
of origin, it was decided to rely upon the existence of at least some degree of correlation 
between women's `income of origin' and their 'income of destination' and to use various 
measures pertaining to income of destination in order to investigate possible links between 
income and women's age at first marriage. It is acknowledged that, as with most data on 
income in less developed countries, the measure of income which is used in the models 
presented in this study is imperfect, at best. However, it is better to have some measure of 
income, however imperfect, than to have no measure at all. It is for this reason that in the 
models of marriage age, the income of destination is used as a proxy for the household's 
income of origin. 
27 Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989: 905-926. 
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In this study, based on our assumption that women's income of origin is highly correlated 
with their income of destination, measures of per capita expenditure, either per capita total 
expenditure or per capita foodgrains expenditure, cannot be used because intuitively, per 
capita measures take into account the completed family size after marriage, and thus will not 
necessarily shed light on the income of origin (or destination) affecting the age at marriage. 
Consumption measured by total expenditure was chosen as the most relevant measure of 
income because it was correlated with several other important income measures, it was the 
variable the women were best able to describe accurately and provide information on, and it 
has been used by other studies. 28 Taking into account the limitations of a cross-sectional 
survey that measures observed expenditures at a point in time in relation to consumption, and 
the fact that female respondents were able to give more accurate information on monthly 
expenditures than on aggregate incomes, total consumption expenditure is arguably the best 
single guide to consumption and welfare in Ramanagaram, at least in the context of an 
analysis of the determinants of marriage age. 
In our estimates of total expenditure we will not include ownership of consumer durables on 
the grounds that the latter would have probably inflated the former if included in a single 
measure, and is endogenous in a model of the determinants of marriage age. I believe that the 
total consumer expenditure measure used here is still able to distinguish between households 
at different levels of income. Additionally, as we saw in Chapter 3, the very low correlation 
coefficient (0.16) between the total expenditure variable and the ownership of consumer 
equipment illustrates that measuring household welfare in Ramanagaram is complex. 
Moreover, given the endogeneity of this variable, in attempting to assess the determinants of 
the age at which women were married (in most cases, many years before the purchase of 
28 Blundell, Preston and Walker, 1994; Ketkar, 1979. 
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these consumer durables) it seemed better to leave out this measure, for the moment, in 
models of marriage age, but to include the index of ownership of items of consumer 
equipment later in models of fertility, where it would be possible to assess the impact of 
durables ownership on family size. 
D. Social norms 
A fourth factor that is widely theorised as influencing marriage age consists of social norms 
concerning marriage. Dasgupta defines social norms as `injunctions on behavioural 
strategies, accepted by members of society generally. '29 He points out the evidence in rural 
societies for the existence of many reciprocal insurance agreements, and suggests that three 
main factors sustain compliance with these insurance agreements. Firstly, rural communities 
function like small states, with the structures of authority invested in some and recognised by 
all members. Secondly, individuals internalise social norms so that their utility function is 'a 
reflection of ordering over actions in part driven by social norms. By internalising a norm, a 
person makes the springs of his actions contain the norm ... 
in short, his upbringing ensures 
that he has a disposition to obey the norm. '30 Finally, a third factor sustaining a norm is that if 
there is a `sufficient' number of individuals adhering to a norm, no one individual wishes to 
deviate because if he or she does so, there will be sanctions against him or her imposed by 
the others for as long as he or she does not conform. Dasgupta argues that this results in an 
externality, with a certain pattern of behaviour being sustained and replicated even when the 
rationale for such behaviour may have long since disappeared. This is particularly true of 
matters such as the `proper' time to marry. The individual's utility is an increasing function 
of the average level of activity of all others, thereby sustaining a mode of behaviour and 
actions with no incentive to deviate from them. This behavioural pattern is easily illustrated 
from statements made by women in Ramanagaram, where some women mentioned that their 
29 Dasgupta, 1993a: 210. 
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daughters `should be' married before 21, but could not actually give precise reasons why this 
should be so, barring that their community would not look well upon parents who did not do 
their `duty' by their daughters in finding husbands for them. ' For example, Nagama, age 36 
and a mother of four daughters, from village D, remarked, `I will marry my daughters at 15. I 
know it is wrong, but I do it because it is expected, we live in a "society", though personally I 
want to improve them. ' Another woman, Laxmiamma, age 29, from village A, remarked, 
`Marriage at 15 is the norm here. I feel I have suffered enough, why should I make her suffer? 
But, society matters too. ' 
Identifying changes in social norms about marriage age is difficult, because economists 
postulate that social norms are subsumed within the utility function. However, one possible 
way to measure changes in norms is to examine changes over time and one possible way to 
examine changes over time empirically is to compare the year of marriage across women. It is 
hypothesised that the woman's year of marriage will affect the age at marriage if there has 
been a general trend (most likely upwards) in norms about marriage age in the region in 
which she lives that is not accounted for by differences in educational attainment, income or 
any other variable. Thus, women who marry in more recent decades may marry at later 
ages. 32 This is likely to happen if there has been a change in social norms over time toward a 
view that later marriage age is better, a view that takes hold irrespective of the individual's 
specific circumstances. There was mixed evidence of such `ideational change' in the group 
discussions involving the Ramanagaram women. Both literate and illiterate women, older and 
younger women, and especially those who were still single, opined that in the 1990s, the mid- 
30 Dasgupta, 1993a: 210. 
31 In fact, one woman, Padmavatamma, said that it would be considered highly irresponsible if parents 
did not look after the matrimonial interests of offspring, especially daughters. When asked if daughters 
could choose partners for themselves, she said that when she was young she had had no choice but that 
she realised that youngsters nowadays thought otherwise. She went on to attribute youngsters' desires to 
choose their own partners to the influence of the cinema. 
32 This is shown clearly by Janakarajan, Olsen and Seabright, 1996. In their study of 496 marriages in 
two villages in Tamil Nadu in south India, they find that the female age at first marriage rose from 15.4 
in the 1950s to 18.6 in the 1980s. 
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twenties was the `appropriate' time for marriage. It is my guess that the women obtained this 
idea from the heavily advertised government-sponsored media campaigns on radio and 
television which spread information that marrying daughters before 18 was `wrong', illegal 
and not in the best health interests of daughters. The actual impact of time on marriage age is 
identified in a multiple regression context (as explored below). 
E. Religious, ethnic and caste differences 
The age at marriage may depend on religious, ethnic or caste differences in the population. 33 
This has been argued in many studies. 34 In his analysis of marriage, divorce and fertility 
among American religious groups in the 1980s, for instance, Sander finds that there is a 
statistically significant difference in marriage and divorce rates between Catholics and non- 
Catholics even after controlling for income and educational differences. 35 In their study 
conducted in Bijnor district between 1990 and 1992, Jeffery and Jeffery find that the age at 
first marriage for Muslim Sheikhs was consistently less than that for Hindu Jats for all age 
36 cohorts. 
Religion may have a direct impact on the age at marriage as a system of beliefs, values, or 
ideas. 37 Alternatively, it may exert an indirect effect via its impact on women's status within 
the family or community. 38 The age at marriage may also depend on church sanctions and 
religious prescriptions. 39 For example Caldwell et al argued that the main motivation for 
33 Carlson, 1979: 341-353; Frisbie, 1986: 99-106; Brien and Lillard, 1994: 1167-1204. Brian and 
Lillard argue that in Malaysia there are differences in marriage age and in fertility between the Malays, 
the Chinese and the Indians, even after controlling for socio-economic effects such as a rise in female 
education and rapid economic growth. 
34 See Sander, 1995: Chapter 2; Mcquillon, 1989: 331-346; Ketkar, 1979: 479-488. 
35 Sander, 1995. 
36 Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997: Chapters 5 and 6. 
37 We have dealt with the normative content of religion on marriage in detail in Chapter 1. 
38 See Chamie, 1977: 365-382; Obermeyer, 1992: 33-60. 
39 For example, a related issue (which we do not explore in this chapter) is the question of remarriage. 
The Mysore Population Study of 1961 argued that remarriage in towns such as Ramanagaram was as 
low as 1%, because religious tradition among higher caste Hindus, forbade the remarriage of widows. 
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early marriage in Karnataka `was provided by divine sanctions against girls who failed to 
marry before menarche . 
00 Religion can also affect the search time of finding a suitable mate 
because of the higher costs to members of some religions of making a wrong marital choice. 
This argument is applicable in Ramanagaram where the costs of making a wrong choice of 
marital partner are high. However, whether such costs differ between Hindus, Muslims and 
Christians, leading to a higher age at marriage for one religious group vis-ä-vis the others, is a 
question that needs further investigation. In the 7th Round of the Indian National Sample 
Survey undertaken in 1953-54, it was found that Muslim women in Karnataka were marrying 
1 year later than Hindu women, while Muslim men were marrying nearly 1.5 years later than 
Hindu men 41 This study, however, did not control for other socio-economic variables, so 
these findings must be interpreted with caution. 
In order to assess the influence of religion on the age at marriage for the Ramanagaram 
dataset, three dummy variables were created. The first was for Hindus versus non-Hindus, 
and the second for Muslims versus non-Muslims, having the Christians as the base category. 
Third, since this study is particularly concerned with Hindu-Muslim differences, a dummy 
variable was created for Muslims versus Hindus, excluding the Christians. 
The Mysore Population Study and the National Family Health Survey argued that in 
Karnataka, caste has an important influence on the age at first marriage 42 This is regarded as 
However, the study noted that remarriage was permitted among scheduled castes and that 2% of the 
scheduled caste women in the towns had remarried more than once. Among males, however, remarriage 
was common. See the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 106-107. Thus, religious attitudes towards 
remarriage may also affect marriage age. 
40 Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 345. 
41 As reported by Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 344. 
42 The Mysore Population Study found that among the Hindus, Brahmin women in the birth cohort 
1918-1932 had the highest median age at first marriage (16 years) of all castes in the sample. The study 
also found that among the Christians in Bangalore city, there was a caste-like division. There were 
Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. Of these three, the study spoke of `marked differences 
between the Indian Christians and the other two. Indian Christians showed greater similarity to Hindus 
and Muslims, than to Anglo-Indians and Europeans, both in the level and trend of age at marriage'. For 
more on this, see the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 98. 
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operating either through custom, or, as in the case of economically disadvantaged castes, 
through there being a strong economic reason for women to marry at young ages. 
Although Indian Muslims and Christians also have a sort of `caste system', in the 
Ramanagaram sample the widest array of castes was unquestionably found amongst the 
Hindu respondents. When asked about their caste, it is interesting that Muslim and Christian 
respondents categorised themselves in religious divisions, providing answers such as 
'Mehdavi', `Sunni' or `Protestant'. However, since `caste' for Muslims and Christians was 
essentially coterminous with `religion', nothing could be gained by including it as a separate 
variable in explaining their marriage ages. Therefore, the castes for the Hindus alone were 
classified into three broad categories for analysis: high castes, low castes and scheduled 
castes; and correspondingly three separate dummy variables were created for them. 43 The 
number of observations was reduced to 111, since only the Hindu women in the sample were 
considered. 
F. Husband's occupation 
The primary occupation of the husband may have an indirect impact on the age at first 
marriage of the woman. Men who are in skilled jobs may prefer marrying women who are 
older, or more educated, or employed outside the home. This may be because such women 
earn additional income, or raise better `quality' children. Alternatively, men employed in 
occupations requiring cheap child labour (such as domestic industry) may marry at a young 
age and consequently also marry younger women than others. 44 Farmers may also desire more 
43 The high castes included brahmins, gowdas, and vokkaligas; the low castes included aswaianas, 
balijas, hestru, kumbhar, kurubas, lingayats, maduvar, and viswakarmas; and the scheduled castes 
included the ekesu, lambani, ganigas, gangemata, upasadus and those who did not give a caste name but 
described themselves as 'se', i. e. scheduled castes. 
44 This has been argued theoretically in proto-industrial populations in Europe as described in Kriedte, 
Medick and Schlumbohm, 1981. However, the empirical findings do not provide support for this view: 
see Ogilvie and Cerman, 1996. 
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child labour for farming requirements although this implicitly assumes that they are unwilling 
or unable to hire market labour. 45 On the other hand, if the husband is earning a very high 
wage, he may be able to afford the costs of keeping a wife and raising a family, thereby 
reducing female age at marriage. 
In order to assess these hypothesized relationships between husband's occupation and age at 
marriage for Ramanagaram women, this variable was measured in three ways. First, 
husband's occupation was measured as taking a value of I if the husband was employed in a 
skilled occupation and 0 if he was employed in an unskilled occupation. Second, it was 
measured as taking a value of I if the man was a farmer, and zero otherwise. Finally, it was 
measured as taking a value of 1 if the husband was employed in domestic industry, and 0 if 
he was employed in any other occupation. 
G. Age at menarche 
The age at menarche is an important demographic variable and it is sometimes argued that it 
exerts an autonomous effect on the age at marriage 46 Trends in the age at menarche have 
been mainly researched by those working in the field of medicine. The most important 
finding of this research is that there has been a secular decline in the age at menarche over 
time in Europe. 7 In a pioneering article in Nature in 1973, Tanner argued that there was a 
secular declining trend in the age at menarche in five European countries - the U. K., Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Hungary. More recent evidence for Denmark, collected by 
Boldsen, confirms this secular decline in the age at menarche, as well as a significant decline 
in its variance. 48 Though we will not go more deeply into this research area, various studies 
45 Thorner, Kerblay and Smith, 1986. 
46 Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 353-355. 
47 Tanner, 1973: 95-96; Frisch, 1982: 1033-1035; Ostersehlt and Dankerhopfe, 1991: 647-654; 
Boldsen, 1992: 167-173. 
48 Boldsen, 1992: 167-173. 
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have concluded that trends in the age at menarche are related to changes in stature and 
nutrition, and that there is seasonal variation in menarche with different mean ages at 
menarche for girls born in different seasons. 9 
In the demographic research on south India, Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell have postulated 
that marriage traditionally took place shortly after menarche. 50 This is supposed to have been 
due partly to a belief in divine sanctions51 and partly to a common social custom which 
forbade a girl attaining menarche from continuing to perform agricultural work or paid work 
for other households; she was allowed to resume such work only after marriage. This created 
an economic pressure to marry early. Traditionally, Karnataka was characterised not so much 
by child marriage as by very early marriage of teenage girls. The Mysore Population Study 
found that 42% of women born in Karnataka between 1893 and 1902 were married before the 
age of 13.52 By comparison, Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell found that in 1980 only 1% of 10- 
year-olds were married, and 31% of 15-19-year-olds, indicating a high percentage of girls 
who were not being married as children, but who were probably being married a few years 
after menarche, rather than immediately after it. Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell postulated 
that this was because there had been a change in perceptions, according to which the proper 
time to marry was now regarded as being some years after menarche. In addition, the process 
of looking for and fixing up a suitable alliance took a year or two and this delayed marriage 
until some years after menarche. Jeffery and Jeffery argue that traditionally in north India, as 
49 Boldsen, 1992: 167-173. Boldsen tests the theory that the onset of menarche peaks in the seasons of 
winter and summer, but finds no evidence for this in Denmark. He does however suggest that the 
seasonality of menarche is probably due to the seasonality of births. 
Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 350-355. 
51 For example, Hindu scriptures such as the Dharma sastras advise that marriages of girls should not be 
delayed long after puberty. They recommend that girls be kept unmarried for a maximum of three years 
after puberty, and then only if suitable husbands cannot be found for them. For more on this see, 
Radhakrishnan, 1947: 169. 
52 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 93. 
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well, marriage shortly after menarche is popular though there is normally a gap of several 
months between marriage and cohabitation. s' 
In the present study, the Ramanagaram women were asked at what age they attained 
menarche. Boldsen has argued that girls are more likely to remember the exact time of 
menarche if it took place close to an important event in the family or a major festival, holiday 
or birthday. In addition, I would suggest that those who might not otherwise remember the 
precise age at menarche may remember the class that they were studying in if they were at 
school at the time and may thus be able to give precisely the year of the onset of menarche. 54 
In order to test the hypothesis of a secular decline in the age at menarche for the 
Ramanagaram sample, a five-year moving average of the age at menarche among the women 
of the sample was calculated and a linear trendline plotted through this graph. This procedure 
does not show any rise or decline in the age in menarche over time. In fact, the age at 
menarche appears to fluctuate more or less around the same level, approximately 14 years, 
for all birth cohorts in the sample. This does not exclude the possibility that age at menarche 
influenced the age at marriage, but it excludes the possibility of a systematic influence caused 
by change over time. 
The hypothesis that the gap between menarche and marriage was widening over time was 
tested by plotting a linear trendline through a graph which looked at the gap between 
menarche and marriage against the year of marriage. The result showed that for the women of 
the Ramanagaram sample, the gap between the age at menarche and the age at marriage 
increased from about 2 years for women who married in the 1940s to almost 5 years for 
women who married in the late 1990s. 
53 Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997. 
54 It has been found that women's recalled ages at menarche are very reliable. For more on this, see 
Livson and McNeill, 1962: 218-221. 
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Given the theoretical arguments concerning the relationship between the age at menarche and 
the age at marriage, this variable was included in the multivariate models estimated below. 
H. Marital consanguinity 
Another factor postulated as influencing marriage age is the extent of consanguinity between 
spouses in a population. In Karnataka in particular and in south India more generally, 
consanguineous unions are quite common even today; this is not the case in north India. 55 
Those who have particularly referred to consanguinity in Karnataka include Srinivas, 
Conklin, Scarlett Epstein, Hill, Radha Rama Devi et al, Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, and 
Bittles, Coble and Appaji Rao 56 Janakarajan, Olsen and Seabright also found that in their 
study of 496 marriages in two villages in Tamil Nadu, 59% of marriages which took place in 
the 1980s were consanguineous unions. 7 More recently, the National Family Health Survey 
estimated that 36% of ever-married women in Karnataka had married a relation and that rural 
women were more likely to marry relatives than urban ones. 58 Consanguinity was also more 
common for Hindus (37%) and Muslims (31%) than for Christians (22%). In Karnataka, the 
nature of the consanguineous relationship varies between religious communities. For 
example, Muslims have traditionally married first cousins while Hindu women have 
traditionally married their maternal uncles. It is possible that this may have led Hindu women 
to marry at a younger age so as not further to delay marriage for their uncles. 59 
55 Bittles, 1994: 561-584; Agarwal, 1994: 391-402. 
sG See Srinivas, 1965: 146-150; Conklin, 1973: 53-63; Scarlett Epstein, 1973: 197; Hill, 1982: 204; 
Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 343-361; Bittles, Cobles and Appaji Rao, 1993: 114 -115. 57 Janakarajan, Olsen and Seabright, 1996. 
58 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 54-55. See also Rao, Inbaraj and 
Jesudian, 1972: 174-178; Rao and Inbaraj, 1977: 281-288. 
59 Bittles, Cobles and Appaji Rao, 1993: 111-116. 
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The existence of consanguinity between spouses can be attributed to five causes. 60 First, it is 
supposed to be influenced by cultural traditions. Second, it is supposed to be necessitated by 
the reduced need for dowry payments in consanguineous unions, where payments are often of 
lower value or non-obligatory 61 Thirdly, compared to earlier decades, improvements in 
public health may ensure increased numbers of children surviving to marriageable age. 
Therefore, with larger numbers of potential partners to be found within the family itself due 
to better health provision, marriage to a close relative may be made easier. A fourth reason 
for consanguineous unions is the desire to maintain full control over ancestral property and 
landholdings. Finally, consanguineous marriage may be one form of risk-diversifying 
behaviour in which the household minimises risk by keeping the income from land or the 
returns from family enterprise strictly in the hands of family members as well as enjoying 
better opportunities for monitoring the behaviour of other family members. 
Given these theoretical considerations, it seemed important to take this variable into account 
in assessing the determinants of the age at first marriage in Ramanagaram. Marriage between 
relatives was widely prevalent in the Ramanagaram sample, where 40% of women had 
married a relative, 38% of Hindus, 41% of Muslims and 47% of Christians. The high 
percentage of consanguineous marriages among Christians in the Ramanagaram sample is 
inconsistent with the results for all of Karnataka as reported by the National Family Health 
Survey. 62 At the 95% confidence level, the differences in marrying relatives was not found to 
be statistically significant between any of the three religious groups. The exact nature of the 
relationship with the husband before marriage in the 80 consanguineous marriages is reported 
in Table 1. 
60 Bittles, 1994: 561-584. 
61 Govinda Reddy, 1988: 263-268; Centerwall and Centerwall, 1966: 1160-1167. 
62 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 54-55. 
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Table 1: Marital consanguinity by religion , Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Nature of consanguineous All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
relationship 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
First cousin on father's side 14 17.5 4 9.5 8 25.8 2 28.6 
First cousin on mother's side 30 37.5 13 31.0 15 48.4 2 28.6 
Maternal uncle 18 22.5 16 38.1 2 6.5 0 0.0 
Other blood relation 4 5.0 4 9.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other non-blood relation 1 1.3 1 2.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Second cousin on father's side 7 8.8 2 4.8 3 9.7 2 28.6 
Second cousin on mother's side 6 7.5 2 4.8 3 9.7 1 14.2 
Total consanguineous marriages 80 100 42 100 31 100 7 100 
For the sample as a whole, the most popular forms of consanguineous marriage was to first 
cousins on both the mother's and father's sides. There were also 23% of women who had 
married their maternal uncles; these were mainly Hindu, as this relationship is disallowed by 
Islam. 
In the present study, marital consanguinity was measured by a dummy variable which took 
the value I if the woman had married a relation and 0 otherwise. An alternative way of 
measuring consanguinity was also attempted. This was the coefficient of inbreeding used by 
Bittles63 This coefficient is a statistical measure of the proportion of gene loci at which an 
individual is homozygous, and is used to describe the mean level of inbreeding in a 
population. It takes a value between a minimum of 0 (unrelated) and a maximum of 0.125 
(double first cousin or uncle-niece marriages, where partners have two sets of grandparents in 
common). The average coefficients of inbreeding for the three communities were 0.03 for the 
Hindus, 0.03 for the Muslims, and 0.02 for the Christians, which are all high by the standards 
of other population 5"M 
63 For more on the calculation of the coefficients of inbreeding, see Bodmcr and Cavalli-Sforza, 1976: 
361-379. I am grateful to Dr. D. N. Rao and Prof. N. Appaji Rao of the Department of Biochemistry, 
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore for enabling me to understand better how these coefficients are 
calculated and used in empirical work. 
64 Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza, 1976: 361-379. 
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1. Other factors 
It has been argued that the age at marriage in urban areas is higher than it is in rural areas, 
mainly because of the higher average educational and employment status of women in urban 
areas, and peer-level effects whereby a higher age-at-marriage norm in some urban 
communities influences members of these communities to adopt similar behaviour patterns. 65 
Location thus affects marriage age by altering the attractiveness of the unmarried state, the 
costs of marital search, and the incentive to marry. This variable is not used in the 
multivariate analysis conducted below mainly because of the close proximity of the five 
villages surveyed to Ramanagaram town and the close associations between the town and the 
villages (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
Age at marriage may also depend on the welfare system. For example, as Ogilvie argues, in 
some pre-industrial European societies one could get poor relief from the village or town 
community, and this reduced the incentive to have many children for welfare and insurance 
purposes. 66 In developing societies such as India, where children are valuable means of 
insurance in old age and there is no widespread or national system of social security, women 
who are never married, or do not have children, are often in a precarious position. This 
creates an economic compulsion that may result in early and near-universal marriage. 67 This 
variable was not included in the multivariate models conducted below, because it does not 
vary sufficiently across the Ramanagaram sample. 
Another factor thought to influence the age at first marriage includes the family system and 
the manner in which marriage is arranged. This refers particularly to whether a new family is 
expected to set up an independent household, or if young couples live in extended or multiple 
65 Shapiro, 1996: 89-103. 
66 Ogilvie, 1997: Chapter 8. 
67 Dasgupta, 1993a: 323. 
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family households with parents and other siblings. Traditionally, the latter system will have 
the effect of lowering the age at marriage because young brides may be preferred, whose 
`personality can be moulded by both her husband and his parents. '68 Also, this means that 
couples do not have to wait until they can afford to buy or rent a separate dwelling, or inherit 
one, before getting married. This factor is quite important because it has been shown in 
studies of pre-industrial Europe, that waiting to own a dwelling had a significant impact on 
raising the marriage age there. Laslett argues that in north-west Europe marriage was 
dependent on the extent of saving for marriage so that only those who were `successful 
enough under prevalent economic circumstances to create their own households' were 
eligible for marriage. 69 This was because couples were required to marshall their own 
resources and set up independent households after marriage, rather than living with parents. 
These resources were to be marshalled through life-cycle service, with young men and 
women working as servants or `trainees' with other households or production units. In such 
situations, the individuals were required both to give up a portion of the product of their 
labour to their employer, and at the same time to accumulate and save funds for marriage. 
The system of life-cycle servants served the dual purpose of inculcating values of thrift and 
saving in individuals, and fostering independence in order to be able to own separate 
dwellings and eventually set up separate households. 70 The obvious consequence of such a 
system was that marriage was delayed until such time as couples saved enough to marry and 
set up separate households, and Laslett argues that it was this which led to the quite high 
marriage ages observed for both men and women in pre-industrial Europe. However, because 
the structure of the family system and the way in which marriage was arranged did not vary 
significantly across the Ramanagaram sample, this variable was not included in the 
multivariate analysis conducted below. ***[Response to 46] Moreover, nuclearity of the 
family and household structure is endogenous in a model of marriage age because the age at 
68 Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 345. 
69 Laslett, 1988: 236. 
70 Laslett, 1983. 
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marriage is chosen before the household is formed. It might be appropriate to include 
marriage age may be included in a model of the determinants of household structure, but to 
do the opposite involves clear endogeneity problems which would invalidate the entire 
econometric analysis. Household structure usually also changes over time, which further 
complicates the relationship between household structure and marriage age. For all these 
reasons, this variable was not included in the models of marriage age presented later in this 
chapter. 
The existence of polygyny or polygamy can also influence the age at marriage and hence 
fertility. ' It is possible that in societies where polygamy is popular, age at marriage for 
women is lower and fertility higher. 72 In the Ramanagaram sample, this factor is unimportant 
mainly because there were only four polygynous marriages (less than 2% of the entire 
sample). 
The age at marriage may also depend on attitudes towards sexual activity and fertility outside 
marriage and the fate of illegitimate children. In societies such as Ramanagaram where sexual 
activity outside marriage is generally considered taboo, at least among Muslims, Christians, 
and higher-caste Hindus, couples who wish to be sexually active have to marry, and this will 
tend to lower marriage age. This variable also did not vary significantly across women in the 
Ramanagaram sample and therefore it was not included in the models of marriage age 
presented below. 
Female autonomy in decision-making, the status of women in the household, and the extent 
of female mobility in the community may all affect age at marriage. It is possible that in areas 
where a purdah system operates, women are less geographically mobile, and that coupled 
71 Hern, 1992: 53-64. 
72 This factor is relevant indirectly in the Indian context as right-wing political propaganda has routinely 
spoken of the `excesses' of Muslim fertility due to the religious sanction for polygamy. 
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with lower female autonomy, this results in lower ages at first marriage. ' It must also be 
recognised that a woman's preferences may diverge from her family's preferences and that 
the extent of female autonomy will influence to what extent women's preferences regarding 
the right time to marry are realised. This variable was not included explicitly in the 
multivariate models of marriage age presented below because it is highly correlated with the 
religion dummies and the education variables, and is in any case difficult to measure 
accurately. 
Finally, the age at marriage may depend on the inheritance system, particularly whether 
unmarried women are able to inherit land. If unmarried women are not allowed to inherit 
land, there may be a tendency for early marriage in order to gain access to land. 74 Agarwal 
argues that in south Asian communities which recognised women's rights in landed property, 
land was kept within members of the extended family by several means such as strict rules on 
land alienation, post-marital residence in the village taking the form of uxorilocality or 
matrilocality, and close-kin marriages. 5 In Karnataka, inheritance is patrilineal. The only 
exception is the Bant community in the south Canara district of Karnataka, who practise 
matrilineal/bilateral inheritance. 76 This variable was not used in the multivariate models 
conducted below, firstly because it was rare for unmarried women to inherit land in 
Ramanagaram, and secondly because other measures of income were also being used in the 
econometric models of marriage age. 
As this brief survey shows, a wide range of variables can in theory affect the age at marriage. 
However, only certain variables have been included in the econometric analysis which 
73 [n_____rr innn_ Ine nin_ . -rr-__- __ I. _rr.. . r...., V 1'dSSVII, 177L: 17Jý61L-, JC11CIy ana JCIICIy: Iyy/. 
" Agarwal, 1994. Agarwal argues that while in legal terms women have won extensive rights to inherit 
and control land, in practise this is not quite so. She writes that of those women who do own land, fewer 
exercise effective control over it. 
75 Agarwal, 1994: Chapter 3. 
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follows, as some variables do not vary across women in the same society or are not possible 
to obtain empirical measures for. 
II. A survey of the trends in marriage age in Karnataka 
There is a small existing literature on marriage age in Karnataka which focusses on 
explaining the rise in the age at first marriage over the last century or so. 77 The Mysore 
Population Study found that the age at first marriage in all the zones covered by the survey 
increased from 14.0 years for women in the birth cohort 1893-1902 up to 15.5 for women in 
the birth cohort 1928-32.78 The National Family Health Survey found that between 1961 and 
1993, the singulate female age at first marriage in Karnataka rose from 16.4 years to 19.6 
years. 79 However, in the cross-section of 187 ever-married women studied in Ramanagaram, 
the mean age at first marriage was 17.3, reflecting the fact that women were of varying age- 
cohorts. Interestingly, the age at first marriage is higher for Muslims and Christians at 17.6 
years, compared to 16.9 years for the Hindus. However, the 0.7 year difference between the 
Hindu and Muslim and the Hindu and Christian mean ages at first marriage is not statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level. 80 Also, the mean age at cohabitation for the women 
76Agarwal, 1994: Chapter 3: 11: 2: 116-117. Agarwal argues that in south India the practice of 
matrilineal/bilateral inheritance is also documented among the Nangudi Vellalars, Nayars and Tiyyars 
of Tamil Nadu and the Phadiyas and Chettis of Wynad district on the Kcrala-Tamil Nadu border. 
77 These include the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 88-108; Goyal, 1975; Caldwell, Reddy and 
Caldwell, 1983: 343-361; National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 47-55. 
78 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 91. 
79 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 47. The Mysore Population Study, 
conducted in 1961, found that there was not much change in the male age at first marriage for men in 
the birth cohort 1893-1902 and 1923-1927. The male age at first marriage for these cohorts was 23.3 
and 24.1 years respectively. The study also argued that most men married between 18 and 30, and that 
it was unusual for a man to marry before 18 years. See Mysore Population Study, 1961: 95. 
80 The difference between Hindus and Muslims is not significant at the 5% level. At a higher level of 
significance, say 12%, it is difficult to gauge if the size of this impact on fertility outcomes would be 
large, even if Hindus and Muslims married at the same age and retained their age-specific fertility, 
because it is difficult to hold other factors constant. If we do not hold other factors constant, the 
resulting figure would merely be equivalent to a cross-tabulation of religion against fertility outcomes. 
Thus, although the question is an interesting one, it is not possible to assess the size of the impact on 
Hindus and Muslims ( assuming it is statistically significant, which it is not) because it is necessary to 
hold other factors constant. It must be emphasised again that, at the mean, the t-test shows that the 
impact could easily be zero. 
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of the Ramanagaram sample is not very different from the mean age at first marriage. These 
findings are consistent with Basu's argument that, on average, there is a very small gap 
between marriage and cohabitation in south India. 8' 
Table 2 presents data on the distribution of women's age at first marriage for Karnataka state 
and for the Ramanagaram sample. The most interesting feature of Table 2 is that over fifty 
percent of women in both Karnataka state and the Ramanagaram sample have married before 
the legal age of 18. 
Table 2. Age-specific first marriage, Karnataka (1998); Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Woman's age at first marriage % of women (Karnataka) % of women (Ramanagaram) 
0-7 4.3 0.5 
8-12 17.9 4.9 
13-17 42.9 50.0 
18-22 26.5 34.8 
23-27 7.3 8.7 
28-32 1.0 0.6 
Over 32 0.1 0.5 
Total 100 100 
(Source: Batliwala et at, 1998, p. 193) 
Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell suggested that the age at first marriage increased over the last 
century for women in Karnataka for a number of reasons. These included the decline of child 
marriage, the shift from bridewealth to dowry, the decline in marriages to relatives, a rise in 
life expectancy, a rise in the belief that pre-menarchic girls are immature, the difficulty in 
finding suitable grooms, changes in perceptions regarding the age which is commonly 
regarded as `the threshold to maturity', the greater `educational and occupational 
heterogeneity' in society caused by the diminished influence of caste in deciding occupation, 
ai Basu, 1993: 85-95. 
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increased education of girls, and increased migration which made it increasingly difficult for 
parents of daughters to find suitable matches, by causing a `classic marriage squeeze. '82 
There is evidence in support of some of these hypotheses. There is evidence that child 
marriage has declined in recent times. 83 There is evidence that the practice of giving and 
taking dowry, which has been mainly a post-Independence phenomenon, has gained 
predominance from the 1960s on. 84 There is evidence from the National Family Health 
Survey that marital consanguinity, though it has shown declines elsewhere in south India, is 
still widespread in Karnataka. 85 With reference to the `classic marriage squeeze', in the 
Ramanagaram sample mothers did mention the problem of finding suitable grooms for their 
daughters, though rarely concern over finding suitable brides for their sons. This is despite 
the fact that Karnataka, like India as a whole, has had a steadily declining sex ratio over time. 
However, there are also some weaknesses in Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell's analysis and in 
the National Family Health Survey. Firstly, both studies are essentially univariate analyses 
that study the age at first marriage without controlling for differences in education, 
occupation, income or any other variable. Moreover, the Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell study 
is a relatively old one now and a generation has passed since their work was carried out. The 
National Family Health Survey, though more recent, is a volume that essentially collates data 
from a large random sample survey rather than doing more complex analyses with the data 
82 This is because each succeeding generation is larger than the one above it due to increased life 
expectancy and better health facilities with time. See Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1983: 343-361. 
83 The Infant Marriage Prevention Regulation was passed in 1894, prohibiting marriage of girls below 8 
years and boys before 14 years. After the Sarda Act was passed in British India in 1929, Mysore state 
also enacted a legislation fixing the minimum age at marriage for girls at 14 years, and for boys at 18 
years. However, the effort failed. In 1955 a revision of the Hindu Marriage Law which had validity 
throughout India established the minimum age at marriage for girls at 15 years and for boys at 18 years. 
The Mysore Population Study, 1961, also found that the percentage of those women marrying under the 
age of 13 had fallen from 34% for women in the birth cohort 1893-1902, to 18% for women in the birth 
cohort 1928-1932. See Mysore Population Study, 1961: 93. 
84 See Tambiah, 1973: 100-110; Rao, 1993: 666-677. 
85 National Family Health Survey 1992-93, Karnataka, 1995: 54-55. See also Bittles, Cobles and Appaji 
Rao, 1993: 114-115. For evidence on the decline of consanguineous marriage in one other sample 
survey see Janakarajan, Olsen and Seabright, 1996. 
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set. Moreover, the survey covered Karnataka as a whole, and provided no district-level or 
taluk-level data at all. Furthermore, neither of these studies primarily focused on differences 
by religion. 86 Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell's study did not deal with this factor at all, and 
the National Family Health Survey, which did collect data on religion, mentioned that there 
were differences by religion but did not actually go into possible reasons for these 
differences. This analysis of the Ramanagaram sample will attempt to address and redress 
some of the gaps in the existing research on the determinants of marriage age in Karnataka. 
Following Sander, this chapter uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation procedures to 
identify the factors which influence the age at first marriage in this sample of Ramanagaram 
women. 87 Age at marriage is measured as the woman's age at the time of her first marriage 
for all ever-married women in the sample (N = 187). 
88 
III. A model of the determinants of the age at first marriage in Ramanagaram 
As discussed in the theoretical section above, nine variables were identified as being 
potential influences on the age at first marriage of the Ramanagaram women. These were the 
education of the woman, the education of her spouse, total household expenditure (as a proxy 
for income), the woman's age at menarche, the year in which the woman's marriage took 
place, the religion in which the woman was brought up, the woman's caste, whether her 
86 One exception to this is the Mysore Population Study of 1961, which found that there were 
differences in the age at first marriage by religion. Marriage age for Hindu women in the birth cohort 
1888-1897 was 12.9 years. The comparable figure for Muslim women was 15.1 years. On the other 
hand, the age at first marriage for Hindu women born in the birth cohort 1928-1932 was 15.3 years, 
while the comparable figure for Muslim women was 15.8 years. Thus, it emerged from the study that 
Muslim women had a higher age at first marriage than the Hindu women covered in the study. Muslim 
men, too, were marrying later than Hindu men. For men in the birth cohort 1888-1897, mean age at 
marriage was 22.7 for Hindu men and 24.3 years for Muslim men. This increased to 23.4 years for 
Hindu men and 24.9 years for Muslim men for those in the birth cohort 1918-1927. See Mysore 
Population Study, 1961: 96-98. 
87 Sander, 1995. Sander uses OLS regression procedures to investigate the effect of several factors, 
including religion, on fertility in America. 
88 `Ever-married women' refers to those women who were married, widowed or separated at the time of 
survey. 
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marriage was a consanguineous union or not, and the primary occupation of the woman's 
husband. 
Each of the nine variables was regressed individually against the age at first marriage. 89 This 
was for two reasons: firstly, to obtain a preliminary indication of its possible influence; and 
secondly, to explore the relative usefulness of different measures of the same factor, and 
possible functional specifications. At the first stage, the nine variables were placed in a 
multiple regression and some alternative ways of measuring them were explored. Thereafter, 
a number of zero restrictions were successfully imposed on the model according to the results 
of successive F-tests. This yielded the `best' preliminary model of the determinants of female 
marriage age in Ramanagaram. 
However, this preliminary model only allowed for religion to exert a shift effect on the age at 
first marriage. In order to assess whether it also exerted slope effects - i. e. whether the effect 
of various socio-economic variables on age at first marriage varied across religious groups -a 
second stage of analysis was undertaken, in which Hindu and Muslim interaction terms were 
created, to form a total of 36 explanatory variables. Of the variables discussed above, only 
the variable on caste was excluded, because it pertained to the Hindus only. This variable 
was, however, used in a multiple regression model of marriage age among the Hindu women 
only. 
At the first stage, the starting-point of the most general preliminary model estimated in the 
first stage is represented in row 1 of Appendix A. 4.1. Multiple regression with the nine 
variables shown in row 1 of Appendix A. 4.1 resulted in the model represented in row 1 of 
Appendix A. 4.2. Multiple regressions were performed using alternative measures of some 
variables, with the starting-point regressions shown in Appendix A. 4.1 and the final results 
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shown in the corresponding row of Appendix A. 4.2. The alternative measures used in 
regressions 2 through 8 were as follows. 
Regression 2 explored an alternative way of measuring women's education, by breaking it 
down into years of primary, secondary and university education. Education is broken down 
into its components in order to examine whether education of a particular quality influences 
marriage age. Rather than the absolute number of years of education, it is important to 
understand whether it is primary, secondary or university education that influences the 
woman's marriage decision. Regression 3 looked at alternative measures of husband's 
education, breaking it down into years of primary, secondary and university education. This 
raised the number of explanatory variables from nine to thirteen. Regression 4 looked at an 
alternative measure of marital consanguinity by replacing a dummy variable for whether the 
woman had married a relation with the coefficient of inbreeding between the woman and her 
husband. 
Regression 5 explored an alternative way of assessing the impact of religion. Regressions 1-4 
had used two dummy variables for religion, a Hindu dummy variable (taking a value of 1 if 
the woman was Hindu and 0 if she was non-Hindu) and a Muslim dummy variable (taking a 
value of I if the woman was Muslim and 0 if she was non-Muslim), with the Christians as the 
base category. By contrast, regression 5 considered the effect of religion between Hindus and 
Muslims in the sample, excluding the Christians: it did this by defining a dummy variable 
which took a value of 1 if the respondent was Muslim and 0 if the respondent was Hindu. 
Thus, only 173 observations were used because the Christians in the sample were excluded. 
The measures of religion used are listed in Table A. 4.1 in the Appendix to this dissertation. 
89 The results, however, are not reported here because these simple regressions suffer from omitted 
variable bias. 
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The next step (in regressions 6 and 7) was to use alternative measures of the primary 
occupation of the woman's husband. In regressions 1-5, this had been measured in terms of 
skilled versus non-skilled occupations. In regression 6, this was replaced by a measure of 
farming versus non-farming occupations. Then, in regression 7, it was replaced by a measure 
for whether the husband was employed in domestic industry versus in any other occupation. 
In regression 8, for ever-married Hindus alone (n=103), the impact of caste on the age at first 
marriage was tested by using a dummy variable for scheduled castes vis-i -vis others and a 
dummy variable for high castes vis-ä-vis all others (keeping the low castes as the base 
category). Finally, in regression 9, the `best general model' (which turned out to be model 3) 
was estimated for Hindus only, but now excluding the caste variable. 
Since all the final regression models presented here were linear models estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares, they were individually tested for any violation of the assumptions of 
classical linear models, i. e. for violations of the linearity, normality, equality of variance and 
collinearity assumptions. No violations of these assumptions were found in the final models 
presented in Appendix A. 4.2. 
Of the preliminary model specifications explored, model 3 is the one which best explains 
variation in the age at marriage in Ramanagaram. Though a greater proportion of the 
variation is explained by model 5, which has an adjusted R2 of 0.52, this model is estimated 
from a smaller sample size (n = 173) and excludes all the Christians in the sample. Therefore, 
we regard model 3 as the `best' model of the age at marriage in Ramanagaram, because it 
includes all 187 observations, and thus all segments of the population under study. 
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Of the thirteen90 variables used at the starting-point in estimating model 3, those which 
emerged as being significant determinants of female marriage age were women's secondary 
education, husband's primary education, age at menarche, whether the husband performed a 
skilled occupation, year of marriage, and total expenditure. In this model, a one-year increase 
in female secondary education is associated with a 0.34 year rise in female marriage age; a 
one-year increase in husband's primary education is associated with a 0.24 year rise in female 
marriage age; a one-year increase in the age at menarche is associated with a 0.43 year 
increase in marriage age; an additional later year of marriage is associated with a 0.11 year 
increase in marriage age; if the husband performs a skilled occupation, the woman married 
two and one-half years later on average; and a Rs. 100 rise in total expenditure is associated, 
on average, with a 0.05 year increase in female marriage age. The model explained 50% of 
the variation in the age at marriage in the sample. 
The most interesting feature of model 3 is that when husband's education is broken down 
into primary, secondary and university education, the primary education variable is 
significant with the expected positive sign, while secondary and university education 
disappear from the model. It is necessary to ask why we do not observe husband's secondary 
and university education to be significant as well. One possible explanation is that the effect 
of higher education may be picked up in the `husband's skilled occupation' dummy variable, 
which may measure `effective education', i. e. the extent to which education affects the 
capacity to perform work efficiently and thus increases the opportunity cost of parent's time. 
Both secondary education of the husband and university education of the husband are 
correlated with the husband's participation in a skilled occupation (the correlation 
coefficients are 0.45 and 0.41 respectively). Moreover, the primary education of husband 
variable is also highly correlated with husband's secondary education (the correlation 
90 The number of explanatory variables has increased from nine in model I to thirteen in model 3 
because women's and husband's education were both broken down into primary, secondary and 
university-education components. 
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coefficient is 0.72). Thus, the impact of husband's higher education may be acting through 
both the primary education and skilled occupation variables. 
Another interesting finding of these preliminary regressions is the behaviour of the 
occupation variables: the coefficient on the husband's occupation variable (measured as a 
farming occupation) in model 6 was not significant, compared to models 1 through 5, where 
husband's occupation (measured as a skilled occupation) was a very significant determinant 
of female marriage age. Instead, in model 6 the religion variable was highly significant. It is 
interesting that dropping the skilled occupation of husband variable makes religion 
significant. This does not indicate that religion per se is a significant determinant of marriage 
age, but rather that it is appearing in a model where a significant economic variable - 
husband's skilled occupation - has been excluded. In all the other models where husband's 
skilled occupation is used, religion is not significant at all. In effect, the significance of the 
religion variable in model 6 is an illustration of the `characteristics' hypothesis discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
Finally, differences in caste status were examined in model 8 of the preliminary models, 
where the sample was restricted to ever-married Hindus only (n=103). The variables which 
emerged as significant determinants of marriage age for Hindu women were the year of 
marriage, woman's secondary education, whether the husband performed a skilled 
occupation, and whether the woman belonged to a high caste. An increase of one year in the 
date of marriage increased the marriage age by 0.16 years; an additional year of the woman's 
secondary education increased marriage age by 0.35 years; if the husband performed a skilled 
occupation this increased female marriage age by 1.97 years; and if a woman belonged to a 
high caste she was married, on average, 0.68 years later. The equation explained 47% of the 
variation in marriage age among Hindu women. When compared with the `best' model 3 
which included the Muslims and Christians, we find that the age at menarche, women's 
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university education, men's primary education, and total expenditure are the variables which 
were included in the models for all religions combined but not in this model for Hindus only. 
On the other hand, the high-caste variable was significant for Hindus. This suggests that 
some of the norms or customs of castes may operate to form a sort of `caste culture' which 
exerts an influence on female marriage age irrespective of socio-economic distinctions 
between members of different castes. 9' 
It emerges from the preliminary regressions that after controlling for the effect of other socio- 
economic variables, religion exercises no independent effect on the age at marriage. 
However, it is necessary to examine if the effect on marriage age of various socio-economic 
attributes differs across religious groups. That is, it is necessary to examine if the regression 
lines for Hindus, Muslims and Christians have different slopes, different intercepts or both. 
The main purpose of this chapter was to find out whether or not religion exercises a 
significant effect on the age at marriage, with particular emphasis on differences between 
Hindus and Muslims. Therefore, at the first stage, the most general equality to be tested is 
whether the factors affecting marriage age are the same for Hindus as for Muslims. This 
hypothesis was tested by comparing the coefficients in the models estimated for the sub- 
samples of the Hindus and the Muslims separately (i. e. the `unrestricted' model) against the 
coefficients in the model estimated for the pooled sample of Hindus and Muslims combined 
(i. e. the `restricted' model). The sub-sample regressions were estimated by beginning with 
general model 3, and estimating it for Hindus and Muslims separately. The starting models 
contained eleven explanatory variables: woman's total years of primary education, woman's 
total years of secondary education, woman's total years of university education, husband's 
total years of primary education, husband's total years of secondary education, husband's 
91 When the 'best' starting-model 3 is run on Hindus only (n = 103), excluding the caste variable, in the 
resulting preliminary regression 9, the significant variables are women's secondary education, skilled 
occupation of husband and the year of marriage, which are similar to model 3. 
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total years of university education, total monthly expenditure, age at menarche, year of 
marriage, a dummy variable which took a value 1 if the husband performed a skilled 
occupation, and a dummy variable which took a value I if the woman had married a 
relative92. The estimation procedure then used successive F-tests of zero restrictions on the 
deleted variables. The results of this procedure for Hindus are reported in Tables 3, and for 
Muslims in Table 4. The sample size for Christians was too small (N=14) to estimate the 
model successfully for Christians only. The `pooled' regression on Hindus and Muslims was 
likewise estimated using the same 11-variable general starting model. The results of this 
estimation are reported in Table 5. 
92 Note that compared with model 3, there are 11 rather than 13 explanatory variables in the sub-sample 
regressions because we exclude the Muslim and Hindu religion dummies. 
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Table 3: OLS estimates of the determinants of the age at first marriage, Hindus only 
(Ramanagaram, 1996) 
Dependent variable is AGEMAR: the woman's age at first marriage in years 
Sample: 103 ever-married Hindu women 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T Ratio [Prob. ] 
Constant (CONST) -350.956 *** 62.338 -5.630 [. 000] 
Woman's education 
Secondary education of woman (SEDU) 0.421 *** 0.143 2.944 [. 004] 
Husband's occupation 
Husband's occupation is skilled (SKILL) 2.774 *** 0.928 2.991 [. 004] 
Age at menarche 
Age at menarche (AGEMEN) 0.584 ** 0.226 2.58 1 [. 011 ] 
Income 
Total expenditure (EXPNRS) 0.005 0.005 0.929 [. 355] 
Year of marriage 
Year of marriage (YRMAR) 0.181 *** 0.032 5.708 [. 000] 
R-Bar-Squared 0.547 
Residual sum of squares 892.621 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 4: OLS estimates of the determinants of the age at first marriage, Muslims only 
(Ramanagaram, 1996) 
Dependent variable is AGEMAR: the woman's age at first marriage in years 
Sample: 70 ever-married Muslim women 
Regressor 
Constant (CONST) 
Woman's education 
Secondary education of woman (SEDU) 
Husband's occupation 
Husband's occupation is skilled (SKILLED) 
Age at menarche 
Age at menarche (AGEMEN) 
Income 
Total expenditure (EXPNRS) 
Year of marriage 
Year of marriage (YRMAR) 
R-Bar-Squared 
Residual sum of squares 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
-85.384 ** 44.665 
0.611 *** 0.155 
3.532 *** 1.051 
0.702 ** 
0.007 
0.327 
0.003 
0.046 
0.481 
605.746 
0.023 
T Ratio [Prob. ] 
-1.912 [. 060] 
3.951 [. 000] 
3.360 [. 001] 
2.148 [. 035] 
1.984 [. 052] 
1.990 [. 051] 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 5: OLS estimates of the determinants of the age at first marriage, pooled model of Hindus 
and Muslims (Ramanagaram, 1996) 
Dependent variable is AGEMAR: the woman's age at first marriage in years 
Sample: 173 ever-married Hindu and Muslim women 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T-Ratio 
Error [Prob. ] 
Intercepts 
Hindu religion dummy (HINDU) -3.547 2.462 -1.440 [. 152] 
Muslim religion dummy (MUSLIM) -2.858 2.411 -1.185 [. 238] 
Woman's education 
Secondary education of woman (SEDU) 0.735 *** 0.104 7.096 [. 0001 
Income 
Total expenditure (EXPNRS) 0.005 0.003 1.598 [. 1 121 
Husband's occupation 
Husband's occupation is skilled (SKILL) 2.482 *** 0.690 3.598 [. 000] 
Age at menarche 
Age at menarche (AGEMEN) 0.739 *** 0.194 3.805 [. 000] 
Year of marriage 
Year of marriage (YRMAR) 0.004 ** 0,002 2.197 [. 029] 
R-Bar-Squared 0.443 
Residual sum of squares 1823.9 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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In order to compare the coefficients in the model estimated for Hindus and Muslims 
separately with the coefficients in the pooled model estimated for Hindus and Muslims 
combined (i. e. in order to test if the restricted and unrestricted models are the same), an F-test 
was used to test the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: 3 Muslim =3 Hindu for i=1..... k regressors 
against the alternative hypothesis: 
Hl: For at least one pair of regressors, 3M slim does not equal 3i . 
""'d" 
Hence: 
F (k, n-2k) = RSSRestricted _ RSSUnrestricted/ 
k 
RSSUnrestricted/ ll-2k 
where k is the number of regressors in the pooled model, 2k is the number of regressors in the 
unrestricted model, and n is the number of observations in the pooled model. The unrestricted 
residual sum of squares (RSSunrestricled) equals the residual sum of squares for the Hindus-only 
model (RSSHind°) plus the residual sum of squares for the Muslims-only model (RSSM°s. "") 
Therefore: 
RSSunrescricted = RSSMas1in + RSSH'"du = 892.62 + 605.75 = 1498.37 
The restricted residual sum of squares (RSSRe: c°cted) is derived from the pooled regression for 
Hindus and Muslims combined, as set out in Table 10. The restricted residual sum of squares 
from the pooled model was: 
RSSRescricted = 1823.9 
The number of regressors in the pooled or restricted model was k=7. The number of 
regressors in the unrestricted model was 2k = 10 (2k = 5+5). 
Therefore, the value of the F-statistic is: 
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F(12,163) = 1823.9 - 1498.3675/ 7=5.059 
1498.3675/163 
The critical value of F(7,163) at the 0.05 level is 2.01. Since, F(7,163) = 5.059 > 2.01, this 
implies that we can reject the null hypothesis that the way in which the explanatory variables 
affect marriage age for Hindus and Muslims is identical93. This implies that it is worthwhile 
to analyse the differences in the socio-economic determinants of marriage age between 
Hindus and Muslims. 
Such an analysis was then undertaken by means of a multiple regression with interaction 
terms which included observations from all three religious groups. The general starting model 
included the initial starting-point variables of model 3 (the `best' preliminary model), plus 
Hindu and Muslim interaction terms with each of the starting-point variables. The 
interaction-regression starting-model therefore consisted of 36 variables. Successive variable 
deletion tests, using a joint F-test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of groups of 
variables, were imposed on this general model. This yielded the specification shown in Table 
6. 
93 Note that the F-statistic is rejected even at the 0.01 level (F = 5.059 > 2.64). 
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Table 6: OLS interaction model of the determinants of the age at first marriage (Ramanagaram 
sample, all religions, 1996) 
Dependent variable is AGEMAR: the woman's age at first marriage in years 
Sample: 187 ever-married Hindu, Muslim and Christian women 
Base category: Christians 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Tratio [Prob] 
error 
Intercepts 
Constant (CONST) 
Muslim religion dummy (MUSLIM) 
Hindu religion dummy (HINDU) 
Woman's education 
Woman's secondary education (SEDU) 
Secondary education for Muslims (MSEDU) 
Secondary education for Hindus (HSEDU) 
Age at menarche 
Age at menarche (AGEMEN) 
Age at menarche for Muslims (MAGEMEN) 
Age at menarche for Hindus (HAGEMEN) 
Income 
Total expenditure (EXPNRS) 
Total expenditure for Muslims (MEXPN) 
Total expenditure for Hindus (HEXPN) 
Husband's occupation is skilled 
Husband's occupation is skilled (SKILL) 
Muslim husband's occupation is skilled (MSKILL) 
Hindu husband's occupation is skilled (HSKILL) 
Year of marriage 
Year of marriage (YRMAR) 
Year of marriage for Muslims (MYRMAR) 
Year of marriage for Hindus (HYRMAR) 
R-Bar-Squared 
-381.5090 
295.9298 
198.2441 
-0.275 
0.888 
0.750 
* 
*** 
*** 
0.978 
-0.273 
-0.267 
0.009 
-0.002 
-0.005 
*** 
1.282 
2.246 
0.814 
0.195 
-0.149 
-0.099 
** 
* 
0.530 
102.0155 -3.7397 [. 000] 
112.2234 2.6370 [. 009] 
110.9455 1.7869 [. 076] 
0.217 -1.266 [. 207] 
0.269 3.300 [. 0011 
0.256 2.932 [. 004] 
0.591 1.654 [. 100] 
0.663 -0.413 [. 680] 
0.618 -0.433 [. 666] 
0.003 3.080 [. 002] 
0.005 -0.543 [. 588] 
0.004 -1.116 [. 266] 
1.780 0.720 [. 473] 
2.078 1.081 [. 281] 
2.023 0.403 [. 688] 
0.053 3.680 [. 000] 
0.058 -2.560 [. 0111 
0.057 -1.732 [. 085] 
*** = Significant at 0.01 level; ** = Significant at 0.05 level; *= Significant at 0.10 level. 
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All the models were tested for functional form using Ramsey's RESET test based on the 
square of the fitted value; for normality based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals; 
and for heteroscedasticity, based on the regression of the squared residuals on squared fitted 
values. 
In order to compare the behaviour of the Hindus with that of the Muslims and Christians, 
restrictions were imposed on the parameters of the final interaction model and Wald tests 
were performed to test the validity of these restrictions. In the discussion which follows the 
results of these tests are compared with those obtained from regressions on Hindus only 
(presented in Table 3) and Muslims only (presented in Table 4), as a check on the reliability 
of the estimates obtained from the interaction model. 
The first set of hypotheses tested concerned the effect of women's secondary education on 
marriage age. A Wald test rejected the restriction that the sum of the coefficients on the 
variables SEDU and HSEDU was equal to zero, implying that secondary education has a 
significant effect on marriage age for Hindus. A one-year increase in secondary education 
increased Hindu women's age at marriage by 0.48 years .9'A 
Wald test also rejected the 
hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on SEDU and MSEDU were significantly 
different from zero, implying that secondary education has a significant effect on marriage 
age for Muslim women. A one-year increase in secondary education for Muslim women 
increased their marriage age by 0.61 years. 
Did the effect of secondary education on female marriage age differ, however, between 
Hindus and Muslims? A Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on HSEDU 
equalled the coefficient on MSEDU, implying that there was no difference in the effect of 
94 Note that since the model is estimated with interaction terms, the effect of secondary education on 
marriage age for Hindus is calculated by adding the coefficient on SEDU to the coefficient on HSEDU. 
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secondary education on marriage age between the two religious groups. These results are all 
wholly consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 4. 
The next set of hypothesis tested concerned the effect of the age at menarche. An F-test 
rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients of AGEMEN, HAGEMEN And MAGEMEN 
were all equal to zero, implying that these variables should be retained in the model. 
However, only one of the three age-at-menarche variables (AGEMEN) was significant 
separately, and only at the 0.10 level. One possible reason for this finding is that the age at 
menarche is comparatively invariant relative to the age at marriage. The mean age at 
menarche in the sample is more or less the same for all religious groups, approximately 13.5 
years. While the age at menarche varied between ages 11 and 16, the age at marriage varied 
much more widely, from age 7 to age 35. In the marriage models for Hindus and Muslims 
estimated separately, the age at menarche is a very important variable in explaining age at 
marriage, with coefficients significant at the 0.05 level. According to Table 3, a one-year 
increase in the age at menarche results in a 0.58 increase in the age at marriage for Hindu 
women; according to Table 4, a one-year increase in the age at menarche raises the age at 
marriage by 0.70 for Muslim women. Moreover, the size of these coefficients is similar to 
that found on the HAGEMEN (0.71) and MAGEMEN (0.71) variables in the interaction 
model in Table 6. These results considered together suggest that the age at menarche is 
important in explaining age at marriage. 
The importance of the age-at-menarche variable was further borne out by the results of 
testing three hypotheses. A Wald test rejected the restriction that the coefficient on 
AGEMEN plus the coefficient on HAGEMEN equals zero, implying that the effect of the age 
at menarche for Hindu women was significant. A Wald test also rejected the restriction that 
the coefficient on AGEMEN plus the coefficient on MAGEMEN was equal to zero, implying 
This procedure is adopted for calculating the effects of all other interaction explanatory variables 
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that the age at menarche exerted a significant effect on the age at marriage for Muslim 
women. Finally, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on HAGEMEN 
equals the coefficient on MAGEMEN, implying that there was no difference in the effect of 
menarche on marriage between Hindus and Muslims. The findings from these tests indicate 
that the age at menarche is a significant influence on the age at marriage for Hindus and 
Muslims, and that the insignificant t-ratios in the interaction model are probably due to the 
multicollinearity between the menarche-interaction terms and the religion dummy variables. 
However, the effect of age at menarche on age at marriage is similar between Hindus and 
Muslims. 
The next set of hypotheses tested pertained to the total expenditure variables. In the 
interaction model, a 100-rupee rise in total expenditure significantly increased marriage age 
by 0.9 years. In the sub-sample regressions, expenditure did not significantly affect marriage 
age for Hindus; for Muslims the estimated coefficient is significant only at the 0.10 level. 
However, an F-test of zero restrictions on all three expenditure variables together in the 
interaction model was rejected, implying that the variables EXPNRS, HEXPN and MEXPN 
should be retained in the final interaction model. 
A Wald test accepted the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on EXPNRS and 
HEXPN was equal to zero, implying that expenditure does not exert a statistically significant 
effect on marriage age of Hindus. This finding is consistent with the regression on the sub- 
sample of Hindus only, in Table 3. However, a Wald test rejected the restriction that the sum 
of the coefficients on EXPNRS and MEXPN was equal to zero, implying that expenditure 
exercises a significant effect on marriage age for Muslim women. This finding is consistent 
with the regression on Muslims only in Table 4. 
throughout this chapter. 
150 
Finally, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on MEXPN was equal to the 
coefficient on HEXPN, implying that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
effect of expenditure on marriage age between Hindus and Muslims. This finding is 
consistent with our previous findings. As we can see from Table 4, for Muslims, even though 
expenditure is significant at the 0.10 level, the coefficient is extremely small, about 0.007, 
which is not very much different from that for the Hindus (which is 0.005). Thus, total 
expenditure does not appear to exercise a significant effect on the age at marriage for the 
whole sample, and even though it has a (marginally) significant effect on Muslim marriage 
age, this effect is not significantly different from its effect on Hindu marriage age. 
The next set of hypotheses concerned the `husband's occupation is skilled' variable. 
According to the results of the interaction model, none of the variables relating to skilled 
occupation for husbands (SKILL, HSKILL and MSKILL) were significant separately, as 
shown by their t-ratios. However, the hypothesis that all three variables had zero coefficients 
was rejected by an F-test. This implies that the variables should be retained in the model. The 
sub-sample regressions in Tables 3 and 4 show that for both Hindus and Muslims considered 
separately, the SKILL variable is highly significant with a large positive coefficient (2.8 for 
Hindus and 3.5 for Muslims). The sizes of these coefficients is similar to those estimated in 
the interaction model, at 2.1 for Hindus and 3.5 for Muslims. The reason why, in the 
interaction model, none of the SKILL variables have high t-ratios may be that the correlation 
between SKILL and HSKILL is quite high, at 0.63, as is the correlation between SKILL and 
MSKILL (0.63). The fact that these variables have significant coefficients in the sub-sample 
regressions, and the fact that an F-test rejects the hypothesis that all three should be excluded 
from the model, supports the view that husband's skilled occupation does have an important 
effect on marriage age, despite the insignificant t-ratios on each variable separately in the 
interaction model. 
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A Wald test rejected the restriction that the coefficient on SKILL plus that on HSKILL was 
equal to zero, implying that husband's occupation being skilled did have a significant effect 
on the age at marriage of Hindu women. A Wald test also rejected the restriction that the 
coefficient on SKILL plus that on MSKILL was equal to zero, implying that husband's 
occupation being skilled did have a significant effect on the marriage age of Muslim women. 
As discussed above, these findings are consistent with the sub-sample regressions in Tables 3 
and 4. Finally, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on HSKILL was equal 
to the coefficient on MSKILL, implying that husband's occupation being skilled did not have 
a significantly different effect on age at marriage for Hindus than for Muslims. Thus, the 
SKILL variable does appear to be a significant determinant of marriage age for both Hindus 
and Muslims, but there is no difference between the two religious groups. 
Finally, the effect of the year-of-marriage variables was tested. A Wald test rejected the 
restriction that the coefficient on YRMAR plus the coefficient on HYRMAR equals zero, 
implying that for Hindus the year of marriage is a significant determinant of marriage age. 
This finding is borne out in the sub-sample regression in Table 3. A Wald test rejected the 
restriction that the coefficient on YRMAR plus the coefficient on MYRMAR was equal to 
zero, implying that the year of marriage significantly affected Muslim marriage age. By 
comparison, in the sub-sample regression on Muslims in Table 4, the year-of-marriage 
variable is significant at the 0.10 level, and the size of the coefficient is the same (0.05) in the 
interaction model. These findings taken together suggest that the year of marriage does 
significantly influence Muslim age at marriage. Finally, a Wald test accepted the restriction 
that the coefficient on MYRMAR was equal to the coefficient on HYRMAR, implying that 
the effect of the year of marriage on age at marriage for Hindus is not significantly different 
from its effect for Muslims. 
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One possible reason for the importance of the year-of-marriage variable might be legislation 
concerning the age at marriage in Karnataka. According to the Child Marriage Restraint 
Act 
of 1978, the minimum legal age for marriage in India is 18 years for women and 21 years 
for 
men. 95 However, the National Family Health Survey documented that for Karnataka as a 
whole in 1995,51% of women in the 20-24 age group had married at 18 or younger. 
This 
proportion was as high as 59% in the rural areas and 36% in the urban areas. What the report 
stated of Karnataka as a whole was: `Evidently many marriages in Karnataka do not abide 
by 
the legal regulations regarding age at marriage. '96 If we consider mean age at marriage alone, 
many women in the Ramanagaram sample appear also not to have followed the legal 
prescription of 1978. The mean age at marriage for those marrying after 1978 was 18.2 years, 
while the mean age at marriage for those marrying before 1978 was 15.5 years. However, 
in 
order to see this issue more clearly, a five-year moving average for age at first marriage by 
year of marriage was calculated. This indicated a sustained rise in marriage age. In order to 
see if the observed rise in marriage age may have been partly in response to the change in the 
law, the percentage of women who married after the age of 18 according to marriage year in 
five-year intervals was also calculated. As evident from figures 1 and 2, after 1978 there does 
seem to be a gradual increase in marriage age, with a greater percentage of marriages taking 
place after the age of 18, which may be related to the passing of the law restraining child 
marriage. 
95 Historically in India, early marriage and child marriage have been recognized as 'social problems' 
and early social reformers were involved in campaigns to increase male and female marriage age. In 
1872, the Civil Marriage Act was passed largely due to the efforts of a social reformer in Bengal, Ram 
Mohan Roy. Later, in British India, the Sarda Act of 1929 fixed the legal marriage age for men at 18 
and for women at 14. The latter was raised to 15 in 1949. However, where the 1978 Child Marriage 
Restraint Act differs from past legislation is that child marriage was made an offence punishable by law. 
96 National Family Health Survey 1992-93, Karnataka, 1995: 51. 
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Figure 1. Five-year moving average of age at first marriage 
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Finally, let us examine whether the intercepts are different across the three religious groups. 
A Wald test rejected the restriction that the coefficient on CONST was equal to the 
coefficient on CONST+MUSLIM, implying that the intercept for Muslims was different from 
that for the Christians. A Wald test also rejected the restriction that the coefficient on 
CONST was equal to the coefficient on CONST+HINDU, implying that the intercept also 
differed significantly between Christians and Hindus. Finally, a Wald test accepted the 
restriction that the coefficient on MUSLIM equals the coefficient on HINDU, implying that 
ýýýýýo 
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the intercept for Hindus is not significantly different from the intercept for Muslims. These 
results taken together suggest that Hindus and Muslims do not have significantly different 
intercepts, but that the intercept for Christians is significantly different from those for both 
Hindus and Muslims. Membership of the Hindu instead of the Muslim religion does not have 
a significant effect on female age at marriage independently of socio-economic differences 
between the two religious groups. However, in the context of a model of the age at marriage, 
in which the dependent variable, and indeed all of the explanatory variables take values 
strictly greater than zero, it is not possible to draw interpretative conclusions from the size of 
the intercept coefficients. 
As we have seen, Wald tests accept the hypothesis that there is no difference between Hindus 
and Muslims in their age at marriage; or in the socio-economic variables which influence 
their age at marriage. However, it may be recalled that an F-test applied to the sub-samples of 
Hindus and Muslims as against a pooled model of Hindus and Muslims did suggest that for at 
least one regressor, the coefficient for Hindus did not equal that for Muslims. The apparent 
contradiction in these two results needs some explanation. One of the reasons why we do not 
observe significant differences between Hindus and Muslims in the interaction model may be 
the high degree of multicollinearity between some of the interaction terms. Though this does 
not bias the estimates of the coefficients obtained, it does affect the standard errors on which 
the Wald tests are based. This may be one reason why we observe a contradiction between 
the results of the F-test and the results of the Wald tests. One reason to place some reliance 
on the results of the Wald tests is that, as we have seen in Section I, qualitative evidence (in 
the shape of remarks made by the Ramanagaram women) suggest that there was little 
difference between Hindus and Muslims in terms of women's ideas about the correct age at 
which to marry. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Age at first marriage is a vital demographic variable that is widely held to have a profound 
impact on women's fertility. However, while much demographic research has focused on the 
age at marriage as an explanatory factor in models that seek to identify the determinants of 
women's fertility in India, there is relatively little work, whether theoretical or empirical, that 
looks into the determinants of the age at marriage itself. 97 This chapter is an attempt to fill 
this gap. 
In the Ramanagaram sample, the only factors that influenced female marriage age were the 
educational level of the woman, especially secondary education; whether the woman's 
husband had a skilled occupation; the woman's age at menarche; the year in which the 
marriage took place; total monthly household expenditure (which was used in this study as a 
proxy for income); religion (Christianity versus all others, but not Hinduism versus Islam); 
and caste status. 
Those variables that were not significant are interesting in that they illustrate where the 
Ramanagaram dataset is at variance with other theoretical and empirical literature on 
marriage age. Of the variables considered in our regression models, the marital consanguinity 
variables, no matter how they were measured, were insignificant. As discussed in the 
theoretical section, consanguineous marriage, especially the uncle-niece union, is thought to 
reduce female marriage age, mainly because of the large age gap between spouses. The 
widespread acceptance of consanguineous marriage in Karnataka, particularly in rural areas, 
has been noted in many empirical studies, and consanguineous unions made up almost 40% 
of the marriages in the Ramanagaram sample. 
97 As also remarked in Singh, 1992: 123-130. 
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However, neither measure of consanguinity was found to be a statistically significant 
predictor of marriage age in the Ramanagaram sample. Although marital consanguinity may 
be a cultural tradition typical to south India that has reinforced greater female autonomy there 
because it keeps the woman close to her natal family, and although it may function as an 
important means of reducing dowry and as a way of diversifying risk for rural households, 
the Ramanagaram sample provides no statistical evidence that it reduces marriage age. 
Husband's education is also theoretically supposed to affect marriage age, and did have a 
significant effect in the preliminary model, but not in the interaction model. Different 
theories have hypothesised diametrically opposed effects for this variable. Groom's 
education is hypothesised to increase female marriage age because better-educated men 
prefer to marry women who are older, whether because they desire a better-educated spouse, 
because they believe that it is better to marry someone who is more mature, because they 
believe that a better-educated wife would earn more, or because they believe she will cause 
their children to be better-educated. But, men's education may decrease female marriage age 
if better-educated men are able to afford to marry earlier in life. Also, if a wife is supposed to 
be near her husband's age or younger than her husband, then the wife's age at marriage may 
be lower if the husband's is. 
In the preliminary models husband's education, particularly primary education, exercised a 
significant positive influence on female marriage age. However, husband's primary education 
was not a statistically significant determinant of marriage age for any of the three religions in 
the interaction model. One reason for this finding may be that the effect of men's education is 
being picked up by other variables such as husband's skilled occupation (which is discussed 
later in this section). 
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One way in which husband's occupation was measured was whether the husband performed a 
farming-related occupation. Historically in the case of pre-industrial Europe, it has been 
suggested that if the husband was a farmer, he was likely to marry later because he needed to 
wait until he or his bride inherited (or accumulated enough savings to purchase) a farm, 
thereby increasing both male and female marriage age. Alternatively, it has been suggested 
that in order to obtain more child labour for the family farm, men who were farmers married 
earlier and married younger women. In the econometric models this variable was not 
significant, perhaps because farming was not the only occupation in Ramanagaram which 
used some amount of child labour. Many occupations (particularly those connected with the 
silk industry such as boiling cocoons in the silk-reeling units and silk rearing) also required 
large quantities of child labour. Moreover, in Indian society a man does not need to wait to 
achieve economic independence through inheritance before he marries, but can cohabit as a 
married man with his own parents. 
Another measure of husband's occupation was if a man was employed in domestic industry. 
This variable is hypothesised to decrease female marriage age because additional child labour 
may be required for such occupations, again a hypothesis widely advanced for pre-industrial 
Europe. In the econometric models this variable was not significant, again perhaps because 
child labour was important in so many income-earning occupations and in household 
activities in Ramanagaram. 
Moving onto the variables which did emerge as significant determinants of female marriage 
age in Ramanagaram, let us first consider husband's skilled occupation. Theoretically, this 
variable is expected to exert an impact on female marriage age in different ways. First, there 
is a hypothesis that if a husband holds a skilled occupation rather than an unskilled one, he 
will tend to marry an older bride because he prefers to wait for a better-educated bride due to 
`positive assortative mating'. Second, in a skilled occupation a man can earn additional 
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income and raise better-'quality' children, which may lead him to delay marriage so as to 
reduce child `quantity'. Third, a `skilled occupation' is a measure of `effective education' or 
human capital investment. The implication of this finding is that there is a `pure work 
influence' on female marriage age even after controlling for education. Fourth, men in skilled 
occupations may want to devote some years building up their careers before getting married, 
increasing their own ages at marriage, and hence leading them to marry older women. 
Finally, men in skilled occupations may be more influenced by their colleagues or peers in 
the workplace who are marrying later as well. In the preliminary regression models, 
husband's skilled occupation did emerge as a significant influence on female marriage age. 
Even though the t-ratios on the SKILL variables were insignificant in the interaction model, it 
was argued that this was probably due to multicollinearity, and that this variable is a 
significant determinant of female marriage age. This is supported by its importance in the 
models of marriage age estimated for sub-samples of Hindus and Muslims. If we examine 
differences in the effect of husband's skilled occupation on female marriage age by religion, 
there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of husband's skilled occupation on 
marriage age between any of the three religious groups. 
The next variable which was significant was the education of the woman. Theoretically, 
female education is hypothesised to exert a powerful positive effect on female marriage age 
for a variety of reasons 98 This hypothesised effect was borne out in the preliminary models. 
Both total education and - even more - secondary education appeared to increase women's 
marriage age. There are several reasons why secondary education may exert a larger effect 
than total education. First, higher education may have delayed marriage because of the 
tendency of women with such an education to have a longer search process, and their greater 
capacity to bear the search costs of doing so. Higher education also increases the opportunity 
cost of women's time (both in employment and the opportunity costs of leisure) and increases 
98 Birdsall, 1989: 23-50; Appleton, 1996: 139-166. 
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both productivity at home and in the market. It is also possible that when girls in 
Ramanagaram are in secondary school, which they enter at age 11 or 12, they are old enough 
to be amenable to educational teaching about high marriage age. When girls are in high 
school, they are able to read about the benefits of small families themselves or are influenced 
by the media (such as radio and television) on these matters. This was particularly evident to 
me during my fieldwork because the Anganwadi (courtyard) teachers were required to have 
passed the SSLC (tenth standard) examination in order to teach, and many of the single girls 
who had not as yet completed their SSLC were keen to do so in order to become courtyard 
teachers, and planned to marry only after completing their secondary education. 
Women's secondary education was also highly significant in the interaction model. It exerted 
a significant and positive impact for Hindus separately and Muslims separately, although 
there was no statistically significant difference in its effect between the two religions. 
Interestingly, this variable is insignificant among the Christians, possibly because there was 
not much variation in education among Christians. From the qualitative information gathered 
during my fieldwork, it seemed likely that it was university education which exerts a 
significant effect on Christians' marriage age, although this could not be tested 
econometrically because the sample size of the Christians was too small. 
The income variable, measured as total expenditure, emerged as very significant in the 
models of marriage age presented here. Theoretically, income is thought to exert either a 
negative or a positive impact on marriage age. It may increase marriage age for those women 
who earn higher incomes because these women expect to obtain fewer gains from marriage. 
On the other hand, higher incomes earned by men may enable them to support a wife with no 
income or to afford to have additional children, consequently leading to lower marriage ages 
for women. The income variable (measured as total expenditure) had a highly significant 
positive effect on marriage age. These findings have several implications. First, income of 
160 
destination may indeed have been a good proxy for income of origin, since it exerts a 
measurable effect on marriage age. Second, the fact that the positive effects of income 
outweigh the negative effects implies that it is making sense, at least in Ramanagaram in the 
1990s, for the rich to marry later and the poor to marry earlier. This may be due to two 
causes. First, as suggested by the literature on income and marriage age, women who have 
higher incomes have lower expected gains from marriage, and hence may be marrying later. 
Second, the poor may require children for old-age support and insurance to a greater degree 
than richer parents with other means of saving and insurance, leading to lower ages at 
marriage for women who are from poor families in order to ensure that enough children are 
born to guarantee effective insurance cover. However, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the effect of this variable on marriage age between Hindus and Muslims. 
Age at menarche also had a significant positive effect on marriage age, one which did not 
vary across religious groups. There are several possible reasons for this. First, menarche may 
be a sign of a woman being `grown up' enough to marry `soon'. Second, it may be a sign that 
a girl is now reproductively fertile and needs to be married off to prevent illegitimate 
pregnancies. The qualitative evidence collected during my fieldwork suggests that both of 
these factors may have been at work. Most important, however, was that two key desired 
characteristics in a potential bride in Ramanagaram were physical strength and long hair. 
This was because, for the rigorous life which many of the Ramanagaram women had to lead 
after marriage, stamina and strength were required to keep up with household activities. The 
women explained that this was also compounded by the fact that because both boys and girls 
were being sent to school, married women were bearing the burden of additional work 
formerly performed by children. Given the lack of alternative labour to help with household 
tasks, women were required to take huge burdens in terms of time and stamina on themselves. 
Hence, because physical strength increased household productivity, it was a highly desired 
characteristic for young women, contributing greatly to their eligibility in the marriage 
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market. Another desired characteristic, which was also reflected in Chapter 3 where we saw 
that one of the key items of personal expenditure for the Ramanagaram women was coconut 
oil, was long hair, which was prized as an asset. Interestingly, both desired characteristics - 
physical strength and long hair - are directly related to better nutrition and health, which in 
turn are medically known to be reflected in early menarche. The positive relationship 
between age at marriage and age at menarche may therefore have been because menarche is a 
good proxy for a woman's health and nutritional status and hence her desirability in the 
marriage market. 
Year of marriage was included in the model as a possible proxy for changes in social norms 
and/or legislation over time, both of which would, be theoretically postulated to increase 
marriage age. The econometric findings showed that a one-year later year of marriage was 
associated with a significant increase in marriage age for all three religious groups. The 
implications of the significant effect exerted by the year of marriage variable must be 
considered more carefully. With the imposition of the Child Marriage Restraint Act in 1978, 
there was a change in the practice of child marriage, with an average of 54% of the women 
who married after 1978 in the Ramanagaram sample doing so after the age of 18, compared 
to an average of 27% for those women who married before 1978. Although the law is still not 
wholly complied with, it appears to have exerted some influence on people's behaviour. This 
is borne out by the opinions expressed by some of the Ramanagaram women. For example, 
Sardamma of village C said 'My daughter can study as much as she wants to for now, and she 
must get married only at 18. ' On the other hand, the law is certainly still being violated, as 
illustrated by Chandramma of village B who said that for her daughter 'it is best that she 
should get married at 15-16. As she is currently that age, I am looking out for an alliance for 
her. ' The fact that we see the 'time' effect operating on age at marriage even after controlling 
for variations in other factors such as education, income and occupation may mean that the 
1978 law is being better enforced. 
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An alternative interpretation of the positive effect of year on age at marriage is that the 
changes over time may be being brought about by changes in the set of expectations, social 
norms, and customs governing age at marriage and female status in the home, especially with 
regard to the `proper time to marry' for women in younger birth cohorts. This is because for 
`social behaviour' (such as fertility may be) an individual's utility-maximising level of that 
behaviour may be an increasing function of the average level of that activity undertaken by 
all others in a social reference group. 
We find some support for the influence of norms in the responses to two questions on 
daughters' age at marriage in the Ramanagaram questionnaire. The women who had married 
daughters were asked at what age their daughters had been married, and, for those who had 
unmarried daughters, at what age they desired their unmarried daughters to be married. For 
all women who had married daughters, the mean age at which the daughters had married was 
17.5 years. For those who had unmarried daughters, the proposed mean age at marriage was 
18.9 years. It is interesting that both these figures are higher than the mean age at marriage 
for ever-married women in the sample as a whole (17.3 years), again indicating that `normal' 
female marriage age may be rising. 
The positive effect of year on age at marriage was observed among all three religious groups, 
with no significant difference in the effect between Hindus and Muslims, but a significantly 
larger effect among Christians. 
A final variable which is theoretically claimed to influence marriage age in the Indian context 
is caste. In a model estimated for Hindu women only, high caste was found to exert a 
significant impact on Hindu marriage age even after controlling for the influence of other 
socio-economic factors. In the context of Karnataka, this may be because the high castes are 
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more exposed to urban influences or to relatives who have migrated away from Karnataka 
because of the strict government policy of reservations in academic institutions and 
government jobs for lower castes and scheduled castes. This may have contributed to a higher 
female age at marriage among high castes in Ramanagaram because of the desire to emulate 
the late-marrying behaviour of those who live in cities. Another fallout of the reservation 
policy which may contribute to higher marriage ages among women of high castes could be 
the lack of suitable marriage partners living close by, and consequently, the greater search 
time associated with finding suitable partners. 
An explanation for why the scheduled-caste variable did not emerge as significant may be the 
very small differences in education and income patterns between them and the low castes in 
Ramanagaram. The mean level of education for women from the low castes was 4.95 years, 
and the mean level of education for women belonging to the scheduled castes was 4.14 years. 
The mean level of total monthly expenditure for households belonging to the low castes was 
Rs. 998.26, while the mean level of total monthly expenditure for households belonging to 
the scheduled castes was Rs. 844.75. For purposes of comparison, the mean number of years 
of female education among high caste women was 7.26 years, and the mean level of total 
monthly expenditure for households belonging to high castes was Rs. 1068.34. These 
findings reveal relatively small differences between the low castes and the scheduled castes, 
but considerable differences between them and the high castes. This in turn suggests that 
there may be little difference between the low and the scheduled castes in other variables 
which we cannot measure or control for. 
The main purpose of this study is to identify differences between religions in the 
determination of demographic indices. Theoretically, religion has been hypothesised to have 
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a direct impact on the age at first marriage via its function as a system of beliefs or values, 
and an indirect impact via its impact on women's status. 99 
The religion variable was eliminated in almost all the preliminary models of marriage age in 
Ramanagaram. The only model in which it was retained was one which excluded the 
husband's-skilled-occupation variable. This illustrates the operation of the `characteristics' 
hypothesis, i. e. that apparent differences by religion in marriage or fertility, are often due to 
socio-economic differences. between members of various religious groups. Controlling for 
other socio-economic variables, religion by itself had no significant effect on female marriage 
age in Ramanagaram. 
The interaction model then showed that there were also no differences between Hindus and 
Muslims in the effect of other socio-economic variables on marriage age. That is, the factors 
which determine marriage age in Ramanagaram do not differ between Hindus and Muslims. 
However, there were some differences in the socio-economic influences on marriage age 
between Christians and the two other religious groups. 
These findings provide no empirical support for the concerns which have been put forward 
by the more extreme right-wing political parties in India since the 1990s about the so-called 
`Islamic' effects on marriage, according to which that Muslim women have much lower 
autonomy (and hence lower marriage age) than other religious groups. The analysis for 
Ramanagaram shows that any observed difference in female marriage age across religious 
groups can be explained by other socio-economic differences between these communities 
such as access to secondary education, income, age at menarche, year of marriage and 
husband's occupation. 
99 See Sander, 1995 for differences between Catholics, Protestants and Baptists in America; Thornton, 
1979: 131-142; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997: 212-254. 
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This chapter has investigated the determinants of the female age at marriage on the grounds 
that it is an important proximate determinant of women's fertility and a vital variable in 
explorations of economic demography in a society in which most reproduction occurs within 
marriage. Despite these facts, beyond the early theoretical economic models of marriage put 
forward in the 1970s and early 1980s, there has been little attempt, at least in the realm of 
economics, to integrate the theoretical literature on the determinants of marriage age with the 
discipline encouraged by concrete empirical findings. 
This chapter has attempted to contribute to an understanding of the determinants of the 
timing of marriage in an economic and demographic context. It has been based on twin paths 
of scholarly investigation. First, it has attempted to highlight the most important theoretical 
and empirical issues that emerge in assessing the determinants of marriage age through a 
survey of the economic, socio-anthropological and medical literature that does exist. Second, 
it has carried out a detailed econometric investigation of the empirical evidence obtained 
from a sample from one taluk in Karnataka to investigate whether, in addition to the factors 
which have conventionally been used to account for differences in marriage age among 
populations, religion also plays a role. 
This chapter found that after controlling for other socio-economic factors such as income, 
education, age at menarche and year of marriage, the religion in which the woman was raised 
did not exert an effect on the age at marriage in Ramanagaram. Nor did the effects of other 
socio-economic factors on marriage age differ between Hindus and Muslims. Discussions of 
fertility in poor countries have stressed that it is important to increase female age at marriage 
to lower fertility. This chapter supports the conclusion that in order to achieve this end, 
increasing the educational level of women, particularly secondary education, is essential. 
Skilled occupations and rising incomes also seem to play a role in delaying marriage. The age 
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at marriage is also influenced by biological factors such as the timing of menarche. However, 
this study also recognises that social factors such as the role of custom (which may be what is 
reflected in the significant `year of marriage' variable), may come to bear on marriage 
decisions as well. All in all, this chapter hopes to have integrated economic argument and 
econometric analysis with a consideration of wider sociological factors to identify the most 
important determinants of female marriage age in Ramanagaram. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Determinants of Contraceptive Use in Ramanagaram 
I have never adverted to the check suggested by Condorcet without the most marked 
disapprobation. Indeed I should always particularly reprobate any artificial and unnatural 
modes of checking population, both on account of their immorality and their tendency to 
remove a necessary stimulus to industry. ' 
There are two opposing views of the interaction between fertility regulation and the fertility 
transition. The first view is that fertility will decline in response to the supply of family 
planning services. The other is that fertility will decline in response to the decline in the 
demand for children. 2 This debate is particularly relevant for south India where in the past 
two decades there have been rapid declines in fertility, often approaching replacement levels, 
as in the case of Tamil Nadu. It is still unclear the extent to which these declines are due to 
the provision of family planning services, to socio-economic changes in education and 
women's employment, to changes in the institutional structure, to changes in ideas and 
norms, or to some combination of all of these factors. 
The decision whether or not to practise contraception is based on the individual's evaluation 
of the costs and benefits of adopting a contraceptive method. The costs of practising 
contraception include factors such as the actual monetary costs of using a method, the time 
spent in travelling, payments to providers such as family planning clinics or hospitals, and 
psycho-social factors such as the `fear of adverse health effects and disapproval of husband 
and other family members. '3 The benefits of practising contraception are the reduced cost of 
additional children, as well as the reduced maternal health risks associated with repeated 
pregnancies. 
1 Malthus, 1817: 393, as quoted in Folbre, 1992: 114. Although clearly Condorcet was in favour of 
contraception, as Folbre argues, `Whether or not he was prudish, Malthus endorsed traditional religious 
views of contraception that other political economists of his day were willing to criticise. ' See Folbre, 
1992: 114. 
2 Pritchett, 1994 : 1-2. 
3 Bongaarts, 1997a: 13; see also Bongaarts and Bruce, 1995: 57-75. 
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In the survey, the Ramanagaram women were asked if they had ever used any method of birth 
control. The question was answered in the affirmative by 53% of ever-married women in the 
whole sample, 86% of Christians, 57% of Hindus and 40% of Muslims. These percentages 
suggest that it is possible that religion does affect contraceptive use in Ramanagaraam. 
However, it is also possible that underlying characteristics of the three religious groups are 
what accounts for these differences. The basic issue which this chapter will address is 
whether contraceptive decisions are just a means to an end (i. e. of achieving a particular 
fertility outcome), or whether they have their own costs, i. e. the contraceptive decision is not 
totally transparent and therefore a study of the determinants of contraceptive choice is 
relevant. 
At the outset it must be emphasised that this study will not deal with whether the supply of 
contraception and contraceptive usage acts as an independent determinant of fertility. This is 
not because the importance of this issue is not recognised, but because of the limitations of 
the dataset available for Ramanagaram. The Ramanagaram dataset is drawn from a sample 
over which contraceptive access is uniform and, indeed, very good. This is because the 
government family planning movement in Karnataka is well-organised and covers all parts of 
the state. In order to test whether contraceptive supply is an independent determinant of 
fertility, one would require a much larger sample drawn from areas which have quite 
different access to family planning services. 
The best way of studying if contraceptive use has an independent effect on fertility would be 
to select samples from several areas all over India and then to estimate a simultaneous 
equations model using socio-economic determinants of fertility, the decision to use 
contraception, and proxies for the supply of contraception. A detailed micro-level dataset 
such as the one collected in Ramanagaram is more suited to the study of what characteristics 
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of women influence their decision whether to use contraception, and that is the question this 
chapter will explore. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section I reviews the literature on the importance of 
family planning programmes, whether the decision to use contraception ought to be studied 
separately from the decision whether to have a child, and the theoretical determinants of 
contraceptive use. Section II examines the empirical findings on contraceptive use in 
Ramanagaram. Section III considers the empirical evidence from the survey on fertility 
preferences in Ramanagaram. Section IV estimates a logic model of the determinants of 
contraceptive use for Ramanagaram. Section V presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
I. Theories of the determinants of contraceptive use 
Existing views of the importance of contraceptive use within the theory of fertility comprise 
two broad streams: that which dwells on the supply-side determinants of contraceptive use 
such as family planning programmes4, and that which deals with demand-side determinants 
such as the role of desired fertility'. The first body of theory stems from the work of Easterlin 
and others. 6 The Easterlin `synthesis' framework postulates that in the early stage of the 
demographic transition, mortality and natural fertility are dominant, social and cultural 
factors influence the number of children, and the supply of living children is lower than 
desired fertility. As survival rates improve, the desire for large families declines, and actual 
fertility exceeds desired fertility. In this scenario, actual fertility is still determined primarily 
by natural fertility because family planning is not used, due to the high perceived or actual 
costs of using family planning services. Eventually, fertility regulation is adopted, but actual 
° For example, Parker Mauldin argues that 'There is considerable empirical evidence that large-scale 
family planning programs, when well-managed, have a substantial effect on fertility. ' See Parker 
Mauldin, 1983: 289. 
5 See The Economist, 1994: 21-23. 
6 Easterlin, 1975: 54-63; Bourgeois-Pichat, 1967: 160-163. 
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fertility is still greater than the demand for children. Finally, society progresses towards a 
regime in which couples adopt contraception and limit family size. The costs of regulating 
fertility are negligible, and actual fertility will equal the demand for children 7 Thus, the 
Easterlin synthesis framework acknowledges a role for both demand- and supply-side factors: 
contraceptive use is determined both by the desire to achieve certain fertility outcomes and 
the costs of using contraception. 
The fundamental issue which demographers and economists debate about is whether 
contraceptive use ought to be studied independently of fertility choice. This discussion has 
taken the form of debates about the impact and relative success of family planning 
programmes in effecting fertility transitions. 8 In 1960 only 10% of women in developing 
countries were using any form of fertility control, whereas by 1994 the figure had risen to 
51%. 9 Figures such as these have led demographers to argue that there is a 'KAP-gap' (a gap 
in women's knowledge of, attitudes towards, and practice of birth control) and an `unmet 
need' for contraception. '° 
However, there is considerable debate both about the existence and the size of the KAP-gap. 
Bongaarts argues that for the 15 major KAP surveys conducted, the average KAP-gap is of 
the order of 21%. h1 Bongaarts suggests that there are `substantial levels of unmet need for 
contraception' because of `limited access to and poor quality of family planning services, 
dissatisfaction with and/or lack of knowledge of available contraceptive methods, weak 
motivation to implement reproductive preferences, and opposition from the husband. "2 The 
provision of adequate family planning services is one way to counteract the `unmet need' for 
7 One example of an application of the Easterlin model is Chen, Hicks, Johnson and Rodriguez, 1990: 
408-24. 
8 Bongaarts, 1997b: 422-443. 
9 The Economist, 1994: 22. 
10 Bongaarts, 1991: 293-313; Thapa, 1993: 4. 
11 Bongaarts, 1991: 293-313. 
12 Bongaarts, 1991: 311. 
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contraception in poor countries, and is one of the most important arguments in favour of 
continuing investment in large-scale family planning programmes. " 
However, the role of family planning programmes in the fertility transition has also been 
attacked. Demographers such as Westoff argue that the KAP-gap is negligible because the 
KAP surveys undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s do not distinguish between women who 
wish to limit their fertility and women who are not practising contraception because they are 
infecund or pregnant. 14 A recent and serious attack has come from Pritchett, who contends 
that desired fertility and the demand for children are the key factors in explaining changes in 
fertility, and that the supply of contraception is relatively unimportant. 15 Pritchett bases this 
view on three arguments. First, he contends that the supply portion of the unmet need is 
small, i. e. women are failing to use contraception not because access is restricted, but 
because of other factors affecting their demand for contraception. Second, he argues that the 
calculation of unmet need is over-stated because it includes a large number of currently 
pregnant women and amenorrhoeic women whose pregnancies were not planned. Third, he 
holds that the unmet need also includes a large proportion of women who have a demand for 
spacing births, rather than for limiting them altogether; providing such women with 
contraception will leave their final fertility unaffected. Finally, he argues that fertility is 
inelastic with respect to contraceptive costs, as the latter are small relative to the costs of 
children. 16 Pritchett substantiates his view by alluding to the unimportance of contraception 
for historical fertility transitions. He argues that `contraceptive use is higher where fertility is 
lower primarily because desired fertility is lower which leads to both lower fertility and 
higher contraceptive demand, and hence higher contraceptive use' 17 
13 See also Guilkey and Jayne, 1997: 173-189. 
14 Westoff, 1988: 225-232. 
15 Pritchett, 1994: 1-55. 
16 Pritchett, 1994: 3. 
17 Pritchett, 1994: 15-18. The conclusion that there is a negative relation between desired fertility and 
contraceptive use is also found in other studies, for example Entwisle, Hermalin and Mason, 1986; 
Hirschman, 1985: 35-59; Omondi-Odhiambo, 1997: 29-40. However, unlike for Pritchett, this factor is 
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Let us examine these arguments further. First, Pritchett is correct to argue that access to 
family planning alone does not have an impact on contraceptive adoption. However, as 
Bongaarts has suggested, family planning programmes not only provide access, but also aid 
in `The diffusion of knowledge about fertility regulation and the social acceptability of 
private control over reproductive behaviour [which] have probably been more important in 
raising contraceptive use than has the mere physical accessibility of methods. 18 Moreover, as 
Egerö argues, `The very act of providing services changes the context within which people 
operate, and could in certain situations be an important `ideational' preparation for the 
couple-based decision-making about birth control simply by making birth control an open 
public issue. ' 19 
Second, Pritchett's theory cannot explain entirely the rapid decline in fertility in Bangladesh 
and Indonesia in the past two decades, nor the declines in fertility which we observe in Tamil 
Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in India in the 1980s and 1990s, which have been 
attributed by other demographers to the increase in the supply of family planning here, along 
with information dissemination and a change in the social norms associated with controlling 
reproductive behaviour, at times independent of other demand-side socio-economic factors 
such as female education (as in the case of Andhra Pradesh). 20 
Third, Pritchett is correct to suggest that estimates of unmet need are overstated to the extent 
that they include currently pregnant women and that the efforts to reduce the unmet need for 
spacing are less important for their impact on fertility. However, Bongaarts has shown that 
only one among many other factors, including supply-side factors, found to be important in these other 
models. 
18 Bongaarts, 1997b: 427. See also Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 5-30. 
19 Egerö, 1994: 25. 
20 Retherford and Ramesh, 1996; Koenig et al, 1992; Egerö, 1994; Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 5-30. 
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even after adjustments for these factors are made, levels of unmet need in developing 
countries are still substantial. 21 
Fourth, Pritchett's argument that family planning programmes do not cause declines in 
unwanted fertility may have to be viewed in the context that over the fertility transition, 
unwanted fertility typically has an inverted U-shape. In the first part of the transition, 
unwanted fertility rises while overall fertility declines; in the last part of the transition, 
unwanted fertility also declines. Assessing the impact of family planning programmes on 
unwanted fertility is then difficult because `family planning programs are often instituted in 
the early phases of the fertility transition when ... there 
is a strong upward pressure on 
unwanted fertility. '22 Thus, the net effect of a family planning programme is not the expected 
decline in unwanted childbearing, but perhaps instead either a steady level of unwanted 
fertility (when the role of the programme is to prevent what would have been a substantial 
rise in unwanted fertility) or an increase (when the programme prevents an even larger rise 
than would have occurred otherwise). 23 
Fifth, given that attempts to quantify the unmet need for contraception have been performed 
and it has been shown to exist (as noted above), it seems unusual to assign such a small role 
to the provision of family planning in the fertility transition. 
24 For these reasons, it seems 
more appropriate to argue that both the demand for children and the supply of contraception 
play an important role in the fertility transition: 
Making contraception more widely available will make it easier 
for women to have only the number of children they want, and to do so 
in safe and efficient ways. But changing the number they want to have 
will need a subtle mix of education, economic development, land reform 
21 As Bongaarts argues 'In sum, the unquestionable existence of an unmet need for contraception, while 
not as extensive as the proponents of programmes believe, is more important than Pritchett suggests. ' 
See Bongaarts, 1997b: 429. 
22 Bongaarts, 1997a: 30-31. 
23 Bongaarts, 1997a: 30-31. 
24 For example, see the Mysore Population Study which recorded that 80% of couples interviewed in 
Ramanagaram recorded abstinence for 6 months or more as the main means of post-partum birth control 
practised. See the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 136. 
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and improvements in the lot of women. 25 
Investigating if contraceptive use exercises a completely autonomous role on fertility is 
difficult, mainly because the investigation must be conducted in areas which have differential 
access to contraception. However, another option is to investigate empirically a testable 
model which introduces variables which may affect the decision to use contraception 
independently of the determinants of fertility. This chapter carries out such an analysis for 
the Ramanagaram sample. We therefore go on to discuss which factors may affect the 
decision to use contraception. 
One of the most important factors postulated as influencing this decision is women and men's 
education. Rosenzweig and Schultz argue that couples with more schooling have a wider 
knowledge of contraceptive methods, use the methods better, and are better able to overcome 
biological constraints on their fertility, compared to couples with less schooling. 26 According 
to Ainsworth et al, educated women are more likely to use contraception because information 
about availability, correct use, side effects, and costs are less difficult and costly for educated 
women to assimilate. 27 In addition, women with some education have a stronger bargaining 
position within the family when it comes to decisions about contraception. These conclusions 
are supported by studies on a number of other countries. 28 
Women's education is also important in affecting contraceptive use in south India, as 
described in the Mysore Population Study. 29 In their study of birth control practices in Tamil 
Nadu, Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan find that education motivates higher contraceptive 
25 The Economist, 1994: 23. 
26 Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1989: 457-477. 
27 Ainsworth, Beegle and Nyamate, 1996: 85-122. 
28 Chen, Hicks, Johnson and Rodriguez, 1990: 408-424; Schuler, Hashemi and Riley, 1997: 563-575; 
Guilkey and Jayne, 1997: 173-189; Shapiro and Tambashe, 1994; Jejeebhoy, 1992; Castro Martin, 
1995: 187-202; Cochrane, 1979. 
29 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 163. 
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use, not necessarily by increasing women's autonomy, but by raising the cost of children. 
30 
The National Family Health Survey on Karnataka also found a positive relation between 
education and contraceptive use. 31 In the logit regression models presented later in this 
chapter, this variable is measured in terms of the total number of years of education of the 
woman. 
Several studies also argue that husband's education is an important determinant of 
contraceptive use. Ainsworth et al argue that husband's education exerts an impact most 
particularly at low levels of husband's and wives' schooling, a conclusion substantiated by 
other studies. 32 Omondi-Odhiambo goes so far as to claim, for Kenya, that the net effect of 
husband's education on the desire to use contraception and on effective contraceptive use is 
larger than that of wife's education.; Husband's education, measured in terms of the total 
number of years of education, is used in the logit models presented later in this study. 
Contraceptive choice may be affected by the occupations of women. 
34 For example, women 
who are employed may be more likely to use contraception either for birth spacing or for 
birth limitation, if their occupations are incompatible with child-rearing. 35 Women who are 
employed in a skilled occupation may also use contraception more. 
36 In a study of women's 
work and birth control in two villages in Tamil Nadu, Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan 
argue that those women who were employed outside their homes doing beedi-rolling" work 
30 Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996: 187-201. 
31 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 88. 
32 Ainsworth, Beegle and Nyamate, 1996: 85-122. For another example, in their study of 4184 women 
covered under the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in Tunisia, Cochrane and Guilkey find that 
women's education had no effect on contraceptive adoption but that husband's education significantly 
increased the use of IUDs and traditional methods. For more on this, see Cochrane and Guilkey, 1995: 
779-804. 
33 Omondi-Odhiambo, 1997: 29-40. He argues that educated husbands employed in higher-status 
occupations discuss family planning with their wives, and use more effective (44% of the sample of 
1129) rather than less effective (23%) methods of contraception. 
34 Kraft and Coverdill, 1994: 593-602. 
35 Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996: 187-201. 
36 Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996: 187-201. 
37 Beedis are a relatively inexpensive hand-rolled cigarette, popularly smoked by people in India. 
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with independent sources of income, had much greater autonomy than women who mainly 
performed housework or were employed as agricultural labourers '3' and were also twice as 
likely to adopt birth control. 39 In the econometric models presented later in this chapter, this 
variable is measured in three ways: first, so as to take the value I if the woman was employed 
in a home-related occupation and 0 otherwise; second, so as to take the value I if the woman 
was employed in a silk-related occupation and 0 otherwise; and third, so as to take the value 
1 if the women was employed in a skilled occupation and 0 otherwise. 
Contraceptive choice may also be affected by the occupations of men. Men who are 
employed in skilled occupations may encourage their wives to use contraception more if they 
want fewer or better-'quality' children. Men who are employed in domestic industry may 
encourage their wives to use contraception less, if more children are required for their labour. 
Finally, if a man is employed as a farmer, he may encourage his wife to use contraception 
less, if children are required for the family farm. In the econometric models presented, this 
variable is measured in three ways: so as to take the value 1 if the man was employed in a 
skilled occupation and 0 otherwise; so as to take the value I if the man was employed in 
domestic industry and 0 otherwise; and so as to take the value I if the man was a farmer and 
0 otherwise. 
Contraceptive use may also be affected by income. Families with higher incomes may be 
more likely to use contraception because they may be able to afford better access to 
contraceptive services. Alternatively, they may have a higher opportunity cost of the value of 
their time spent in leisure which may reduce their demand for children and increase 
contraceptive use to achieve lower desired fertility outcomes. This variable is included in the 
38 Women employed in the beedi industry were 8.6 times more likely to say that they could support 
themselves independently, were 11 times more likely to enjoy greater freedom of movement and 3.3 
times more likely to discuss finances and fertility decisions. These women were also the ones who were 
1.27 more likely to report contraceptive use. 
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econometric models presented below and is measured in terms of total monthly expenditure, 
total monthly food expenditure and in terms of an index of ownership of items of consumer 
equipment. 
The decision to use contraception may also depend on the age of the woman. Studies of 
contraceptive use argue that women in their mid-thirties to mid-forties, who have completed 
their childbearing, may have the highest demand for contraception compared with women 
who have not as yet completed their families. 40 Certainly, women who are older will have 
grown up in a cohort in which norms and values were more unfavourable to contraception 
than they were for younger women. This variable is measured in the econometric models in 
terms of the woman's age in years at the time of survey. 
Contraceptive choice is affected by the institutional structure and by ideas and norms about 
contraceptive use. Dyson and Moore have argued that the extent to which women have access 
to social resources such as information, economic support, political support and their natal 
kin after marriage, has an important impact on their ability to enjoy greater autonomy. For 
example, family planning programmes need to take into account cultural constructs such as 
patriarchy, which may generate a desire for large families41, because in countries where 
patriarchy is strong, `using contraception may be regarded as a violation of fundamental 
moral taboos. '42 The influence of ideas and norms on the decision to use contraception is 
supported by statements made by the Ramanagaram women. For example, when questioned 
about the ideal number of children, Kamalamma, age 45, said, `Two is about right. The 
government tells us through the family planning programme. I got myself operated after two 
children. I do not know if the population is growing too fast, but we are all told that we 
39 Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan found that women with education reported greater use of birth 
control by a factor of 1.42. See Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996: 187-201. 
40 Visaria and Chari, 1998. 
41 Frank and McNicoll, 1987: 212. 
42 Omondi-Odhiambo, 1997: 29. 
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should only have two. '43 The woman's age variable, which is included in the econometric 
models, may also capture the effect of changes in social norms over time. 
Related to the role of norms and social mores, another factor which may influence 
contraceptive use is religion. For example, in their study of Bangladesh, Schuler, Hashemi 
and Riley find that Hindu women are more likely to use a contraceptive method than Muslim 
women. `' The Mysore Population Study found that in Karnataka post-partum abstinence was 
on average longer for Hindu than for Muslim women, with obvious contraceptive 
implications 45 Amin, Diamond and Steele's study of Bangladesh found that religion is an 
important predictor of contraceptive use, but primarily via the religious practices of the 
community, rather than through individual religious observance. 
6 Religion is included in the 
econometric models presented later in this chapter. 
Another social characteristic which may influence contraceptive use is caste. For example, 
Dharmalingam and Morgan argue that in Tamil Nadu, the Nadar caste gives its women much 
greater autonomy (as defined by freedom of movement, decision-making authority and inter- 
spousal communication) than upper castes, and this has significantly raised contraceptive 
acceptance. 47 This variable is included in one preliminary logit model estimated for Hindus 
only. 
Another factor which may affect contraceptive use is consanguineous marriage. It is possible 
that a woman who marries a relative may be more likely to consult with her extended family 
43 The importance of the media is also observed in studies of fertility in other countries. For example, 
Ibrahim and Ibrahim argue that in Egypt, over 70% of Egyptian women acquire their knowledge about 
family planning from the television and that this is one of the most important factors accounting for 
fertility declines in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s. See Ibrahim and Ibrahim, 1998: 19-52. 
44 Schuler, Hashemi and Riley, 1997: 563-575. 
45 Mysore Population Study, 1961: 137. Desired fertility between Hindus and Muslims was, however, 
similar at 3.7 births for Hindus and 3.8 births for Muslims. See Mysore Population Study, 1961: 141. 
46 Amin, Diamond and Steele, 1996. 
47 Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996: 187-201. 
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on matters relating to contraception. Alternatively, since consanguineous marriages in 
Karnataka have traditionally involved a large age gap between spouses, this may contribute to 
reducing inter-spousal communication on contraception, which may decrease contraceptive 
use. This variable is included in the econometric models presented below and is measured in 
terms of a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the woman married a relative but 0 
otherwise; and in terms of the coefficient of inbreeding (discussed in the preceding chapter). 
Another important influence on contraceptive use is family composition 48 For example, it is 
conventionally argued that female extended family members such as mothers and mothers-in- 
law have an important role to play in influencing a couple's decisions about using 
contraception 49 Most often, the hypothesised direction of influence is thought to be negative. 
In this chapter, the influence of the extended family is measured in terms of the total number 
of female extended family resident in the household. The influence of female extended 
family on women's decisions to use contraception is also discussed in detail in the qualitative 
evidence presented in Section II below. 
Another factor which may influence a woman's decision to use contraception is her 
autonomy and her mobility, as measured by her freedom of movement and of interaction with 
others. 50 For example, Schuler, Hashemi and Riley argue that in Bangladesh, greater 
autonomy for certain women has encouraged them to join credit programmes more readily 
than others, and that this has also increased their propensity to use contraception independent 
of other `empowerment' variables, because it has removed psycho-social barriers to using 
contraception 51 Morgan and Niraula studied two villages in Nepal and found that greater 
48 Muhuri and Menken, 1997: 279-294. 
49 Srinivas, 1989: 123-144. 
50 Although autonomy is defined more widely in Chapter 6. See also Dyson and Moore, 1983: 35-60; 
Basu, 1992; Balk, 1994: 21-45. 
51 This is because women who earn independent incomes via the credit programmes are able to 
contribute to support their families, are less insecure because they own cash and other assets, feel less 
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autonomy increased contraceptive use and lowered the levels of the `unmet need' for 
contraception. 52 This variable was included in the econometric models in the form of a 
question which asked women if they felt that access to a contraceptive method was easy for 
them. However, a more in-depth qualitative examination of how women's autonomy in 
Ramanagaram influenced the decision to practice family planning is also carried out in 
Section II below. 
Another factor postulated as affecting contraceptive use is the preference for sons. Aly and 
Shields argue that given that children are born sequentially, ceteris paribus, son preference 
may be expected to result in higher contraceptive use for families with more sons than 
daughters. 53 These findings are also supported by Schuler, Hashemi and Riley for 
Bangladesh, Morgan and Niraula for Nepal, and the National Family Health Survey for 
Karnataka. 54 The Ramanagaram women themselves made statements indicating that the 
decision to use contraception was affected by the desire for sons. For example, one Hindu 
woman, Vasantakumari, age 24, remarked, `I will have an operation (sterilisation) after I have 
a son. I will still try for a boy ... 
because I have three girls, who will look after me 
otherwise? ' This variable was not included in the econometric models because it is 
endogenous in a model of contraceptive choice where the dependent variable is whether or 
not the woman had ever used contraception. 
vulnerable to the threat of abandonment, and are less worried about the physical side effects of taking 
contraceptives. See Schuler, Hashemi and Riley, 1997: 573. 
52 Morgan and Niraula, 1995: 541-561. Morgan and Niraula found that contraceptive use was 24% in 
the low autonomy area in Nepal which they studied compared with 40% in the area of high autonomy. 
In terms of the 'unmet need', the proportion of women using contraception who intended no more 
additional births was estimated in the low autonomy area to be 59%. The comparable figure for the high 
autonomy area was 45%. 
Ss Using a sample of 8979 households from Egypt and non-linear maximum likelihood estimation 
procedures, Aly and Shields argue that contraceptive use increases dramatically at each parity as the 
number of sons increases. See Aly and Shields, 1991. 
54 Schuler, Hashemi and Riley, 1997: 563-575; Morgan and Niraula, 1995: 541-561; National Family 
Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 89-90. 
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The incidence and period of breastfeeding may also affect contraceptive use. A longer period 
of breastfeeding may reduce the necessity for using temporary or permanent methods of 
contraception. Informal discussions with the women of Ramanagaram suggested that there 
were no significant differences between Hindus and Muslims in the number of months of 
breastfeeding after birth. In the questionnaire, there was one question on whether women 
breastfed their children, but no information was collected on the length of breastfeeding. The 
percentage of women who breastfed their children was 98% among the Hindus, 96% among 
the Muslims, and 100% among the Christians. In any case, breastfeeding must be regarded as 
endogenous with contraceptive adoption and cannot therefore be included in the model as an 
exogenous determinant of the latter. 
Another factor thought to influence contraceptive practices is infant mortality. Gulati has 
argued that in India a decline in infant and child mortality generates a larger demand for 
contraceptive methods to regulate fertility, because of the increased survival of children into 
adulthood. 55 Retherford and Ramesh argue that one reason why contraceptive use in Tamil 
Nadu is high compared with other states in north India is that the infant mortality rate in 
Tamil Nadu is 68 per 1000 births, compared with 100 per 1000 births in Uttar Pradesh. 56 This 
variable is not included in the econometric models below because the infant mortality rate is 
unlikely to have varied greatly (or perceptibly) within Ramanagaram, and it would in any 
case have been impossible to assign an infant mortality rate to each woman in the sample. 
However, it is possible to estimate the mean level of infant and child deaths by religious 
group for the Ramanagaram sample, and the number of children ever born net of child deaths. 
These estimates are shown in Tables I and 2. 
55 Gulati, 1992: 157-172. 
56 Retherford and Ramesh, 1996. For evidence from elsewhere see Guilkey and Jayne, 1997: 173-189. 
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Table 1: Infant mortality by religion, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Infant mortality All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.00 
Standard deviation 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.00 
Table 1 shows infant mortality by religion in the Ramanagaram sample. A statistical test 
shows that this difference is not significantly different between Hindus and Muslims. There 
is also evidence from Ramanagaram that total children ever born net of infant mortality is not 
significantly different to the differences between Hindus, Muslims and Christians 
children ever born. This is depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2: Children ever born net of infant mortality, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Children ever born All women 
net of infant 
mortality 
Hindus Muslims Christians 
Mean 2.87 2.51 3.51 2.46 
Standard deviation 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.33 
in total 
The tables show that taking into account figures for infant mortality in the sample does not 
significantly alter the inherent differences between Hindus, Muslims and Christians in the 
mean level of their fertility. 
Another factor which may affect contraceptive use is the degree of participation of men in 
decision-making about fertility. In his study of Kenya, Omondi-Odhiambo argues that men 
have been usually excluded from participating in many family planning programmes. 57 
Moreover, since some traditional and modern methods of contraception do require the 
husband's consent, approval and financial support (or all three), it is important to take men's 
ideas about contraception into account when devising a family planning strategy. This is also 
important because in many less developed societies there is very limited inter-spousal 
57 Omondi-Odhiambo, 1997: 29. 
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communication on fertility 58 This issue is particularly relevant to an analysis of women's 
decisions about contraception because though in the aggregate, men's and women's 
perceptions of contraception are similar, at the couple level, there is a relatively large amount 
of disagreement and this causes both lower contraceptive use and increased conflict over 
intentions to use contraception in the future. 59 In the econometric models presented below, 
this variable is not used because it is highly correlated with husband's education and 
occupation, and indeed, the level of participation by men may even be a result of the level of 
education. However, the role of husbands in decision-making about contraception in the 
Ramanagaram sample is discussed in detail in the qualitative evidence presented in Section 
II. 
Of the factors postulated in the literature as being important determinants of contraceptive 
choice, therefore, eleven have been regarded as appropriate for inclusion in the econometric 
models estimated below for Ranmanagaram. These are woman's education, husband's 
education, income, woman's occupation, husband's occupation, marital consanguinity, 
woman's current age, woman's reported ease of access to a contraceptive method, resident 
female extended family, religion, and caste (used in one model for Hindus only). Before 
reporting the results of model estimation, however, let us briefly examine patterns of 
contraceptive use in Ramanagaram. 
II. Contraceptive use in Ramanagaram 
Before analysing the determinants of contraceptive use in Ramanagaram, it is important to 
examine the pattern of such use, as well as the Ramanagaram women's attitudes towards 
56 In Omondi-Odhiambo's study, couples were more likely to use contraception if they discussed family 
planning with each other, and 73% of couples who discussed family planning actually used it. Omondi- 
Odhiambo, 1997. See also Caldwell and Caldwell, 1990. 
59 Biddlecom, Casterline and Perez argue that more than 50% of couples do not concur in their 
perceptions about the basic aspects of contraception. See Biddlecom, Casterline and Perez, 1996. 
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contraception. In the survey, the Ramanagaram women were asked if they had ever used any 
method of birth control. The question was answered in the affirmative by 53% of ever- 
married women in the whole sample, 86% of Christians, 57% of Hindus and 40% of 
Muslims. According to the 1991 Census, 44% of Indian couples are effectively protected by 
family planning methods. 60 There are significant regional differences, however, with rates as 
high as 50% in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, but only 20% in Uttar Pradesh . 
61 The 
Ramanagaram sample therefore resembles the states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh 
which adjoin Karnataka geographically. According to the National Family Health Survey, 
knowledge of contraception is almost universal in Karnataka, with 99% of ever-married 
women (and 96% of currently-married women) in urban and rural areas reporting knowledge 
of at least one modern method. 62 However, the practice of birth control is lower, with only 
53% of ever-married women having ever used a method of contraception. 63 
The survey also asked Ramanagaram women which method of birth control they adopted, and 
their responses are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Method of birth control used, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Method of birth control used All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Copper t55.1 5 8.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Malad (pills) 18 18.2 8 13.6 7 25.0 3 25.0 
Nirodh (condoms) 6 6.1 3 5.1 2 7.1 1 8.3 
Operation 66 66.7 41 69.5 18 64.3 7 58.3 
Mala d+ operation 4 4.1 2 3.4 1 3.6 1 8.3 
60 Figures taken from the India Population Data Sheet, 1994. 
61 Retherford and Ramesh, 1996. 
62 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 79-80. 
63 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 79-80. Coincidentally, this figure is 
identical to that of ever-users of contraception in the Ramanagaram sample. 
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The most popular means of birth control was the sterilisation operation. It is interesting that 
even women who were not currently using any contraception preferred the sterilisation 
operation to any other method. For example, one woman, Padma, from Ramanagaram town, 
age 23 remarked, 'I will have an operation after three children. Currently, I do not use any 
birth control techniques. ' However, some women did have their reservations. For example, 
Gangamma, a Hindu mother of five, aged 33, from Ramanagaram town remarked, `I am 
scared of undergoing the operation. That is why I have five children. ' Another woman, 
Puttibai, from village A, age 35 remarked, `The population is less today because operations 
are in vogue, but I will not have it because they are said to be painful. ' 
This predominance of the tubectomy is similar to findings from the National Family Health 
Survey which reported that female and male sterilisation is the most widely-known 
contraceptive method in Karnataka, and that knowledge of spacing methods is comparatively 
low. 65 Female sterilisation accounts for 87% of total current contraceptive practice in 
Karnataka and the median age at sterilisation is 25.2 years. 66 Sterilisation operations also 
account for 79% of all contraceptive use in Tamil Nadu and 95% in Andhra Pradesh, but only 
66% in Uttar Pradesh. 67 
In the Ramanagaram sample, spacing methods were more popular among the Christians and 
Muslims than among Hindus. The second most popular method of family planning in the 
sample was birth control pills, which was used by one-quarter of Muslim and Christian 
women, but only 14% of Hindu women. By contrast, only Hindu women used the IUD. 
64 This finding was also corroborated in interviews with doctors in Ramanagaram taluk, March 1996. 
65 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 79-80. A 'modern' method refers to intra- 
uterine devices (IUDs), pills and condoms. 
66 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 88. The survey found that sterilisation 
operations after the age of 35 were quite rare (approximately 4%). This finding is similar to the case of 
Tamil Nadu. 
67 The median age at sterilisation in Tamil Nadu is 26.2 years and in Andhra Pradesh is 24.5 years; the 
comparable figure for Uttar Pradesh is 29.6 years. See Retherford and Ramesh, 1996. 
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Why is a permanent method of contraception so favoured by the women of Ramanagaram, as 
indeed by women in other south Indian states? One contributory factor is that most family 
planning services are performed by the public sector which emphasises permanent methods 
of birth control, and hence sterilisation is less costly and more easily available than other 
methods. Another contributory factor is the very small degree of communication about 
contraception by couples, discussed below. The tubectomy is a contraceptive method which a 
woman can adopt without the need to discuss it with her husband or seek his consent. 
Thirdly, the tubectomy involves fewer costs in terms of post-operative care or trips to health 
centres or family planning clinics, making this option attractive to women who live further 
away from medical infrastructure, as well as to service providers. 68 
The National Family Health Survey found that couple communication in Karnataka is very 
low, with an estimated 58% of women in Karnataka ever discussing contraception with their 
husbands. 69 In the Ramanagaram sample, couple communication was even less frequent, with 
only 36% answering that they ever discussed contraception with their husbands, 37% of 
Hindus, 23% of Muslims and 93% of Christians. This variable was not used in the logit 
regression analysis (discussed below) because it was highly correlated with both women's 
and men's education and it seemed likely that it was a result of education. 0 
Earlier the importance of female autonomy in influencing women's decision to use 
contraception was discussed. Moreover, recent studies of family planning in India suggest 
that `before accepting any contraceptive method, women generally seek the opinion of 
parents, husband and in-laws, in that order, and accept contraception only if these three 
68 Visaria and Chari, 1998: 53-112. 
69 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 104. 
70 The correlation coefficient between whether the woman discussed contraception with her husband 
and her total years of education was 0.56, while the correlation coefficient between whether the woman 
discussed contraception with her husband and his total years of education was 0.51. 
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parties approve. '" The Ramanagaram questionnaire therefore asked women which persons 
they consulted about family planning. Their responses are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4: Person(s) influencing decisions about birth control, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Persons influencing family All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
planning decisions 
Couple 
Couple + parents-in-law 
Couple + nurse 
Woman 
Woman + mother-in-law 
Woman + doctor/nurse 
No response 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
95 50.8 44 42.7 38 54.3 13 92.9 
2 10.7 2 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.4 0 0.0 
36 19.3 26 25.2 10 14.3 0 0.0 
1 0.5 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
3 16.0 2 1.9 I 1.4 0 0.0 
49 26.2 28 27.2 20 28.6 1 7.1 
187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 
The most popular responses were that the woman took the decision either together with her 
husband or alone. In response to this question, one Hindu woman, Sanamma aged 36 years, 
from Ramanagaram town asked, `What do you mean? In this house, I am the only head! ' 
Although half the sample reported taking the decision to use contraception with their 
husbands, it must be remembered that over 60% of women said that they did not discuss 
contraception with their husbands at all. It seems likely that this contradiction arises from 
many women's desire to display loyalty towards their husbands by reporting that they took 
the decision to use contraception together, whether or not they were actually doing so. It may 
also indicate that though communication was taking place, it was partial and limited. Finally, 
it may reflect the influence of the media, since family planning campaigns on radio and 
television continually urged couples to discuss birth control with each other. 
In order specifically to assess the influence of female extended family members and friends, 
the women were specifically asked with whom they would discuss family planning apart 
71 Visaria and Chari, 1998: 97. 
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from their husbands, among five options: mother-in-law, sister-in-law, sister, mother and 
friends. The responses to this question are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Influence of female extended family members or friends on family planning, 
Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Female extended family All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
member 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
None 53 28.3 37 35.9 12 17.1 4 28.5 
Mother 37 19.7 21 20.4 10 14.2 6 42.8 
Friends 25 13.3 15 14.5 8 11.4 2 14.2 
Mother-in-law 25 13.3 11 10.7 13 18.6 0 0.0 
Sister 24 12.8 10 9.7 11 15.7 3 21.4 
Sister-in-law 6 3.2 3 2.9 3 4.3 0 0.0 
Nurse 1 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Other 6 3.2 4 3.8 0 0.0 2 14.2 
Breakdown of `others' 
Aunt 1 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 7.2 
Daughter + daughter- in-law 1 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Niece 1 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Co-sister* 2 1.1 1 0.9 0 0.0 1 7.2 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
*husband's brother's wife 
Mothers, friends, mothers-in-law and sisters were the chief confidants on family planning 
matters, and this was true for all three religious groups. Qualitative evidence suggests that 
one reason sterilisation operations are such a popular method of contraception in 
Ramanagaram is partly because female extended family or women-friends urge women to 
undergo these operations after they have achieved what is perceived to be an ideal family size 
of two or three children. For example, Devamma, a mother of three sons and two daughters, 
aged 51, a housewife from village C, said, `I encouraged my daughter and daughters-in-law to 
have two children quickly and go in for the operation. Then they are not troubled any more. 
The girls have to go in one morning and come back later by auto. They take some rest and 
then they do not have to bother any more. There is no problem as with the pills, which they 
may not remember to take. After all, why should they be burdened with so many children as 
IT 72 
72 An auto is a three-wheeled motorised vehicle, short for `auto-rickshaw'. 
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This study is concerned primarily with the impact of religion on demographic outcomes. One 
finding from the National Family Health Survey which is quite interesting from the point of 
view of the present study is that approval for family planning in Karnataka was highest 
among the Christians (92%) compared with Hindus (84%) and Muslims (81%). '3 All 201 
women in Ramanagaram were asked what they thought was the position of their religion on 
contraception. The first question was, `Does your religion permit contraception? ', and the 
responses to it are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Does your religion permit contraception? Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Response All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Yes 106 52.7 90 81.0 1 1.3 15 100.0 
No 78 38.8 4 3.6 74 98.6 0 0.0 
Don't know 17 8.5 17 15.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 201 100.0 111 100.0 75 100.0 15 100.0 
Over half the sample said that they thought that their religion permitted contraception, 100% 
of the Christians, 81% of the Hindus, but only 1% of the Muslims. However, there was 
considerable variation in Muslim women's presentation of what they regarded as the Islamic 
ban on contraception. Shamshed Banu, age 33 years, and a Muslim mother of 4 children, 
said, `Whatever God gives is his will. ' But another Muslim woman, Hussain Bi, age 63, 
mother of 7 children from Ramanagaram, said, ' God's will is fine, but how do we support 
the (larger) family? ' Iqbal Banu, a Muslim social worker, explained the position of Islam on 
contraception to me as follows: `Everyone is having an operation. The Koran says that we 
can take pills when the stomach [womb] is empty, but when there is a birth [conception], we 
can't take the tablets. We need to reconsider this. ' 
73 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka. 1995: 107. 
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The women were then asked what their personal views were concerning the position of their 
religion on birth control. This second question was a very sensitive one and many women 
were reluctant to answer this openly. The women were for the most part happy to answer 
questions on this issue in general terms, but more hesitant when questioned on specific, 
individual preferences. This must be understood in the context of Ramanagaram society. In a 
small community such as Ramanagaram taluk, where the priests and mullahs wielded 
considerable power both in terms of their religious position and their high social standing, it 
was not very easy for the women to divulge openly (to what must be perceived as an urban 
stranger alien to their context) their true feelings on an issue as sensitive as religion and 
family limitation. Thus, there is perhaps a case to be made here that revealed preferences and 
stated preferences were different. Nevertheless, keeping this caveat in mind, it is possible to 
analyse the women's responses, which are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: View regarding position of religion on birth control, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Response All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Agree 74 36.8 40 36.0 22 29.3 12 80.0 
Disagree 29 14.4 4 3.6 24 32.0 1 6.6 
Don't know 20 9.9 14 12.6 5 6.6 1 6.6 
Did not answer 4 1.9 3 2.7 1 1.3 0 0.0 
No view 74 36.8 50 45.0 23 30.7 1 6.6 
Total 201 100.0 111 100.0 75 100.0 15 100.0 
Perhaps the sensitive nature of this question is reflected in the large proportion (37%) who 
said that they had `no view'. Among the Hindus in the sample, although 36% agreed with the 
position of their religion, there were 45% who said that they held no view. For example, 
Gaurama, a Hindu woman aged 26 from village C remarked, `Our religion does not say 
anything, hence I have not hesitated to have an operation'. The number of Hindus who said 
that they had `no view' is much higher (45%) than among the Christians (7%) and Muslims 
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(31%) probably because, as we saw in Chapter 1, Hinduism does not say very much 
scripturally about birth control. 
The other interesting difference across religious groups is in the percentage disagreeing with 
the position of their religion on contraception. This was only 14% for the whole sample, but a 
shocking 32% for Muslims, compared to only 7% for Christians and only 4% for Hindus. 
This finding is interesting, because, as we have seen earlier, although there is debate about 
whether or not theologically Islam permits contraception, the perception among Muslim 
women in Ramanagaram is unambiguously that it does not permit birth control. Muslim 
women who did limit their fertility implicitly contrasted the position of priest and theological 
writings, as in the case of Shahzamma Husseini, from Ramanagaram town, aged 35, who 
remarked, `I am educated, therefore I have a small family. We do not need to consult the 
priest because everything is written in the Shariat. ' A Hindu woman, Saraswati, aged 38 from 
Ramanagaram town remarked, `The Muslim religion does not allow contraception, unlike us 
Hindus'. These findings suggest that insofar as religion does influence contraceptive choice, 
it is through local community influences, and the manner in which theological beliefs are 
interpreted to women, rather than through the actual theological content of the religion world- 
wide. 
In Karnataka, all forms of family planning methods and services are provided through 
government hospitals and urban family welfare centres in urban areas and through Primary 
Health Centres (PHC) and sub-centres in rural areas. Besides these government medical 
outlets, family planning services are also available from private hospitals, private clinics and 
non-governmental organisations. Sterilisation operations and IUD insertions are conducted 
mostly in government hospitals, PHCs and in sterilisation camps which are organised 
periodically by the government hospitals. Modern methods of contraception are available 
through both government and private sources; government health outlets supply 83% of 
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users. Sterilisation operations are performed almost exclusively at government facilities 
which conducts 95% of male sterilisations and 87% of female sterilisations 74 
The Ramanagaram questionnaire asked several questions in order to find out whether women 
felt there was an `unmet need' for family planning. First, women were asked how frequently 
they visited their local family planning health centre or hospital. Their responses are reported 
in Table 8. 
Table 8: Frequency of visits to family planning centre/local hospital by ever-married women, 
Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Frequency of visits All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Do not go at all 
Nurse comes to house 
Go when ill 
Often 
Not often 
Rare 
Sometimes 
Only in old age 
Daily 
Total 
69 36.8 37 35.9 29 41.4 3 21.4 
50 26.7 32 31.1 13 18.6 5 35.7 
24 12.8 12 11.6 10 14.3 2 14.2 
20 10.7 4 3.8 12 17.1 4 28.6 
15 8.0 12 11.7 3 4.3 0 0.0 
4 2.1 4 3.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
4 2.1 4 3.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
2 1.1 0 0.0 2 2.9 0 0.0 
1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.4 0 0.0 
187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 
Of the entire sample, 37% said that they never went at all to the local hospital. This is in 
contrast to the doctors' views that women with inter-uterine devices ought to visit their 
doctors fortnightly, while those using other contraceptive methods ought to visit them 
weekly. Mothers were also asked to bring in their children on Thursdays for check-ups and 
vaccinations. 75 It has been suggested in other studies such as that by Arends-Kuenning of 
Bangladesh, that doorstep delivery is an important way to reduce fertility because it reduces 
the costs of contraception, particularly for women with little or no education and for those 
74 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 111-126. 
75 Oral communication provided by doctors from Ramanagaram town. 
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who live in less developed areas. 76 The 27% of women who responded that they depended 
on the nurse who came round once a fortnight to provide family planning advice and services 
suggests that the system of doorstep delivery of contraceptives is effective in Ramanagaram. 
This was more prevalent among the Hindus (31%) and Christians (36%) than among the 
Muslims (19%). One Hindu woman, Sowbhagyamma, aged 20 years, from Ramanagaram 
town remarked, `It is easy for us to get contraception as the nurse comes once in two weeks 
to give us pills. ' Compared with Hindus and Christians, a higher percentage of Muslim 
women (41%) said that did not go to the health centre at all. The most important result of 
these findings is that women in Ramanagaram did have access to doorstep delivery of 
contraceptives by nurses and that the doorstep nurses would have gone to all homes, 
irrespective of religion, if asked. Thus, it seems that health care and contraceptive services 
are available in Ramanagaram, either through the hospital or through the nurses who 
regularly visited both town and villages. 
Women were also directly asked was how easy it was currently for them to obtain at least one 
method of contraception. Their responses are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Ease of obtaining contraception, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Response All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Easy 71 37.9 42 40.7 20 28.6 9 64.3 
Nurse provides 18 9.6 13 12.6 5 7.1 0 0.0 
Not easy 5 2.7 4 3.8 0 0.0 1 7.1 
Cannot get 2 1.1 0 0.0 2 2.9 0 0.0 
Not applicable* 91 48.7 44 42.7 43 61.4 4 28.5 
Total 187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 
*This stands for those who said that they did not currently use contraceptive services and thus had no need to obtain them from 
any particular source. 
These responses also indicate that contraceptive services were easily available in 
Ramanagaram taluk and that the nurses who visited their localities once a fortnight were an 
Arends-Kuenning, 1997: 1. 
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important aspect of this access. " This view seems to be unanimous by religion. Another 
interesting finding from this table is the size of the `not applicable' category, which is twice 
the size, in terms of percentages, for Muslim women as it is for Christian women. This 
suggests that contraception was used much less by the Muslim women than by women of 
other religions, at least before controlling for the influence of other factors, but that this was 
not because it was difficult to obtain. 
In conclusion, these findings show that just over half the sample had used a method of 
contraception, the most popular of which for all religions was the sterilisation operation. The 
decision to use contraception was influenced by husbands and by other female family 
members and friends, but many women took the decision alone. Religion appeared to play a 
part in influencing family planning but women were hesitant to reveal their views about this 
openly. A greater proportion of Muslim women than of Hindus or Christians disagreed with 
what they perceived to be the position of their religion on contraception. Finally, 
contraceptive services are perceived as being widely available, though Muslim women used 
the doorstep delivery of contraceptives less than others. Together, these findings suggest 
strongly that the main motivation associated with contraceptive use was its acceptability 
rather than its availability. This illustrates the importance of examining the determinants of 
acceptability, which is undertaken in Section IV below. 
III. Fertility preferences, ideal family size and unwanted fertility 
A final step, before analysing the determinants of contraceptive use in Ramanagaram, is to 
examine what women themselves said about their fertility preferences. 
77 Although doctors interviewed in Ramanagaram taluk said that Copper-Ts, were in 'short supply'. 
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A. Fertility preferences 
Interpretation of data on fertility preferences is a matter of debate, for several reasons. First, 
at the time of interview women's attitudes towards fertility may not be fully formed. Second, 
these views may change over time. Third, the influence of others may have influenced 
women's preferences, or at least their expression of them. Women's stated preferences and 
their revealed preferences may therefore diverge. It can nevertheless be useful to explore 
what women state their fertility preferences to be. 
The currently married women in the Ramanagaram sample were asked, first, if they wanted 
another child. In the entire sample, 33% of married women answered yes. The responses 
were almost identical between Hindus (at 35%) and Muslims (at 33%), although lower 
among Christians (at 21%). These findings are similar to the findings of the National Family 
Health Survey which found that 30% of women in Karnataka said that they wanted another 
78 child. 
The women who did want another child were then asked if they preferred a boy or a girl. 
Their responses are reported in Table 10. 
Table 10: Preferences for children, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Boy or girl All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Boy 34 54.8 23 63.9 10 43.5 1 33.3 
Girl 14 22.6 8 22.2 6 26.1 0 0.0 
One of each 2 3.2 1 2.8 0 0.0 1 33.3 
Both 4 6.5 1 2.8 3 13.0 0 0.0 
Either 8 12.9 3 8.3 4 17.4 1 33.3 
I Total 62 100.0 36 100.0 23 100.0 3 100.0 
78 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 111. 
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By far the most women wanted a boy, at more than half of the whole sample. Preference for 
boys was highest among the Hindus, and lowest among the Christians. This strong preference 
for sons is similar to other studies of fertility preferences for Karnataka which show 44% of 
mothers wanting boys and only 16% wanting 79 
The women gave a variety of reasons for their preferences which are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: Reasons for desiring another boy or girl, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Reason All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
l enough 1 1.6 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 more nice 1 1.6 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
3 nice 1 1.6 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 boring 1 1.6 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Both nice 4 6.5 1 2.7 2 8.7 1 33.3 
For husband 1 1.6 0 0.0 1 4.3 0 0.0 
Girls expensive 2 3.2 1 0.0 1 4.3 0 0.0 
God's will 5 8.1 0 0.0 5 21.7 0 0.0 
In-law pressure 2 3.2 1 2.7 1 4.3 0 0.0 
Insurance 20 32.3 13 36.1 6 26.1 1 33.3 
Like girls 1 1.6 0 0.0 1 4.3 0 0.0 
Help mother 6 9.7 5 13.8 1 4.3 0 0.0 
Nice 1 1.6 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
No kids 1 1.6 1 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Opposite sex 15 24.2 9 25.0 5 21.7 1 33.3 
Total 62 100.0 36 100.0 23 100.0 3 100.0 
For the sample as a whole, the most popular reasons for desiring an additional child were for 
insurance purposes (32%), in order to have a child of the opposite sex to existing children 
(24%), and to provide help to the mother (10%). There was little difference in response by 
religion. Jayalakshmi, a 27 year-old Hindu woman from village A, who was a mother of one 
son and who wanted her next child to be a daughter, said rather poetically that she wanted 
two children: `One for love and one for property -a girl for aase (love) and a boy for aasti (to 
bequeath property) is perfect for us. ' Lakshmi, a Hindu woman, aged 20, who was single, 
79 See the National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 111-126. 
197 
said that she wanted two children, `a girl for the aarti (lighting the oil lamp for prayer in the 
home) and a boy for keerti (family prestige). ' 
Pursuing the theme of gender preference, the entire sample of Ramanagaram women were 
asked if the birth of a boy was better news, worse news or similar news to the birth of a girl. 
Table 12: Preferences between boys and girls, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Boy better 87 43.2 47 42.3 38 50.6 2 13.3 
Indifferent 96 47.8 53 47.7 30 40.0 13 86.6 
Boy worse 7 3.5 3 2.7 4 5.3 0 0.0 
Did not answer 11 5.5 8 7.2 3 4.0 0 0.0 
Although 43% of the sample believed that the birth of a boy was better news, 48% said that 
they were indifferent. The highest son-preference was expressed by the Muslims (at 51%), 
but it was nearly as high among the Hindus (at 42%); only the Christians expressed low son- 
preference (at 13%). One woman, Jayantibai, aged 24, from Ramanagaram town, who was 
the wife of a silk unit owner, remarked, 'My first-born was a son, so I did not feel bad. So, I 
am indifferent between the birth of a girl or a boy from now onwards. ' But even among the 
son-preferring Muslims there were deviant views, such as that of Najmunissa, age 60 years, 
from Ramanagaram town, who said, `I always wanted a girl. I had six sons instead. I always 
wanted fewer boys and at least one girl, because for the mother, girls are so much closer. ' 
These answers seem to contradict those to the questions on preferences for a boy versus a girl 
as the next child, discussed in Table 10. It appears that when women are asked in abstract 
terms if the birth of a boy is better than that of a girl, as in Table 12, they are reluctant to 
express son-preference and opt to say that they are indifferent, whereas when women who 
were currently married and desired another child were questioned specifically if they desired 
their next child to be a boy or a girl, a majority preferred sons to daughters. Moreover, in the 
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latter case we are dealing only with 62 women compared with 201 women. One reason for 
these contradictory findings may be that media campaigns which encouraged families not to 
discriminate against the girl-child made women reluctant to divulge their true feelings, 
preferring instead to claim `indifference'. This is again an example of stated preferences 
diverging from revealed preferences. Perhaps what is most significant, however, is the very 
small proportion of the sample - of whatever religion - who said that the birth of a girl was 
better news. 
On comparing Table 10 with Table 12, son-preference seems far stronger for Hindus than for 
Muslims for the next child (as shown in Table 10), but general son-preference seems stronger 
for the Muslims, (as shown in Table 12). However, it is important to be aware that while 
Table 12 depicts responses for all 201 women, Table 10 shows only the responses of the 62 
women who wanted another child. The empirical impact of son-preference cannot be 
explored in an econometric model of contraceptive choice because it is endogenous to the 
decision to use a contraceptive method. However, it can be, and indeed is, explored in the 
models of fertility presented in Chapter 6. The greater degree of son-preference among 
Hindus may also account for the higher levels of infant mortality and under-5 mortality found 
among Hindus than among Muslims in all of India. Although we do not go into the 
relationship between religion, infant mortality and son-preference more deeply here, this is an 
important area for future research. 
The women were also asked if their husbands wanted another child. This may seem odd at 
first sight, given the reported infrequency of couple communication on fertility planning. 
However, this question is important as an indication of the influence of husbands over wives' 
fertility decisions. The responses are shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13: Whether husband wants another child, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Category All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
No 105 66.9 59 68.6 36 62.1 10 76.9 
Yes 37 23.6 20 23.3 14 24.1 3 23.1 
Yes boy 11 7.0 4 4.7 7 12.1 0 0.0 
Yes girl 4 2.5 3 3.5 1 1.7 0 0.0 
Total 157* 100.0 86 100.0 58 100.0 13 100.0 
*30 married women did not answer this question because they said that they did not know their husband's views. 
The non-answers varied by religion, given by 17 Hindus, 12 Muslims and I Christian woman. 
In the sample as a whole, some two-thirds of women said that their husbands did not want 
another child, with fairly similar percentages among the Hindus and Muslims but 
substantially higher percentages among the Christians. The other striking finding was the 
12% of Muslim wives who reported that their husbands specifically wanted another boy, 
which compared to very small percentages giving this answer in the other two religious 
groups. 
Comparing husbands' desires with the women's own wishes, we find that the percentage of 
women who did not want more children along with the percentage of women who said their 
husbands did not want any more children was similar, at 67% of those who responded to this 
question. The percentage of women who did not want another child varied hardly at all 
among religions. There was greater variation in the corresponding percentages among their 
husbands, at 69% among Hindus, 62% among Muslims and 77% among Christians. Judging 
by these responses, a greater percentage of Muslim men than Muslim women want an 
additional child; while a smaller percentage of Christian men than Christian women want 
another child. 
In order to assess the extent of use of birth control strategies in the sample population, all 
ever-married women were asked if the birth of their children had been planned or not. For the 
sample as a whole, a majority (71%) reported that the birth of their children had been 
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unplanned. There was considerable variation by religion, with this answer being given by 
80% of Muslims, and 70% of Hindus, but only 21% of Christians. 80 
B. Ideal family size and unwanted fertility 
One of the main criticisms of family planning programmes, as we saw in Section I, is that 
they are not associated with declines in unwanted fertility: as contraception aimed at reducing 
unwanted fertility has been increasing, the rate of unwanted fertility has been increasing as 
well. Bongaarts defines unwanted births as those births which occur after a woman has 
attained her desired family size, and estimated them as 22% of observed fertility in a sample 
of twenty developing countries in 1990.81 Studies which emphasise the importance of 
contraceptive availability for reducing fertility calculate `unwanted' fertility using ideal 
family size. 
The Ramanagaram women. were asked two sets of questions to ascertain their ideal family 
size. The first was, `Do you have a desired or ideal number of children? If so, what is it? ' 
Their answers are reported in Table 14. 
Table 14: Do you have a desired/ideal number of children? Ever-married women, Ramanagaram 
sample (1996) 
Category All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Yes 145 77.5 80 75.5 52 74.3 13 92.8 
No 40 21.3 22 20.7 17 24.2 1 7.1 
I Don't know 2 1.1 1 1.0 1 1.4 0 0.0 
80 However, it must be borne in mind that the sample size of ever-married Christians is small relative to 
those of ever-married Hindus and Muslims. 
81 Bongaarts, 1997a. 
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Almost identical proportions of Hindu and Muslim women said that they did have an ideal 
number of children (at about 75%) but the percentage was much higher among Christian 
women (at 93%). Women were often amused by this question, as in the case of one Muslim 
woman, Sofia Banu, age 40, from Ramanagaram, a mother of five children, who remarked, 
`What is the point of asking me about what I would have desired? If I had that much sense, I 
would have cut off my childbearing at two! ' 
The precise numbers of children women said they desire are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15: Ideal number of children, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Ideal number of All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
children 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mean 2.51 2.48 2.65 2.21 
1 10 4.9 7 6.3 1 1.3 2 13.3 
2 72 35.8 38 34.2 24 32.0 10 66.6 
3 44 21.8 26 23.4 16 21.3 2 13.3 
4 16 7.9 8 7.2 8 10.6 0 0.0 
531.5 1 0.9 1 1.3 1 6.6 
Don't know 55 27.4 31 27.9 24 32.0 0 0.0 
God gives 1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.3 0 0.0 
The difference in the means between Hindus and Muslims, Muslims and Christians and 
Hindus and Christians was not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This is 
interesting because if the Hindu and Muslim women, who (as we will see in Chapter 6) show 
higher fertility than the Christians, desire similar numbers of children to the Christians, then 
it is essential to investigate those factors which are preventing Hindu and Muslim women 
from achieving their desired family size. 
Most studies of the KAP-gap in the provision of family planning services employ the concept 
of `unwanted fertility', which is measured either as the `unwanted' component of the total 
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fertility rate expressed in births per woman82 or as the number of living children less the ideal 
number of children stated by the respondent. The latter measure of unwanted fertility can be 
calculated for the Ramanagaram sample, as shown in Table 16. 
Table 16: Unwanted fertility, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Unwanted births All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Mean 0.85 0.55 1.44 0.07 
Median 0010 
Mode 0000 
Maximum 7774 
Minimum -4 -4 -3 -2 
The mean for the entire Ramanagaram sample closely resembles the 0.8 found for rural 
women in Karnataka by the National Family Health Survey. 83 The mean for Muslim women 
is strikingly high compared to that for Hindus and Christians. This difference in the mean 
level of unwanted fertility between Hindus and Muslims and between Muslims and 
Christians is statistically significant at the 5% level, which suggests that Muslims in 
Ramanagaram are perhaps still more uneasy about contraceptive practice than Hindu and 
Christian women, despite the disagreement of some Muslim women with the perceived 
religious requirements of Islam on contraception. Again, this finding is similar to that of the 
National Family Health Survey, which found a mean of 1.0 for Muslim women in Karnataka. 
By this measure, there is substantial `unwanted' fertility in the Ramanagaram sample. 
However, since this measure does depend crucially on women's stated `ideal' number of 
children, and there may be a discrepancy between stated and revealed preferences, this 
finding should be interpreted with caution especially in the light of the evidence of easy 
access to contraception provided by women's answers to the other survey questions. 
82 Bongaarts, 1997a. 
83 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 125-126. 
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In order to approach the same question in a different way, the Ramanagaram women were 
asked if they would have wanted fewer children than they currently had. Their responses are 
reported in Table 17. 
Table 17: Would you have wanted fewer children? Ever-married women, Ramanagaram sample 
1996 
Responses 
Yes 
Yes, wanted daughters 
Yes, wanted two children 
Yes, wanted fewer boys 
Yes, wanted fewer girls 
Yes (total) 
No 
No, want more girls 
No (total) 
Don't know 
Total 
All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
34 18.2 8 7.8 24 34.3 2 14.3 
1 0.5 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 0.5 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.4 0 0.0 
1 0.5 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
38 20.3 11 10.7 25 35.7 2 14.3 
142 75.9 88 85.4 42 60.0 12 85.7 
1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.4 0 0.0 
143 76.5 88 85.4 43 61.4 12 85.7 
6 3.2 4 3.9 2 2.9 0 0.0 
187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 
In the entire sample, just over three-quarters of women said that they did not want fewer 
children, but answers varied significantly by religion, with about 85% of Hindus and 
Christians giving this answer, but only 61% of Muslim women. Most women of all religions 
apparently did not want fewer children than they had already. This finding is in striking 
contradiction to the estimates of unwanted births just discussed. When directly questioned, 
women were very loyal to existing children and did not want to suggest that any of them were 
actually `unwanted'. However, when asked in abstract terms about their ideal family size, 
women gave answers implying unwanted births averaging almost one child per woman. 
These findings highlight that women's stated preferences and their revealed preferences can 
diverge considerably, and point to the fact that estimates of unwanted fertility depend 
crucially on the manner in which questions about these issues are asked. 
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The fertility preferences of Ramanagaram women were further explored by asking women 
why they did or did not want fewer children. Some women wanted fewer children but felt 
constrained by the demands of their families, as in the case of Nagamma, aged 36, from 
village D, the mother of four young daughters, who remarked, 'I have four daughters. I am 
trying for a son because my parents-in-law are pressuring me. Our religion says we need a 
son to look after us. But, I would definitely have liked fewer daughters. I do not send the girls 
to school now because my parents-in-law disapprove. Even though I know differently, I must 
listen to them. But I will definitely send my girls to school after they (in-laws) die. ' The 
diverse range of reasons which women gave in response to this query is presented in Table 
18. 
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Table 18: Reasons for wanting/not wanting fewer children, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Reasons 
Reasons for not wanting fewer children 
I each nice 
l enough 
I lives here 
1 nice 
2 enough 
2 nice 
2 right 
3 enough 
3 nice 
4 nice 
God's will 
God's will + insurance 
Happened 
Income 
Insurance + help mother 
Insurance 
Like all 
Many will help with work 
Love all 
Large family is nice 
Help mother 
Nice 
Currently have only 1 child 
Currently have only 2 children 
Planned 
Wanted 3 
Will do work 
All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. No. No. No. 
3003 
1102 
1100 
3300 
7250 
18 12 33 
1010 
5320 
9441 
1100 
5050 
1010 
2200 
1100 
1100 
17 12 50 
2020 
1010 
1100 
1100 
2110 
1100 
2200 
1010 
16 961 
1010 
1100 
Reasons for wanting fewer children 
8 excessive 
All are boys 
Expensive 
Girls expensive 
Wanted less girls 
Opposite sex 
Pressure from parents-in-law 
Don't know 
Total 
101 
1010 
21 6 15 0 
2020 
5140 
4220 
1100 
2101 
187 103 70 14 
These responses suggest that women in the Ramanagaram sample desired children primarily 
for their services as consumer goods, producer goods and investment goods. For the sample 
as a whole, the most popular reason for desiring fewer children was that children were 
expensive to raise. The next most popular reason was the desire for fewer girls. The main 
reasons for not desiring fewer children were that 2 children was just right and that the current 
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number of children would serve as a means of insurance in old age. God's will was another 
reason, cited by 7% of Muslim women. 
Finally, in an attempt to determine wanted family size in relation to actual family size, the 
women were asked if, in their opinion, large families were better than small ones. The 
responses are shown in Table 19. 
Table 19: Large families vis-a-vis small families, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Large families better than small 
No 
Yes 
Yes but expensive 
Same 
Don't know 
Did not answer 
Total 
All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
111 55.2 55 49.5 45 60.0 11 73.3 
82 40.7 50 45.0 28 37.3 4 26.6 
3 1.5 3 2.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 
1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.3 0 0.0 
2 0.9 1 0.9 1 1.3 0 0.0 
2 1.0 2 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 
201 100.0 111 100.0 75 100.0 15 100.0 
Some 40% of women said that large families were better than small families, with the highest 
proportion among the Hindus and the lowest among the Christians. One Hindu woman, 
Saraswati, aged 38 years, who lived in a joint family in Ramanagaram town, remarked, 'I 
like large families - there is salvation in large crowds! ' However, the fact that more than half 
the sample of women did not favour large families provides some support for the view that 
there may be substantial unwanted fertility in Ramanagaram. 
To summarise, it appears that Ramanagaram women did have opinions on desired fertility, 
which were similar across religions, and that this figure was lower than actual family size. 
However, when specifically questioned if they would have wanted fewer children 
themselves, most women answered `no'. Moreover, while half the sample preferred small 
families, the other half still preferred large families. In my view, the apparent contradiction 
between the women's small ideal family size and their stated desire not to have had fewer 
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children, was related to the ex ante general and ex post specific nature of the questions asked. 
When asked in general terms if they had an ideal or desired family size, the women were 
willing to express their opinions freely. Yet they also recognised that they could not have had 
less children because of certain constraints. The women, therefore, attempted to justify the 
existence of already born children with very similar reasons to those put forward in response 
to an earlier question if boys were to be preferred to girls (example: insurance vis-ä-vis 
expense). It appears that the Ramanagaram women recognised the need for children, 
specifically in order to contribute to the household's activities or insurance in old age but 
also realised that additional children (particularly daughters) would be expensive to rear. 
Shivalingamma, a Hindu woman aged 32 from village C, gave explicit statement to the 
different cost-benefit calculations involved: `If the family is large, everyone can pitch in to 
collect water, firewood etc., but it also costs more to support a large family. So, I do not 
know which is better. Perhaps we need to balance the two. ' Thus, though the Ramanagaram 
women reported an ideal family size which was smaller than the actuality, they were also 
able to justify their actual large families on various counts. However, the contradictory nature 
of the same women's replies to different questions casts worrying light on the extremely 
shaky nature of the evidence on which most estimates of `ideal' or `unwanted' fertility appear 
to be based in the contraceptive choice literature. Depending on how the question is posed, 
the same woman will give different answers, depending on whether she is focusing primarily 
on costs or on benefits, whether she is asked for a general normative statement or a concrete 
positive one, whether she feels she is likely to be approved of by the questioner for certain 
answers, and many other unmeasurable factors. 
208 
IV. A logit model of contraceptive use 
To identify determinants of contraceptive use in Ramanagaram, a logit model of 
contraceptive choice was estimated. A logit model was used because the dependent variable 
was dichotomous, namely, ever-use of contraception by the woman. If a woman had ever 
used any method of contraception, she was assigned a value of 1; if she had never used a 
contraceptive method, she was assigned the value 0. 
For the reasons discussed in Section I of this chapter, the explanatory variables used were the 
education of the woman, her husband's education, various measures of the household's 
income, various measures of the woman's occupation, various measures of her husband's 
occupation, various measures of marital consanguinity, the woman's current age, the 
woman's reported ease of access to a contraceptive method, the number of female extended 
family members, various measures of religion, and caste (used in one model for Hindus only). 
The preliminary logit models estimated used backward elimination based on the value of the 
likelihood ratio. The procedure involved two stages. First, 11 models which did not include 
interaction terms between the religion dummies and the other regressors were estimated, with 
the purpose of arriving at the best specification of certain regressors for which alternative 
measures were available. The `best' specification of the model was selected on the basis of 
goodness of fit and specification tests for heteroscedasticity, model specification and 
collinearity. Then, at the second stage, the best of these models was selected, and each 
independent regressor was interacted with the two religion dummies. The initial starting- 
points of the first 11 models estimated are reported in Appendix A. 5.1. The results of these 
preliminary models are reported in Appendix A. 5.2. 
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In model 1, the variables used were woman's total years of education, husband's total years 
of education, total monthly expenditure, a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the 
woman performs a home-related occupation, a dummy variable which took the value I if the 
husband performs a skilled occupation, a dummy variable which took the value I if the 
marriage was consanguineous, the woman's age, the number of female extended family 
members, a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the woman says that contraceptive 
access is easy and two religion dummies, one which took the value 1 if the woman is Muslim 
and the other dummy variable which took the value 1 if the woman is Hindu (using the 
Christians as the base category). 
Regressions 2 and 3 considered alternative measures of income. In model 2, total monthly 
expenditure was replaced by total monthly food expenditure. In model 3, this was replaced by 
a dummy variable which took the value I if the household owned a television. In models 4 
and 5, two alternative measures of women's occupation were considered. These were a 
dummy variable which took the value I if the woman performed a skilled occupation (in 
model 4), and a dummy variable which took the value 1 if she performed a silk-related 
occupation (in model 5). In models 6 and 7, two alternative measures of husband's 
occupation were used. These were a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the husband 
performed a farming occupation (in model 6), and a dummy variable which took the value 1 
if he was employed within domestic industry (in model 7). In model 8, the coefficient of 
inbreeding replaced the consanguineous marriage dummy. 
In models 9 and 10, alternative measures of religion were tested. First, in model 9, a dummy 
variable which took the value of 1 if the woman was Muslim and 0 if she was Hindu is used. 
This model excluded the Christians. As with the models of marriage age presented in Chapter 
4 and the models of fertility presented in Chapter 6, in model 10 of contraceptive adoption 
an index of piety was used to measure religious observance and practice for all women. In 
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model 11, the sample was restricted to ever-married Hindus (N = 103) and two dummy 
variables for high caste membership and scheduled caste membership were used (retaining 
the low castes as the base category). 
Of all the preliminary regression models estimated, model 1 emerged as the best 
specification. In this model, woman's education, husband's education, the ease of access to a 
contraceptive method, the number of female extended family members resident, the woman's 
age, whether the woman was Muslim, and whether the woman was Hindu, emerged as the 
most significant determinants of the probability of contraceptive use. 
According to this model, a greater degree of education for the woman and for her husband 
both increase the probability of contraceptive use. This suggests that knowledge of 
contraception is affected by values or skills learned in school, and that this is similar for both 
men and women. The model also predicts that if a woman is older, she is less likely to use 
contraception. If there is one more female family member resident, the woman is less likely 
to use contraception. If the woman said that contraceptive access was easy, she was more 
likely to use contraception. Finally, the model predicts that if a woman is either Muslim or 
Hindu, she is less likely to use contraception than if she is Christian. However, a Wald test of 
whether the Muslim coefficient equalled the Hindu coefficient was accepted, indicating that 
the effect of religious affiliation on the probability of contraceptive use did not differ 
significantly between the two groups. This conclusion is also supported by preliminary model 
9 which was estimated for Muslims and Hindus only (N = 173), and in which the variable 
denoting religious affiliation, taking a value of 1 if the woman was Hindu and 0 if she was 
Muslim, did not emerge as a significant determinant of the probability of contraceptive use. 
However, having established that Hindus and Muslims do not have significantly different 
intercepts, it is also important to examine whether religion affects the slope of the regression, 
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i. e. whether the socio-economic factors which affect contraceptive use act differently for the 
three religious groups. In order to investigate whether there were different slopes, different 
intercepts, or altogether different determinants for the three religious groups, interactive 
terms between the other explanatory variables and the Hindu and Muslim dummies were 
introduced into the model. 
The initial starting-point variables of the interaction model were the woman's total years of 
education, 84 husband's total years of education, total monthly expenditure, a dummy variable 
which took the value 1 if the woman performed a home-related occupation, a dummy variable 
which took the value 1 if the husband performed a skilled occupation, a dummy variable 
which took the value 1 if the marriage was consanguineous, the woman's age, the number of 
female extended family members, a dummy variable which took the value I if the woman 
said that contraceptive access was easy, a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the 
woman was Muslim, a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the woman was Hindu, plus 
interactive terms between each of them and the Muslim and Hindu dummies, making a total 
of 27 explanatory variables. Although originally 29 variables were created, two of the 
interaction terms were not ultimately included in the starting model because they were 
perfectly correlated with one or more other regressors. 
At every stage of the regression procedure, a restriction was imposed which hypothesised that 
the coefficients on a particular regressor and all its interaction terms were equal to zero. This 
hypothesis was tested by using a likelihood ratio test and the model was re-estimated on the 
basis of the outcome of this test. The likelihood ratio (LR) test was of the form: 
84 It must be noted that for the maximum likelihood estimation of the logit models, women's and men's 
education was not broken down into primary, secondary and university education, mainly because of 
the multicollinearity between the measures of education themselves and the high correlation of the 
education-religion interaction terms both with the religion dummies and with the other education 
measures. Both for parsimony in the specification of the model, and because no significant amount of 
information about the effect of education on contraceptive choice was being lost, it was decided to use 
women and men's total number of years of education as explanatory variables in the interaction model. 
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LR = 2LL(HI) -L (Ho)l ~ H2 (r) (4) 
where L(H1) = the maximised value of the log likelihood function under the unrestricted 
model; L(Ho) = the maximised value of the log likelihood function under the restricted 
model; and r= the number of restrictions. The final model estimated using this procedure is 
reported in Table 20. 
213 
Table 20: Logit maximum likelihood estimation of the determinants of contraceptive use 
(Ramanagaram sample, all religions, 1996 
Dependent variable is CTPRUSE : 1= woman had ever-used a contraceptive method; 0= woman had 
never used a contraceptive method 
Sample: 187 ever-married Hindu, Muslim and Christian women 
Base category: Christians 
Regressor Coefficient T ratio Marginal 
[Prob. ] effecta 
Constant (CONST) -2.8762 ** -2.2666 [. 025] 
Woman's education 
Number of years of education (EDCN) 0.5697 
Number of years of education for Muslims (MEDCN) -0.5281 
Number of years of education for Hindus (HEDCN) -0.4500 
** 
** 
2.6584 [. 009] 0.1367 
-2.3006[. 023] 0.0099 
-2.0259[. 044] 0.0287 
Husband's education 
Husband's years of education (EDCNSP) 0.3460 1.2408[. 216] 0.0829 
Muslim husband's years of education (MEDCNSP) -0.0986 -0.3572[. 721] 0.0594 
Hindu husband's years of education (HEDCNSP) -0.2358 -0.8465[. 398] 0.0264 
Ease of access to a contraceptive method 
Ease of access to contraception (EASYCON) 0.0102 0.0038[. 997] t 
Ease of access to contraception for Muslims (MEASY) 4.0397 1.3233[. 187] t 
Ease of access to contraception for Hindus (HEASY) 2.8578 1.0536[. 294] t 
Female extended family 
Female extended family resident (FEXFAM) -0.4435 ** -2.2640[. 025] -0.1064 
Muslim female extended family resident (MFEXFAM) 0.2428 0.7461 [. 457] -0.0481 
Hindu female extended family resident (HFEXFAM) --- 
Woman's age 
Woman's age (AGE) -0.0085 -0.3751[. 708] -0.0021 
Muslim woman's age (MAGE) 
Hindu woman's age (HAGE) 
-0.0679 * -1.8768[. 062] -0.0183 
Notes: 
'Marginal effect = coefficient* scale factor. This is evaluated at the sample mean of the regressor. 
t Not reported because the explanatory variable is a dummy variable. 
- Note that two Hindu interaction terms (HWOMAN and HFEXFAM) were excluded from the model because of 
their perfect correlation with other regressors. As the model could not be estimated by retaining them, it was 
necessary to exclude them. 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Model statistics 
Scale factor for the calculation of marginal effects 
Maximised value of the log likelihood function 
Mean of CTPRUSE 
Mean of fitted CTPRUSE 
Goodness of fit 
Pesaran-Timmermann test statistic 
Pseudo R-Squared 
0.23990 
-90.8589 
0.54011 
0.49733 
0.75401 
-2.8630 [0.004] 
0.29576 
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The first variable which emerged as significant is the number of years of education for the 
woman. The model indicates that education has a significant and positive impact on 
contraceptive use for women of all three religions in Ramanagaram. Calculated at the sample 
means, a one-year increase in total education increases the probability of contraceptive use by 
0.01 for Muslims, by 0.14 for Christians and by 0.03 for Hindus. 85 However, as the present 
study is particularly concerned with Hindu-Muslim differentials, the interesting question is 
whether the effect of total education on the probability of contraceptive use differs between 
Hindus and Muslims. A Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on 
EDCN+HEDCN equals the coefficient on EDCN+MEDCN, implying that the effect of total 
education on the probability of contraceptive use did not differ significantly between Hindus 
and Muslims. Analogous tests, however, established that the effect of women's education on 
contraceptive use did differ significantly between Christians and Hindus, and between 
Christians and Muslims, with a much larger marginal impact of education on contraceptive 
choice for the Christians than for women of the other two religions. The major religious 
difference in relation to this variable was therefore between Christians and all other groups. 
One possible explanation for why education is much more important for Christians than for 
Hindus or Muslims may be that education has increasing returns in contraceptive use and 
Christian women have more education, on average, than Hindu or Muslim women. 
Total education of the husband was the next variable to emerge as significant. Although the t- 
ratios on the husband's education variables were not individually significant, this set of 
variables had to be retained in the model as a group, on the basis of the likelihood ratio test. 
One possible reason for the insignificant t-ratios for the individual husband's-education terms 
is multicollinearity among them. Retaining them in the model was supported by Wald tests 
85 It may be recollected that when reporting the value of the logit coefficient for Muslim and Hindu 
interaction terms, this is equal to the stated coefficient for a particular attribute plus the value of the 
coefficient on the base category of that attribute. Thus, the coefficient for total education for Muslims is 
equal to the coefficient on MEDCN plus that on EDCN; the coefficient for Hindus is that on HEDCN 
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which rejected the hypotheses that the coefficient on EDCNSP+HEDCNSP was not 
significantly different from zero, and that the coefficient on EDCNSP+MEDCNSP was not 
significantly different from zero. However, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the 
coefficient on EDCNSP was not significantly different from zero, indicating that husband's 
education did affect contraceptive use for Hindus and for Muslims, although not for 
Christians. Calculated at the sample means, a one-year increase in husband's total education 
increases the probability of contraceptive use by 0.06 for Muslims and by 0.03 for Hindus. A 
Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on EDCNSP+HEDCNSP equalled the 
coefficient on EDCNSP+MEDCNSP, implying that husband's education does not have a 
different effect on contraceptive use for Muslims than for Hindus. Analogous tests 
established that the effect of years of husband's education on contraceptive use was not 
significantly different between Christians and Hindus, or between Christians and Muslims. 
The next variable which emerged as significant was the presence of female extended family 
members resident in the household, which significantly decreased the probability of using 
contraception among Hindu and Christian women, but had no effect for Muslims. For Hindu 
and Christian women, calculated at the sample mean, one additional female family member 
reduced the probability of contraceptive use by 0.11. However, this difference between 
Hindus, Christians and Muslims was not statistically significant as a Wald test accepted the 
restriction that the coefficient on FEXFAM equals the coefficient on FEXFAM+MFEXFAM, 
indicating that the presence of female extended family acts similarly on contraceptive use by 
Hindu, Christian and Muslim women. 
The ease of access to a contraceptive method did not emerge as significant for any of the 
three religious groups. This is consistent with the qualitative finding that family planning 
services are widely available in Ramanagaram, as. in the state of Karnataka in general. 
plus EDCN and so forth. It is this value of the coefficient which is multiplied by the scale factor to get 
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However, it was retained in the model because of the rejection of a likelihood ratio test that 
the coefficients on the ease of access to contraception variable and the interaction terms 
derived from it were all equal to zero. The importance of this set of variables is also borne 
out by Wald tests which rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients on EASYCON+MEASY 
and EASYCON+HEASY were not significantly different from zero. However, a Wald test 
that the coefficient on EASYCON was not significantly different from zero was accepted. 
Therefore, this variable and the interaction terms associated with it were retained in the 
model. The individual coefficients are not significant, probably because of multicollinearity 
between all of these variables. A Wald test accepted the hypothesis that the coefficient on 
EASYCON+MEASY equals the coefficient on EASYCON+HEASY, indicating that the 
effect of ease of access to a contraceptive method did not differ significantly between Hindus 
and Muslims. Analogous tests established that the effect of ease of access to a contraceptive 
method on contraceptive use did not significantly differ between Christians and Hindus, and 
between Christians and Muslims. 
Finally, a woman's age was found to affect contraceptive use significantly though with very 
different effects across religions. Calculated at the sample means of all other variables, if a 
woman was Muslim, her being one year older decreased the probability of her using 
contraception by 0.02. The fact that younger Muslim women are more likely to use 
contraception may be testimony to the influence of the family planning programme in 
changing norms in Ramanagaram. A Wald test showed that the coefficient on AGE+MAGE 
was not significantly different from the coefficient on AGE, indicating that the effect of a 
woman's age on contraceptive choice did not differ significantly among religious groups. The 
interaction term for Hindus (HAGE) is perfectly collinear with other interaction terms and 
hence is excluded from the estimation. The variable (AGE) which is included therefore 
compares Muslims with the Hindus and the Christians combined. 
the value of the marginal effect for interaction terms. 
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Finally, it must be noted that the religion dummies for Hindus and for Muslims were deleted 
from the model on the basis of a likelihood ratio test. This finding is very interesting from the 
point of view of the present study because it is in contrast with the preliminary models in 
which the Muslim and Hindu religion dummies were significant. In the preliminary models, 
the Muslim and Hindu dummies had a negative effect on contraceptive use, although the 
effect did not differ significantly between Hindus and Muslims. The findings from the 
interaction model suggests that although the Hindu and Muslim religion have an effect on 
contraceptive use in Ramanagaram, it is expressed primarily through differences in how 
socio-economic `characteristics' of the individual members of different religions affect their 
contraceptive use. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 1, there is debate about the influence of 
Islamic prescriptions on the acceptibility of using contraception by Muslim women and some 
ambiguity about the influence of Hinduism on contraception. However, in this model, 
Hinduism is not having an effect on contraceptive use which is significantly different from 
the effect of Islam. The findings from both the preliminary and the interaction models suggest 
that rather than theological doctrines, it may be the manner in which religion is being 
interpreted to women by the community which is influencing their contraceptive use, via the 
decisions they make about other aspects of their lives such as their education. This finding is 
also consistent with the qualitative evidence presented earlier in this chapter which suggested 
that community interpretations of religion may be more important than religious observance 
in explaining contraceptive use. This is also reflected in one of the preliminary models 
estimated, model 10, which replaced the Hindu and Muslim dummies by an index of piety, to 
measure the effect of religious observance and practice on the decision to use contraception. 
Model 10 showed that the index of piety did not affect the probability of contraceptive use. 
This finding is interesting because it indicates that it is not the strength of religious practice 
which influenced the decision to use contraception, but rather perhaps the manner in which 
religion is interpreted to women by their communities. 
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The logit coefficients and analysis of the marginal effects suggest that similar combinations 
of factors account for patterns of contraceptive use among the three religious groups. Among 
Hindus, the factors positively affecting the probability of using contraception are the 
education of the woman, her husband's education, and ease of access to a contraceptive 
method, while the factors affecting it negatively are the number of female family members 
resident. The woman's age is unimportant. For Muslims, the factors positively affecting the 
probability of using contraception are women's education, husband's education, and ease of 
access to a contraceptive method, while the factor negatively affecting the decision to use 
contraception is the woman's age. Female resident family members has no significant 
influence. Finally, for Christians, the factor affecting the probability of contraceptive use 
positively is the woman's education, while the factor affecting contraceptive use negatively is 
the number of female extended family members resident in the household. Those factors 
which had no impact were husband's education, the woman's age, and the ease of access to a 
contraceptive method. 
If we consider comparisons across pairs of religions, the estimated regression lines for 
Hindus and for Christians differ in terms of intercept and in terms of slope mainly because of 
differences in the effect of women's education. Muslims and Christians also differ in terms of 
intercept and in terms of slope, again specifically in terms of the effect of woman's 
education. Hindus and Muslims did not differ in terms either of intercept or of slope, 
indicating that the factors which affect decisions about contraception in Ramanagaram do not 
vary significantly between Hindus and Muslims. 
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V. Conclusion 
The extent of contraceptive adoption has concerned demographers and family planning 
policy in developing countries since the mid-1950s. As we saw in section I, the importance of 
family planning programmes in bringing about fertility declines has been the subject of much 
debate. As yet, there appears to be little consensus about either the impact of contraception 
on fertility, or the determinants of contraceptive use. This chapter has sought to address the 
latter question for one region of southern India. 
The analysis began by examining the findings concerning contraceptive use and practice in 
Ramanagaram, women's fertility preferences and `unwanted' fertility. The main conclusions 
derived from this part of the analysis was that just over half of the sample had ever used a 
method of contraception, and that of the women who had used contraception, almost two- 
thirds had opted for a tubectomy. Inter-spousal communication about family planning was 
low, but women did discuss these issues with other female extended family members and 
friends. As nurses regularly visited the localities studied, access to at least one method of 
contraception was reported to be comparatively easy. Finally, when questioned about the 
impact of religion on contraception, though some women were hesitant to reveal their views, 
Muslim women thought that their religion did disapprove of contraception, and as many as 
one-quarter of them disagreed with this position. This proportion was much larger than that 
found among Hindus and Christians. This suggests that the absence of theological 
prohibitions in Islam on contraception is irrelevant, since these Muslim women think that 
there are such prohibitions. 
The information collected about Ramanagaram women's fertility preferences showed the 
importance of distinguishing revealed preferences from stated ones. On average, ideal family 
size in Ramanagaram was 2.5 for all three religious groups, and the difference between ideal 
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family size and actual family size, which demographers conventionally use as the measure of 
`unwanted' fertility, averaged 1 child for all women. Though just over half of the sample said 
that they preferred small families to large ones, larger actual family size was rationalised and 
justified on several counts, particularly insurance reasons. These reasons were also 
manifested in a pronounced preference for sons. 
The final part of this chapter estimated a logit model of the determinants of contraceptive 
choice, comprising 11 preliminary logit regression models and then going on to a more 
elaborate model of contraceptive choice which used 27 explanatory variables measuring 
socio-economic and other differentials among women in the sample, coupled with interaction 
terms between the explanatory variables and the Hindus and Muslim religion dummies. 
Let us begin by considering the factors which were found not to affect the probability of 
contraceptive use. The first of these was the income of the household. Three different 
measures of income - total expenditure, total food expenditure, and television ownership - 
were explored but none was found to be a significant determinant of contraceptive choice. 
This suggests that income does not affect the demand for children, perhaps because its effect 
is cancelled out by various substitution effects. Another possible reason is that because 
access to contraception is very good in Ramanagaram, women's purchasing power, as 
measured by income, has no impact on contraceptive use. The lack of significance of the 
television ownership variable is also important because it suggests that the `media 
brainwashing' explanation of contraceptive adoption is not entirely substantiated. 
Second, husband's occupation, distinguished as farming-related and domestic-industry- 
related, was not a significant predictor of the probability of contraceptive use. However, in 
the preliminary model estimated on Hindus only, if the husband's occupation was skilled, the 
probability of contraceptive use by his wife was higher. This may be because men in skilled 
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occupations are better educated, and hence amenable to lower-fertility norms. Another 
possible explanation is that Hindu women who had husbands in skilled occupations may have 
been less secluded than others and have had greater autonomy over decision-making about 
contraception. 
One of the most interesting findings of the present study is that marriage to a relation appears 
not to affect a woman's decisions about contraception, a finding which is consistent across 
all three religious groups. As discussed earlier, consanguineous marriage is regarded in the 
literature as affecting contraceptive use through increasing the influence of the natal family 
on the woman. Interestingly, the finding that consanguinity exercises no effect on 
contraception seems in contrast with the other econometric findings such as the significant 
effect of the female-extended-family variable reported earlier. In combination, the findings 
from these variables suggests that while extended family (as measured through members 
resident) can exert an impact on demographic outcomes, the same may not be true of the 
influence of extended family, as measured through the influence of inbreeding, in south 
India. 
For the Hindus, caste had no effect on contraceptive use. Neither of the two dummy 
variables, for high castes and scheduled castes, was a significant determinant of contraceptive 
use. This may be because the family planning movement in Ramanagaram has now covered 
all major caste groups in the region, leading to greater homogeneity in contraceptive adoption 
than in the age at marriage (as discussed in Chapter 4 above). 
Different measures of women's occupation (distinguished as home-related, skilled and silk- 
related), exerted no effect in the interaction model, although woman's occupation 
distinguished as silk-related, had exerted an impact in the preliminary regression models. 
These findings casts doubt on the argument that as women are employed, this raises the 
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opportunity cost of their time and encourages them to use contraception in order to limit 
fertility. It may be that because access to contraception is so widespread and its benefits are 
so well-known in the region, whether or not a woman used contraception was not determined 
by her employment status. Or it may be that so many of the Ramanagaram women were 
employed, that there is not enough variation in these variables to account for differences in 
contraceptive use. Finally, it may be that because women's occupation is so closely related to 
women's education, it does not appear individually significant. 
It has been hypothesised that if the husband is better educated, he will encourage his wife to 
adopt a contraceptive method because he is aware of the importance of contraception in order 
to limit and space births, because he is concerned about his wife's health, or because he 
wishes to attain a low fertility goal. In the preliminary models, husbands' education was a 
very significant determinant of the probability of contraceptive use, and it exerted its impact 
in the expected positive direction. The variable did not display significant t-ratios in the 
interaction model, but Wald tests established that it was important for Hindus and for 
Muslims. This indicates that even after controlling for women's education, husband's 
education influences the decision to use contraception. This finding is vital from the 
perspective of family planning policy because it indicates that men should be targeted, 
whether through the education system, through the health system, or through the media, if it 
is desired to influence contraceptive adoption by their wives. This finding is also consistent 
with the qualitative information from Ramanagaram which suggested that couples should be 
encouraged to communicate more about family planning, and that for couples who say that 
they communicate already, care must be taken to ensure that communication is not partial and 
limited, but substantial. 86 
86 One way of doing this is to ascertain men's and women's views about contraception, as argued by 
Biddlecom, Casterline and Perez, 1996. 
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The ease of access to contraceptives significantly affected contraceptive use in the 
preliminary models, but did not display significant t-ratios in the interaction model. However, 
Wald tests established that this factor was important for Hindus and for Muslims, although 
there was no significant difference in the effect of this factor between religious groups. This 
suggests that even though most women in the Ramanagaram sample did say they had easy 
access to contraception, access was still a major issue for the remainder. 
Let us now turn our attention to those factors which exercised a consistently significant effect 
on the decision to use contraception. The first such factor was women's education. It is 
hypothesised that as women become better educated, they are likely to be better informed of 
contraceptive techniques, use information about contraception better, and discuss 
contraception with others. Moreover, the higher opportunity cost of their time makes them 
demand fewer children and use contraceptives to achieve their lower fertility goals. 
Education may also change women's values in a direction consistent with less rejection of 
family planning. The effect of education on contraceptive use was not significantly different 
between Hindus and Muslims, but was significantly higher for Christians, compared to the 
other two religions. One possible reason for this finding may be that education exercises a 
greater impact on the decision to use contraception for a population with a high average level 
of education, and then only after a certain level of education has been reached. Because 
Christians had a much higher average level of education (9.2 years) than Hindus or Muslims 
(5.5 years), it is possible that they were more susceptible to this sort of educational impact on 
contraception. Another possible reason for this effect is that the variation in Christian 
women's education was small: out of the 13 married Christian women interviewed, 10 had 
had at least some schooling. 
The next factor which was significant for Hindus and Christians in the final interaction model 
was the presence of female family members in the household. Conventionally, demographers 
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have argued that the role of the female extended family, and especially the mother-in-law, 
was to encourage high fertility and discourage contraceptive use among young brides. 
Another reason is that the mother's extended family may look after her children at low real 
and opportunity-cost, thereby cutting the cost of having more children, which in turn 
discourages the use of contraception. This appeared to be borne out by the econometric 
finding that for Hindus and Christians only, if a woman had one additional female family 
member resident this reduced her probability of contraceptive use. However, it emerges from 
the qualitative evidence collected during my fieldwork that female extended family and other 
female associates may be performing a role with respect to contraception which is quite 
different to that postulated in much of the older literature on the subject (and which 
contradicts directly the econometric findings of the present study). For example, Naseem 
Khatoon, a Muslim mother of 7 children, age 45, from Ramanagaram town, remarked, 'We 
need to improve ourselves, have fewer children. I wish people had spoken to us when we 
were young, now there is so much difficulty .. the family planning people 
keep telling us the 
population is growing. We should have more responsibility. ' It was similar among Hindu 
women: for example, one Hindu woman, aged 51, from Ramanagaram town, stated quite 
clearly that she encouraged all her daughters and daughters-in-law to `have their children and 
stop with an operation. ' Such remarks suggest that attitudes favouring low fertility (and the 
associated contraceptive practices) have gained widespread acceptance within parts of south 
Indian society in the 1990s. This factor may be an important contributing factor to the fall in 
fertility in south India in recent years, although one which is hard to measure except by 
micro-level fieldwork of the sort carried out in the present study. 
However, it is must be acknowledged that the role of female extended family on the decision 
to use contraception is an issue on which the qualitative and quantitative findings from 
Ramanagaram are at odds with one another. There are two possible explanations for this. The 
first is that quantitatively, female extended family may be exercising a negative effect on the 
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decision to use contraception not because there is a direct causal link between these two 
factors, but because there is an indirect connection, i. e. some other underlying factor may be 
affecting both variables. For example, it may be that those who live with extended family are 
also those who come from more traditional and conservative homes in which the use of 
contraception is discouraged. The other possibility is that female extended family members 
are actually discouraging the use of family planning, but that women are not willing to admit 
it openly in a questionnaire survey. In any case, the contradiction between the econometric 
and qualitative findings do suggest that this whole relationship requires further research. 
The last variable which was a significant determinant of contraceptive use was the woman's 
age. Muslim women were found to have a higher probability of ever having used 
contraception if they were younger. There are several possible explanations. One is the 
`ideational change' argument, i. e. that younger women are more exposed to family planning 
messages than older ones. The woman's age may also be proxying for changing norms over 
time. 
Finally, we consider religion. In the preliminary models (the ones which did not use 
interaction terms), Hindu religion and Muslim religion did emerge as a negative influence on 
contraceptive use; however, in the interaction model this effect disappeared. 87 This suggests 
that Hindus and Muslims do not have significantly different intercepts. It was discovered that 
the estimated regression lines for Hindus and Muslims also did not differ in terms of slope. 
However in the interaction model, the estimated regression lines differed in terms of intercept 
and in terms of slope between Hindus and Christians and between Muslims and Christians. 
Thus, it is probably the differences between Christians and the other two religious groups 
87 Note that the religion dummy which took the value I if the woman was Hindu in preliminary model 9, 
and which was estimated on the sample of Hindus and Muslims only (N = 173), was found to be 
insignificant as well. 
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which accounts for the initial significance of the Hindu and Muslim religion dummies in the 
preliminary regression models. 
The qualitative evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the decision to use 
contraception may be influenced by the manner in which Islam and Hinduism is being 
interpreted for women by the local community in Ramanagaram. This was clearly evident to 
me when I interviewed the local mullah of Ramanagaram. By a happy coincidence, the wife 
of the mullah was admitted to have a baby in a private clinic the day I went to interview the 
lady doctor at the clinic. Seizing the opportunity, I informally interviewed the mullah. He 
stated that he strongly objected to women working outside the home, which he said was 
against the Shariat. He said that he strongly disapproved of Najma Heptullah, a woman 
parliamentarian and speaker of the Lok Sabha (the lower house of parliament) at the time, as 
a role model for Muslim women. More particularly, he stated that he did not encourage birth 
control, but rather believed that children were `gifts of God'. 
We have already observed that Muslim women in Ramanagaram believed that contraception 
was not encouraged by their religion, and that in fact over one-quarter of Muslim women 
disagreed with this position. For example, a Muslim woman, Azmatunissa, age 52, from 
Ramanagaram, who was educated to the Masters level, remarked, `I had two births and then 
got myself operated. My husband encouraged me. We have a responsibility to restrict our 
fertility... In twelve years the population has increased a lot. I feel sick looking at the 
numbers. I follow the Koran, what is correct, but ... 
I am trying to propagate small family 
norms. But you see, men are selfish. They do not allow girls to study. Husbands do not like 
wives in control of their lives or their fertility. ' 
Quantitative and qualitative evidence from the present study also suggests that individual 
beliefs held by men and women about whether their religion prescribes or proscribes 
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contraceptive use (whether or not their religion actually does so) may be fundamental to 
demographic decisions. The effect of religion may also be exercised through the local 
religious community, particularly through religious leaders88. However, this is expressed not 
in terms of a `pure theological effect' on the decision to use contraception, but in terms of 
decisions taken about socio-economic matters, such as whether to continue an education, by 
individual members of different religions. In addition, socio-economic factors appear to 
affect the contraceptive decision-making of Christians in Ramanagaram differently to other 
religious groups. 
These findings have important policy implications. First, it may be necessary for population 
policy to target religious and community leaders. Second, without systematically controlling 
for socio-economic status and other factors it is impossible to make generalisations about 
contraceptive adoption by religion, as is often heard from religious leaders speaking about 
members of their own community who are said to have committed a `travesty of faith' by 
practising family planning; or from more right-wing Indian politicians who make blanket 
statements about contraceptive acceptance and adoption by members of other religions. 
Thirdly, policy initiatives directed at altering patterns of contraceptive adoption may need to 
target some of India's different religious groups in different ways, since in Ramanagaram the 
socio-economic factors determining people's existing contraceptive use vary between 
Christians and other religions, although not between Hindus and Muslims. The present study 
emphasises the importance of holding socio-economic factors constant when attempting to 
evaluate the impact of religious faith on demographic outcomes, and the importance of 
recognising the influence of the community in enforcing popular and preconceived notions 
about religious injunctions on birth control. In fact, it is the neglect of such a procedure 
which causes serious misrepresentations of demographic phenomena in developing countries 
88 This is similar to the conclusion of Amin, Diamond and Steele, 1996. 
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such as India, and which is the more fundamental travesty which this chapter has attempted 
to overcome. 
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CHAPTER6 
The Determinants of Fertility in Ramanagaram 
This chapter will analyse the socio-economic and demographic determinants of fertility 
among the 201 women of the Ramanagaram sample. The chapter begins with a review of the 
relevant literature on the determinants of fertility. It then undertakes an econometric analysis 
of the factors influencing variations in fertility among the women interviewed in the 
Ramanagaram survey. It concludes with a consideration of the implications of these findings 
for theoretical models of fertility in religiously differentiated societies. 
The discussion that follows categorises the factors influencing fertility into what are 
conventionally termed the `proximate determinants' and the `nonproximate determinants' or 
`nonproximate developmental factors' in fertility change. ' In the two preceding chapters, we 
analysed the factors influencing two important proximate determinants of fertility in the 
Ramanagaram sample: nuptiality and contraceptive use. This chapter focuses on the influence 
of the nonproximate determinants. 
I. Proximate determinants and nonproximate developmental influences 
A. Proximate determinants 
The proximate determinants of fertility are those intermediate variables through which 
change in fertility is effected. 2 Following Bongaarts and Srinivasan, the proximate 
determinants of fertility can be grouped into four main categories: natural fertility, nuptiality, 
contraceptive use, and abortion. The relationships between actual fertility, the chief 
' The term `nonproximate determinant' is used by Bongaarts, while, in the context of India, both terms 
are used interchangeably by Srinivasan. See Bongaarts, 1978: 105-132; Srinivasan, 1995: 577-586. 
230 
proximate determinants of fertility, and some of the main nonproximate determinants, are 
schematically represented in the diagram below. 
Proximate and nonproximate determinants of fertility change 
Proximate 
determinants 
Nonproxirtwtc 
clctcrminants 
i 
" Natural fertility 
" Abortion 
" Woman's education 
" Husband's education 
" 1Yuntan's occupation 
thisband'soccupatiun 
" Income 
Infant mortality. 
Politics 
" Nuntiality 
" Contraceptive choice 
" Tamil) planning services 
" household structure 
" Extended fancily 
" Son-preference 
" Female autonomy 
" Religion 
" (aste 
Urban-rural residence 
I)emmtd for children as 
" conswucr goods 
" producer goals 
" Insestmcni goods 
" httra"bouschold bargaining 
Natural fertility is defined as the total fertility of a couple which has not practised any 
method of deliberate control either to increase birth-spacing or to curtail total family size. 
Natural fertility has a number of components: sterility, menarche, intrauterine mortality, 
breastfeeding, postpartum abstinence, and so on. Historically in India, according to 
Srinivasan, natural fertility has been low, averaging 6 births per woman, mainly because it 
was kept in check by social, religious and cultural practices (such as the prohibition of widow 
remarriage and prolonged breast-feeding) and a high incidence of febrile diseases which 
diminished biological fecundity. 3 However, with improvements in health care and life 
2 Bongaarts, 1978: 105-132; Srinivasan, 1995: 577-586. 
3 Srinivasan, 1995: 581. 
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expectancy in the 1960s and 1970s, natural fertility in India increased from 6 in the 1930s to 
7 in the 1970s and 9 in the 1980s. 4 
Nuptiality, reflected in the proportions married and the female age at first marriage, is the 
second important proximate determinant of fertility. 5 This factor has been hypothesised to 
affect fertility because a later marriage age for women is associated with lower fertility. This 
factor is highly relevant for India, since marriage is near-universal. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
for the Ramanagaram sample, the mean age at first marriage was 17.3 years, and there were 
no women in the sample who had remained unmarried past the age of 49. 
The third important proximate determinant of fertility is contraceptive use. Contraception 
performs both birth-spacing and birth-limitation functions. In India, the importance of this 
factor in the control of fertility was recognised at an early date and India was the first country 
in the world to launch an official government-sponsored family planning programme (in 
1951). Moreover, as a part of this programme, the first family planning centre in Karnataka 
was set up in Ramanagaram in 1952. 
Induced abortion, the willingness and ability of women to terminate unwanted births, is the 
final proximate determinant of fertility. It may be influenced by socio-economic factors such 
as income, by technological factors such as the availability of safe abortion methods, by 
religious and cultural factors such as attitudes toward the moral acceptability of abortion, and 
by practical and legal factors such as the laws regarding termination of pregnancies. 
In previous chapters we have already looked at nuptiality and contraceptive use in detail. We 
have not considered natural fertility or induced abortion primarily because of paucity of data 
on these two factors, and because we are keen to compare the causes of fertility change in 
Srinivasan and Jejeebhoy, 1981: 103. 
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Ramanagaram and in Karnataka for only those proximate determinants which have been used 
to account for changes in fertility by other studies conducted in previous decades in this 
region, such as the Mysore Population Study and the National Family Health Survey, which 
also mainly concentrated on nuptiality and contraceptive choice as the key demographic 
variables affecting fertility outcomes. 
B. Nonproximate `developmental' determinants 
Nonproximate determinants affect fertility through their impact on the proximate variables 6 
1. Infant and child mortality 
A first important nonproximate developmental factor is infant and child mortality. According 
to the theory of `demographic transition' the pace and timing of mortality decline 
(particularly for infants) determines the timing of fertility decline, even in the absence of 
modern contraception. There are two main hypotheses concerning the effects on fertility of 
higher infant mortality. First is the `child survival hypothesis' which argues that if parents 
live in an area of high child mortality, they will have more children because they expect to 
lose a high percentage of offspring to death 7 Second is the `child replacement hypothesis', 
which assumes that if a child dies, parents are anxious to replace it as soon as possible 
s 
Lower mortality both reduces the number of births necessary to achieve desired reproductive 
s Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; Goldstone, 1986: 5-33. 
6 An illustration of the way in which the nonproximate determinants affect fertility via the proximate 
determinants can be found in studies of historical demography. Wrigley and Schofield argue that 
fertility trends in England from 1541-1816 followed real wage trends with a lag of forty years, so that 
the increase in fertility in England after 1750 occurred when nuptiality responded with a lag to the rise 
in real wages in the early eighteenth century. Goldstone argues that in England before 1700 changes in 
real wages determined fertility by affecting the proportions marrying, though in later cohorts, fertility 
was determined by a sustained fall in the age at marriage. For more on this debate, see Wrigley and 
Schofield, 1981; Goldstone, 1986: 5-33. 
7 Birdsall and Griffin, 1988: 29-55. For evidence from other countries, see Olsen, 1987; Ketkar, 1979: 
479-488; Duraisamy 1988: 293-316. 
8 Scrimshaw, 1978: 383-403. 
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outcomes, and reduces the costs to parents of investing in children, by reducing the risk that 
such investments will be lost through child deaths. This is an especially important 
consideration in the context of the `quantity-quality' model of fertility of Becker and Lewis, 
and Schultz .9 This variable 
is not included in the econometric models presented later in this 
chapter because it did not vary significantly among the women covered in the Ramanagaram 
sample, and because in any case it would be impossible to assign an infant mortality rate to 
each woman in the sample. 
2. Education 
Education is another important nonproximate influence on fertility. A wide array of empirical 
studies have shown that greater education, especially secondary education for women, 
contributes significantly to declines in fertility, even after controlling for other variables. 
10 
There are a number of avenues through which female education is hypothesised to influence 
fertility. First, attending school or university may itself delay marriage. Second, it may mean 
women have better knowledge of contraception and greater efficiency in using it. Third, 
educated women are hypothesised to have healthier babies and lower child mortality, which 
in turn lowers their fertility. " Fourth, educated women are hypothesised to be more likely to 
work in jobs in the modern sector which are incompatible with looking after children, thereby 
increasing the time costs of having children. 12 Fifth, as Mason argues, education is also likely 
9 Becker and Lewis, 1973b: S279-288; Schultz, 1990: 599-634. 
10 See Cochrane, 1979; Cochrane, 1983: 992- 1026; Dasgupta, 1995a: 1879-1902; see also Caldwell, 
1980: 225-255; Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1985: 29-51; Nag and Kak, 1984: 661-678; Appleton, 
1996: 139-166; Duraisamy, 1988: 293-316; Shapiro, 1996: 89-103; Ajayi and Kekovole, 1998: 113 - 
156. Birdsall and Griffin postulate that women with very few years of primary schooling have slightly 
higher fertility than those with no education, but that as the number of years of education increases 
beyond primary levels, the number of children declines. See Birdsall and Griffin, 1988: 29-55. 
" According to Singh, Casterline and Cleland, educated women achieve desired family size better as 
they are more successful in preventing excess births by using contraception. The World Fertility Survey 
also found that while desired family size may not vary by educational level, actual family size does. See 
Singh, Casterline and Cleland, 1985: 113-135. 
12 Female employment itself does not necessarily reduce fertility. Only those women who perform jobs 
which are incompatible with child rearing are likely to show reduced fertility. See Standing, 1983: 517- 
546. 
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to have a favourable effect on a woman's status in the household and her influence on all 
household decisions, including additional childbearing; insofar as wives desire fewer 
children than husbands, this may tend to reduce fertility. Sixth, education also influences the 
ability of mothers to produce higher `quality' children, who are more expensive to raise, 
which increases the unit costs of higher child `quantity' (or higher fertility). '3 
The interaction between child quality and child quantity can be expressed using the analysis 
put forward by Becker. 14 The model assumes that the shadow price of child quantity depends 
on child quality and the shadow price of child quality depends on child quantity. Thus, an 
increase in child quality not only raises the amount spent on each child but also raises the 
cost of each child. Similarly, an increase in child quantity raises the cost of adding to child 
quality because a greater number of children are now affected. An exogenous increase in the 
number of children raises the shadow price of child quality and reduces the demand for 
quality. The reduction in quality in turn lowers that shadow price of child-quantity (which 
depends on child quality), and this continues until an equilibrium is reached. Commodities 
such as children which do not have close substitutes have modest price elasticities and the 
demand for them does not, in general, change by large amounts as prices change. Declines in 
fertility can then be explained by the quantity-quality model as this implies that the demand 
for children will be highly responsive to price and income, even where children have no close 
substitutes. In order to arrive at the demand for children, if a fixed cost of each child which 
includes all expenditures on children independent of child quality is now taken into account, 
the ratio of the shadow prices of quantity and quality depends on the ratio of quality to 
quantity, on the ratio of fixed to variable costs, and on the ratio of marginal to average 
variable costs of quality. The interaction between quantity and quality is such that an increase 
13 For example, the Mysore Population Study noted that ever-married women in Bangalore city, aged 
more than 45 years with high school or university education, gave birth, on average, to 4.0 children, 
compared with 5.3 children for women with no education, and 5.5 children for women with primary 
education. See the Mysore Population Study, 1961: 122. 
14 Becker, 1981: 93-113. 
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in quality and a decrease in quantity encourages greater substitution away from child quantity 
and towards child quality. The decrease in quantity and the increase in quality would be great 
even if the increase in the fixed cost of quantity was small and the elasticity of substitution 
between quantity and quality not large. Education of the woman then leads to falling fertility 
because higher mother's education causes initial increases in the relative price of quantity 
(lowering the price of child quality) due to the high marginal rates of return on education. 
This in turn increases the demand for child quality by more than for other goods, even if both 
quality and other goods are equally good substitutes for quantity. As educated women now 
have lower demand for child quantity, the interaction with child quality implies that they 
invest more in education and other training of their children. 
Female education was included in the econometric models of fertility below, in two 
alternative measures: first, in terms of the total number of years of education; and second, the 
number of years of primary, secondary and university education separately. 
The education of the woman's husband has also been postulated as an important determinant 
of fertility. An increased level of husband's education increases the opportunity cost of 
women's time. It may also contribute to the desire for fewer, but better `quality' children 
because higher education for the man raises the relative price of child quantity (and lowers 
the price of a unit of child quality) which increases the demand for child quality relative to 
the demand for other goods. A higher level of education for the husband may also lead him to 
prefer a wife who is more highly educated or has a skilled job, factors which themselves may 
contribute to lower fertility. In this study, husband's education was measured in two ways: in 
terms of husband's total number of years of education, and in terms of the number of years of 
husband's primary education, of secondary education and of husband's university education. 
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3. Employment 
Female labour force participation is another important nonproximate influence on fertility 
and is closely related to education. Women who work have fewer children because the 
opportunity cost of children for them is higher. 15 Higher women's wages have the same effect 
on the time cost of children whether or not women work. However, female employment is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fertility reduction. This is because women's 
employment depresses fertility only if women work in jobs which are incompatible with 
child-rearing (for example in cities, or in the modem sector). 16 In rural areas, female 
employment does not necessarily depress fertility because it is often compatible with child- 
rearing. 17 In such a context, working mothers may have more children than non-working 
ones, because higher incomes enable women to provide for more children. This issue is 
particularly relevant to Ramanagaram, where so many women were employed in the silk 
industry, essentially still a cottage industry. 
Other important findings pertaining to female employment and fertility are that if the woman 
has a skilled occupation, she is likely to have lower fertility because of the higher opportunity 
costs of childbearing and child-rearing; that labour market discrimination against women 
raises fertility; and that women from poor households, who tend both to work and to suffer 
from malnutrition, are more likely to experience secondary sterility, which will contribute to 
a negative relationship between fertility and women's work. '8 It is also argued that in order 
15 Birdsall and Griffin, 1988: 29-55. 
16 Standing, 1983: 517-546. 
17 In a very early article on female employment in cottage industry and fertility, Jaffe and Azumi 
argued that female employment in cottage industries may have actually increased fertility in Puerto 
Rico and Japan in the 1950s. They argued that women employed in agriculture had the highest fertility, 
while those employed in non-agricultural industry which was carried on very near the woman's home, 
enabling women to combine work and childrearing, resulted in considerably higher fertility than if the 
woman worked away from the home. See Jaffe and Azumi, 1960: 52-63. 
18 Standing, 1983: 517-546. 
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to depress fertility, it is necessary to raise both the productivity of women inside the home 
and their earnings in the market outside. 
' This is important because it improves women's 
bargaining position within the household by widening their exit options, whether or not 
women actually take up work outside the home. 20 
In this study, employment for women was measured in three different ways. The first was 
through a dummy variable which took the value of 1 if the woman said she had a primary 
occupation and 0 otherwise. The second was through a dummy variable which took the value 
1 if the woman was employed in a silk-related occupation, and 0 otherwise. The latter was 
tested for two reasons: first, because in Ramanagaram taluk the silk industry is the main 
source of livelihood for a large part of the population; and second, because some stages in the 
silk process are dominated by women workers and child labour. There is a large literature on 
proto-industry (market-oriented rural domestic industry) which postulates that it creates 
incentives for higher fertility? ` Therefore, it seemed important to analyse if employment in 
this industry was related to fertility behaviour in the taluk. Finally, a third dummy variable 
was defined which took a value of 1 if the woman was employed in a skilled occupation 
(such as a teacher) and 0 otherwise. 
The occupation of the woman's husband is also postulated as an important predictor of 
women's fertility, though the manner in which it is supposed to affect fertility is complex. It 
is theorised that if the husband is employed in a skilled occupation, his wife is likely to have 
fewer children. This is because a man will tend to prefer a wife who is also employed in a 
skilled occupation, who is better-educated, or who is older at the time of marriage. 
Alternatively, it has been postulated that at higher wage rates men can afford to marry earlier 
19 Duraisamy's analysis supports this conclusion. He argues that in his sample of 525 rural households 
in Tamil Nadu, an increase in wages would draw women into the labour force. See Duraisamy, 1988: 
293-316. 
20 Dasgupta, 1995a: 1879-1902. 
21 Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm, 1981: 58-9. 
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and raise more children, hence increasing their fertility. It has also been postulated that if the 
husband's primary occupation is farming, there may be greater need for children to work on 
the family farm, increasing the demand for children. There may also be a higher demand for 
children if men are employed in domestic industry, for the same reasons as adduced for the 
employment of women in domestic industry. 
In order to test these competing theories, three variables relating to husband's primary 
occupation were created. First, a dummy variable was created which took the value 1 if the 
husband had a farming occupation and 0 otherwise; the expected sign of the coefficient on 
this variable is positive. Second, a dummy variable was created which took the value I if the 
husband had a skilled occupation and 0 otherwise; the expected sign of the coefficient on this 
variable is negative. Thirdly, a variable was created which took the value 1 if the husband 
was employed in domestic industry and 0 otherwise; the expected sign of the coefficient on 
this variable, is positive. 
4. Income 
Income is a further nonproximate influence on fertility. The pure `income effect' raises the 
demand for all normal goods, including children. This is thought to be the reason for the 
observation that at very low levels of income as incomes rise, fertility rises. As income keeps 
rising, fertility is subsequently observed to fall because at higher incomes various substitution 
effects come into play, reducing the demand for children by increasing the price of children 
relative to other goods, and thus parents substitute away from them. These substitution 
effects operate in a number of ways: by increases in the opportunity cost of parent's time, by 
the `quantity-quality' trade-off, and by increased access to substitutes for various `child 
services' such as insurance and welfare. Thus, the effect of income on fertility is first to 
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increase fertility due to the operation of a pure income effect, and then to depress fertility 
due to substitution effects. 
Consequently, in empirical analyses of income and fertility, one seldom observes the pure 
income effect, mainly because the substitution effects soon cancel it out. 22 Consistent with 
the theoretical and empirical literature discussed in Chapter 3, five different measures of 
income were calculated for the Ramanagaram sample: total monthly expenditure, per capita 
monthly expenditure, total monthly foodgrains expenditure, per capita monthly foodgrains 
expenditure, and an index which measured the ownership of items of consumer equipment. 
The regression models estimated in this chapter use total monthly expenditure, total monthly 
food expenditure and the index of consumer equipment ownership as measures of income. 
Per capita expenditure and per capita foodgrains expenditure are not used because they are 
calculated by taking total family size into account and are therefore endogenous in a model of 
fertility. However, in order to control for the fact that some households' total expenditure (or 
total food expenditure) may be higher than that of other households not because they are 
richer, but because there are more members living in the household, we also use (as discussed 
below) the total number of female extended family members (or total number of extended 
family), both of which are highly correlated with total household size, as an additional 
explanatory variable in the models, in order to control for family size. 23 
5. Women's status and female autonomy 
Another important nonproximate influence on fertility is women's status and female 
autonomy. Dyson and Moore define female autonomy as `the capacity to manipulate one's 
personal environment'. 24 Various studies have postulated that an increase in women's 
22 Schultz, 1982: 137-150; Duraisamy, 1988: 293-316. 
23 The correlation coefficient is 0.87. 
24 Dyson and Moore, 1983: 45. 
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autonomy, independence, or control of resources leads to a fall in fertility. 25 Women's status 
is believed to influence fertility in two ways. First, it can increase child survival due to a 
mother's increased ability to provide better nutrition and medical care, and it will tend to 
increase the value of daughters in a society, which may consequently increase nutritional and 
health investments in them. Mason argues that women are more motivated than men to ensure 
that their children survive and will therefore attempt to achieve better child survival rates 
when they have greater autonomy and the resources to do so. Others have also argued that 
mortality and women's status are linked 26 
The second, and more direct set of ways in which women's status is thought to affect fertility 
is that it tends to increase the age at first marriage, to strike at the roots of a patriarchal family 
structure, to reduce son-preference, to push families toward being more `conjugally- 
oriented'27, to encourage women's access to contraception, and to diminish the extent to 
which women have to resort to high fertility in order to gain power and prestige within the 
family or the wider community. 28 Mason claims that there is more evidence in support of the 
view that greater female autonomy lowers fertility by lowering mortality rather than in the 
direct ways just mentioned. 29 Finally, Dyson and Moore argue that across India, it is possible 
to observe a broad north-south dichotomy with areas of low female autonomy (and high birth 
and death rates) prevalent in north India, and comparatively high female autonomy (and low 
birth and death rates) prevalent in south India. 30 There is also evidence which Kennedy and 
25 Mason, 1993: 19-42; Dharmalingam and Philip Morgan, 1996: 187-201; Dreze and Sen, 1995); 
Malhotra, Vanneman and Kishor, 1995: 281-305; Steele, Amin and Naved, 1998. 
26 Standing, 1983: 517-546; Dyson and Moore, 1983: 35-60. 
27 `Conjugally-oriented' families are those families in which husbands and wives are thought to have 
greater communication with each other, and jointly exercise household decision-making, in particular, 
reproductive decision-making. These families contrast with those in which the extended family, in-laws 
and other relatives exercise a greater role in making household decisions, with husband-wife 
communication playing a smaller role. 
28 Standing, 1983: 517- 546; Cochrane, 1983; Cain, 1984; Dyson and Moore, 1983: 35-60; Mason and 
Taj, 1987: 611-638. 
29 Mason, 1993: 19-42; Cain, Khanam and Nahar, 1979: 432; Srinivas, 1989: 129; Oppong, 1983: 556- 
557; Dasgupta, 1995a: 1888; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982: 803-815; Cain, 1984. 
30 This is similar to Sopher's hypothesis of differences in culture between north and south India. See 
Sopher, 1980: 289-327. Dyson and Moore's contrasting demographic regimes mirror the alleged 
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Haddad provide from a study of Ghana and Kenya conducted in 1994, and which Kennedy 
and Peters provide from a study of Kenya and Malawi conducted in 1992, that extra income 
or expenditure improves child nutrition more if it goes to women rather than to men. 
3 This 
variable was not included separately in the econometric models for two reasons: first, 
because it is highly correlated with women's education, occupation and other explanatory 
variables, and could also well be the result of education; and second, because it did not vary 
sufficiently across Hindus and Muslims in the Ramanagaram sample. 
6. Children as consumer, producer and investment goods 
It is hypothesised that poor households have high fertility because children simultaneously 
function as consumer goods, producer goods and investment goods. Children are desired for 
the utility they provide to parents; for their contributions of labour income and time spent 
performing household tasks (especially fuel and water collection); and for the insurance they 
provide in societies where risk is high and established systems of social security are lacking. 
There is considerable evidence in support of the producer goods motive for high fertility. 
Dasgupta argues that in poor households, even when parents are young, children are required 
to take care of younger siblings and of animals on the family farm, and to collect water and 
firewood. 32 Cain finds that in Char Gopalpur in Bangladesh, children of all classes enter the 
labour force at an early age. Male children are net producers as early as age 12; and they 
compensate for their cumulative consumption by age 15.3; Duraisamy contends that in poor 
households in Tamil Nadu, the wage contributions of children encouraged parents to have 
cultural differences between the northern, mainly `Aryan' culture and the southern, predominantly 
'Dravidian' culture. For more on some of these factors and the contrasts between north India and south 
India, see Agarwal, 1994; Malhotra, Vanneman and Kishor, 1995: 281-305; Murthi, Guio and Dreze, 
1995: 745-782; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997. 
31 Kenendy and Haddad, 1994; Kennedy and Peters, 1992. 
32 Dasgupta, 1993a: 358-361; Dasgupta, 1995a: 1879-1902. 
33 Cain, 1977: 201-227. 
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more children and discouraged investment in their schooling. 
34 Mamdani argued forcefully 
that children in Manupur in Punjab were making productive contributions to the household at 
early ages, and that this was most evident in the poorest households. 
35 However, some studies 
disagree. 36 Based on a sample village in Maharashtra, Vlassoff reported that the average work 
day for boys was 2.6 hours, with younger boys working only 1.7 hours. At age 18, 
contributions in the busiest season were only 4 hours. Unlike Mamdani, Vlassoff found that 
the poorest households had more idle labour as well. ' 
There is also some empirical evidence for the old-age security motive for high fertility. May 
and Heer estimated that in the 1960s an Indian couple needed to have 6.3 children in order to 
be 95% certain that they would have a surviving son when the father reached the age of 65.38 
At the time, this figure was very close to India's average total fertility rate. However, for the 
insurance motive, the evidence is also mixed. Vlassoff and Vlassoff concluded from a sample 
village in Maharashtra that most men worked until death, and tended to link security in old 
age with adequate economic resources such as land rather than with children (even 
specifically sons). 39 Nag and Kak concluded the same from a re-survey of Mamdani's village 
of Manupur in the early 1980s 40 Thus, though the three motives for childbearing seem 
convincing explanations of high fertility in poor societies, the empirical evidence appears to 
be mixed, and to depend greatly on the context and the specific population being analysed, 
the country in question, and the time period in which the analysis was conducted. 
Related to the producer good motive, it has been postulated that the lack of water and fuel 
infrastructure in poor countries may create a cycle of overpopulation, poverty and 
34 Duraisamy, 1988: 293-316. 
35 Mamdani, 1972. 
36 For a reappraisal of the evidence from Punjab, see Das Gupta, 1994: 101-133. 
37 Vlassoff, 1979: 415-428. 
38 May and Heer, 1968: 199-210. 
39 Vlassoff and Vlassoff, 1980: 487-499. However, there is little support for this hypothesis among the 
women of Ramanagaram because they did express their concern about sources of support in old age. 
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environmental degradation. 1 In poor countries, lack of infrastructure means households must 
undertake water and fuel collection tasks by hand. 2 This results in high fertility because 
children typically carry out these tasks. This can eventually give rise to a `tragedy of the 
commons', where common resources are continually depleted due to the externalities that 
collectively arise from high fertility and increasing population density, which in turn, deplete 
common resources further. 43 In sum, when the social costs of the externalities to child 
rearing outweigh the private benefits of children, this may result in a situation where poverty 
and depletion of environmental resources is a natural consequence. Because this hypothesis 
has not yet been explored in detail empirically on the micro-level, the present study has 
sought to do so, by investigating in detail how water and fuel were obtained by Ramanagaram 
households, which household members collected it, and finally (in the econometric analysis 
of the determinants of fertility) whether these infrastructure variables influenced fertility 
significantly. 
a. Water infrastructure 
There were five main sources of water supply in Ramanagaram: daily filling-up of pots of 
water from the river or from hand-pumps provided by the municipality; borewells; motor 
pumps; taps/pipes in the home supplied by the municipality; and ordinary wells. The 
women's responses to the question `What is your main source of water supply? ' are shown in 
Table 1. 
40 Nag and Kak, 1984: 661-678. 
41 Dasgupta, 1993a: 358-361. 
42 Dasgupta, 1993a: 359. 
43 Lee and Miller, 1991: 275-297. Dasgupta argues that the breakdown of agreements on common 
property resources may set off this spiral in poor countries. See Dasgupta, 1995b; Dasgupta, 1993b: 
207-243. 
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Table 1: Sources of water supply. Ramana2aram sample (1996) 
Source of water All women Hindu Muslim Christian 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Pots of water collected 166 82.3 90 81.1 63 84.0 13 86.7 
Tap 13 6.5 6 5.4 6 8.0 1 6.7 
Pipe 8 4.0 5 4.5 2 2.7 1 6.7 
Borewell 5 2.5 5 4.5 0 0.0 00 
Ordinary well 3 1.5 1 0.9 2 2.7 00 
Motor pump 1 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 00 
Missing/don't know 5 2.5 3 2.7 2 2.7 00 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
In the sample as a whole, 82% said that they collected pots of water by hand as their primary 
source of water supply, and this percentage was quite similar across religious groups. 
The women were then asked `How many pots of water are required per day to meet the 
family's water requirements? '. The average number of pots of water required per day in 
Ramanagaram was 26.3: the Muslims required 27.7, the Christians 26.9 and the Hindus 25.2. 
It may be recollected that the mean household size in the sample was 5.7 for Hindus, 6.6 for 
Muslims and 4.3 for Christians. Thus, the Muslims, who had the largest households, also had 
the highest water requirements. The mean per capita water requirements by religion were 
almost identical between Hindus and Muslims (4.5 - 4.6 pots per person) but 6.2 among the 
Christians. One reason why the Christians had the highest per capita water requirements may 
be that they were the most likely of all three religious communities to have water taps in their 
homes or employ others to collect water for them (as discussed below). 
Table 2 shows the responses to the question `Who collects water? '. 
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Table 2: Water collection in the household, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Water collection performed by All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Woman 134 66.7 84 75.7 43 57.3 7 46.7 
Husband 22 11.0 9 8.1 11 14.7 2 13.3 
Daughter(s)t 40 19.9 20 18.0 18 24.0 2 13.3 
Son(s)t 11 5.5 7 6.3 3 4.0 0 0.0 
Children* 35 17.4 22 11.0 11 14.7 2 13.3 
Daughter(s)-in-lawt 9 4.5 6 5.4 3 4.0 0 0.0 
Others** 25 12.4 13 11.7 9 12.0 3 20.0 
Total number of women*** 201 111 75 15 
t Very often, more than one daughter, son or daughter-in-law assisted with water collection, though the detailed 
breakdown is not reported here. 
*In their responses, some women did not distinguish between sons and daughters and preferred to indicate that 
`children' in the household helped with water-collection. 
**This includes siblings, brothers-in-law, hired coolies and servants, parents-in-law, joint family members (where 
the woman did not provide a detailed breakdown), sisters-in-law, co-sisters, girl neighbour, mother, sons-in-law, 
and in three cases an unnamed person. 
***The women mentioned more than one person who collected water, and hence the column totals do not add up 
to 100%. 
Women and children (especially daughters) are the main water-carriers in Ramanagaram 
taluk: 67% of all women collected water on a daily basis for their own homes, and 47% of all 
households used one or more children to collect water. In only 10% of households were men 
alone performing water-carrying duties, though a few men did come under the `others' 
category. 
Looking at the religious breakdown, 76% of Hindu women, 57% of Muslim women and 47% 
of Christian women collected water for their own homes. Moreover, 50% of Hindu 
households and 47% of Muslim households used children for water collection, compared 
with only 26% of Christian households. This is relevant to a discussion of fertility because it 
appears that those religious communities (mainly Hindus and Muslims) which had greater 
fertility, were also those in which children were more widely used for water-collection, 
although naturally we cannot know whether these are causally related. For those children 
who went to school, water collection was done either in the early morning, before school 
hours, or in the late afternoon or evenings after school. This made the problem of irregular 
water supply (which was discussed in Chapter 2) even worse because it meant that in order to 
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catch the water supply when it was on, there was an incentive to keep at least one child home 
from school. 
Even so, women told me during my fieldwork that as the daughters of the household were 
increasingly being sent to school, the water-collection tasks often fell on their mothers. One 
woman, Devamma from village C, remarked that while she realised the importance of 
educating her daughters, yet she was suffering greater tiredness and ill-health, mainly 
because she did not have enough help with the water- and fuel-collection tasks. Another 
problem, she complained, was that the younger generation (especially sons) wished to bathe 
every day, as opposed to once in three days like their parents. However, they refused to 
collect the extra water required, putting an extra burden on their mothers and sisters. 
Although more girls were being sent to school, this process would perhaps have proceeded 
further and faster by this time if it was not for the water burden that it implied. 
Women were also asked, `How many hours per person per day are required for water 
collection? '. In the sample as a whole, the mean was 2.2 hours per person per day, 2.3 for the 
Hindus, 2.2 for the Muslims, and 1.5 for the Christians. The differences between the three 
religious groups was found not to be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The 
closeness of the figures for all three religious groups suggests that the women's answers were 
accurate and that they were acutely aware of the time spent per day collecting water to meet 
the household's needs. Hence it is certainly possible that labour needed for water collection 
entered into their fertility calculations. 
b. Fuel infrastructure 
The Ramanagaram women were also asked about their sources of fuel, and their answers are 
shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Source of fuel, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Source of fuel All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Firewood 149 74.1 90 81.1 49 65.3 10 66.7 
Coconut husks and sawdust 78 38.8 47 42.3 30 40.0 1 6.7 
Kerosene 37 18.4 14 12.6 18 24.0 5 33.3 
Gas 32 15.9 16 14.4 12 16.0 4 26.7 
Total number of households 201* 111 75 15 
* Column totals do not add up to 100% because women often gave more than one response to this question. 
Of the women in the sample, the majority (74%) used firewood. Even schoolteachers and 
government office clerks (considered to be more `prestigious' and monetarily more 
rewarding occupations for women), used firewood, although these groups often bought it 
rather than collected it. The large difference in the proportions dependent on firewood 
between the Hindus on the one hand and the Muslims and Christians on the other is probably 
explained by the relative prosperity of some Muslim and Christian households. In fact, for the 
sample as a whole, the correlation coefficient between per capita expenditure and firewood 
usage was negative (-0.31), suggesting that as incomes rose, less firewood was used, being 
replaced by alternative fuel sources such as kerosene oil or gas. 
The firewood requirements of the family were expressed by the women interviewed in terms 
of manas. One mana cost approximately Rs. 8 to Rs. 9. Sometimes, when firewood was 
bought, it was also expressed in terms of adis or carts. For those who owned silk trees, or a 
saw-mill, there was no question of payment for firewood collection. For others, the firewood 
was collected by hand from common land in surrounding areas or on the outskirts of the town 
and no monetary payment was made for it. For still others, it was purchased from the saw- 
mills. I observed in my fieldwork that most families purchased a fixed amount of firewood 
per week, and supplemented it with additional wood, if required, which was either purchased 
again, or cut by hand. The wood was piled up in front of the house and used slowly during 
the week. The women could not provide precise estimates of the percentage physically 
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chopped as opposed to the amount purchased. At best, they could provide the figures for the 
amount of manas they consumed per week. The average Ramanagaram family which used 
wood for fuel needed 6.7 manas every week, 6.3 among the Hindus, 7.0 among the Muslims, 
and 7.8 among the Christians. 
Women were asked who performed firewood collection for the household. In Table 4 their 
answers are alphabetically grouped by family members and group totals for some of the 
family members who were mainly responsible for fuel collection, in order to facilitate 
comparisons. This table is presented in detail, both to highlight the range of responses, and to 
illustrate how firewood collection in Ramanagaram taluk, as perhaps in most parts of India, is 
a fundamental aspect of daily living and may involve various combinations of all members of 
the family and household. 
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Table 4: Combinations of household members who perform firewood collection tasks, 
Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Household member(s) All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Brothers-in-law (2)* 1 
Brothers (1 or 2) 3 
Daughter 4 
Daughter + daughter-in-law 1 
Total daughters 5 
Daughter-in-law (2) 2 
Father (tractor)* 5 
Father-in-law + brother-in-law 1 
Girl neighbour 1 
Husband 42 
Husband+ daughters (3) 1 
Husband +sons (2) 1 
Total husbands 44 
Children (2) 3 
Children (3) 1 
Children (4) 2 
Children (5) 3 
Children (6) + daughters-in-law (2) 1 
Children (7) 1 
Total children 11 
Male joint family members 1 
Parents in-law 1 
Mother 1 
Nephews (2) 1 
Son -1 
Son (auto) 1 
Son 9 
Son (cycle) 1 
Son (2) 8 
Son (3) 2 
Total sons 22 
Servant I 
Suppliers 6 
Woman 43 
Woman + daughters (unspecified) 2 
Woman + daughters (3) 1 
Woman + daughter-in-law I 
Woman + husband - 11 
Woman + husband + son 1 
Woman + children 1 
Woman + co-sister 1 
Woman + son (3) 1 
Woman (auto) 1 
Total women 63 
0 
3 
4 
0 
4 
1 
21 
0 
0 
21 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
i00 
i00 
i80 
00i 
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020 
5 15 2 
100 
600 
33 
200 
100 
100 
100 -i 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
52 
10 
21 
0 .0 00 
01 
20 
00 
00 
00 
19 5 
10 
10 
21 5 
10 
00 
00 
30 
10 
10 
50 
10 
10 
00 
10 
8 
8 
*The presence of two or more particular household members is represented in the round brackets [example: (2)). 
Where there is no round bracket, this implies a single person only. Sometimes, the women would also describe 
how the firewood, once collected, was eventually transported back home. If mentioned, this is represented in curly 
brackets [example: {cycle)]. 
The women themselves, their husbands and their sons were those mainly responsible for 
firewood collection. But this differed across religions. For Hindus, the women themselves 
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and their husbands were primarily responsible, while in Muslim families, it was mainly the 
husbands and sons. This is probably due to the strict code of the purdah practised by the 
Muslim women and girls of Ramanagaram. In the Christian families, husbands, sons and 
women themselves collected firewood. 
An interesting feature of the Ramanagaram sample is that among the children, there is a 
broad split down gender lines in the allocation of water-collection and fuel-collection tasks, 
with daughters routinely collecting water and sons mainly collecting fuel. As one Muslim 
woman explained, daughters were not normally sent out very far on their own to collect 
firewood, both for security reasons and because it was a very heavy load to carry. The 
reluctance to send daughters out for firewood was evident across all three religious groups. 
In Ramanagaram taluk, it was intrinsically less laborious to obtain water, as compared with 
firewood, due to easy access to the river Arkavati and due to water taps provided by the 
municipality. If we accept the hypothesis that increased fertility arises because children may 
be desired as producer goods to help with fuel and water collection, this argument could 
perhaps explain observed son-preference among all religious groups, since sons would help 
with the more labour-intensive fuel collection. This desire for sons may be reinforced if 
communities observe a strict code of up rdah which restricts the mobility of girls and women. 
Women were asked how many hours the family spent collecting fuel each day. The responses 
were remarkably similar across religious groups, at 1.6 hours for Hindus, 1.8 for Muslims, 
and 1.8 for Christians. The closeness of these figures, as with those for water-collection, 
suggests quite accurate responses and knowledge by the respondents about the time involved 
for firewood collection. 
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The econometric analysis of fertility will examine whether the family's fuel and water 
requirements influenced the total number of children ever born. This is done by creating two 
dummy variables, the first measured whether the household collected water in pots by hand, 
the second whether it collected firewood by hand. 
7. Son-preference 
A further nonproximate influence on fertility is son-preference and possible discrimination 
against daughters. Demographers postulate that the strength of parents' preferences for sons 
may increase fertility because a larger total number of children must be born in order to 
obtain the desired quantity of sons44 Chen, Huq and D'Souza, Cain, Mason, Dyson and 
Moore, and Dasgupta, have all shown that evidence exists that some women may not be as 
interested in the survival of some of their children as in that of the others, as is evident in 
gender discrimination against daughters relative to sons in the access to food and medical 
care in some parts of north India 45 To explain this theoretically, Cain has hypothesised a 
`security-fertility' theory which is the `lexicographic safety-first' (LSF) model. According to 
lexicographic decision rules, agents maximise net returns, but do so subject to the condition 
that these net returns do not fall below some specified `disaster level'. For reproductive 
decisions, this means that parents wish to maximise `utility' subject to the constraint that the 
probability of inadequate support in old age is less than or equal to some target. In certain 
societies, minimum requirements for old age security can be expressed in terms of a certain 
as Irudaya Rajan, Mishra and Vimala, 1996: 1980-1986. In this article, using Census data for India 
between 1980 and 1991, they argue that the acceptance of a permanent method of contraception among 
Indian couples is strongly associated with the sex composition of the family, in particular the number of 
sons. 
"S Chen, Huq and D'Souza, 1981: 55-70; Cain, 1984; Mason, 1993: 19-42; Dyson and Moore, 1983: 
35-60; Dasgupta, 1993a: 343-370. 
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number of surviving children, say, `one healthy, loyal, and surviving son'. The fertility level 
then depends on the probability of child survival and child default. 46 
Given the enormous literature devoted to son-preference in poor countries and the old-age 
security motive for fertility, from the Ramanagaram data a variable was calculated in order to 
see whether the delay in succeeding in giving birth to a son had any impact on fertility. This 
was done by calculating an index which measured the location of sons in the birth-order. This 
variable in a sense captures a pure demographic accident. Of course, this calculation could 
easily have been done with reference to the location of daughters in the birth-order; however, 
the location of sons was of more interest because the literature on the old-age security motive 
suggests that fertility will be higher as parents try to have at least one surviving son who will 
look after them in old-age. 
This variable was calculated as follows. A number was assigned to each family, which took 
the value of the birth order of the first-born son. For example, if a woman gave birth to a son 
followed by a daughter followed by another son, the variable took the value `1'. If she gave 
birth to a daughter, followed by another daughter, then a son, and then another daughter, it 
took the value '3'. If the woman had only. daughters and no sons, the variable took the value 
0. In the multivariate models presented later, it was attempted to examine whether this 
demographic accident affected. total fertility. 
To cast some qualitative light on the old-age security motive for fertility, women were also 
asked with whom they would live after the age of 60. Over half of all women preferred to live 
with their sons in old age, a percentage which was very similar across all religious groups: 
57% of Hindus, 55% of Muslims and 53% of Christians. Only 5% of the women in the 
46 For example, Cain found that in a comparative study of villages in Bangladesh, Maharashtra and 
Andhra Pradesh, the security motive was mainly responsible for explaining fertility differentials and 
son-preference. See Cain, 1981: 467. 
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sample said they would choose to live alone. However, women did indicate that living with a 
son was contingent on obtaining a daughter-in-law they could tolerate. One uneducated 
woman, Gangamma, age 36 of Ramanagaram town, replied: 'If Indira Gandhi herself did not 
stay with her son because she could not get on with her daughter-in-law, how do I know, 
when my son marries, if I will obtain a daughter-in-law that I will get on with; and therefore, 
how can I possibly say who I will stay with in my old age? It is a very stupid question. ' 
8. Extended family 
It is also postulated that the presence of extended family to share the costs of child rearing is 
an important nonproximäte determinant of fertility. Hajnal argued that in north-west Europe 
in the past, the costs of raising children were solely borne by parents; by contrast, the 
`Asiatic' pattern involved joint households, where the costs of child rearing were borne by 
many, and hence parents had less disincentive to have high fertility 47 Oppong has argued that 
the wide dispersal of. the costs of having children among the kinship network contributes to 
high fertility in Africa as well4$ 
On the other hand, the presence of extended family members may act to reduce fertility, both 
because there is a lack of privacy and because traditional taboos on sexual intercourse at 
particular times are more likely, to be. observed by women in extended households, under the 
scrutiny of in-laws, than among those living in nuclear family households. 
Most households in Ramanagaram had extra persons beyond the nuclear family living in the 
household. These included family members, such as elderly parents or parents-in-law, distant 
relatives, and servants living permanently in the household. Table 5 shows the average 
household composition for different religious groups in Ramanagaram. 
47 Hajnal, 1982: 449-494. 
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Table 5: Household composition table, (Ramanagaram sample, 1996) 
Mean number of: All women Hindu . 
Muslim Christian 
Women (wife/female head) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Husbands (male head) 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Offspring 2.9 2.5 3.5 2.3 
Other relatives 1.5 1.6 1.6 0.3 
Servants 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0 
Mean household size 5.9 5.7 6.6 4.3 
The mean household size for this sample is very similar to the mean household size 
calculated for Ramanagaram by other studies 
49 The lower household size among the 
Christians compared to Hindus and Muslims seems to be caused primarily by the lower 
number of other relatives in their households. This may be because members from the better- 
educated Christian community are able to migrate easily to other places elsewhere in India; 
and therefore the possible universe of `extra kin' resident locally who could be recruited as 
members of Christian households is lower than for the other two religious groups. There may 
also be a tendency towards more nuclear families within the Christian community because of 
its tendency to be the most educated of all the religious groups in Ramanagaram. 
Women were also asked `Who looks after the children when you are not at home? '. Their 
answers are shown in Table 6. 
48 Oppong, 1983: 547-589. 
49 For example, a study of urban infrastructure undertaken in 1995 has calculated that mean household 
size in Ramanagaram was 5.6. See the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Report, 1995. 
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Table 6: Role of the extended family in assisting with child-care, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Extended family member All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
assisting with child-care 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mother 34 16.9 15 13.5 14 18.7 5 33.3 
Mother-in-law 45 22.4 25 22.5 17 22.7 3 20.0 
Father 3 1.5 2 1.8 1 1.3 0 0.0 
Father-in-law 8 4.0 6 5.4 2 2.6 0 0.0 
Friend 6 3.0 5 4.5 1 1.3 0 0.0 
Husband's brother's wife 6 3.0 4 3.6 2 2.6 0 0.0 
Sister 5 2.5 2 1.8 2 2.6 1 6.7 
Sister-in-law 6 3.0 3 2.7 3 4.0 0 0.0 
Elder offspring 11 5.5 6 5.4 4 5.3 1 6.7 
Others 28 13.9 12 10.8 13 17.3 3 20.0 
Extended family not used 35 18.7 23 22.3 11 15.7 1 7.1 
Total 187 100 103 100 70 100 14 100 
Table 7: Breakdown of `others' assisting with child-care, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Breakdown of `others' All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
Aunt 1010 
Brother 1010 
Daughter 1010 
Daughter-in-law 4' 310 
Husband 6222 
Joint family 4040 
Kids work 1100 
Maid 1100 
Midwife 1010 
School 4310 
Servant 2101 
Work at home 2110 
Nearly 77% of the women interviewed had extended family helping with the child care, 
though not all these relations were actually coresident in the women's families. The most 
popular responses for the whole sample taken together were the woman's mother, her 
mother-in-law, elder offspring, and `others' (broken down in Table 7). The percentage 
relying on their own mothers varied a great deal among religious groups: lowest for Hindus 
(13.5%), higher for Muslims (18.7%) and very much higher for Christians (33.3%). By 
contrast, 22% of women interviewed listed their mothers-in-law as helpers with child care, 
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and this percentage was approximately the same for all religions. Clearly, members of the 
extended family, widely defined, helped substantially with child care. This variable is 
therefore included in the econometric models of fertility estimated below. It is measured as 
the number of female extended family members resident in the household. 
9. ReliRion 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the impact of religion on fertility can be direct, in the form of 
religious injunctions to refrain from contraception or to have certain numbers of children in 
order to continue the lineage, or indirect, in the form of religious norms about such matters as 
women's status (which may in turn affect fertility). 
The Ramanagaram questionnaire contained five questions which focused on the religious 
characteristics of the women and their families. First, the women were asked how faithfully 
they practised their religion. They were asked to respond on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 was 
`not at all', 2 was `not very much', 3 was `medium', 4 was `quite a bit', and 5 was `very 
much'. Their responses are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Faithfulness in practising religion. Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Rank All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % 14o. ' % No. % No. % 
Mean 3.8 3.2 4.6 4.1 
173.5 6 5.4 1 1.3 0 0.0 
2 23 11.4 21 18.9 1 1.3 1 6.7 
3 40 19.9 32 28.8 -56.7 3 20.0 
4 70 34.8 49 44.1 16 21.3 5 33.3 
5 61 30.3 3 2.7 52 69.3 6 40.0 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
Christians and Muslims rated themselves as being more `faithful' to their religion than the 
Hindus. The difference between the Muslims and Christians was not found to be significant, 
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at the 95% level, but the difference between the Hindus and Muslims and that between the 
Hindus and Christians was found to be highly significant. One might speculate that this is a 
spinoff of `minority group status' whereby members of a small religion are more assiduous in 
their faith to it. 
The women were then asked about the role of their local priest in their lives. First, they were 
asked `How much does it matter to you what the local priests think of you? '. Again they were 
asked to use a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 stood for `not at all' and 5 stood for `very much'. The 
responses are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Importance of the priest's opinion, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Rank All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mean 3.0 2.1 4.2 3.6 
1 40 19.9 33 29.7 4 5.3 3 20.0 
2 52 25.9 44 39.6 7 9.3 1 6.7 
3 26 12.9 20 18.0 5 6.7 1 6.7 
4 28 13.9 . 14 12.6 
"'- 10 13.3 4 26.7 
5 55 27.4 0 0.0 49 65.3 6 40.0 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
It appears that the Muslims and Christians were also more concerned with the opinions of 
their priests than the Hindus. The difference between Muslims and Christians was not found 
to be statistically significant, but the differences between Hindus and Muslims and between 
Hindus and Christians were found to be highly significant. 
The women were then asked if they would ask advice from the local priests about aspects of 
their lives. The responses to this question are shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Would you ask advice from your priest about aspects of your life? Ramanagaram 
sample (1996) 
Rank All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mean 3.1 2.2 4.2 3.6 
1 40 19.9 32 28.8 5 6.6 3 20.0 
2 50 24.8 43 38.7 6 8.0 1 6.7 
3 27 13.4 21 18.9 5 6.6 1 6.7 
4 28 -13.9 -- 15 - 13.5 9 12.0 4 26.6 
5 56 27.8 0 0.0 50 66.6 6 40.0 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
The difference in means was statistically insignificant at the 95% confidence level for the 
difference between Muslims and Christians, but it was significant for the differences between 
Hindus and Christians and between Hindus and Muslims. Thus, it appears that the Muslim 
and Christian priests exercised more influence over their communities than the Hindu priests, 
both in terms of the importance the women placed on their priests' opinions of them and in 
terms of whether they would ask advice from the priest about aspects of their daily lives. 
The Ramanagaram women were then asked how frequently they visited places of worship. 
Their responses are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11: Frequency of visits to places of worship, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Rank All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mean 2.8 3.2 2.1 3.9 
1 54 26.8 6 5.4 48 64.0 0 0.0 
2 28 13.9 25 22.5 1 1.3 2 13.3 
3 32 15.9 26 23.4 3 4.0 3 20.0 
4 75 37.3 51 45.9 19 25.3 5 33.3 
5 12 5.9 3 2.7 4 5.3 5 33.3 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
Christian women visited places of worship most frequently, followed by Hindu women and 
then, a long way behind, by Muslim women. The difference in means between all three 
groups was significant at the 95% confidence level. There were 37% of women in the sample 
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who said that they visited places of worship quite a bit, but also 27% who said that they did 
not visit places of worship at all. This was mainly because a large proportion of Muslim 
women (64%) were not allowed to go to the mosque in Ramanagaram because of purdah 
restrictions. 50 Thus, all communities seemed to believe in visiting places of worship, though a 
large percentage of the Muslim women were prevented from doing so by other norms. Even 
then, Muslim women who were not allowed to visit the mosque prayed simultaneously at 
home during prayer-time. Thus, the Muslim women's lower level of attendance at places of 
worship cannot be interpreted as indicating a lesser importance of religion in their lives. 
Finally, the women were asked if they interacted with neighbours who did not belong to their 
religion. The responses are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12: Frequency of interaction with other religions, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Rank All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mean 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 
1 78 38.8 51 45.9 32 42.6 5 33.3 
2 48 23.3 30 27.0 14 18.6 4 26.6 
3 29 14.4 14 12.6 13 17.3 2 13.3 
4 29 14.4 11 9.9 14 18.6 4 26.6 
5 16 7.9 5 4.5 1 1.3 0 0.0 
Don't know 1 0.5 0 0.0 1 1.3 0 0.0 
Total 201 100 111 100 75 100 15 100 
Although there were some exceptions, the religious groups did not mix very much socially in 
Ramanagaram. The lower proportions for the Muslims (62%) and Christians (60%) than for 
the Hindus (73%) is understandable, since the former were minorities in a predominantly 
Hindu region. But in the analysis, the differences between all three groups, Hindus and 
Muslims, Muslims and Christians and Hindus and Christians were not found to be significant 
so There were 27 Muslim women who rated their frequency of visits to places of worship as `medium' 
to `very much', even though none of them were actually allowed to go to the mosque (and, in fact, did 
not go there) for prayers. This question was often misinterpreted by Muslim women as referring to how 
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at the 95% level. What is striking is how little even the two `minority' religions interacted 
outside their own religious community. 
In summary, women in Ramanagaram appear to be religious, the Muslims and Christians 
more so than the Hindus. The opinions of the priests are important, but more so to Muslims 
and Christians, who would ask for advice pertaining to their lives, than for Hindus, who 
would not. All communities worshipped either at home or at places designated for worship, 
and interactions between those of different religions appears to be limited, though there were 
pockets where there were exceptions5' 
In order to test empirically the effect of the religion on fertility in the econometric analysis, 
the following measures of religion were used. Firstly, a dummy variable was defined that 
took a value of 1 if the respondent was Muslim and 0 if otherwise. Secondly, a dummy 
variable was defined which took the value 1 if the respondent was Hindu and 0 otherwise. 
The Christians were the base category. Thirdly, a dummy variable was defined which looked 
only at Hindu and Muslim respondents, leaving out the Christians, and took a value of 1 if 
the respondent was Muslim and 0 if the respondent was Hindu; because the Christians were 
excluded, the sample size was reduced to 173 ever-married women. Fourthly, a qualitative 
`index of piety' was created, which was calculated as each women's mean response to the 
five questions in the questionnaire relating to. her personal evaluation- of her religiosity 
(discussed above). 
frequently they prayed. Moreover, some Muslim women did visit the burial sites of saints or seers 
dar ha nearby which they considered as places of worship. 
St The women were also asked two questions about the religiosity of their offspring, although their 
responses are not reported here. These questions were `Are your children religious too and do they go 
to the temple/mosque/church/worship at home? ' and 'Do they practise religion to your satisfaction? ' 
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10. Marital consanguinity 
Marital consanguinity is also postulated as affecting fertility. However, we need to recognise 
two effects of consanguinity on fertility which work in opposite directions. First, there is the 
possibility of greater autonomy for the woman by marrying into the natal family, and thereby 
residing matrilocally; this would tend to reduce fertility. Second, there is the larger number of 
years of childbearing potential within marriage which may occur due to the woman's low age 
at marriage if she marries a relation who is much older than herself, such as a maternal uncle; 
this would tend to increase fertility. 
Consanguineous marriage is incorporated into the regression models estimated below in two 
ways. Firstly, we define a dummy variable for whether or not a woman had married a 
relation. Secondly, we use Bittles, Coble and Appaji Rao's statistical measure of the 
`coefficient of inbreeding'. 52 
11. Caste 
Among Hindus, caste is also postulated to affect fertility. In theory, the higher castes may be 
expected to have lower fertility, while the scheduled castes may be expected to have higher 
fertility. 3 The mechanism behind, this is postulated to. be the `culture' of various castes, 
which favour a high-fertility or low-fertility norm. Caste is incorporated into the regression 
models estimated for Hindus only in the form of two dummy variables: one which took the 
value of 1 if a woman belonged to a high caste and 0 otherwise; and one which took the value 
1 if the individual belonged to a scheduled caste and 0 otherwise. The category `low caste' 
was defined as the base category. 
52 Bittles, Cobles and Appaji Rao, 1993: 111-116. 
53 Although studies such as the Mysore Population Study found that high castes in Karnataka had higher 
fertility than others. See Mysore Population Study, 1961: 120-121. 
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12. Politics 
Politics, whether at the regional, state or national level, or more significantly, at the level of 
the village community, may be an important nonproximate influence on fertility. 54 This is 
particularly important if there are direct political or economic benefits to be obtained at the 
national level if a group has numerical strength. At the village level, as Srinivas argues, one 
of the main features of the `dominant caste' in village India is that in order to be `dominant' a 
caste has to be ritually high55, economically rich, and strong in numerical terms. This enables 
the caste to corner the gains from development, particularly in those local self-government 
institutions which are based on adult franchise. This was evident during my fieldwork in 
Ramanagaram, where one woman (a teacher in a local Urdu-medium school) mentioned that 
in the local elections, the main contest was invariably between candidates sponsored by the 
Gowdas (an upper-caste Hindu group) and the Muslims, both of which were economically 
rich and numerically preponderant groups in Ramanagaram taluk. Moreover, as is well- 
known, control over these political panchayati-rai institutions can immediately translate into 
economic gain for the concerned group. 56 This is especially true for the leaders of the groups 
at the top, because apart from the economic gain which is derived by all households, the 
political gain for the leaders who control the local government institutions can be enormous. 
Thus, politics both at the national level and at. the immediately visible level of the village 
community may also provide a powerful incentive for higher fertility. These mechanisms 
may lie behind any observed effect of religion or caste on fertility. No political variables are 
included in the regressions because religious membership does, in part, proxy membership of 
a group with political aspirations; the main political rivalry in Ramanagaram was between 
54 For more on this distinction see Srinivas, 1994. 
ss This refers to the position of the caste in the caste hierarchy. Srinivas argues that empirically, the 
dominant caste is one which is observed to be higher up the caste order. See Srinivas, 1994. 56 However, as Srinivas correctly argues, `Numbers are also important at the other end of the spectrum 
i. e. to resist being "steam-rollered" by the dominant castes'. See Srinivas, 1989: 141. 
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Muslims and Gowdas. Moreover, the structure of political institutions in Ramanagaram taluk, 
and the way in which these institutions were organised, did not vary significantly between 
Hindus and Muslims or across individuals - certainly not enough to warrant including 
political variables separately in the econometric models. 
II. The alternative: do we need an `ideational' theory of fertility? 
Ideational theories of fertility challenge the basic economic assumption of the `new 
household economics', that the changing balance between the costs and benefits of 
childbearing reduces the demand for children and is the key to the fertility transition. Cleland 
and Wilson, who have been the most important proponents of the ideational view, argue that 
even Easterlin's model which combined economic decision-making with social constraints is, 
in essence, a demand-side explanation because, `the idea that economic considerations of 
costs and benefits are of primary importance remains central'. 57 Cleland and Wilson argue 
that Caldwell's `intergenerational wealth-flows' theory, by contrast, which postulates that the 
fertility transition is caused by a reversal of the net flow of goods and services from children 
to older generations, is a theory of ideational change because the central idea behind. it is the 
`cultural transmission of the idea that the child-centred nuclear family, replaces the extended 
family system with its vested interest in high fertility'. 58 
Cleland and Wilson argue that findings showing a relationship between education for women 
and declining fertility is due to changing perceptions, ideas and aspirations rather than to 
changes in women's economic circumstances 59 They suggest also that changes in social 
norms and attitudes towards birth control may be the key factor which determine the timing 
57 Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 8; See also Cleland, 1993: 345-352. 
58 Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 8. 
S9 Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 25. 
264 
of the fertility transition, although they admit that `in the absence of direct evidence to 
support it, such a view is largely speculative. '60 
Cleland and Wilson argue that evidence for the importance of ideational theories is to be 
found in the case of historical European populations. In the case of 700 provinces in 
historical Europe, fertility began to decline in a short period of time, in 59% of the provinces 
between 1890 and 1920, and in 71% of the provinces between 1880 and 1930. Moreover, 
they argue that contraceptive use existed in pre-transition historical societies, especially in 
France, where from the 1780s family limitation was widespread. This view is also reflected 
in the findings of Knodel and van de Walle, who argue that economic development in 
European countries showed no association with the date at which significant fertility declines 
began, that the practice of family limitation was largely absent, and that cultural settings 
influenced the onset and spread of fertility declines independently of socio-economic 
conditions. 61 Lesthaeghe and Wilson argue that 'the inhabitants of `secularised' regions in 
Europe were the first to adopt fertility control, and that in Catholic regions, secularisation 
played a particularly important role in the fertility transition. 62 As Cleland and Wilson put it, 
in historical Europe, just as in the developing world today, the culture of 
sub-populations, loosely defined by religion, language or region, appears 
to exert a major influence on the timing of reproductive change, independently 
of levels of development, education or provision of family planning services 63 
It is necessary to examine this theory carefully, both because of its importance to the 
explanation of fertility decline, and because it epitomises the most divisive issue in 
demography between economics and other disciplines, namely, the way in which `culture' 
60 Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 25. 
61 Knodel and van de Walle, 1986. 
62 Lesthaeghe and Wilson, 1986. Secularisation refers to a decreasing belief in traditional religious 
constructs that deal with salvation, the soul, life after death etc. Secularisation is also associated with 
declining adherence to organised or institutional religion. 
63 Cleland and Wilson, 1987: 24. 
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affects demographic outcomes 6» Cleland and Wilson's argument that ideas and aspirations 
are vital in the fertility transition cannot be dismissed out of hand, but measuring these 
ideational changes, and distinguishing them from changes in behaviour for other reasons, 
appears to be extremely difficult. Moreover, the evidence from Europe has also been 
interpreted in a more socio-economic light by others, and the debate about the causes of the 
fertility transition in Europe is still unresolved 65 Finally, Thomas has refuted the argument 
that Caldwell's theory of wealth-flows is an ideational theory. Rather, he argues that 
reproductive behaviour in the Caldwell model is motivated directly by the expected gains 
from children, and indirectly by underlying social change. 6 However, these arguments must 
not be taken to imply that the present study is opposed to the ideational view of fertility. 
Rather, it is the view of the present study that the most important aspect of Cleland and 
Wilson's ideational theory, which has relevance for Karnataka and other parts of south India 
such as Tamil Nadu, is the hypothesis that ideational change about attitudes towards birth 
control may be important to the timing of the fertility transition. 67 
For example, it is hypothesised that one reason why contraceptive use is higher and fertility 
is lower in other south Indian states such as Tamil Nadu (which has achieved near- 
replacement levels of fertility) is because there is greater exposure to the mass media, a much 
higher proportion of mothers in these states receive antenatal care with much better use of 
maternal and child-health services . than 
in north India, and the percentage of girls aged 6-14 
attending school is high. 68 However, the most interesting outlier among the south Indian 
64 Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988: 1. 
65 Galloway, Hammel and Lee, 1994: 135-158. 
66 Thomas, 1993: 353-359. 
67 This is also suggested by Knodel and van de Walle, 1986; and also by Cotts Watkins, 1990: 241-272. 
68 Retherford and Ramesh, 1996: 2. However, there are also socio-economic characteristics which 
distinguish Tamil Nadu from north Indian states such as Uttar Pradesh. First, the percentage of females 
aged 6-14 attending school in Tamil Nadu is 79% compared with 48% in U. P.; the percentage of 
females aged 6 who are illiterate is 44% in Tamil Nadu compared with 69% for U. P.; the percentage of 
ever-married women who work outside their homes is much higher (47% in Tamil Nadu compared with 
13% in U. P. ); more households have electricity (64% in Tamil Nadu compared with 32% in U. P. ); and 
many more ever-married women are regularly exposed to the electronic mass media in Tamil Nadu 
(78% in Tamil Nadu compared with 35% in Uttar Pradesh). 
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states is Andhra Pradesh. This state has a very high proportion of females age 6 and over who 
are illiterate (62%) with only 55% of females aged 6-14 attending school. However, Andhra 
Pradesh has managed to achieve a total fertility rate of 2.2 mainly because 62% of its 
households receive electricity and 75% of ever-married women are exposed to the mass 
media. 69 This example is particularly important because it is an exception to the argument 
that high levels of education are a necessary precondition for achieving replacement-level 
fertility and may provide some empirical support for the influence of `ideational change' on 
fertility. 70 
Bongaarts and Watkins argue that theoretically there is an important link between `social 
interactions' and contemporary fertility transitions 71 According to them, the influence of 
social interactions is not limited to `the spread of. birth control techniques, or even to the 
spread of ideas about these techniques', but extends also `to ideational change more 
generally. '72 They emphasise that the effects of social- interactions on fertility are most 
evident in the personal networks of small communities. Finally, they argue that there are 
three aspects of social interactions which are relevant for fertility: first, that it involves the 
exchange of information and ideas; second, that it encapsulates the joint evaluation of their 
meaning in a context; and third, that it involves social influence constraining or encouraging 
action. 73 Perhaps the `ideal' model of fertility is then one which does not depend wholly, on 
the one hand, on diffusion of ideas, and changes. in aspirations or, on the. other. hand, on pure 
economic determinants, but on some combination of socio-economic influences and changes 
in attitudes towards birth control influenced by social interactions. In essence, what the 
present study argues is that a more realistic model of fertility is one encapsulating ideational 
69 Retherford and Ramesh, 1996. 
70 See also evidence from Bangladesh in Koenig et al, 1992: 352-364. 
71 Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996: 639-682. 
72 Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996: 657. 
73 Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996: 657. 
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change which is partly contingent on structural economic change and partially autonomous. 74 
The most important feature of this model is that, as opposed to a dichotomy between socio- 
economic theories and ideational theories, such a model sees no conflict between both 
operating simultaneously, but sees an important orchestrating role for social interactions, as 
observed in the experience of the transition to replacement levels of fertility in parts of south 
India. 
One of the major problems with ideational change is that it is hard to observe and measure. In 
the econometric analysis conducted later in this chapter, the age of the woman was used as a 
control variable in order to take into account the fact that some women who had been 
interviewed had not, as yet, completed their fertility. However, once all other socio-economic 
factors are controlled for, if fertility is observed to rise with a woman's age, this may also be 
a reflection of 'ideational change' in aspirations or norms concerning fertility over time. 
III. Children ever born in Ramanagaram 
In Chapter 1, trends in fertility and religious differences in fertility between Hindus, Muslims 
and Christians, were explored for India, Karnataka state and Bangalore rural district. To what 
extent does the Ramanagaram sample also reveal demographic differences between religious 
groups? Table 13 presents data on the number of children ever born for each religious group. 
This is the dependent variable used in the regression models presented in the next section of 
this chapter. 
74 This is the view of Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, which the present study concurs with. Their model of 
ideational change has two features: first, it is cohort and education driven; second, a period-cohort 
interaction is recognised which is used to capture ideational change. For more on this see, Lesthaeghe 
and Surkyn, 1988: 1-45. 
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Table 13: Number of children ever born, Ramanagaram sample (1996) 
Children ever born All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
0 13 7.0 8 7.8 4 5.7 1 7.1 
1 27 14.4 15 14.6 10 14.3 2 14.3 
2 45 24.1 29 28.2 -9 12.8 7 50.0 
3 38 20.3 27 26.2 10 14.3 1 7.1 
4 25 13.4 12 11.7 11 15.7 2 14.3 
5 18 9.6 6 5.8 11 15.7 1 7.1 
663.2 1 1.0 5 7.1 0 0.0 
7 11 5.9 5 4.9 6 8.6 0 0.0 
821.1 0 0.0 2 2.9 0 0.0 
921.1 0 0.0 2 2.9 0 0.0 
10 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
More than 10 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 187 100.0 103 100.0 70 100.0 14 100.0 
Mean 3.04 2.66 3.73 2.29 
Median 3.00 2.50 4.00 2.00 
Mode 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 
Maximum 9.00 7.00 9.00 5.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A majority of the women in the sample had either 2 or 3 children, although there were 15 
who had between 7 and 9 children. The modal value for the Muslims, at 4, was much higher 
than that for the Hindus and the Christians, at 2. The means also appeared to differ greatly, 
with Muslim women having 1.07 children more on average than the Hindus and 1.41 more 
on average than the Christians. While the difference between Hindus and Christians was not 
found to be significant at the 95% level, the differences in means between Hindus and 
Muslims and between Muslims and Christians were statistically significant. In the 
Ramanagaram sample, the Muslims have higher fertility than the Hindus and the Christians 
and this difference is nearly one child on average. As discussed in Chapter 1, this is 
consistent with the finding reported for Karnataka as a whole by the National Family Health 
Survey. 75 
75 National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka, 1995: 60-62. 
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These findings on number of children ever born essentially raise the following questions. 
First, what is the impact of religion on differences in the number of children ever born, once 
other factors are controlled for? -Is a certain number of children desired for their own sake, 
for religious reasons, or for other considerations such as family obligations or economic 
benefits accruing from children? Finally, how do other factors, such as the age of the woman, 
which may reflect the diffusion of ideas and changes in aspirations, affect the number of 
children ever born? 
IV. Regression models of the nonproximate determinants of fertility in Ramanagaram 
Of all the factors discussed in the introductory section, those which emerged as appropriate 
for inclusion in a model of the nonproximate determinants of fertility for the women in the 
Ramanagaram sample were the following: the education of the woman; the education of her 
husband; various measures of income; the occupation of the woman; that. of her husband; 
marital consanguinity; the presence of extended family in the household; the desire for a son; 
provisions of water and fuel infrastructure; differences in religion and caste; and the age of 
the woman. These factors were chosen on a number of grounds. First, information on them 
all could be obtained by means of intensive questioning of the women of Ramanagaram. 
Secondly, they are all factors which are not endogenously determined with fertility itself. 
Many studies of fertility incorrectly include factors which are endogenous to fertility as 
independent variables. 76 It is for this reason that the proximate determinants of fertility are 
not included here as explanatory variables. In all models estimated, the dependent variable 
was female fertility, measured as the total number of children ever born (CEB) to the woman. 
76 It is recognised that one can resolve the endogeneity of the proximate determinants issue by using 
simultaneous equation models to estimate fertility. However, given the range of nonproximate factors 
on which data was obtained, and the small size of the sample, OLS methods using the nonproximate 
determinants was regarded as preferable. 
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The analysis was conducted as follows. First, fourteen preliminary models were estimated 
which experimented with different measures of certain variables, in order to determine the 
`best' specification of the model. Then, using this `best' specification, an F-test was 
performed in order to find out whether the effect of the socio-economic and other 
determinants of fertility differed -significantly, 
for the sub-samples of the Hindus and the 
Muslims compared with the `pooled' model of Hindus and Muslims together. Finally, 
interaction terms between the explanatory variables and the Hindu and Muslim religion 
dummies were introduced into the general model in order to estimate a final model of 
fertility, incorporating slope effects as well as shift effects. 
The initial starting points of the fourteen preliminary multiple regression models estimated to 
explore alternative variable specifications are shown in Appendix A. 6.1 to this dissertation, 
and the results of these models are reported in Appendix A. 6.2. 
Regression 1 estimated a general model of fertility which incorporated the following thirteen 
explanatory variables: the total number of years of education of the woman, the total number 
of years of education of the husband, total expenditure, a dummy variable which took the 
value I if the woman had married a relation, a measure which took the number of the position 
of the first-born son in the birth-order, a religion dummy which took the value 1 if the woman 
was Muslim, another religion dummy which took the value 1 if the woman was Hindu (the 
Christians were kept as the base category), a dummy variable which took the value I if the 
woman had a primary occupation, a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the woman's 
husband was a farmer, a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the household used piped 
water from a tap in the home (as opposed to collecting water by hand), a dummy variable 
which took the value 1 if the household used gas or kerosene oil as the primary source of fuel 
(as opposed to collecting firewood), the total number of female extended family members 
resident in the household, and the age of the woman. 
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Regression 2 replaced the total number of years of education of the woman with her total 
number of years of primary education, her total number of years of secondary education and 
her total number of years of university education, and kept all other variables the same as in 
Regression 1. This was in order to see if primary education, secondary education, and 
university education exerted separate effects on fertility. In regression 3, the total number of 
years of husband's education was replaced with husband's years of primary education, years 
of secondary education and years of university education, in order to assess if they exerted 
separate effects on fertility. 
Regressions 4 and 5 explored the impact of alternative measures of income: model 4 used 
total food expenditure and model 5 used an index for the total number of items of consumer 
equipment owned by the household. 
In model 6, the consanguinity dummy variable was replaced by the coefficient of inbreeding, 
a statistical measure of consanguinity. 
Regressions 7 and 8 explored the impact of alternative measures of religion. In regression 7, 
an index of piety was used, which was calculated as the average of the woman's rating of her 
own religiosity on a scale of 1 to 5 in answer to five questions on religion in the 
questionnaire (as described in Section II. A. 1 in this chapter). In regression 8, a dummy 
variable which took a value 1 if the woman was Muslim and 0 if she was Hindu was used. 
This model excluded the Christians, reducing the sample size to N= 173. 
Regressions 9 and 10 explored the impact of different measures of women's occupation. 
Regression 9 used a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the woman was employed in a 
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skilled occupation, and regression 10 used a dummy variable which took the value 1 if she 
was employed in a silk-related occupation. 
Regressions 11 and 12 evaluated alternative measures of husband's occupation. Regression 
11 used a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the husband was employed in a skilled 
occupation, while regression 12 used a dummy variable which took the value 1 if the husband 
was employed in domestic industry. 
Regression 13 replaced the number of female extended family members with the total 
number of extended family members of both sexes, to explore the hypothesis that male 
family members might also help with child care or influence fertility in other ways. 
Finally, regression 14 explored the impact of alternative measures of caste. In this case, the 
sample size was restricted. to ever-married Hindus only (N = 103). Regression 14 used two 
dummy variables, one which took the value 1 if the woman belonged to a `high' caste, and 
the other which took the value 1 if the woman belonged to a `scheduled' caste. The `low' 
castes were retained as the base category. 
Of all the preliminary models estimated, models 12 and 13 emerged as the `best' models in 
terms of the proportion of the variation in fertility which they can explain. In models 12 and 
13, the factors which affected fertility were female university education, husband's primary 
and secondary education, position of first-born sons in the birth-order, the Muslim dummy 
variable, the Hindu dummy variable, whether or not the woman's husband was employed in 
domestic industry, the woman's age, and the number of extended family members resident in 
the household, measured either as the total of both sexes (in model 13) or as the number of 
females only (in model 12). 
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Model 12 had several interesting features. First, though husband's primary and secondary 
education were significant, the signs on the two coefficients were opposite. An additional 
year of primary education for the husband increased fertility by 0.15 children, while an 
additional year of secondary education decreased fertility by 0.23 children. Both the Hindu 
and Muslim dummies were significant and positive, indicating that both Hindus and Muslims 
had, on average, more children than the Christians, who form the base category. If a woman 
was Muslim she had 1.31 children more, on average, than if she were Christian. If a woman 
was Hindu, she had 0.95 children more, on average, than if she were Christian. The position 
of sons in the birth-order was also highly significant: controlling for other factors, if a woman 
had a son who was one position later in the birth-order she had 0.47 more children on 
average. If the husband was employed in domestic industry, he had 0.86 fewer children than 
if he was employed in other occupations. This model also highlighted a possible influence of 
`Marshallian atmospheric externalities' or `ideational change' in that even after controlling 
for the influence of other socio-economic factors, a woman's age had a significant positive 
influence on her fertility (although this may simply result from her having had a larger fertile 
lifespan in which to have children). The model explained 57% of the variation in children 
ever born. 
In most of these preliminary models, the Muslim and the Hindu dummy variables were-both 
significant and positive, with large coefficients, indicating that if the woman was Muslim (or 
Hindu), she was likely, on average, to have just over one child (or just about one child) more 
than if she were Christian. There were however two exceptions: in model 7 the impact of 
religion was tested using an index of piety rather than religious affiliation. In model 8, a 
dummy variable was used which distinguished between Hindus and Muslims only, excluding 
the Christians from the sample. The interesting feature of models 7 and 8 is that neither 
alternative measure of the religion variable was significant, when other socio-economic 
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characteristics were controlled for. This may be because the piety index in model 7 is acting 
as a proxy for Muslims and Christians (who on average rated themselves as more pious) 
versus the Hindus (who rated themselves as comparatively less pious). However, piety does 
not affect fertility, apparently, even if the religion in which you are pious (or not) does so. 
Moreover, the insignificance of the Hindu/Muslim religion dummy in model 8 indicates that 
there was no significant difference in the fertility level between Hindus and Muslims, after 
controlling for other socio-economic factors 77 
Finally, preliminary model 14 explored the impact of alternative measures of caste, 
restricting the sample size to 103 as this was relevant only to Hindus. In the resulting model, 
the factors which accounted for changes in children ever born among Hindus were the 
position of sons in the birth-order, the age of the woman, and whether or not the woman 
belonged to a high caste. The last variable indicated that if a woman belonged to a high caste, 
on average, she had 0.3 fewer children than if she belonged to a low or a scheduled caste. 
This suggests that there may be a `caste' culture which influences fertility even after the 
socio-economic characteristics of caste members are controlled for, and that high castes in 
this region are adopting a lower-family-size norm. The model explained 51% of the variation 
in children ever born among Hindu women in the sample. 
The next step in the analysis was to estimate the `best' specification (model 12) on sub- 
samples of Hindus and Muslims, and to compare these regressions with a `pooled' model 
estimated for Hindus and Muslims combined. This was done by using an F-test. The sub- 
sample regressions on Hindus and Muslims are reported in Tables 14 and 15, and the pooled 
model for Hindus and Muslims in Table 16. 
77 It must be emphasised that the Hindus are different to the Muslims in terms of the effect of religion 
on fertility, but this is shown later to be due to a slope effect rather than an 'intercept' effect. What 
model 8 shows is that there is no difference between Hindus and Muslims in terms of an 'intercept' or 
'pure religion' effect alone. 
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Table 14: OLS estimates of the determinants of children ever born, Hindus only (Ramanagaram, 
1996 
Dependent variable is CEB: the total number of children ever born to the woman 
Sample: 103 ever-married Hindu women 
Regressor 
Constant (CONST) 
Coefficient Standard T Ratio 
error [Prob. ] 
-0.473 0.514 - 0.920 [. 3601 
Woman's education 
Secondary education of woman (SEDU) -0.107 0.068 -1.570 [. 120] 
University education of woman (UEDU) -0.085 0.131 -0.648 [. 519] 
Husband's education 
Primary education of husband (PEDUSP) 0.076 0.084 0.905 [. 368] 
Secondary education of husband (SEDUSP) -0.086 0.086 -1.007 [. 317] 
Husband's occupation 
Husband employed in domestic industry (DOMINDU) -0.726 *** 0.269 -2.697 [. 008] 
Son preference 
Position of first-born son in the birth-order (SONPRF) 0.484 *** 0.132 3.656 [. 000] 
Female extended family 
Number of female extended family (FEXFAM) -0.002 0.079 -0.022 [. 982] 
Woman's age 
Woman's age (AGE) 0.090 *** 0.013 7.008 [. 000] 
Fuel infrastructure 
Household uses gas/kerosene for fuel (GASKERO) -0.044 0.355 -0.123 [. 902] 
R-Bar-Squared 0.594 
Residual sum of squares 110.930 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Table 15: OLS estimates of the determinants of children ever born, Muslims only 
(Ramanagaram, 1996) 
Dependent variable is CEB: the total number of children ever born to the woman 
Sample: 70 ever-married Muslim women 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T-Ratio [Prob] 
error 
Constant (CONST) -0.206 0.747 -0.275 [. 784] 
Woman's education 
Secondary education of woman (SEDU) -0.042 0.090 -0.462 [. 645] 
University education of woman (UEDU) -0.421 ** 0.182 -2.313 [. 0241 
Husband's education 
Primary education of husband (PEDUSP) 0.315 *** 0.097 3.247 [. 002] 
Secondary education of husband (SEDUSP) -0.259 *** 0.095 -2.725 [. 008] 
Husband's occupation 
Husband employed in domestic industry (DOMINDU) -1.208 ** 0.479 -2.525 [. 014] 
Son preference 
Position of first-born son in the birth-order (SONPRF) 0.275 * 0.151 1.826 [. 073] 
Female extended family 
Number of female extended family (FEXFAM) -0.721 *** 0.160 -4.495 [. 000] 
Woman's age ". 
Woman's age (AGE) 0.098 *** 0.016 -4.495 [. 000] 
Fuel infrastructure 
Household uses gas/kerosene for fuel (GASKERO) -0.789 * 0.445 -1.772 [. 081] 
R-Bar-Squared 0.656 
Residual sum of squares 125.754 
***=Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Table 16: OLS estimates of the determinants of children ever born, pooled model of Hindus 
and Muslims (Ramanagaram, 1996) 
Dependent variable is CEB: the total number of children ever born to the woman 
Sample: 173 ever-married Hindu and Muslim women 
Regressor 
Intercepts 
Hindu religion dummy (HINDU) 
Muslim religion dummy (MUSLIM) 
Coefficient Standard T Ratio 
error [Prob. ] 
-0.197 0.380 -0.519 [. 604] 
0.094 0.439 0.215 [. 830] 
Woman's education 
Secondary education of woman (SEDU) 
University education of woman (UEDU) 
Husband's education 
Primary education of husband (PEDUSP) 
Secondary education of husband (SEDUSP) 
Husband's occupation 
Husband is employed in domestic industry (DOMINDU) 
Son preference 
Position of first-born son in the birth-order (SONPRF) 
Female extended family 
Number of female extended family (FEXFAM) 
Woman's age 
Woman's age (AGE) 
Fuel infrastructure 
Household uses gas/kerosene for fuel (GASKERO) 
R-Bar-Squared 
Residual sum of squares 
-0.048 0.056 -0.866 [. 388] 
-0.228 ** 0.114 -2.008 [. 046] 
0.171 
-0.195 *** 
0.063 2.704 [. 008] 
0.064 -3.050 [. 003] 
-1.037 *** 0.250 -4.146 [. 000] 
0.394 *** 0.010 3.956 [. 0001 
-0.220 *** 0.077 -2.857 [. 005] 
0.090 *** 0.010 9.467 [. 000] 
-0.351 0.287 -1.222 [. 224] 
0.592 . 
279.971 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level 
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The null hypothesis was that the coefficients on all the explanatory variables for Hindus were 
equal to the coefficients on all the explanatory variables for Muslims. As in Chapter 4, the F- 
test is defined as: 
where: 
Hence: 
F (k, n-2k) = RSSRestricted _ RSSUnrestricted/ k 
RSSUnrestricted / n-2k 
RSSunrestacted = RSSMusGm + RSS"'ndu = 110.9295 + 125.7540 = 236.6835 
RSSRestricted = RSSPooled 
model 
= 279.9714 
n= number of observations = 173 
k= number of regressors in the restricted model = 12 
2k = number of regressors in the unrestricted model = 10 +10 20 
F= 279.9714 - 236.6835/12 = 2.332 
236.6835/173-20 
As the critical value of F(12,153) is 1.83, and the calculated F=2.332 > 1.83, the F-test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the explanatory variables are equal for 
Hindus and Muslims. This established that at least one socio-economic factor affects the 
number of children ever born differently for Hindus than it does for Muslims. It therefore 
seemed justified to go on to examine in detail the manner in which the various socio- 
economic factors exercise their influence on the fertility of Muslims, Hindus and Christians 
in Ramanagaram. 
This next stage of the analysis was conducted by introducing interaction factors 
(multiplicative dummy variables) into the fertility model. All the explanatory variables were 
interacted with the Hindu and Muslims religion dummies. The interactive variables were 
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I 
created using those variable specifications in the `best' fertility model (model 12) and 
interacting each explanatory variable with the Hindu and Muslim religion dummies, creating 
an initial starting model containing 47 explanatory variables. The model which resulted from 
the estimation of this starting-model is reported in Table 17. 
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Table 17: OLS estimates of the determinants of children ever born, all religions (Ramanagaram, 
199 
Dependent variable is CEB: the total number of children ever born to the woman 
Sample: 187 ever-married Hindu, Muslim and Christian women 
Base category: Christians 
Regressor Coefficient Standard T Ratio[Prob. 
error 
Intercepts 
Constant (CONST) 
Muslim religion dummy (MUSLIM) 
Hindu religion dummy (HINDU) 
Woman's education 
University education of woman (UEDU) 
University education of Muslim woman (MUEDU) 
University education of Hindu woman (HUEDU) 
Husband's education 
Husband's primary education (PEDUSP) 
Primary education of Muslim husbands (MPEDUSP) 
Primary education of Hindu husbands (HPEDUSP) 
Husband's secondary education (SEDUSP) 
Secondary education of Muslim husbands (MSEDUSP) 
Secondary education of Hindu husbands (HSEDUSP) 
Husband employed in domestic industry 
Husband in domestic industry (DOMIND) 
Muslim husband in domestic industry (MDOMIND) 
Hindu husband in domestic industry (HDOMIND) 
Son-preference 
Position of first-born son in the birth order (SONPRF) 
Position of first-born son for Muslims (MSONPRF) 
Position of first-born son for Hindus (HSONPRF) 
Fuel infrastructure 
Household uses gas/kerosene (GASKERO) 
Muslim household uses gas/kerosene (MGASKERO) 
Hindu household uses gas/kerosene (HGASKERO) 
Female extended family 
Female extended family resident (FEXFAM) 
Muslim female extended family. resident (MFEXFAM) 
Hindu female extended family, resident (HFEXFAM) 
Woman's age 
Woman's age (AGE) 
Muslim woman's age (MAGE) 
Hindus woman's age (HAGE) 
0.999 1.023 0.975 [. 3311 
-0.798 1.128 -0.707 [. 481] 
-1.762 1.122 -1.570 [. 118] 
-0.002 
-0.402 
-0.109 
*** 
0.039 -0.047 [. 962] 
0.084 -4.763 [. 000] 
0.104 -1.049 [. 296] 
-0.161 
0.488 
0.264 
-0.003 
-0.285 
-0.150 
** 
*** 
0.168 -0.957 [. 340] 
0.198 2.467 [. 015] 
0.185 1.429 [. 155] 
0.084 -0.034 [. 973] 
0.108 -2.638 [. 009] 
0.104 -1.439 [. 152] 
-0.781 0.479 -1.631 [. 105] 
-0.310 0.693 -0.447 [. 655] 
0.121 0.559 0.217 [. 828] 
1.130 
-0.809 
-0.590 
*** 
*** 
0.156 7.254 [. 000] 
0.213 -3.795 [. 000] 
0.204 -2.892 [. 004] 
0.086 0.326 0.264 [. 792] 
-0.746 * 0.422 -1.767 [. 079] 
-0.307 0.443 -0.694 [. 489] 
-0.014 0.087 -0.165 [. 869] 
-0.677 *** 0.149 -4.560 [. 000] 
0.013 0.025 0.521 [. 603] 
0.085 *** 0.029 2.949 [. 004] 
0.082 *** 0.029 2.840 [. 005] 
R-Bar-Squared 0.606 
*** = Significant at the 0.01 level; ** = Significant at the 0.05 level; *= Significant at the 0.10 level 
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The first significant variable was women's university education. Higher education is 
postulated as influencing fertility for several reasons: it may increase the opportunity costs of 
women's time; it may bring into operation the `quantity-quality' trade-off; university 
education encourages women to study later into their fertile lifespan which may directly 
delay marriage and childbearing; it may make women more effective users of family planning 
methods; and it may inculcate values incompatible with high fertility. University education 
was significant at the 0.01 level for Muslims, but not at all significant for Hindus and 
Christians. Neither secondary nor primary education was significant for any religious group. 
According to the model, a one-year increase in university education decreased Muslim 
women's fertility by 0.40 children. Three hypotheses were tested in relation to university 
education. First, a Wald test rejected the restriction that the coefficient on HUEDU equalled 
the coefficient on MUEDU, implying that the effect of university education on fertility was 
significantly different for Muslims than for Hindus. Second, a Wald test accepted the 
restriction that the coefficient on UEDU equalled the coefficient on UEDU+HUEDU, 
implying that the effect of university education on fertility for Christians was similar to that 
for Hindus. Third, a Wald test rejected the restriction that the coefficient on UEDU equalled 
that on UEDU+MUEDU, implying that the effect of university education on fertility differed 
between Christians and Muslims. 
The next significant variable was husband's primary education. If a Muslim man had an 
additional year of primary education this increased his wife's fertility by 0.33 children. 
Husband's primary education was not significant for Hindus and Christians. Three 
hypotheses were tested for this set of variables. First, a Wald test accepted the restriction that 
the coefficient on HPEDUSP equals the coefficient on MPEDUSP, indicating that there is no 
significant difference in the effect of husband's education on the fertility of Muslims and 
Hindus. Second, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on PEDUSP equals 
the coefficient on PEDUSP+HPEDUSP, implying that the effect of husband's primary 
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education on children ever born for Christians is similar to its effect for Hindus. Third, a 
Wald test rejected the restriction that the coefficient on PEDUSP equals the coefficient on 
PEDUSP+MPEDUSP, implying that the effect of husband's primary education on fertility 
differed between Christians and Muslims. 
Husband's secondary education decreased fertility significantly for Muslims, but had no 
effect for Hindus and Christians. This may be because Muslim men who have attended 
secondary school prefer wives who are more educated, or they too prefer better `quality' 
children to a higher `quantity'. Three hypotheses were tested in relation to this variable. First, 
a Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on HSEDUSP equalled the coefficient 
on MSEDUSP, implying that the effect of husband's secondary education on Hindu fertility 
was not significantly different from its effect on Muslim fertility. Second, a Wald test 
accepted the restriction that the coefficient on SEDUSP equals the coefficient on 
SEDUSP+HSEDUSP, implying that the effect of husband's secondary education on Christian 
fertility is not significantly different from its effect on Hindu fertility. Third, a Wald test 
rejected the restriction that the coefficient on SEDUSP equals the coefficient on 
SEDUSP+MSEDUSP, implying that the effect of husband's secondary education on fertility 
significantly differed between Christians and Muslims. 
The next significant variable was whether the husband was employed in domestic industry. 
This variable was not significant for Hindus, Muslims or Christians. However, an F-test 
testing the joint restriction that the coefficient on all three variables was not significantly 
different from zero was rejected, implying that these variables had to be retained in the 
model. Hypothesis-testing with these three variables also showed that their effects on fertility 
were not significantly different from each other. This result is probably because of a high 
degree of multicollinearity between these regressors, which makes them individually 
insignificant, but very significant overall. 
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The next significant variable measured son-preference through the position of the first-born 
son in the birth-order. This variable was significant for Hindus, Muslims and Christians at the 
0.01 level, implying that son-preference may be captured in a `pure demographic accident' 
variable affecting fertility. If a Hindu woman had a son who was one place later in the birth- 
order, this raised her fertility by 0.32 children; if a Muslim woman had a son who was one 
place later in the birth-order this raised her fertility by 0.54 children; and if she was Christian 
this raised her fertility by 1.13 children. Three hypotheses were tested in relation to this 
variable. First, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the coefficient on HSONPRF was not 
significantly different from the coefficient on MSONPRF, implying that son-preference had 
similar effects on Hindus and Muslim fertility. Analogous tests established that the position 
of the first-born son affected fertility among Christians significantly differently from its 
effect among Hindus and Muslims. 
The next variable to affect fertility was women's age, which was significant for both Hindus 
and Muslims at the 0.01 level, but not significant for the Christians. Three hypotheses were 
tested in relation to this variable. First, a Wald test accepted the restriction that the 
coefficient on HAGE was not significantly different from the coefficient on MAGE, implying 
that the effect of woman's age on children ever born was not significantly different for 
Hindus than for Muslims. Analogous tests established that the effect of woman's age on 
fertility was significantly different for Christians from its effect for either Hindus or 
Muslims. 
The next variable to affect fertility was the presence in the household of resident female 
extended family. As argued earlier, one reason why this variable was used was that it is 
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highly correlated with total household size and was used as a proxy for it. 78 This variable had 
no significant influence on the fertility of Hindus and Christians, but if a Muslim woman had 
one additional female family member, this decreased her fertility by 0.69 children, an effect 
significant at the 0.01 level. Though this finding may appear counter-intuitive, given that 
female extended family members are postulated as reducing the time-costs to parents of 
having children by taking over some of the child care responsibilities, this suggests perhaps 
the influence of other women encouraging family planning (as we saw in the qualitative 
evidence in Chapter 5). Alternatively, it may reflect greater monitoring of couples' 
observance of abstinence norms in households containing extended family members. 
Moreover, extended family members may substitute for children either spatially or as 
productive members of the family labour force. A Wald test rejected the restriction that the 
coefficient on FEXFAM was equal to the coefficient on MFEXFAM, implying that the effect 
of female extended family on the fertility of Muslim households was significantly different 
from their effect on the fertility of Hindu and Christian households. 9 
The next variable influencing fertility was the availability of fuel infrastructure. This variable 
was not significant for Hindus and Christians, but a Muslim household had 0.66 fewer 
children if it used gas or kerosene rather than firewood as a primary source for fuel. Three 
hypotheses were tested in relation to this variable. First, a Wald test accepted the restriction 
that the coefficient on HGASKERO equals the coefficient on MGASKERO, implying that 
the effect of using gas or kerosene for fuel on fertility was not significantly different for 
Hindus and Muslims. Analogous tests established that the effect of using gas or kerosene as a 
78 It may be recollected that this was done in order to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient on the 
total-expenditure variable i. e. it was necessary to control for the fact that some families had higher 
expenditure not because they were richer but because they had more members living in the household. 
As total household size could not be used in the model because it is endogenously determined with total 
fertility, the female-extended-family variable was used instead, because it was highly correlated with 
total household size. 
79 It may be recollected that HFEXFAM could not be included in this model due to perfect collinearity 
with the other regressors. Hence, it is not possible to test the equality of MFEXFAM = HFEXFAM 
separately. 
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primary source of fuel does not have significantly different effects on fertility between 
Christians and Hindus, and between Christians and Muslims. 
Finally, we must consider the intercept terms. None of the intercept terms were significant. 
Three hypotheses were tested: first, whether the coefficient on CONST equals the coefficient 
on CONST+MUSLIM; second, whether the coefficient on CONST equals the coefficient on 
CONST+HINDU; and third, whether the coefficient on MUSLIM equals the coefficient on 
HINDU. All three hypotheses were accepted, implying that religious affiliation alone does 
not exert a separate effect on the fertility of the three religious groups. 
The findings from the interaction model support the conclusion that differences in fertility 
among religious groups are not due to religion alone. Rather, they are caused by differences 
in socio-economic and other characteristics of individual members of different religions, and 
by differences in the way members of different religions respond demographically to certain 
socio-economic and other influences. Thus, the conclusion from both the preliminary models 
and the interaction model is that the causes of religious differentials in fertility are more to be 
found in the background socio-economic characteristics of members of different religious 
groups, and in their patterns of response to changes in these characteristics, than in religion 
by itself. 
V. Conclusion 
For many decades now, in both theoretical models and empirical studies, economists, 
demographers and anthropologists have been concerned with explaining fertility trends in 
India. For the most part, these empirical analyses of fertility have taken the form either of 
large sample surveys or of microdemographic investigations in localised areas. This chapter 
has adopted the second approach. It has attempted to assess the influence of the 
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nonproximate developmental factors that affect fertility, using a sample of 201 households 
from Ramanagaram taluk in Karnataka in south India from which information was collected 
on a very wide variety of variables. What light do the findings from the Ramanagaram 
sample shed on the various economic, social and religious factors which have been 
hypothesised to influence fertility theoretically, and which were discussed earlier in this 
chapter? 
Let us turn our attention first to the factors which did not turn out to be significant predictors 
of fertility. The first factor considered is the occupation of the woman. Although this was 
significant in some of the preliminary models, it was insignificant in the final interaction 
model. In this study, woman's occupation was measured in three ways. The first measure was 
whether or not the woman had a primary occupation. Theoretically, we expect that if a 
woman is not a housewife, but has an occupation, her fertility is lower. This variable was not 
significant for Hindus, Muslims or Christians. 
The second way in which women's occupation was measured was whether or not the woman 
had a skilled occupation. In particular, if a woman is employed in a skilled occupation, she 
may have lower fertility because of the higher opportunity costs of bearing and rearing 
children due to the availability of better economic opportunities outside the home. This 
variable, however, was not significant for Hindus, Muslims or Christians. 
The third way in which this variable was measured was whether or not the woman had a silk- 
related occupation. If a woman performs a silk-related occupation, her fertility may be higher 
because many of the silk-related processes (such as silk-rearing, cocoon-boiling, silk-reeling 
and filature work) required a continuous supply of child labour. Thus, if a woman was in a 
silk-related occupation, she may have had higher fertility because of the increased demand 
ý 
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for child labour. However, even this measure of women's occupation was not significant 
either for Hindus, Muslims or Christians in the interaction model. 
There may be several reasons why none of the measures of women's occupation were 
significant predictors of fertility. Firstly, this variable may have been highly correlated with 
income, education or other indicators of women's status. Secondly, as argued in section I. B. 3, 
it is hypothesised that women's occupation affects fertility only if women are working in the 
urban sector, in the modern labour force. As argued in Chapter 2, although Ramanagaram 
was classified as a `town', the environment in which women lived and worked was still very 
`rural'. Moreover, the silk industry, in which so many of the Ramanagaram women worked is 
still entirely a cottage-based industry. These may be the reasons we do not observe women's 
occupation (measured in any way) to have a significant effect on fertility: the available work 
for women in Ramanagaram is still too compatible with childrearing, and in this respect 
varies too little across women, to exert any effect on their fertility decisions. 
Income is a second factor often hypothesised to affect fertility. The argument usually goes 
that as income rises, initially it increases fertility and then later reduces it. This latter effect is 
because as incomes rise, the price of children increases relative to the price of other goods, 
due to the operation of various substitution effects, which increase the opportunity costs of 
parent's time, with the operation of. the 'quantity-quality' trade-off, and with better access to 
substitutes for `child services' such as insurance and welfare. In the present study, income 
was measured in three different ways: as total expenditure, as total foodgrains expenditure, 
and through an index of the ownership of items of consumer equipment. In no model was any 
of the income measures a significant determinant of fertility. This suggests either that income 
does not exercise an impact on fertility, or that a pure 'income effect' on fertility is 
completely outweighed by various other 'substitution effects' in our models. This finding is 
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surprising in the light of other fertility studies, and given the wide range of variation in 
income in the Ramanagaram sample. 1 
The next factor that was found to exert no influence on fertility was marital consanguinity. 
Theoretically, it has been postulated that fertility should be higher in consanguineous 
marriages than in marriages where partners are unrelated, mainly because of the initial low 
age at marriage for women and large age differences between spouses in consanguineous 
unions. Women in consanguineous unions are also postulated to have more children in order 
to have more sons to keep property within the family. On the other hand, consanguineous 
marriages may lead to lower fertility because of greater female autonomy arising from the 
fact that wives stay near their families of origin. In the present study, consanguinity was 
measured using a dummy variable and the coefficient of inbreeding. The theoretical 
expectation of higher fertility in consanguineous unions was not confirmed in the `best' 
preliminary fertility model (model 12) nor in the interaction model. 
The next factor which was not significant was some measures of husband's occupation. Some 
occupations for men are supposed to increase a couple's fertility (farming, domestic 
industry), others to decrease it (skilled occupations). Theoretically, we expect fertility to be 
higher if the husband is employed in farming or domestic industry because of greater demand 
for child labour, and we expect fertility to be lower if the husband is employed. in a skilled 
occupation because a man who is employed in a skilled occupation may prefer a wife who is 
also employed in a skilled occupation, is better educated, or is older. In the models presented 
here, neither skilled nor farming occupations for husbands significantly affected fertility. The 
fact that the farming-occupation variable was insignificant implies that fertility was not 
affected specifically by an increased demand for child labour in agriculture, probably because 
many occupations in cottage or small-scale industry in Ramanagaram also used child labour. 
Secondly, the insignificance of the skilled-occupation variable may be because this variable 
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is highly correlated with men's secondary education, which (as we shall see below) exerted a 
negative effect on fertility. Domestic industry did have to be retained in the interaction model 
because an F-test which performed a joint test of zero restrictions on the coefficients of the 
domestic industry variables was rejected at the 0.05 level. However, this variable did not 
have a significant t-ratio for any religious group. Hypothesis-testing also showed that the 
effect of domestic industry on fertility was not significantly different between Hindus, 
Muslims and Christians. In combination, this implies that husband's employment in domestic 
industry does affect fertility overall, and in a negative direction, but that it is difficult 
econometrically to isolate its effect on fertility for individual religious groups. 
Let us now turn our attention to those factors which emerged as significant nonproximate 
determinants of fertility. The first factor is the education of the woman. Theoretically, this 
variable is hypothesised to lower fertility because it may delay marriage, because women 
acquire better knowledge of contraception, and because women with education have healthier 
babies with lower child mortality. Women with education are also more likely to be 
employed, which may be incompatible with child rearing because it increases the opportunity 
costs of women's time. Education is also very important from the perspective of population 
policy because recent studies have argued that in other developing countries, such as in 
Kenya, the apparent success of the country's population policy has been largely, attributable 
to the success of its education policyjn increasing primary and secondary school enrolment, 
particularly for girls. In that country, the total fertility rate fell from 8.1 in 1978 to 5.4 in 
1993, mainly because total primary school enrolment has remained above 90% since the mid- 
1970s. 80 However, it is important to note, as Jeffery and Jeffery argue, that girls' schooling 
can only lead to lower fertility when class, community and gender politics are changed in 
order to make female empowerment possible. They argue that education alone may not lead 
80 Ajayi and Kekovole, 1998: 113-156. 
1 
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to decreased fertility, unless the structural contexts in which women find themselves are also 
taken into accounts' 
The relationship between more education and lower. fertility is particularly supposed to hold 
for secondary and university education. Women's education was measured in the 
Ramanagaram sample as the total number of years of education, and then broken down into 
the total number of years of primary education, secondary education and university 
education. In the models presented here, female university education emerged as one of the 
most important variables influencing fertility, at least for Muslim women. 
The importance of university education, particularly in the interaction model, suggests that in 
Ramanagaram education affects women's abilities to make decisions about fertility only at 
higher educational levels. It may be that higher education significantly influences women's 
status in the household, relative to other family. members, by enabling women to make 
independent decisions, such as decisions about contraception. Higher education may also be 
increasing the opportunity costs of women's time, and by motivating and enabling mothers to 
produce fewer but better `quality' children, because each child is now more costly to raise. 
Or it may be the case that the aspirations and values which education can convey, which are 
incompatible with high fertility, are only transmitted in high school and university. 
While university education decreased the fertility of Muslims, it had no significant effect on 
the fertility of the Hindus and the Christians. Moreover, there was a difference in the effect 
of husband's university education on Muslim fertility compared to Hindu fertility; and also 
between Muslim fertility and Christian fertility. One reason why Muslims in Ramanagaram 
may be so much more susceptible to university education than the Hindus and the Christians 
may be that Muslim women were the least likely of all the three religious groups to go on to 
81 Jeffery and Jeffery, 1997: 255-256. 
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university. Hence, at the margin, an additional year of university education may affect them 
more. Another reason may be that there was only one Arts College in the town which women 
of all religions attended. However at the level of school, while Muslim girls mainly attended 
the Urdu schools, Christian and Hindu girls attended the Anganwadi and other primary state 
schools, where information about family planning, at least at the secondary school level, was 
regularly imparted. Hence, perhaps Muslim girls were more affected by an additional year of 
university education because the interaction with women of all religions at university had a 
larger impact on their own views about fertility and small family norms. It should also be 
remarked that no measure of women's education appears to affect the fertility of Hindus and 
Christians, which is a very surprising finding, especially given the importance of this variable 
in so many studies of fertility in other societies. One possible reason for this is given that 
women's education and husband's education are highly correlated, for Hindus and Christians 
husband's secondary education is picking up the effect of education on fertility (as discussed 
below). 
Husband's education is also postulated to influence fertility, either in a negative or in a 
positive direction, depending upon the level of the income of the husband, and the relative 
difference between husband's income and wife's income. If the husband has greater 
education, this is hypothesised to increase the opportunity cost of women's time, resulting in 
the desire for fewer, but better-'quality' children. On the other hand, if a husband who is 
highly-educated prefers a wife who is also highly educated or has a skilled job, then this 
would reduce fertility. An alternative view is that husband's education increases fertility if 
the husband is educated and employed and believes that he can afford to support a wife and 
family earlier. This may then give rise to higher fertility by lowering both women and men's 
age at marriage. 
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In the models estimated for Ramanagaram, husband's primary education exercised a 
significant positive influence on fertility only for Muslims. This variable was not significant 
for Hindus and Christians. However, Wald tests established that the effect of husband's 
primary education was not significantly different for Muslims compared with Hindus, even 
though it was significantly different from its effect for the Christians. The fact that for 
Muslims, husband's primary education exercises a positive role on fertility implies that at 
least for this religious community, a few years of education alone do not reduce men's 
demand for children, nor does it necessarily mean that Muslim men marry `likes' in the 
marriage market. Nor, perhaps, does education influence Muslim men's ideas about using 
contraception. A few years of education do not also make Muslim men want to favour child- 
quality over child-quantity. However, if a Muslim man is educated beyond this level (as 
explored below), his education does exercise the expected negative effect on fertility, as it 
does for Hindu and Christian men likewise. 
For all three religions, husband's secondary education exercised a significant and negative 
influence on fertility. This suggests that an increase in husband's secondary education may 
be increasing the opportunity costs of both parents' time, resulting in fewer, but better-quality 
children, or that educated husbands marry 'likes' and that therefore, both husband and wife 
hold low-fertility norms. Further, Wald tests established that the effect of husband's 
secondary education was significantly different between Christians and Muslims, though not 
between Hindus and Muslims nor between Hindus and Christians. Thus, while husband's 
secondary education does affect fertility, it affects it significantly more for Muslims than for 
Christians. Perhaps one reason for this finding is that Christian women in Ramanagaram had 
greater autonomy than Muslim women. Hence, the influence of Christian men on couples' 
decisions is not as great as in Muslim households, where the men's decisons about fertility 
may be very important and even override those of the women. This difference in autonomy 
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may well be what is being expressed in the greater significance of the husband's-secondary- 
education variable for Muslim households. 
The next factor we consider is the position of the first-born son in the birth order. This 
variable in essence measured whether a pure demographic `accident' - how long it took to get 
a son - could have an impact on total fertility. This factor was very significant and positive in 
all of the preliminary models. It was also positive and significant, at the 0.01 level, for all 
three religious groups in the interaction model. We can conclude, therefore, that how soon 
the couple succeeds in having a son strongly influences total children ever born -in 
Ramanagaram, after controlling for the influence of other possible determinants. This is 
consistent with other evidence, both from the Ramanagaram questionnaire and for India more 
generally, that parents expect to derive considerable benefits from sons in the form of old age 
care, and possibly also in the form of contributions to family income earlier in life. Even 
though the position of the son in the birth-order was significant for all three religious groups, 
Wald tests established that this effect was different between Hindus and Christians and 
between Muslims and Christians, though not between Hindus and Muslims. The difference 
was expressed mainly in the value of the coefficient on the son-preference variable, which 
was much higher for Christians than for Muslims and Hindus. Though it is not possible to 
make generalisations because the sample size of Christians is small, greater son-preference 
among the Christians may be_ because the _ 
Christian, community ill, Ramanagaram are 
originally migrants from Tamil Nadu, and their minority status in Karnataka relative to both 
Hindus and Muslims (since they make up only 2% of the population in the taluk may make 
them depend more on sons for insurance cover. 
The next significant variable was the presence of extended family members in the household. 
This variable was used for two reasons. First, it was used as a proxy for total household size 
with which it is highly correlated. This was done so as to control for those households which 
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had higher total expenditure not because they are richer, but because they have more 
members. Second, it is often hypothesised that the presence of extended family significantly 
reduces the costs of childrearing for parents, increasing fertility because parents only bear a 
portion of the costs of childbearing. Alternatively, extended family may reduce fertility if 
there is a lack of privacy, and if traditional taboos on sexual intercourse are observed at 
certain times due to strict monitoring by the extended family. 
What was particularly interesting about this variable in the interaction model was that 
(counter to theory) it had a negative coefficient, at least for Muslims. That is, if a Muslim 
household had one extra female family member, this reduced the number of children ever 
born by 0.69. This runs totally counter to existing theories about the effects of the extended 
family system increasing fertility. Instead, among Ramanagaram Muslims resident family 
. seems to reduce fertility. There are several possible reasons for this. First, the presence of 
extended family may lead to residential crowding, reducing living space for new offspring. 
Second, the direction of causation may in fact be the opposite: exogenous reproductive 
problems may have resulted in reduced fertility, creating more living space and labour 
demand, thereby encouraging coresident extended family. Third, the presence of the extended 
family may result in surveillance of the couple's sex lives, particularly in the case of post- 
partum taboos leading to reduced fertility. Fourth, exogenous availability of extended family 
may have increased household labour supply, substituting for children and contributing to 
lower fertility. Fifth, it may be that because the concept of a child-centred nuclear family is 
replacing the notion of the extended family, this results in lower fertility. Finally, female 
extended family may be directly encouraging lower fertility through the mechanism 
discussed in Chapter 5 where qualitative information from the Ramanagaram interviews 
showed that women consulted with female extended family members on issues which related 
to contraception, and mothers-in-law positively encouraged daughters-in-law to have 
sterilisation operations after a certain number of children had been born. Examining 
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differences by religion, the effect of female extended family for Muslim households was 
significantly different from the effects on Hindu and Christian households, for whom this 
variable was not significant. Perhaps one reason why female extended family resident was 
more important for Muslim households was because of up rdah restrictions, which limited 
Muslim women's mobility, resulting in their greater dependence on female extended family 
and consequently, greater monitoring of Muslim women's fertility behaviour. 
The age of the woman was included in the model for two reasons. The first was that it acted 
as a control variable, because many younger women may not have completed their fertility at 
the time of survey. Secondly, it acted as a measure of `ideational change' over time, based on 
the hypothesis that the social equilibrium with regard to fertility depends on `strategic 
complementarities' in decision-making by individuals, and the history of the social system. 
The effect of woman's age on fertility was very significant and positive both in the 
preliminary -models and in the interaction model. Although this was probably because the 
older women in the sample had had more time to have more children, it may also be 
reflecting the same set of influences we observed with the negative relationship between 
woman's age and her age at marriage, i. e. of changes over time in norms and ideas about 
fertility. Examining differences by religion, this variable was significant for Hindus and 
Muslims, but not for Christians; the size of the effect did not differ significantly between 
Hindus and Muslims. Perhaps. one, rtason why this variable did not, affect the Christians as 
much as it Hindus and Muslims may be because older Christian women in Ramanagaram 
have greater autonomy and have experienced a change in norms about lower fertility within 
their community earlier than women of the other two religious groups, whether through the 
influence of radio and television or through the influence of the meetings on women's issues 
which took place at their local church on Sundays. 
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The next factor we consider is water and fuel infrastructure. It has been hypothesised that a 
major reason for rural households to have many children is to help with collecting water and 
fuel. In the preliminary models, no infrastructure variable exerted any significant influence 
on actual fertility. However, in the interaction model, if the household used gas or kerosene 
for fuel, this had a significant and negative effect on fertility, although only for Muslim 
households. One reason for this finding may be that Muslim households did not use 
daughters at all for collecting fuel because of up rdah restrictions, but did use sons. This may 
have increased the demand for sons, and hence fertility, for those Muslim households which 
were dependent on firewood for fuel, and consequently decreased fertility for those Muslim 
households which used alternative sources of fuel such as gas or kerosene. This is consistent 
with the results of the detailed analysis of water and fuel provision in the Ramanagaram 
sample of households, which found that children were indeed among the primary collectors 
of water and fuel, and that these tasks were immensely time-consuming. However, the fact 
that this variable was significant for one religious. group only, and that Wald tests showed 
this result not to be significantly different between religions, cast some doubt on its 
importance. One explanation may be that parents are simultaneously making decisions about 
a number of matters, such as the number of children to have and/or whether to use firewood 
or kerosene for fuel, and in these models we only observe the outcome. Another possible 
explanation is that access to piped water or gas may be highly correlated with other 
regressors such as educational statuss. occupations of both men and women, and income, and 
these regressors may be picking up the effect of some of the infrastructure variables. 
The last variable which significantly affected fertility was caste among Hindus. 
Theoretically, we expect that some caste groups may have higher fertility than others due to 
the operation of the effects of a particular `caste culture' or the desire of some castes to be 
numerically 'dominant'; this reasoning has been applied specifically to the scheduled castes. 
However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the Mysore Population Study of 1961 found the 
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contrary, namely that the fertility of the non-backward castes was higher than that of the 
scheduled and backward castes. This could not be tested in the interaction model because the 
caste variable applied only to Hindus. However, in model 14 the high-caste variable was a 
significant determinant of fertility, suggesting that even after we take into account socio- 
economic differences between members of various castes, the influence of caste membership 
is important in explaining differences in fertility among Hindus. However, in contrast to the 
1961 findings, those women who belonged to a higher caste in Ramanagaram have 0.3 fewer 
children than those who belonged to low or scheduled castes. The findings from 
Ramanagaram suggest that higher castes have progressed further through a transition from 
higher fertility to lower fertility than have backward and scheduled castes in the region. The 
influence of caste may also illustrate the operation of atmospheric externalities which 
influence fertility irrespective of socio-economic context, as it holds even when variables 
such as education and income are controlled for. 
Finally, we consider whether the religion of the respondent affects fertility independently of 
any differences in socio-economic characteristics across religious groups. Theoretically, 
adherence to some set of religious beliefs is hypothesised to affect fertility either directly (in 
terms of its normative precepts) or indirectly (in terms of other characteristics associated with 
it). In Chapter 1, we explored the theories postulating an impact of religion on fertility in 
considerable detail. In the analysis of fertility in Ramanagaram, religion was measured in 
terms of Hindu and Muslim dummy variables and an index of piety. In all but two of the 
preliminary models, the religion measures were significant. The two models in which the 
religion measures were not significant were model 7 which used the index of piety; and 
model 8 which excluded the Christians. By way of illustration, in model 12, a woman was 
likely to have 1.31 children more if she were Muslim than if she were Christian, and 0.95 
children more if she were Hindu than if she were Christian, after controlling for other 
possible determinants. However, there was no significant difference in fertility level between 
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Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, in the interaction model we saw that the effect of religion 
on fertility is not significantly different between Hindus, Muslims and Christians, as 
evidenced in the acceptance of the hypotheses that the intercept terms for the three religious 
groups were not significantly different from each other. The demographic differences 
between religious groups in Ramanagaram are expressed more in terms of significant 
differences in the effects of various socio-economic factors which influence fertility in this 
society, not in religious affiliation by itself. 
In summary, what can we say about Hindu-Muslim fertility in Ramanagaram? The 
preliminary regression models presented in this chapter concluded that both Hindus and 
Muslims have high fertility when compared with the Christians. The difference of one child 
in the mean level of fertility between Hindus and Muslims, which we observed in Chapter 3, 
disappears once we have controlled for the influence of other socio-economic factors. The 
results from the interaction model suggest that rather than religion, demographic divergences 
were actually related to other socio-economic characteristics such as education, age, 
infrastructure, son-preference, female extended family and (among Hindus) caste, and 
differences in how members of different religions respond demographically. to these socio- 
economic influences. This finding is consistent with the more general theoretical observation 
made in Chapter 1 that there is little theological difference between Hinduism and Islam with 
regard to matters relating to demographic behaviour, except in their positions on birth 
control. These findings are also consistent with those from the analyses of age at marriage 
and contraceptive use, which also found that religion does not exert a pure `theological' 
impact after controlling for other socio-economic factors. 
However, this conclusion may have to be qualified by taking into account that the Muslim 
community in Ramanagaram taluk is economically richer and more urbanised than Muslim 
communities elsewhere in India. This might explain the closeness of Hindu and Muslim 
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demographic characteristics in this region. It may also explain the non-significance of the 
expenditure variable because Muslim/Hindu membership may, in part, be proxying for it. 
However, this caveat does lend strong support to the more general issue raised by the present 
study, namely that as socio-economic factors are targeted more strongly, fertility among 
religious groups in India will tend to converge. 
This has obvious implications for population policy at the state and taluk level. In post- 
Independence India, Karnataka is one of the four states in the south which are collectively 
considered to have performed well on demographic indicators compared with national trends 
and in comparison with other states in north India. However, what this analysis has shown is 
that even if state averages are considered good, there are still likely to be significant 
demographic differences between groups within states. Such differences require further 
research and may be important in formulating government policy. 
What would the individual women of Ramanagaram have to say about attempts to reduce 
their fertility? We conclude this chapter by returning to their views. At the end of the 
questionnaire, the 201 women were asked to reflect on what they felt about the growth of 
population in the towns and villages of Ramanagaram taluk. The responses to this question, 
presented in Table 18, revealed that these women did in fact think about population issues 
and had definite views on the subject. 
i 
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Table 18: What do you feel about the growth of population in your town/village? Ramanagaram 
sample (1996) 
Response All women Hindus Muslims Christians 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
f 
Growing too fast 172 85.5 90 81.1 67 89.3 15 100.0 
Growth is about right 11 5.5 9 8.1 2 2.6 0 0.0 
Don't know 18 8.9 12 10.8 -68.3 0 0.0 
Total 201 100.0 111 100.0 75 100.0 15 100.0 
The Ramanagaram women appeared overwhelmingly to believe that the population in their 
town and villages was growing too fast. Of the women. in the sample, 86% believed that 
population growth was too fast, and the percentage was high among all religions, at 81% of 
Hindus, 89% of Muslims, and 100% of Christians. This may suggest that attempts to 
formulate government policy to reduce fertility will have active support at the grass-roots 
level. However, the other findings of the study show that individual fertility is still quite high, 
and that this is because of socio-economic factors which will need to change before the 
collective demographic aspirations of these south Indian women can be realised. For 
lowering fertility, these socio-economic factors include targeting women's education, 
husband's education, ideas about (and the economic pressures underlying) son-preference, 
the provision of fuel infrastructure, influence of female extended family and changes in 
social norms. The policy measures which would specifically affect Hindu and Christian 
fertility are those which relate to changing perceptions about the importance of sons as a 
means of insurance cover, and using the media to further influence changes in social norms 
about fertility. For Muslims, possible policy 'measures include increased state support for 
education for both Muslim women and their husbands; encouraging the influence of female 
extended family who appear to have a positive effect on Muslim women's fertility; and 
finally, public provision of gas or kerosene oil as alternatives to firewood collection. It is 
only by recognising that socio-economic factors influence different religious groups 
differently that we may be able to devise policy measures which can address the patterns of 
demographic response found in Ramanagaram and elsewhere in India. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion. 
I 
You are a small girl, not yet five and I wonder in what kind of India you will grow up and in what kind 
of India you will serve. ... 
You were hardly two years when you had a little sister. I was immensely 
pleased that it was also a girl. I know girls are not wanted especially in our custom-ridden and 
conservative country, but I feel that it is only women who can make the world a happy place...: Once 
you decide to fortify yourself with knowledge and offer your services to help humanity, nothing can 
come in your path. I know you may marry, but remember this, that once you decide to marry, you must 
not forget your country... and our suffering fellow-beings. ' 
Shakuntala's vision for her daughters in 1946 seems as relevant to Indian women today as it 
was over half a century ago. In keeping with that vision, the present study was motivated by 
the desire to serve the concerns of a small community of Hindu, Muslim and Christian 
women in the taluk of Ramanagaram in the south Indian state of Karnataka via a micro- 
demographic exploration of the socio-economic and religious determinants of their age at 
marriage, their contraceptive choices and their fertility. 
The history of India in the post-colonial era, and more particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, 
has seen the pervasive expansion of `communalism'. This phenomenon uses religion for 
political gains or economic rent-seeking. Within this spirituality-with-competition nexus, 
confrontations between religious groups, particularly between Hindus and Muslims, have 
involved both large-scale communal rioting with great destruction of life and property, and 
less violent, but equally volatile, debates about the numerical preponderance of one group 
relative to another, with specific focus on the impact of religion on fertility behaviour. In this 
debate, more often than not exacerbated by prejudice, the distinction between the sacred and 
the secular becomes blurred. The present study hopes to contribute to this debate with an 
academic examination of the theoretical and empirical links between religion and 
reproduction in India today. 
1 Extracts from a letter, written in English, from Shakuntala Rao (age 26) to her daughter Srilata (age 
4), Madras, south India, 23 December 1946. 
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This study originally set out to answer four questions. First, can the observed higher fertility 
of some religious. communities relative to others in India be attributed to socio-economic 
characteristics or to theological beliefs? 
2 Does the intensity of religious observance influence 
fertility? How does women's status vary across religions and is this significant for fertility? 
Finally, might `convergence' in the demographic behaviour of different religious groups (as 
in the case of Catholic and non-Catholic fertility in the 1970s in the USA) occur in any 
society? 
There are three hypotheses about how religion can affect demographic outcomes. 3 The first is 
the `pure religion effect': that the theological content of a religion exercises an independent 
effect on decision-making about fertility. The present study examined the theological content 
of Islam and Hinduism concerning marriage, children, birth control, and the position of 
women. It concluded that the theological content of Hinduism and Islam concerning 
demographic decisions is very similar. From a purely theological perspective, both religions 
would tend to encourage high fertility, with little difference between the two. 
The second hypothesis is that religious differentials in fertility are due not so much to 
theology, but to differences, in the socio-economic characteristics of individual members of 
different religions. These include not only economic. characteristics-. such . as education, 
income or occupation; but societal characteristics such as minority group status; household 
characteristics such as resident female extended family or access to infrastructure; and 
community characteristics such as caste. 
2 For example, in an early analysis of fertility differentials by religion in India, Mandelbaum argued that 
differences in fertility by religion are more to do with differences in income and education than with 
differences in religion. See Mandelbaum, 1974: 46. 
3 Chamie, 1977: 365-382. 
It 
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A third effect of religion on fertility is an interaction, possibly with religion as the cause, 
between religious affiliation and the level of different socio-economic characteristics. 
This study investigated in detail only the first two hypotheses since explaining differences in 
all socio-economic characteristics that might affect fertility was far beyond the purview of 
this (or any other feasible) fieldwork. It was then examined, using both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence, if either of these hypotheses explained religious differentials in fertility 
within a sample of 201 rural women in the taluk of Ramanagaram in the south Indian state of 
Karnataka. 
It is important to emphasise that any conclusion derived from the Ramanagaram sample 
cannot be representative of India as a whole, nor even of all of Karnataka. First, compared 
with other parts of India, levels of living in Karnataka are relatively good. The rural women 
from whom the Ramanagaram sample were selected are relatively prosperous compared to 
their counterparts in north India. Secondly, the small size of the sample means that the 
conclusions drawn, particularly for sub-groups of the population, must not be taken to be 
representative of all of India's Hindus, Muslims and Christians. There may well be 
demographic differences by religion in other parts of India which are different from those in 
Ramanagaram, and have different determinants. Notwithstanding these caveats, the present 
study regards it as valuable to investigate. if there are demographic differentials by religion in 
a population which is broadly homogenous, faces a similar set of factor prices, and has 
uniform access to family planning. 
From just looking at the monovariate descriptive statistics before taking into account 
differences in any other characteristic, in the Ramanagaram sample Muslim marriage age is 
higher than Hindu marriage age; contraceptive use among Muslims is less than among 
Hindus and Christians; and Muslims had one child more than Hindus. This last finding is 
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similar to that made in other studies of Karnataka. Almost all statements about religious 
differentials in demographic behaviour in India tend to stop with such monovariate 
descriptive statistics. The present study sought to investigate whether these religious 
differentials were upheld even after taking into account differences in other socio-economic 
attributes. 
The age at which a woman marries is hypothesised to be an important proximate determinant 
of fertility. Over the last century or so, the age at marriage has been steadily rising in 
Karnataka. This has been attributed to many causes, including, among others, increasing 
education for girls, ideational change wrought by changing perceptions about the `proper' 
time to marry and the decline in the incidence of child marriage. The present study examined 
trends in marriage age in Ramanagaram, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Mean marriage 
age among Hindus was lower than among Muslims and Christians, at least before controlling 
for the influence of other factors. The study also found that for the Ramanagaram women, the 
age at marriage had been rising over time, more so after 1978 with the imposition of the 
Child Marriage Restraint Act; as was the gap between the age at menarche and the age at 
marriage. There was also qualitative evidence supporting the hypothesis of a `marriage 
squeeze' and a `rising price of husbands' because dowry payments were ordering a market 
characterised by hypergamy. 
An econometric investigation of the age at marriage in Ramanagaram showed that the factors 
tending to increase age at marriage for the women covered in the sample were more years of 
education, particularly secondary education, a later age at menarche, higher income, whether 
the woman's husband performed a skilled occupation and a later year of marriage. Of all of 
these socio-economic factors, the role of education in increasing marriage age must be 
emphasised. Whether through government schools or through the Anganwadi movement, 
encouraging girls to be sent to school, at least up to the SSLC level, seems to be particularly 
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crucial in order to increase their marriage age. Another very interesting finding of the 
econometric analysis was the significant and positive `year of marriage' variable, which may 
indicate `ideational change' over time in the norms surrounding age at marriage in Karnataka. 
. 
Perhaps the most telling confirmation of this emerges from qualitative evidence: when the 
Ramanagaram women were asked at what age they wished their unmarried daughters to be 
married in the future, the average of their responses was 18.9 years, which was higher than 
the mean of their own marriage age (17.3 years). 
"1 
This study also focused on whether religion exercised a significantly different effect on 
marriage age for Hindus, Muslims and Christians covered in the sample. The study found that 
the effect of religion on marriage age was not significantly different between Hindus and 
Muslims, but was significantly different between Hindus and Christians, and between 
Muslims and Christians. The interaction model also showed that the effect of different socio- 
economic factors on the age at marriage of Hindus and Muslims was not significantly 
different between them either. However, the Christians were different from the Hindus and 
from the Muslims, and this difference was expressed in terms of the effect of some socio- 
economic factors such as women's secondary education, total expenditure and the year of 
marriage. Thus, a combination of socio-economic factors such as education and some change 
in social norms about marriage appear to account for the patterns of rising marriage age in 
Ramanagaram. 
A second major proximate influence on fertility is the use of contraception. Access to family 
planning in Karnataka is very widespread. This was reflected in the qualitative questioning of 
the Ramanagaram women, most of whom had easy access to contraception, either through the 
system of doorstep delivery of contraceptives, or through the public-sector provision of 
tubectomies. Most women had access to at least one method of contraception, though Muslim 
women appeared to use the system of doorstep delivery of contraceptives less than Hindus or 
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Christians. In the Ramanagaram sample, just under half the women had used a method of 
contraception. Of these methods, sterilisation operations were by far the most popular. Given 
the easy availability of contraception in Ramanagaram, the main determinants of 
contraceptive use there were factors influencing contraceptive acceptability. Moreover, a 
close look at `unwanted' fertility and fertility preferences in Ramanagaram suggests that 
while these measures are very useful as an indication of desires about fertility, all too often 
women's stated preferences and revealed preferences differ; questionnaire surveys have to be 
carefully formulated in order to obtain accurate estimates of `unwanted' fertility. This is 
because women's responses are influenced by whether they are asked for a general positive 
statement or a concrete normative one, by their existing number of children, and by other 
qualitative factors. 
According to the perceptions of the women in the Ramanagaram sample, religion did 
influence the acceptability of contraception. The most interesting qualitative finding was that 
most Muslim women thought their religion did disapprove of contraception and over one- 
quarter of them disagreed with this perceived position of their religion on contraception. 
Even though a number of scholars have argued that Islam does not oppose contraception, the 
Muslim women of Ramanagaram think that such prohibitions do exist. 
Turning to whether religion actually did influence contraceptive choice, 
_the study 
found that 
the factors affecting the probability of contraceptive use in Ramanagaram were woman's 
education, husband's education, ease of access to contraception, female extended family 
resident and the woman's age. Religion did not have an impact on contraceptive use either 
for the Hindus or for the Muslims, after controlling for the effect of other socio-economic 
factors. Moreover, there was also little difference between Hindus and Muslims in the socio- 
economic characteristics which affected their contraceptive practice, although there were 
differences between both of them and the Christians. Interestingly, for a constant level of any 
307 
one characteristic, it exerts different effects for different religious groups. For example, if we 
take a single socio-economic characteristic such as women's education, the effect of this on 
the probability of contraceptive use for all women is positive. However, the impact of 
women's education on the decision to use contraception for Christians is greater than for 
either Hindus or Muslims. Consequently, education policy towards the Christians, who were 
already better educated, may need to be different from that towards Hindus and Muslims. For 
Hindus and Muslims, education may need to be targeted more strongly. The immediate policy 
implication of this analysis is that population policy in developing countries may have to 
target different religious groups in different ways, in order to increase contraceptive use. 
Having considered the determinants of two important proximate fertility determinants, age at 
marriage and contraceptive choice, the nonproximate determinants of fertility in 
Ramanagaram were explored. The econometric analysis found that the factors affecting 
children ever born in Ramanagaram were women's university education, husband's primary 
education, husband's secondary education, position of first-born sons in the birth-order, 
female extended family members resident, woman's age, and whether the household used 
gas/kerosene in lieu of firewood for fuel. 
Looking at differences across religions prior to controlling for other variables, the mean 
number of children ever born for Muslims was one child higher than for Hindus. However, 
after taking into account the effect of other factors, there was no statistically significant 
difference in the intercept terms for Hindus and Muslims, suggesting that religion is not 
exercising a direct effect on fertility levels. Interestingly, though, there were differences in 
the slopes of the regression lines for the three religious groups, indicating that the set of 
socio-economic factors affecting fertility differ across religions, and that some socio- 
economic attributes affect the fertility of different religions in different ways. Thus, Hindu 
fertility is influenced mainly by the woman's age and the position of first-born sons in the 
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birth-order, while Muslim fertility is affected by those two variables plus woman's university 
education, husband's primary and secondary education, whether the household used gas or 
kerosene as a source of fuel, and the number of female extended family resident. This implies 
that any fertility policy undertaken in Ramanagaram - and possibly other religiously diverse 
societies - needs to target different religious groups differently. For Muslims, policies 
focusing on education and infrastructure would be strongly indicated. For Hindus, by 
contrast, policies focusing on `ideational' change would seem to be more important, insofar 
as woman's age reflects changing norms, and insofar as son-preference arises from norms 
rather than from considerations of insurance. For both groups, however, insofar as son- 
preference arises from insurance considerations, the Ramanagaram findings provide support 
for policies directed at providing old age pensions or access to credit by women (as has been 
successful in Bangladesh4) in order to reduce women's dependence on surviving sons. 
The findings from Ramanagaram show clearly, however, that it is not religious affiliation or 
religious observance which affects fertility, but rather the manner in which religion is 
interpreted to individuals. This was evidenced in the fact that the index of piety created as a 
measure of religious observance was not significant in any of the regression models. 
The implications of these findings on the effect of religion on fertility for Indian politics and 
policy-makers are simple but important. First, they provide no empirical support for views 
which ascribe demographic differentials to differences in theology, or which indulge in 
stereotyping the behaviour of one religious group relative to another. Rather, they suggest 
that it is necessary to focus on how the content of a religion is interpreted to individual 
members of that religion and the corresponding impact on their lives. Therefore, community 
and religious leaders may need to be targeted because of the influence they may wield. For 
example, one of the key qualitative findings from Ramanagaram was that Muslim women 
4 Steele, Amin and Naved, 1998. 
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think that their religion prohibits contraception, even though theologically (as we saw in 
Chapter 1) this point is highly debated. In this case, the actual theological content of Islam is 
irrelevant to decision-making about fertility by Muslim women in Ramanagaram. 
Second, socio-economic factors, especially women's and men's education, need more 
emphasis. Numerous studies of the relationship between education and fertility have found 
this relationship to be vital to fertility declines and the findings from Ramanagaram 
substantiate this . -5 
The mean number of years of education for married women in the 
Ramanagararn sample was only 5.5 years. This is very low and is definitely one area which 
government policy needs to target. More importantly, even if schooling is provided, more 
research needs to be done on the quality of schooling provided, 
6 on how to make mothers 
send their daughters to school, and on why they might prefer alternatives such as Anganwadi 
schools, as observed in Ramanagaram. More research should also be devoted to what it is in 
education (for both men and women), be it the acquisition of skills or the learning of values, 
that reduces their fertility.. 
Third, the findings for Ramanagaram show that different religious groups may need to be 
targeted in different ways if it is thought desirable to try to influence people's fertility 
behaviour. For example, in Ramanagaram, Muslims husbands' education needs more 
targeting in order to affect women's fertility; while for Hindus, women's own education and 
changing attitudes toward son-preference may be the key to lower fertility. 
Other policy measures which could have a direct impact on reducing fertility in India more 
widely are further education about family planning, instituting systems of social security to 
reduce the dependence on children for insurance reasons, further attention to laws which 
Kishor argues that female enrolment in literacy classes and in primary school is the one of the major 
factors behind small families in Tamil Nadu. See Kishor, 1994: 65-100. 
6 For an example of such research see Lloyd, Mensch and Clark, 1998. 
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would deal with gender relations, and further action on enforcing property rights, particularly 
those of women, so as to enable them both to own more land, and exercise more effective 
control over land even when they own it 7 
This study has also generated findings which indicate the need for further research in a 
number of areas. There are variables which affect demographic outcomes in south India, such 
as the role of female extended family in influencing demographic decision-making, which 
need to be explored more deeply. Although the econometric results of this study presented 
confirm the traditional role of extended family acting negatively on contraceptive use and 
fertility, qualitative evidence from Ramanagaram indicated that this role may be changing, 
with female extended family (especially mothers and mothers-in-law) becoming increasingly 
proactive in encouraging younger women family members to undertake family planning. The 
importance of these female social networks in influencing fertility change needs more 
thorough empirical investigation. 
Second, and related to the above discussion, the role of marital consanguinity on age at 
marriage and contraceptive choice, in south India more generally and Karnataka in particular, 
needs more research. Marital consanguinity is a distinctive feature of social organisation and 
marriage practice in Karnataka, and has been widely postulated as increasing fertility. 
However, even though measures of consanguinity were included in models of marriage age, 
contraceptive choice and fertility for Ramanagaram, this variable was not shown to exercise a 
significant effect. It was argued earlier that consanguinity may be popular in Karnataka 
because of the need to reduce dowry payments in marriage, and as a means of diversifying 
risk. Consanguinity also has positive consequences for female autonomy in that it is argued 
that if women are closer to their natal homes, they have greater mobility and autonomy. 
Although this relationship was not explored fully, this is another area requiring further 
ý Egerö, 1994: 26-27. 
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research, especially given the emphasis placed upon it in the demographic and 
anthropological literature. 
The age at menarche as a determinant of the age at marriage is another variable which would 
reward further explanation. Although this variable has been quite thoroughly researched in 
the field of medicine, the present study has shown that it also belongs in the field of 
economic demography. It was postulated here that the positive relationship observed between 
the age at menarche and age at marriage arose because of underlying nutritional and health- 
related variables which led both to early menarche and to advantages in a competitive 
marriage market. This hypothesis would benefit from deeper theoretical and empirical 
explanation. For developing countries, its importance is further emphasised because of its 
relation to changes in women's nutritional status, and investments in their health capital. 
In the Indian context, another relationship which this study suggests needs further exploration 
is that between caste and demographic behaviour. There were several indications that among 
the Ramanagaram Hindus, caste was an important determinant of demographic patterns. 
Though there was not enough information in the Ramanagaram data set to test the empirical 
relationships between caste and fertility more fully, it would be possible to conduct a similar 
type of analysis to that which has been conducted for religion in this study, by focusing on 
caste instead! Given Indian political 
. 
concerns to improve the position. of the 
_ 
more 
disadvantaged castes, exploring the sources of caste differences in fertility is an important 
undertaking. 
Another relationship deserving further empirical research is the link between infrastructure 
provision and fertility. The Ramanagaram study found that all members of the household, but 
8 The importance of combining quantitative and anthropological methods in order to investigate the 
effects on fertility of inter- and intra-. i ti relations has also been argued by Lipton, 1992: 1543-1544. 
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particularly women and children, were responsible for water and fuel collection tasks. This 
may have been one reason for higher fertility. Certainly, in the case of Muslim families, 
those families which used gas and kerosene and did not rely primarily on firewood had lower 
fertility than others, even after controlling for socio-economic variables. This is one area 
which government policy can easily target. For power, the government can implement the 
proposals advocated for Ramanagaram by the 1995 infrastructure consultants: these included 
installing a sub-station, increasing power supply to 40 mw, phasing out power cuts and 
stabilising voltage fluctuations. For water, the infrastructure report recommended the digging 
of additional borewells, the establishment of reservoirs for water storage, the implementation 
of the Cauvery water supply scheme (a Karnataka Government Scheme for sharing the waters 
of the Cauvery equally between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka), efficient recovery of water 
taxes imposed by the state government, and streamlining of the administrative set-up that 
deals with water supply and distribution issues. Until such proposals are implemented 
effectively, as observed both from the analysis of water and fuel provision in Ramanagaram 
in Chapter 2 and the comments of the women themselves, irregular water supply and 
collecting firewood imply that as many hands as possible are required in order to collect the 
household's daily water and fuel requirements. Moreover, water and fuel collection will go 
on constituting a disincentive to send children (particularly daughters) to school. 
This study found that while there was no differences between Hindus and Muslims in terms 
of the determinants of their age at marriage and in terms of the determinants of their 
contraceptive use, there were differences between them in the socio-economic determinants 
of their fertility. Given the `proximate determinants' framework which was adopted to study 
fertility behaviour in Ramanagaram, these findings suggest that the nonproximate influences 
on fertility are acting on Hindus and Muslims differently - not via differences in their age at 
marriage nor via differences in their adoption of contraception, but through some other 
proximate determinant, such as natural fertility, length of breastfeeding, duration of couple 
., 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separation during the fertile period (as affected by divorce or migration), or differences in 
their practice of abortion. For 'example, as argued elsewhere in this study, early studies of 
fertility in the Mysore region did argue that Hindu religious prescriptions on the length of 
couple separation just after childbirth and prohibiting sexual intercourse during certain 
religious festivals were responsible for lower Hindu than Muslim fertility in the early part of 
this century. While the Ramanagaram data set was limited in that it did not collect detailed 
information on all of these other proximate determinants, these findings do suggest that more 
research would be desirable, particularly on the determinants of abortion practices and couple 
separation. 
It must be recognised that this study of Ramanagaram is essentially one which revolves 
around socio-economic determinants of fertility. Although this kind of analysis is very useful, 
an even more broadly-based study, which tried to measure `ideational change' in a more 
detailed way, would be valuable. Although some attempt was made to measure ideational 
change in the models of marriage age, contraceptive choice and fertility, using the `year of 
marriage' and `woman's age' variables, it must be recognised that the lack of data which 
measured ideational change in detail limited an in-depth exploration of the influence of social 
norms on fertility. 
Although this study has concentrated particularly on religion and fertility, it has also been 
more generally a study of women and their status in a south Indian society. As discussed 
above, one of the key issues with which this study was concerned was how women's status 
varies across religions and whether this is significant for fertility. Women's status is broadly 
perceived to be better in south India than in north India. Indeed, this has been attributed to the 
nature of social organisation and marriage practices in south India, better autonomy and 
mobility, female education, and largely proactive regional governments who have taken a 
keen interest in promoting a small family ideal and literacy, and who have recognised these 
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two avenues as a key potential for growth. However, while the quantitative and qualitative 
findings from Ramanagaram substantiate all of these hypotheses, the data collected do 
indicate that there is room for even more improvement and change in the status of women in 
south India, particularly with regard to the relationship between men and women. This 
conviction emerges not merely from the quantitative findings, but more vitally, from the 
opinions of the Ramanagaram women themselves. 
At the end of the questionnaire, the women were asked to reflect on five questions, as a way 
of assessing their perceptions about the changes around them in Ramanagaram town or their 
village over the previous five-year period. They were asked to rate on a scale of `better, same 
or worse' their own economic position, the relations between religious groups, violence 
between men, violence between men and women, and the position of women, five years 
previously, compared to the point at which they were interviewed. 
Of the women in the sample, 44% said that their economic position had improved over five 
years: 50% of Hindus, 33% of Muslims and 47% of Christians. There were 37% of women 
who said that their economic position had become worse: 18% of Hindus, 36% of Muslims 
and. 7% of Christians. Very clearly, of all the three groups, the Muslim women believed most 
that their economic position had worsened over time. 
The women were also asked if they thought that communal relations between religious 
groups had become better, stayed the same or become worse over five years. There were 
major communal riots in Ramanagaram in 1989-90, and as an observer in the area, my 
impression was that the relations between religious groups were somewhat tense. The women 
of Ramanagaram confirmed this impression in their responses to this question. Of the women 
in the sample, 54% said that relations between religious groups had become worse compared 
to five years before, 31% said that relations had stayed the same, and only 15% that they had 
improved. This was fairly uniform across religious groups, with 53% of Hindus, 53% of 
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Muslims and 60% of Christians saying that relations between religious groups had become 
worse over the five-year period. 
The women were asked if the degree of violence among men and between men and women in 
the town or village had increased, decreased or remained at the same level. In the whole 
sample, 61% of women said that violence among men had become worse, 35% that it had 
stayed the same and only 4% that it had decreased. There were 61% of Hindus, 63% of 
Muslims and 53% of Christians who said that violence among men had become worse. 
Interestingly, the percentages are higher among Hindus and Muslims, relative to the 
Christians, possibly because the main conflict between religious groups in Ramanagaram 
taluk in recent years has been between Hindus and Muslims. An even larger proportion of 
women believed that domestic violence between men and women had increased (63%), while 
only 4% thought it had decreased. There were 61% of Hindus, 65% of Muslims and 60% of 
Christians who thought domestic violence had become worse. over five years. One possible 
explanation for this, to which many of the Ramanagaram women alluded, either directly or 
indirectly, was the increasing incidence of alcohol-related abuse by their husbands. 
Finally, the women of Ramanagaram did not think that their position in their town or village 
was improving. The query on any change in their position over the past five years drew rather 
pessimistic comments from them. Of the women in the sample, 65% believed that. their 
position had remained the same, and 21% that it had got worse; only 14% thought that it had 
improved. There were 63% of Hindus, 64% of Muslims and 87% of Christians who thought 
that their position had stayed the same. However, while only 7% of Christians thought that 
their position was worse than before, there were as many as 20% of Hindus and 27% of 
Muslims who thought that their position was worse than before. 
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Thus, the majority of women in the sample interviewed in Ramanagaram taluk believed that 
their family's economic position had somewhat bettered, that the relations between religious 
groups, the level of violence between men and the level of violence between men and women 
had become worse, while their own position as women in the taluk had remained at about the 
same level as five years before. Muslim and Hindu women believed more that they were 
worse off, particularly with regard to their economic position and with regard to their own 
position as women resident in the town or village, compared with the Christians. Such 
qualitative evidence indicates that even in south India, there is still room for improvement in 
women's status. 
In examining if women's status varies across religions, the most significant finding was that 
on most indicators, be it education, income, or occupation, Christian women emerged as 
much better off than their Hindu and Muslim counterparts. Though the main focus of this 
study was not Christian fertility in Ramanagaram, comparisons with the Christians made for 
useful insights. The higher status of women among the Christian community as reflected in 
their access to education and greater independence in decision-making abilities, was 
noteworthy. Moreover, whether-or not it had anything to do with the Church of South India, 
the example of the Christians illustrates the influence of female education on demographic 
outcomes. Given the recent emergence of some communal violence against Indian Christians, 
these findings have somewhat disturbing implications. 
Finally, the last question on which it is important to reflect is whether convergence in Hindu, 
Muslim and Christian fertility in India is possible. I believe that it is, if government policy 
were to target different religious groups in different ways that affect their fertility, but in a 
sensitive manner which works in tandem with religious leaders. Having established that 
community influences on fertility were more significant than individual religious observance, 
the present study suggests the importance of a multi-pronged approach to studying religious 
r, 
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differentials in fertility within a country. However, the most important conclusion of the 
present study is that religious differentials in fertility are the observed outcome of a complgx 
set of factors derived from differences across religious groups in both socio-economic 
characteristics and the effect of these characteristics on demographic decision-making. This 
has far-reaching implications for both policy and politics in a religiously pluralistic society 
such as India. Until public policy moves in such directions, attaining Shakuntala's vision for 
Indian women, and Indian people in general, seems some distance away. 
W. 
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APPENDIX 
A. 1. Questionnaire 
Part I 
I. I. Census information 
1.2. Structure of and decision-making within the family 
Part II 
11.1. Economic value of children 
11.2. Reproduction, contraception and health care 
11.3. Religion and women's status 
----------------------------------------- 
Date and time of interview: 
Language the interview was conducted in: 0 Kannada 0 Hindi 0 Tamil 
O Telugu O English 
Respondent number: 
Part I 
1.1. Census information 
1.1. Name: 
1.2. Town/village: 0 Village A0 Village BO Village C 
0 Village D 13 Village E0 Ramanagaram town. 
1.3. Caste and jati: 
1.4. Age: 
1.5. Religion: 0 Hindu 0 Muslim O Christian O Other 
1.6. What is your primary language of communication? 
O Kannada O Hindi O Urdu O Tamil 
O Telugu 0 English 11 Other 
1.7. Can you read and/or write your primary, lalºguage of communication? 
13 Yes 0 No 
I. S. Can you read and /or write any other language(s)? 
O Yes 0 No 
1.9. If yes, which language(s): 0 Kannada 0 HindiD Urdu 0 Tamil 
0 Telugu 13 English 13 Other 
ft. 
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1.10. Years of education: 
Primary education Secondary education University education 
1.1 1. Occupation: 
Primary occupation Secondary occupation Any other occupation 
1.12. Marital status: 
O SingleO Widowed O Divorced O Deserted (Married, spouse absent) 
O Married 11 Remarried 
1.13. How old were you at menarche? 
1.14. How old were you when you first married? 
1.15. How old were you when you married the man you are currently married to? 
1.16. How old were you when you started living with your first husband? 
1.17. How old were you when you started living with your current husband? 
1.18. Details of husband: 
1.18.1. Age: 
1.18.2. Years of education: 
Primary education 
1.18.3. Occupation: 
Secondary education 
Secondary occupation 
Secondary education 
University education 
Any other occupation 
University education 
Primary occupation Secondary occupation Any other occupation 
1 
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1.19. Before you got married, was your husband related to you in any way? 
C3 Yes C3 No 
1.20. If yes, what type of relationship was it? 
O First cousin on father's side O First cousin on mother's side 
O Second cousin on mother's side O Second cousin on fathers' side 
O Maternal uncle O Brother-in-law 
O Other blood relation 0 Other non-blood relation 
1.21. How many children do you have? 
1.22. How old were you at the birth of your first child? 
Primary education 
Primary occupation 
Primary occupation Secondary occupation Any other occupation 
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1.23.1. Details of children: 
Category 1 2:. 3A56.78 
Name 
Sex O Male 0 Female 
Age 
In school O Yes O No 
Years of education 
Resident O Yes O No 
If no, where does child 
reside? 
1.23.2 Details of other resident members of the household: 
Category 12345678 
Name 
Sex O Male O Female 
Age 
Relationship to household 
head 
Years of education 
Occupation 
1.24. Sources of income: 
1.24.1. How much land does your family/husband have? 
1.24.2. Is it self-owned or leased-in? 13 self-owned 13 leased-in O other 
Category . 1 
2:. .: 3 4 5 6 
.7 
8 9 10 
Name 
Sex O Male 0 Female 
Age 
In school O Yes 0 No 
Years of education 
Resident O Yes O No 
If no, where does child 
reside? 
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Name 
Sex 0 Male O Female 
Age 
Relationship to household 
head 
Years of education 
Occupation 
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1.25. Consumer expenditure and consumer equipment: 
1.25.1. Average monthly consumer expenditure: 
Category Amount Cost (rupees) 
Rent (or do you own your own house? ) 
Food rains (k s. 
Rice 
Wheat 
Ragi 
Pulses 
Other food (k s. 
Fruit/vegetables 
Meat/fish 
Milk (litres) 
Leisure 
Alcoholic beverages 
Tobacco/betel 
Cinema/othcr entertainment 
Children 
Food for children 
Clothing for children 
Education for children 
Miscellaneous* 
Washing soap 
Bathing soap 
Talcum powder 
Coconut oil 
Face cream 
Flowers 
Kumkum powder, kohl and any other cosmetics 
Saris/other clothes for women 
* This is mainly women's expenditure on themselves. 
1.25.2. Do you own any of the following? 
O Transistor/radio O Bicycle O Fan O Cot 
11 Moped/scooter 13 Watch 13 Television 0 Chair/bench 
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1 .2 Structure of and 
decision-making within the family 
2.1. Influence and decision-making within the household: 
2.1.1. Name five people with whom you have the closest contact. 
1.2.3.4. 5. 
2.1.2. Who decides who goes to school? 
O Woman alone O Husband O Father-in-law O Parents 
O Parents-in-law 0 Male relative0 Female relative O Joint family 
11 Husband and wife together O Woman and other relatives 11 Other 
2.1.3 Who decides who performs housework? 
O Woman alone O Husband O Father-in-law O Parents 
O Parents-in-law O Male relative0 Female relative O Joint family 
O Husband and wife together 13 Woman and other relatives 11 Other 
2.1.4 Who decides who performs income-earning work? 
O Woman alone O Husband O Father-in-law O Parents 
O Parents-in-law O Male relative0 Female relative O Joint family 
O Husband and wife together 13 Woman and other relatives O Other 
2.1.5 Who decides how to spend money? 
O Woman alone O Husband O Father-in-law O Parents 
O Parents-in-law O Male relative0 Female relative O Joint family 
O Husband and wife together O Woman and other relatives O Other 
2.2. To what extent does 'custom' decide these matters? 
O Custom is important O Custom is unimportant O Do not know 
2.3. Value of daughters: 
2.3.1. Does your daughter share in the cooking? O Yes 
2.3.2. What age did your daughters get married? 
13 No 
Married 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
daughter 
Age at first 
marriage 
2.3.3. What age will your unmarried daughters be married? 
Unmarried 1 2 3 4 5 
_6 
7 
daughter 
Proposed 
agc at first 
marriage 
2.3.4. Would you/did you allow your daughters to continue schooling after puberty? 
O Yes 0 No 
13 Yes 
0 
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Part II 
II. 1 Economic value of children - benefits and costs 
I. I. Children's contributions to current and future income: 
1.1.1. How many hours a day (approximately) do children spend doing tasks such as: 
O grazing; 
O helping mother; 
O working in other employment (e. g. silk-reeling units)? 
1.2. What is your main source of water? 
O Collected by hand in water pots either from the river or public tap 
O Pipe 11 Tap 13 Other 
1.3. If collected by hand, which family member(s) collects water? 
O Woman 0 Husband 0 Son O Daughters 
O Sisters-in-law O Father-in-law 0 Mother-in-law O Brothers-in-law 
O Daughters-in-law 11 Sons-in-law 11 Servants 0 Others 
1.4. How many hours a day do you or any family member spend collecting water? 
1.5. What is your main source of fuel? 
O Firewood 0 Gas 0 Kerosene 13 Firewood delivered home 13 Other 
1.6. If firewood, which family member(s) collect the wood? 
O Woman O Husband O Son O Daughters 
0 Sisters-in-law O Father-in-law 0 Mother-in-law O Brothers-in-law 
O Daughters-in-law 13 Sons-in-law 13 Servants 13 Others 
1.7. How many hours a day do you or any family member spend collecting firewood for fuel? 
1.8. When you get old (above age 60), who would you live with? 
O Son 0 Daughter "O Husband O Alone 0 Old-age home O Other 
1.9. What do you do about income if something unforeseen happens (e. g. someone becomes ill)? 
Cl the children leave school O son/daughter in the city sends you more money 
0 use savings 0 borrow from neighbours 
0 pawn jewellery O other - who would help you? 
Direct and opportunity costs of children 
1.10. Are boys more expensive than girls? D Yes O No 0 Do not know 
1.11. Why/why not? 
1.12. If there is not enough food, do boys get 0 more O less O the same as girls? 
1.13. If a child is ill, would you spend O more O same O less on medical expenses for 
boys as girls? 
1.14. Do you ever save aside money for your daughters? 
1.15. Have you saved gold/jewellery for her? 
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1.16. Who looks after the children in the home when you are not here? 
O Husband 0 Mother O Father0 Mother-in-law 
0 Sister O Brother O Father-in-law O Sister-in-law 
0 Daughter-in-law 0 Brother-in-law O Other relation O Friend(s) 
O Neighbour Cl Servant -O No one - they stay on their own 
11.2 Reproduction, contraception and health-care 
Fertility 
2.1. Do you wish to have another child? 
0 Yes 0 No 0 Not sure 13 Do not know 
2.2. If yes, would you prefer if it was a boy or a girl? 
11 Boy 0 Girl 13 Either 13 Do not know 
2.3. Why? 
2.4. Is the birth of a by 0 better news C3 -worse news O same as the birth of a girl? 
2.5. Does your husband want another child? 
0 Yes 11 No 0 Not sure 13 Do not know 
2.6. Have your children been planned? O Yes O No 
2.7. Do you have a desired number of children? O Yes O No 
2.8. If yes, what is it? 
2.9. Would you have wanted less children? 
0 Yes 0 No O Not sure 13 Do not know 
2.10. Why? 
2.11. Do you think large families are better than small ones? 
0 Yes 0 No 13 Not sure 13 Do not know 
2.12. Did you breastfeed your children? 13 Yes 0 No 
Contraception and health 
2.13. Do you talk about contraception with your husband? 
O Yes O No O Never O Other comment 
2.14. Have you ever used any birth control techniques? 
O Pills/mala d. O Inter-uterine device/copper-t O Condom/nirodh 
O Sterilisation operation O Any other method 13 Never used any method 
2.15 Between you and your husband, who makes the decisions about birth control? 
0 Woman 0 Husband 0 Husband and wife together 13 Not applicable 
2.16. Apart from your spouse, which female family member would you discuss family planning with? 
D Mother O Sister O Sister-in-law 
O Mother-in-law O Friend/neighbour 11 Other 
2.17. How often do you see your family planning officer or go to the health centre/hospital? 
O Often 0 Not often 0 Only in illness O Not at all 
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2.18. How easy is it for you to get access to contraception? 
0 Easy 0 Not easy 0 From the nurse who visits the locality 
2.19. What are the sleeping arrangements for couples/ architecture of the house? 
2.20. Does your religion permit contraception/abortion? 
O Yes 0 No Cl Do not know 11 Not sure Cl Other comment 
2.21. Do you have any personal views about the position of your religion on contraception/abortion? 
O Yes O No 13 Do not know 13 Not sure 0 Other comment 
2.22. What do you feel about the growth of population in your town/village? 
O Too fast 11 About right Cl Too slow O Do not know O Not sure O Other comment 
11.3. Religion and women's status 
Religion 
3.1. Please rate on a scale of 1 to '5. 
1. Not at all 2. Not very much 3. Medium 4. Quite a bit 5. Very much 
3.1.1 How faithfully do you practice your religion? 
01 02 03 04 05 
3.1.2. How much does it matter to you what the local priests think of you? 
01 02 03 04 05 
3.1.3. Would you ask advice from your priest about aspects of your life? 
01 02 03 04 05 
3.1.4. How often do you go to the temple/mosque/church? 
01 02 03 04 05 
3.1.5. Do you interact with neighbours who do not belong to your religion? 
01 02 03 04 05 
3.1.6. Are your children religious too and do they go to the temple/mosque/church/worship at home? 
13 1 132 03 04 05 
3.1.7. Do they practise religion to your satisfaction? 
01 02 03 04 05 
Women's status 
3.2. Do you feel that women's views are represented through the Municipality? 
O Yes 0 No 11 Do not know O Other comment 
3.3. Is this important to you? 
0 Yes Cl No 0 Do not know 13 Other comment 
3.4. Over the past five years, what do you feel about: 
3.4.1. Your own economic position 
Cl Better 0 Same 0 Worse 
326 
3.4.2. Relations between different religious groups in the village/town 
0 Better O Same 0 Worse 
3.4.3. Level of violence between men 
O Better O Same O Worse 
3.4.4. Level of violence between men and women 
0 Better 0 Same 13 Worse 
3.4.5. Position of women in your village/ town 
O Better 0 Same 0 Worse 
--------------------------------- 
327 
ý O\ 
4! 
E 
E 
cl 
cl 
cz E 
cz 
cz "I C 
E 
4r 
CS 
I= 
+. + 
4r 
.O 
c. 
°. 
C3 
+: + 
ti 
y 
3 79 d W= 
ý. 
3 l ty' CyC $ 
Uý m Wý 
c 
ý... 
k 
' 
.D 
E° 
c cS 
. '1' + . '9 
. 
r3 E n1 
öö 
"' +M 
SE °g 
ö c 
. `"7 + .7 Eg 
öýE Eg 
2+ . '3 cE 
Eö 
. '3 + X, 
cö 
ý:.. 
aE 
9 
3ý3 3ý3 
ä 
3ý3 
S 
3ý3 
ýS x 3ý3 Z 3ý3 
oC u"ý 'u uý cc 
N 'w c- .ý ý 'wN N 'ýö "u ý 
O n cu .. .ýg " 
1 
> O p ä 
l 
y .ý 
c N ° 
u 
2 ö 
u 
ý 
u 
: 
3 
:zü 
. 
_' 9 
`c c 
3 
`c e ä 
ý 
öe 
eg 30 
p'O 
öc 
-o s 
öc 
aö 
s 
`c e 
3ö3 ö 
'ä 
cv 
33ö 9 
öe 
3? ök 
ö0 
gý 
C 
tiV I 
ý g ý j ý ýý 
cý 
2 Og ýý 
ý ü'c u u 
i ýL 
u üs 
`ý 
O. 
ý, 
, 
N y 
ý 
N N ý pppC. 
' 
ýC VI 
h 
O'Ä 
. "E 
Öw 
E 
OL 
ÖW 
E 
Ö. 
ýE 
Ö IL 
a 
Oa 
E 
Ow 
ýE 
Or 
E 
ÖW 
E 
ýE ý E >' 
... t. L 
N 
ýL 
< < <E 
TC 
"% 
' e 
S 
TG 
^ý 
N 
TC 
ýM 
TC 
y N yT 
C 
Ä 
C. ýT' 
T e=J 
PC 
h {ýý 
C 
a 
qq 
_ .CU 
_ Ö ý-' 
ý 
Ö "` 
7 
8 
s 
Cy9 
8 
ö`O 
8 
Y 
' 
ö>> 
8 
ö>> 
8 
i 
öO ýJ 
E -oE F ö. F, 
ö ö 
0 Eö öö j.. o 
e are 9c 
ýc 
are . 
l^d dýö ` n '" ö 
ýö 
sý' 3E8 3E8 ýEE 3E3 3Ey 3E8 ýý8 9 4. 
" ä 
aEü 
ä° 
.E° 'Cü 
öý 
TE 
Cm° -'C ?. 
SSýý Eý 
3'äo 
a. Eý 
'. ýäa 
' 
a. En 
3ää 
ý 
?. Ec 
cä 
?. E ° 
nc. r'i 
z 
o$ c o$ 
ä -3 . 
, o 
3 
F. o. ý 
Cn 
aöu 3 3 r 
C 
> 
ýE ''ý 
'2 ä 
E ö$ 
3 "c o 
o ö $ 
3 .E7 
0 ö $ 
3E 
Föü 
3v 
F+ $ 
3 'e 
ý 
I o 
ö s' 
3>> 
F $ 
'3 
2 
ý' 
° ö s F " 1- ö - ä E 
ö 
ýä C 
ýö ý T . ý9 ö 
? . ö 
ýö ? . S9 ö 
i . ý. fl ö 
ý . ý. ä ö 
? . Äý ö 
ý 
R q 
CCV 
0ggý 
T n 
3Eä 
TCp 
3ýä 
FN 
'ýýä 
TCO 
äýä ' 
T Cpý 
3ýä 
p TCu 
3ý0 
' 
T Cý 
`3Eä 
TCa 
$Eä 
3xE ý08 t°; 8 r° ;B t°; ý ý°08 Fo8 ýo3 ýö8 
O 
ýý++T 
EC 
äe 
jý T'C 
ö0. '3 
TCÜ 
'ýco 
SS 
Cý 
° 
TCt 
° ö. 
T'ý ý 
. 
C ja ö°'3 
TC 
y' 
TG ti 
ýyo 
'Q I f. oü j... $$ . E, o$ . F. o$ , F" oý j_, ö3 F" o$ "3 
Ne ý 
qF 
e0 
"" 
ý 
aE 
TO 
p qu 2 
O 
}6! 
tt{Cýýý 
G G 
ýýF6{{ 
6 6 I ü 
Z 
- .ý a ýn ýo r x o. 
N2 
uCý 
y 
.ý .D 
UÖ[ 
ýUN 
ýl0 
1+ ' 
8v" 
ý 
ý U 
Q 
ý 
en 
c 
0 
11 
0 
C .aÖN oucZ 
C. ) 'u -0 
N ^J Wý7 Ö 
rC! 'F cL3 
t 
ýýýCý 
Vp 
~ ýp 0 T 
u 
ý 
.CÜ": i" 
.. 
ti. C '0 O 
. fl 
CnC II Y O 
Cc 
ý°+ 
Eu 
-r 
U 
U 
0 
ou -u 
Oq 'p 
CC 
"ý o ON 
UG 
'C. O 
ayiý 
O 
C3 C 
Clý 
V 
U 
II h 
ný0 
GZ 
v. 
a9 -9 
7 ý. 
Ö 
"ý 
CC 
Wd 
ChU 
ýý 
.ýtýO 
_ü. u 
__ 
11 ü 
3ýr. h Y2' 8 0° 0 ti oý 
7ýÜ Dp O DD 
fÖ 
eC.. ý. . -. O 
r, ._gäýLE., 
> 
9äýc4. Q ý 0 -v 
ý ro- ýÜ Tl C 
,0ýýr p0ö °° ýö 
c 
- ö- zu. Exo 
ond E ö0 
p"ý 
cpi 
co 
TCWWC^ 
psbEpp .G 
'fl 
yp 11 
,üp0ö 
.rO 
"ý 
"p tn .A 
"y"L Eý 
ýoýy° 
u 11 p 
0ö0 ö-ýNä 
II C 
o :: Öý0Öü 
° cl pCr 
p II xý 
öýý Gü cý Ea 
UMü c'3 Cp 0ý 
y 
C0E y'C 07 
uö 11 ,2hV: C 
ý... 9 'ý, ? CS 
Cp 
-p 2Cp 
CHN7 
. 
°'p 
°ü II 11 ý x, ý 0'? 
. C"O 
11 "Eý c 
o= 
%ý U yy ý. y 
}ý y 
WC ö yý t7 
II ý 
II ý 'ü c II -c 
.. UUwöo -a onýoö E ö0 pCN 
.. 
U. "i dU 
4) 
C .ýC 
[ý 
ýýrr . {.. 
CU. ýý. 
O 
w 
3ý 
P9OÜ... 
"G LY, i 
V3 cl 'N o 
'C ý 
8C?? UO 
. 
'" 
, -. 
C'T 
V l` 
0 
O l` v) 
O 
N 
O N 
> M 
r- i 
e: 
l` 
d' 
$ vl 
ý} 
$ 
ý 2 O Oý Oý Oý Oý Oý O0 O O 
C 2 
. 
2 
cCa oc -u Im E° o`r ti ON 
oü"Lu 
ý 
r_ E rý is ri ö 
E-ý 
o 
N 
tV 
N 
cV 
ý. v 
V 
vNl vhl N 
ý 
r. ;9 
O 
Ov 
O 
Ov 
O 
pv 
O 
0 N 
O 
0 c, 1 
O 
0 N 
O 
0" 
o 0. .. 0 E- ä Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö CD Ö 
vC 
' 
M0 
M00 ýN V7 N 00 vl N Oý N O O 
C 
NM NM N, ý Ný Ný, ^N NN 
R C1 
."u. 
.. o 
N 
u w 
R 
ý 0 p c; p CD 00 CD00 c5"I: CD 
F" 
J  r: 
V MM 'ý V' 't vi `I: v1 N M M 
ia T O(V OlV OcV O cV OCV 
(2, 0..: 
Ch 
O. 
-., 
CJ 
tr 
wC t. c 
NN 
O 
NN 
O 
MO 
m0 
N N Oc"i OM 
LCü 
7ü%O 
,,, >. a0 
a. N 0O N 
'C `n 
, ý, 
Ö 
ON ON 
C 
R 
L >, 
-R D x. 
00 
vi , I: 
;: Z oo ý 
"-ý^-i 
e7 ý ' 
ON OM O 
c^ . 
-V Rý O 7 
> 
M 
O ý 
V1 "G 
ý R 
O 
ý 
O 
cV 
IN 
OM 
Mý 
ÖM 
Mý 
pM 
M 
pM 
M 
pM 
MM 
p N 
N 
p N 
c a w' D 
EFcü 
Vü >ru:! 
yu 
w v) 
CO ON 
>, ü O. 7 R'O 
Cy 
O Oý N ýý ýý 
lb 
^ 
Oh 
lý 
p 
O v1 
M 
O 
N 
O 
N 
O '! ý 
tý 
v 
M 
Oý ? 
M 
Oý ? Oý 'ý 
O, 
oo ? N 
N 
00 ý 
ý 
M 
z 
r 
CZ 'A ý 
M 
CO 
ý II 
;z 
Uy 
ý 
te CU 
E 
OC 
7U 
T7 ` 
cr 
cc U cE 
x 3° 
-0 7 
Ex 
w 
ý. a) 
N 
cý3 
Q) 
II 
aci .0 Ü [C K 
öyO 
UN 6) C) 
.OU 
40. 
y 
"a cd O 
OyC 
ý ... 
24 
ý"-- 3ý 
N r- 
'. ` 
CL 0 
COU ._ 
> 
p aS 
öq äý ä) 
ý°öO 
;; EE 
öo 
io II'ý 
ý. : ... 
ä$ FEý 
g eL 
Ew 
cüý ö^ 
o° 3c 
o g 
är 
cw 
ýs 
cw 
ö° cm 
° s = _ = 2 = z z 
C 
tf E E E E E E E E 
_ I. - - X 
O 
' 
$$ ý ý $$ $g 8 g 
g 
E 
ý ° ý E y 
X X X 
g 
X w cý X ü 
IA 
. i u ü 
ý 
ü ü ü u 
X LE Lt Lt 
c 
E E 
3 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
ä p 
W 
Cc 
it 
cC 
0Y 
Il 
W 
Ö5 
C 
GÄ 
WE 
1 
{ w 5 
1.4 
E 
h 
(J 3 
UE 
. ^ 
UE 
ý O^ 
UE 
^ 
UE UE UE 
Oq 
ua 
Ol 
U. 5 
Ö 
uE 
O 
UE 
Ö 
UE 
ý 
we 
9O ý 
w O. ý 
c 
B er= 
U 
QEý 
T E_ 
a ý o2 ig N N i LL L1 
a a 
I1 t /1 
ýÖ 
Y. M 5! 
S N N S S S S 2 2 
ý 
ü C u u ü 
h F- ü r h° 1-° 
F F F°- F F-° F 
ýý+( 
CyÖ 
Ö Ö Ö Oö^ 
ö 
ýäCp ; 
ýöp+ 
c 
' ý 
ö Qý ÖY Y § ý öý C 
C 
r8 
3r, ý 
r8 
3 
rE rE r8 
J 
rE 
J 
r8 rE 
ö 
rE rE 
1 
rE 
ö C Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö _ 
F F= ü F°- B F°- 
Fü F- E FB (-° E FE i-° E I-° E 
C 
0 
ý 
N ýn 
0 
ý 
V ö 
"R 
C 
ý 
C 
h ý 
C 
.D 
oU 0 
CV 
cs N 
y V1 
p II 
U 'D 
C Ul 
CO 
p 
O. 
N 
O 
V 
O 
nV 
oq C 
cp 
L ,0 
J 
pu 
Of) C 
>O 
CC 
C 
.-O -' u 
s II 
öM 'fl 
äS cz 
a-. 
ý U u 0 
ý 
5 C5 
rý 
u .., 
Lý 
öc3ü 
oä Z 
,-C CL 
ty Oý Qd 
öcöýo5mýp 
CoW=n5E00 
a "ý ý_ý ä. o yý :. '. .. C. 0 ._=O 
._h 
zr Vl 0>>.. . 
Cý cvi °V p' 
ü "ý v, 
tUcý, ý CG pp `C OOgy 
Ü7 6 ed 
yc0 bj3 
-5 
cüot°oE 
Eý ääöýd 
30 ll coöCw Oý 
o 
Il cd 
-c 
.öoc>c oOý. ý II ü 
CLq7 'O Z` O E o6äpc;: y dj e to il moi0 
E 
pý 
ChUC 
3'0 CC 
.U 
"ý 
O II .. U. 
O"ý O-. Oy 
doc'. Q igö ý, l 
ý° c `ý u 
Z cý 'y O ti C '. ^E D aeov 8 ooc o öü 
Cýý .ýýL0 r övx ö° Z; 4. ) = 
9 
"n o. 
e9" r 
-;, 
Üý 
a7 
ý- C 
"° 
ä"q 
E=CCägý E+ 
ohe-Eo60 kg, 3 ý. I sL öý Cp 
W II ü 11 
ýI 
ý$ 
r _ 
5ý'ü 
ü 
HCV 
y ý N" 
v5i 
ýy pÖ 
O Y. 
y 
Yý OÖO Ný 
ý 
e U 
ý 
ö 
c 
00 
.E 
u 
JD 
0 
M 
C 
l0 
b 
CS 
0 
N 
V1 
U 
C 
ý 
z 
C 
O 
9 
0 
u V 
s 
: fl 
N 
ý 
u E 
0 3 
2 
ý ý 
E 
2 
Ta 
P. 
d8 
15 
i7 
N 
n 
Oý 
0 
C 
0. 
ÜO 
ý 
"L 
CQ 
O 
VL 
o> .. ý; 
ai 
ö 
"° uM 
EC0Ü 
y cc33 
ýa0 
.0°yLJL 
aEi 3Q" _° Ea y'E aEi 
Týaou 
wüý1 
, *o,. ^ 
öv-, -E a u 
a :: ".. 
° L' .° . '. 
'D. 
üü. >0 rn s 
ý ýs 
Iü Ec_ eý 
11 xbp 
E 
H 'ýO 11 äE 
?ö xý ü üý 
° a. E ti E, zýuö-'HKUý 
.erN ý 
týn 
ý 11 
GÖOO N7E 
ü =1 ro ýQ> öo äo 
'i7 C ti"ý "O T"CC 
xCö. ö. ý ý 
°'- ý ý" Ku ,NOO E ýq 
"7 
G . 
7.. a 
v-ý_ 
.ý xä a-=: 9 99 
` = Q`r =ý 
N 
Cfý rý{{r O"ý O"ý O"^ 
N22 
M" 
10M 
00 
ý00 
nw 
M 
o- r- Ö Ö 
ý 
n r- 
0 
r- 
0 
t, ý " 
O, 
r,., 
Ö 
r 
0 
r 
Öý- 
^ 
-ý 
o".. 
Ö 
rÖ 
Ö 
C. 
c `-' 
0 . "- 
9p 
ci 
'pp 
-4 
ý 
N 
eý 
N 
N N 
ý 
ä 
r 
eý 
N 
N M 
N 
a 
ý'pp 
O 
"OO .. 
ý+ 
b 
at+ 
Oc 
' . . 
t O 
. O h h v1 
O' 
Al 
Q' 1n a 
.n 
rn 
V1 
a` 
v1 
Q\ ö 
n 
n 
VYc 
L Ö > 
7 Z' ö cö " 
^. . -. - . -- - 
O .O .O O 
NÖ Ö Ö ýi 
f 
n 
' t 
W ý ý W ö W 0ý0 0`00 
V 
E O rt `OCD 
r"1 "-" 
'Qö 
"--" 
`Oö 
H1 . --. 
IIR ö 
OO r. ö fn , --. `Q 
ý 
^ 
`0 
N 
. --. 
'O 
N 
0 0 cs C ý 0 ý 
"ý 
... M{': "ry 
V N V h. 
"ril "rn "rn 
E 
__ , :O 
N N N CI" C! IV Cl fV 
.I 
b0 
`rOö '°ID 'rQö mö ö bö b mg er O 
p Np 
NA NO Np Np Np N p Np 
NO 
ü Q, F 
Qe ` v ö ä ä or v ä v v M. 
V fV N N N N N N N t`. N 
ý V 
O 'O ^ 
p 
`O N. 
NO 
`Q er. 
NO 
'Q M 
NO 
D\ ^_ 
NO 
bM 
NQ 
b 
N 
t1 
O 
b 
týl 
Np 
h 
_^ NO 
aM 
Np . L... F ý "d ,d ,ö ö .d "d "d o d Q 
3 v 4 4 0 ° q ° q o q c?, 
c ^ 
O 
y 
Jv 
c' F" .. ý 
ý 
Ä_ 
Q V . 
LC 
O 
cf y ef O et 
ýO 
ý' O 
ef 
ýO y 
O 
eT 
O 
ný Ö 
O 
ý L' p NÖ 
p 
f`! Ö NO 
. "NO 
lY Ö fV O "NO ý 
NO 
" 'i O 
N O NO " 
E 
C , . _ 
E 
° 
w ü R 4 9 5' R 9 4 ° 4 4" 4 
. , 
O ý 
o oO ag o O O oO Oý 
$ Ng 
.ý «ý E 
O 
np 
O 
ýý 
ý 
ýo ene Ci v m ci "i ý ý. C a0 ý; p 
NQ 
~ 
ý 
c 
'! q t 
A 
ý 
`ý' " Ü 
"'1 
° .. d ö 
.. d 
'D 
d 
.. d d d 
m 
d 
.ý 
d 
ý 
O O 
O 
OÖ 
' "' 
OÖ 
gO . 
^t O et 
O 
O 
e} 
O 
O 
ef 
O 
tVÖ^ s{^ 
N ý 
ÖC Np Np Np Ný Np N N0 
_ 
c`1 ý m 
V "Q 
F 
13 
'g 
V O O 
C O O 0 C O O 
.. 
F o pp 
N n Nh 
o q 
ryý 
o pp 
Nh r 
p p 
Ný r t- 
Q V1 N 
C 
NN 
ý Öý Ö0 00 Op OC O Gi O c5 C ^, C ^Ö ^G 
C Fý v u u u 
LJ 
M M 
A 
M 
r 
m 
V 
O O O O O O O O N C? 
N "'f a V1 b r 00 O' O 
X$ 
a .o 
+ 
Mu X 
cq° 
II y 
N3 
ä .O ü 
CC 
O 
.D 
'C w 
w 
ý. 
N 
-ý 
NB 
.ý .ý 33 
Ný ä 
ý 
+ý 
zä 
11 
-o "ý 
I äýýl 
.. 
ý N 
3'«. 
CGN 
Xv ri 
W q. fn 
. }. 
bý 
" 
.UN 
+Ö 
"ý 
. 
L. 
U+ 
u -ci 
-^. Cü 
>öä 
aU 
Zoa -C S_ -5 
ö 
0ý 
n. ýa 
, ý, 11 ^="- z 
y >+ 
-fl 
Ö OM O 
ä 
C, ý ý^ 11 
ýenU ýZ 
a-, ave 
.. 1 Coo Uy= 
w 
aui 
Eö° 
Ü 
. 
U. 
y. 
ß. -A 
C" 
S4 yy 
Ný tn "i"'j 
010 .mZ9" g y. C. ü Z: eu F- W7Cý 
M0 ctl my 
Cuy>d 
Uy . Z3 
V CO 2Ub C 
.. 
0.. 'O uÖ O 
O0Oýr ÜýC7 
aý: 
t 
C '. .ýý GGg "Fa 
m 
"ý 
w 
Y¬ 
? ýý ýý 
eýý 
EYýý, h. 
Sý 
ýý EE G262 
Y. 
1ýd+ ý, 
L 22 
ý¬ 
a"E 
3 e'1 
Fý 
'3 
2 
ý" 
9 
Fýý 
Fý 
E 
. 
o 
IN ýý... 
S 9 ä S S ä 
_c. 
S 
EE 
ý 
EE 66 fi 
ý 
äPE 
gq 
SEý, 
3" 
eEý 
3 
gg qq ýprý. 
3 
rrýý 
äý$ 
" 
pp pp 
fiýý{ 
" 
gÄ 
y&ag 
" 
gg 
E 
3 3 3 3 3 
Ix 'ý _8 §. -s öý5 F. 7g ä"hS 3y, 
3oEry fi 
5ý-ý 
ý_ý äöý, <ý 
ýoýy< ýb ý-= ýbý. sý ýoý=Eý ý; ý. fiýý g; ýýzý göý=" , 
! 5 
ä_ ý 4 
9 
. 
öb"ýý 
_bbý. _g °bb""ag 11ý 
' 
`db"ýS ýdb: '-, F 
_ýdb"ý, 
ö 
I e. ý 
§ 
ýýgsJ`. 
ý 
aa'b 
$ 8 ? t" 1 
a°bI 
ýS at 11.5; 
q a°b E 
18b S 
Cýý. 
bbýý bbý8 
d 
bb S 
_bb 
5 `b S 
abb 
ý °bs$$ýý S 
"ý 
bbý ¬ 
. '. 
gggEýý;:. "_: 
bb", 
76 
"býp`5=ý,. 
bý6ýp§ `o`6y'ý 
ga``aýý 
iIU $=ýg 
ove 
3ý ýý ý ýb 1 bb ý bb 8 ý ab b g7g `b ff jý bb 
E 
ý 
ö 
E 
ý' 
0., 
ii"fl 
V 
a 
Z ý a 
mý. 
ýä `5e ° 
p 
e 
p 
E Yo 
ý 
gg 
2ä 
Eä e 
p 
> 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
ý ` ' 
y3 A 9 ý1 ý Ey'Tý ý r 
! U1 
ý gý. 
E6§ýý °ý. 
18ECýý 
° rr A 
' E 
. ... z Zu 
z z 
50_ 
ee<: ý ký öý ----- ö 
IE Eý 
a Ü 
6 
öý 
= a Y 
ýýQ 
p°". ýýi 
y 5 5 5 
, ýg, 
.S: "ý. 
ý ý "5. 
ý=+ý ý ý E n 
'I 
` 
ý 
i; _ 3ý= E 2ý2", 3 
E-a 
9 
g 3. 
g 
tl 
ä 3= 
°ý 
4 
3¬I 
c 3 
+ 
ý ý 
ýý: 3x ýx x 3x x 
C 3ý 3f 3i 3ý 3ý 
= 
L 
r ~ 
ý 
~ 
ý 
=Öý 
I 
s-3 
ecPCB e L'ý8 e 
~öý k . 
E 
ýý 
$ 
ci7E 
ii 8 S. -a ' 
£ 
o$ 
ýýs' ; ýý ýý ýý$ ; A M 
r 
1 iIiiJ jIJrp ý" Ifl 
ý . 
g äý fi 9 
jifl ii! i Iiti ýýýý 
ýý 
s 'at a g 
' 
i 9 GY 
5 G 
Z 
h 
ý ý 3 
ii. 
C 
.dU ö° 
s 
N 
7C 
O 
.LN 
äpa 
ä3 
3 
oý 
E 
ý' 
a 
E 
°p 
"7 ý 
ýý 
0. i C 
?ýÖÜ 
ÜO ý` 
h wO 
. -.. N 
Oý . '« 00 
E yT7 
d3ýý 
. eý 
> 
öý 
ti ýw 
.0 vN 
EE 
ýu eý 
Q7 N 
ý 
II ö 
n0 
vö 
ý II ä) ýp 
VI 
ýO 
"ý ý 
7% 
ý "ý 
O 
0 
OA 
N 
Ir 
L 
.D 
ý 
go u ti 
v Ce yOÜ 
Cý 
Oy ý ý F- 11 R 
e ýO 
v, 
ý 
N 
11 -0 
0O 
.. O 
2N 
>ö 
ev 
NC 
OO 
Ow 
`_" aic a0 
c .. U 
Oö. 
CJ 
ýs 
N? 
CG 
vöö 
,pug d 
äoý 'y 
oý3ö 
ý3ä 
--6 ., ý ?4n4. Ew il 
"` .OhNN 
C) ýý 
w0 
ý 
t3 
ýýÖ 
c 
'J ýV 7pw 
CU p"- d 
u FFF+ý+ "p"" 
ÖJ? 
ý 
.ý 
0 Vi 
E 
0 
.O 
ý 
W 
N 
ý w 
Ü 
'n. 
E 
ý ý 
V 
ý w 
L0 
N 
ý y 0 
ý 
ý 
N 
ý 
C 
"C 
O 
ti 
E O 
.D. 
ý 
l.; 
N 
s_ 
to - 0 
C 
O 
ý 
U 
_O 
N 
L 
Li 
C7ÖCw 
Oq "ý ý' cJ 
'in ü cý7 
n' Eý 
eco zý°ý 
Av2 ij u i' 
d2 
r. 0 t) E 
Yö"ä C 
Ö- wp 
=y 
Gpý 
ß0 
O^=2 
mNkS9 Z: 
ti 
N 
ý 
ýy 
ý 
ý 
U 
t 
3 
g' NN_ ;Züö 
Qý wx 
0e 
N 7'N 
"'. 0 
V ,, 
ý, CW"OD 
44C .ö OL O 'nf Oyv 
c u. ýý II HC 
Gr, ý2 
ý 
-2 .. 
ý 
._., 
Ol! -v .... ý. 
+ 
CC 
V6 ýn 
F3ý 
3 .n 
o c^Ui ý"c 0 o. =UUO 
b. y' NU wO ý"ü 
K ý" ý= 
rýýý 
;5 
91XÜ 3 wö 
'JýxwaNj! 
ff: 
a 0 C. 
ö wtiý EEý 
uo- ýý 'x Yý wn 
WN ý" üy 
0 'O 
`27 ýaö= 
. a: y, gc ý, c c8 
e. °dr .J_ 11 ... -ý-- 
ai 
O 
.0 
C 
0 
ý 
.0 
"0 ý 
O 
Q. 
U 
U 
E 
'C 
a. 
ö 
e 
yN 
R7 
0 
0 
C, 
äý 
G 
w1xu 
ý v'f II h 
en ,. r o ! 2. 
d ... 
._y is11 
$ 
C, if 
öx 
[Cu 'A 
OCÜ7 
Eo. bM Ep 
C 
2 
ýO 
CÜ 
C 
0 
9° 
a2 a3i °"°ý 
-ý'. 
°cý° °ä 
aüv 11 ° `r3 y 
0007T7 
uLLCuy 
ONN00L 
.a tL"a LdO 
93 ö°pt" a'ýi 
Ö 
e II II up Cy 
°'v 11 ö il 
c! 
C 
.Ö.:. O 
ü .-H°N 
,3 '0 
p 
"n. 
vý 
y" 
= 4r ü 
d 
Ma ybuö0 
öO 
3d Cý"y CyUö 
ý... ,ýOxÖÄ 0 
vni 
HO *3 o=ü 
äýö. c"yvyýIle 
üCV 11 
ý 
CL y CD 3 
Mö0 ü'° °''° 'O 
:4 ? '. n 
°° F ý'"' y -0 ^ 'Ci 
. 
°G 7L 
.ýc II y °° 
ýöý .ý TL 11 
a3 .oa, b 11 '° y ti_ e`i o"rs °.. c II 
cy 
Ruu 
7: bd 0 
q) 
ý, 
"C ,p 
23 p 'Ö 
Oä 
u-e 
eQo 
äQ 
V 
ý 
ý-r 
d 
E 
c0 
E 
cl i. 
«3 
ca 
r. 
cC 
E 
ca 
t. 
ý C 
ý 
0 
ý w 0 
d 
0 
0 ý 
v 
ID. v 
E 
O 
z 
OJ 
L 
CQ 
C 
O 
O O 
M 
h 
00 
O 
M 
V5 W 
O 
M 
ul W 
O 
N 
ý/ry 
p^p 
ý M h M 
N 
V1 
d 
h 
W hý hN 
v 
A. 
. -. . -. = . - . ý. O O O[- O .ý O r. O . -. O . -. OM O 
. 
O. 
M 
öqý °CV 
> 
Fv -1 
O (:; 
C 
M 
kn OO 
Cý N 
N 
e 
. ___.. . öN öý öN öN 
O 
öN 
O 
0 v^, 
^+ 
Oý O O^ 
'V 
O O O^ 
M 
C7ý 
OO 
ý O^ O v O '/ 
. -. 
"' N 
uý . ea. 
Ö 
.6 
Ö Öý 
Oý O Oý 
Ö 
CT 
Ö 
O, 
Ö 
Oý 
Ö 
O; 
Ö 
Orn 
Ö 
C1ý 
y Ö 
rn 
1 Ö 
Ch o0 
ö 
.. 
u. Te-ý 
.. 
WW 
t pýp 
N 
N 
76. ov 
OiM 9M 
an $Y Ä 
Ný ' 
h 
pN 
C -,, a 
3E 
'aý 
3 
vS 
C9 O, n Oý h cý 'o 
E° ON OtV CD fV ON 
3x_ 
;. IE.. 
ý.... 
"R'^^ 10 'Rcc; 0ý ý ý Mý 
ýO ý0M0 
MN 
M 
M ... ell N ýi 
3$ 
a'oö 4 v' ý :j vi S o` 
Eý. ýý ON Ov Ov o fV O(V O(V 
Eý 
c... y; Y.. .: V G\ 
ý} 
VN 
eý ýM 
ý 
ýý}} 
tt M ý 
a} ýM 
ý '7 
n V^ 
ýO 
N 7M tt 
00 
O 
aaýý 
VM Vr 
V O` Vm 
V Oý V O ' ý 
Ö 
v 
Ö 
7 
Ön 
v 0ý v O s 
Öý 
'7 O `cf 
Öý 
V O 
ý'" 
V 
609 
V OV M 
. i 
.. o, 
n'. ö 
5 C', O O 
12 ^ 
O 
OR 
"t 
UN 
C 
Ö N 
CO 
Cl! 
N NV 
O o i i 
R ýN ý [h O Q i 
N N (V 
_ ... yo.. 
nCý 
OO 
c 
N'V 
O 
NV 
c 
ý 
6-, t 
rj 
NM 
e4 
NN NN 
V 
Ný 
O 
Ný NN 
öona-; ä ei iN N 
9 cV ON Oi ýN C? N 1. (V 
Tp dý 
CV 
oo Or ° 
C g. 
ä. 
_I= T 
YL' ÖN to Öý ý' Öm rl: OR Ö Ö Do Mý O "t Oý b ýý 
r 
C. ) N N pý M (V 
ý 9ý 
tV C-4 
'ý'ý'. 
. ü 
.x 
N M V h b n 00 as O N M 
ý M 
r- 
z 
Vi 
U 
on 
M 
U 
N 
CN 
G 
y 
a 
ý 
ý 
6 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Agarwal, B. (1994). A Field of One's Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ainsworth, M., Beegle, K. and Nyamate, A. (1996). 'The Impact of Women's Schooling on Fertility 
and Contraceptive Use: A Study of Fourteen Sub-Saharan African Countries. ' World Bank 
Economic Review, 10: 1, January, pp. 85-122. 
Ajayi, A. and Kekovole, J. (1998). 'Kenya's Population Policy: From Apathy to Effectiveness. ' In Do 
Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India. Kenya and Mexico (ed. A. 
Jain), pp. 113-156. New York: Population Council. 
Aldrich, J. H. and Nelson, F. D. (1984). Linear Probability, Logit and Probit Models. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Allen, D. (1993). Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
Aly, H. Y. and Shields, M. P. (1991). 'Son-Preference and Contraception in Egypt. ' Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 39: 2, pp. 353-370. 
Amin, S., Diamond I. and Steele, F. (1996). 'Contraception and Religious Practice in Bangladesh. ' 
Policy Research Division Working Paper, 83, New York: Population Council. 
Anand, S. and Harris, C. (1989). 'Food and Standard of Living: An Analysis Based on Sri Lankan 
Data. ' University of Oxford Applied Economics Discussion Paper Series, 84. 
Anderson, K. H., Hill, M. A. and Butler, J. S. (1987). 'Age at Marriage in Malaysia: A Hazard Model 
of Marriage Timing. ' Journal of Developmental Economics, 26: 2, pp. 223-34. 
Appleton, S. (1996). 'How Does Female Education Affect Fertility? A Structural Model for Cote 
d'Ivoire, ' Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58, pp. 139-166. 
Arends-Kuenning, M. (1997). 'The Equity and Efficiency of Doorstep Delivery of Contraceptives in 
Bangladesh. ' Policy Research Division Working Paper, 101, New York: Population Council. 
Bagchi, A. K. (1991). 'Predatory Commercialization and Communalism in India. ' In Anatomy of a 
Confrontation: The Babri Masiid-Ramianmabhoomi issue (ed. S. Gopal), pp. 193-218. Delhi: 
Penguin. 
Balagopal, K. (1992). 'Why Did December 6,1992 Happen? ' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
XXVIII, No. 17,24 April, pp. 790-795. 
Balk, D. (1994). 'Individual and Community Aspects of Women's Status and Fertility in Rural 
Bangladesh. ' Population Studies, 48, pp. 21-45. 
Basu, A. M. (1992). Culture, the Status of Women and Demographic Behaviour. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
- (1993). 'Cultural Influences on the Timing of First Births in India: Large Differences that 
Add Up to Little Difference. ' Population Studies, 47: 1, pp. 85-95. 
(1997). 'The "Politicisation" of Fertility to Achieve Non-Demographic Objectives. ' 
Population Studies, 51: 1, pp. 5-18. 
Batliwala, S., Anitha, B. K., Gurumurthy, A. and Wali, C. S. (1998). Status of Rural Women in 
Karnataka. Bangalore: National Institute of Advanced Studies. 
Bayly, C. A. (1983). Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British 
Expansion 1770-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge-University Press. 
Beck, L. and Keddie, N. eds. (1978). Women in the Muslim World. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Becker, G. S. (1991). A Treatise on the Family: Enlarged Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
- (1981). A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
- (1973). 'A Theory of Marriage: Part I. ' Journal of Political Economy, 81: 4, pp. 813-846. 
- (1974a). 'A Theory of Marriage: Part II. ' Journal of Political Economy, 82: 2: pt. 2, pp. S11- 
S26. 
- (1974b). 'A Theory of Marriage. ' In Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children and 
Human Capital (ed. T. W. Schultz), pp. 299-344. Chicago: NBER. 
Becker, G. S. and Lewis, H. G. (1973). 'On the Interaction Between the Quantity and Quality of 
Children. ' Journal of Political Economy, 81, pp. S279-288. 
Biddlecom, A. E., Casterline J. B. and Perez, A. E. (1996). 'Men's and Women's Views of 
Contraception. ' Policy Research Division Working Paper, 92. New York: Population 
Council. 
337 
Birdsall, N. M. (1976). 'Women and Population Studies. ' Signs, 1: 3, pp. 699-712. 
- (1989). 'Economic Analyses of Rapid Population Growth. ' World Bank Research Observer, 
4, pp. 23-50. 
Birdsall, N. M. and Griffin, C. G. (1988). 'Fertility and Poverty in Developing Countries. ' Journal of 
Policy Modelling, 10: 1, pp. 29-55. 
Bittles, A. H. (1994). 'The Role and Significance of Consanguinity as a Demographic Variable. ' 
Population and Development Review, March, pp. 561-584. 
Bittles, A. H., Cobles, J. M. and Appaji Rao, N. (1993). 'Trends in Consanguineous Marriage in 
Karnataka, South India, 1980-1989. ' Journal of Biosocial Science, 25, pp. 111-116. 
Blake, J. (1984). 'Catholicism and Fertility: On Attitudes of Young Americans. ' Population and 
Development Review, 10, pp. 329-340. 
Blundell, R. W., Browning M. A. and Meghir, C. (1989). 'A Microeconometric Model of Intertemporal 
Substitution and Consumer Demand. ' UCL Economic Discussion Paper, 89- 11. 
Blundell, R. W. and Preston, I. (1992). 'The Distinction between Income and Consumption in 
Measuring the Distribution of Household Welfare. ' UCL Discussion Paper, 92-01. 
- (1994). 'Income or Consumption in the Measurement of Inequality and Poverty? ' Institute 
for Fiscal Studies Working Paper, 94/12, pp. 1-17. 
Blundell, R. W., Preston I. and Walker, I. eds. (1994). The Measurement of Household Welfare. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bodmer, W. F. and Cavalli-Sforza L. L. (1976). Genetics. Evolution, and Man. San Francisco: W. 
H. Freeman. 
Bongaarts, J. (1978). 'A Framework for Analysing the Proximate Determinants of Fertility. ' 
Population and Development Review, 4: 1, pp. 105-132. 
- (1991). 'The KAP-Gap and the Unmet Need 
for Contraception. ' Population and 
Development Review, 17: 2, pp. 293-313. 
- (1993). 'The Supply-Demand Framework for the Determinants of 
Fertility: An Alternative 
Implementation. ' Population Studies, 47, pp. 437-456. 
- (1997a). 'Trends in Unwanted Childbearing 
in the Developing World. ' Policy Research 
Division Working Paper, 98. New York: Population Council. 
- (1997b). 'The Role of 
Family Planning Programmes in Contemporary Fertility Transitions. ' 
In The Continuing Demographic Transition (eds. G. W. Jones, R. M. Douglas, J. C. Caldwell 
and R. M. D'Souza), pp. 422-443. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Bongaarts, J. and Bruce, J. (1995). 'The Causes of Unmet Need for Contraception and the Social 
Content of Services. ' Studies in Family Planning. 26: 2, pp. 57-75. 
Bongaarts, J. and Watkins, S. C. (1996). 'Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions. ' 
Population and Development Review, 22: 4, pp. 639-682. 
Boldsen, J. L. (1992). 'Season of Birth and Recalled Age at Menarche. ' Journal of Biosocial Science, 
24: 2, pp. 167-173. 
Bose, A. (1991). Demographic Diversity of India: 1991 Census. State and District Level Data. A 
Reference Book. Delhi: B. R. Publishing. 
Boulier, L. and Rosenzweig, M. (1978). 'Age, Biological Factors and Socio-Economic Determinants 
of Fertility. ' Demography, 15, pp. 487-497. 
Bourgeois-Pichat, J. (1967). 'Social and Biological Determinants of Human Fertility in Nonindustrial 
Societies. ' Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 3, pp. 160-163. - 
Brian Arthur, W. (1981). Book Review of G. S. Becker's 'A Treatise on the Family, ' Population and 
Development Review, 8: 2, pp. 393-397. 
Brien, M. J. and Lillard, L. A. (1994). 'Education, Marriage and First Conception in Malaysia. ' 
Journal of Human Resources, XXIX. 4, pp. 1167-1204. 
Bulatao, R. A. and Lee, R. D. (1983). Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Cain, M. (1977). 'The Economic Activities of Children in a Village in Bangladesh, ' Population and 
Development Review, 3: 3, pp. 201-227. 
- (1978). 'The Household Life Cycle and Economic Mobility in Rural Bangladesh. ' 
Population and Development Review, 4: 3, pp. 421-438. 
- (1981). 'Risk and Insurance: Perspectives on Fertility and Agrarian Change in India and 
Bangladesh. ' Population and Development Review, 7: 3, pp. 435-474. 
- (1984). 'Women's Status and Fertility in Developing Countries: Son Preference and 
Economic Security. ' World Bank Staff Working Papers, 682. 
338 
1' 
Cain, M., Khanam, S. R. and Nahar, S. (1979). 'Class, Patriarchy and Women's Work in Bangladesh. ' 
Population and Development Review, 5: 3, pp. 405-438. 
Caldwell, J. C., (1980). 'Mass Education as a Determinant of the Timing of Fertility Decline. ' 
Population and Development Review, 6: 2, pp. 225-255. 
- (1986). 'Routes to Low Mortality in Poor Countries. ' Population and Development Review, 
12: 2, pp. 171-220. 
- (1996). 'Demography and social science. ' Population Studies, 50, pp. 305-333. 
Caldwell, J. C. and Caldwell, P. (1990). 'Cultural Forces Tending to Sustain High Fertility. ' In 
Population Growth and Reproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: Technical Analyses of Fertility 
and Its Consequences (eds. G. T. Acsadi, G. Johnson-Acsadi and R. A. Bulatao), 
Washington: World Bank. 
- (1997). 'Population Growth, Physical Resources and Human Resources in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. ' In The Economics of Transnational Commons (eds. P. Dasgupta, K. Mäler and A. 
Vercelli), pp. 118-140. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Caldwell, J. C., Reddy, P. H. and Caldwell, P. (1983). 'The Causes of Marriage Change in South 
India. ' Population Studies, 37: 3, pp. 343-61. 
- (1985). 'Educational Transition in Rural South India. ' Population and Development 
Review, 11: 1, pp. 29-51. 
Caldwell, J. C., Caldwell, P. -and Orubuloye, 1.0. (1992). `Fertility Decline in Africa: A New Type of 
Transition? ' Population and Development Review, 18: 2, pp. 211-242. 
Carlson, E. (1979). 'Family Background, School and Early Marriage. ' Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, 41, pp. 341-353. 
Cassen, R. H. (1976). 'Population and Development: A Summary. ' World Development, 4: 10&11, 
pp. 785-830. 
Cassen, R. H. et al. (1994). Population and Development: Old Debates, New Conclusions. US Third 
World Policy Perspectives, 19. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Castro Martin, T. (1995). 'Women's Education and Fertility: Results from Twenty Demographic and 
Health Surveys. ' Studies in Family Planning, 26: 4, pp. 187-202. 
Centerwall, W. R. and Centerwall, S. A. (1966). 'Consanguinity and Congenital Anomalies in South 
India: A Pilot Study. ' Indian Journal of Medical Research, 54, pp. 1160-1167. 
Chamie, J. (1977). 'Religious Differentials in Fertility: Lebanon, 1971. ' Population Studies, 31: 2, pp. 
365-382. 
Chandra, B. (1984). Communälism in Modern India. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers. 
Chandrasekaran, C. (1952). 'Cultural Patterns in Relation to Family Planning in India. ' In Report of 
the Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Planned Parenthood. Bombay: 
Family Planning Association of India. 
Chaudhuri, S. and Ravallion, M. (1994). 'How Well do Static Indicators Identify the Chronically 
Poor? ' Journal of Public Economics, 53, pp. 367-394. 
Chen, J. A., Hicks, W. L., Johnson, S. R. and Rodriguez, R. C. (1990). 'Economic Development, 
Contraception and Fertility Decline in Mexico. ' Journal of Development Studies, 26: 3, pp.. 
408-24. 
Chen, L. C., Huq, E. and D'Souza, S. (1981). 'Sex Bias in the Family Allocation of Food and Health 
Care in Rural Bangladesh. ' Population and Development Review, 7: 1, pp. 55-70. " Cleland, J. (1993). 'Equity, Security and Fertility: A Reaction to Thomas. ' Population Studies, 47, pp. 
345-352. 
Cleland, J. and Wilson, C. (1987). 'Demand Theories of the Fertility Transition: An Iconoclastic 
View. ' Population Studies, 41, pp. 5-30. 
Christensen, G. (1992). 'Sensitive Information: Collecting Information on Livestock and Informal 
Credit. ' In Fieldwork in Developing Countries (eds. S. Devereux and J. Hoddinott), pp. 124- 
137. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Cochrane, S. H. (1975). 'Children as By-Products, Investment Goods and Consumer Goods: A 
Review of Some Micro-Economic Models of Fertility. ' Population Studies, 29: 3, pp. 373- 
390. 
- (1979). 'Fertility and Education: What Do We Really Know? ' World Bank Staff 
Occasional Papers 1379, World Bank. 
- (1983). 'Effects of Education and Urbanisation on Fertility. ' In Determinants of Fertility in 
Developing Countries (eds. R. A. Bulatao and R. D. Lee), pp. 992-1026. New York: 
Academic Press. 
339 
Cochrane, S. and Farid, S. (1990). 'Socioeconomic Differentials in Fertility and their Explanation. ' In 
Population Growth and Reproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: Technical Analysis of Fertility 
and its Consequences (eds. G. Acsadi , G. Johnson-Acsadi and R. A. Bulatao), pp. 144 -154. 
Washington: World Bank. 
Cochrane, S. and Guilkey, D. K. (1995). 'The Effects of Fertility Intentions and Access to Services on 
Contraceptive Use in Tunisia. ' Economic Development and Cultural Change, pp. 779-804. 
Conklin, G. H. (1973). 'Urbanisation, Cross-Cousin Marriage and Power for Women: A Sample from 
Dharwar. ' Contributions to Indian Sociology, New Series 7, pp. 53-63. 
Cotts Watkins, S. (1990). 'From Local to National Communities: The Transformation of Demographic 
Regions in Western Europe 1870-1960. ' Population and Development Review, 16, pp. 241-272. 
Coulson, N. and Hinchcliffe, D. 'Women and Law Reform in Contemporary Islam. ' In Women in the 
Muslim World (eds. L. Beck and N. Keddie), pp. 37-49. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Cramer, J. S. (199 1). The Logit Model: An Introduction for Economists London: Edward Arnold. 
Das Gupta, M. (1994). 'What Motivates Fertility Decline? A Case Study from Punjab, India. ' In 
Understanding Reproductive Change: Kenya, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Costa Rica (eds. B. Egerö 
and M. Hammarskjöld), pp. 101-133. Lund: Lund University Press. 
Das Gupta, M., Chen, L. C. and Krishnan, T. N. eds. (1995). Women's Health in India: Risk and 
Vulnerability. Bombay: Oxford University Press. 
Dasgupta, P. (1993a). An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
- (1993b). 'Poverty, Resources and Fertility: The Household as a Reproductive Partnership. ' 
In Alternatives to Capitalism (ed. A. B. Atkinson), 207-243. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
- (1995a). 'The Population Problem: Theory and Evidence. ' Journal of Economic Literature, 
33, pp. 1879-1902. 
- (1995b). 'Population, Poverty and the Local Environment. ' Scientific American, February, 
pp. 26-31. 
Day, L. H. (1968). 'Natality and Ethnocentrism: Some Relationships Suggested by a Study of 
Catholic-Protestant Differentials. ' Population Studies, 22, pp. 27-50. 
Devereux, S and Hoddinott, J. eds. (1992). Fieldwork in Developing Countries. London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Dharmalingam, A. and Philip Morgan, S. (1996). 'Women's Work, Autonomy and Birth Control: 
Evidence from Two South Indian Villages. ' Population Studies, 50: 2, pp. 187-201. 
Dreze, J. and Sen, A. (1995). India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Duraisamy, P. (1988). 'An Econometric Analysis of Fertility, Child Schooling and Labour Force 
Participation of Women in Rural Indian Households. ' Journal of Quantitative Economics, 4: 
2, pp. 293-316. 
Dyson, T. and Moore, M. (1983). 'On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy and Demographic 
Behaviour in. India. ' Population and Development Review, pp. 35-60.. 
Dyson, T. and Crook, N. eds. (1984). India's Demography: Essays on the Contemporary Population. 
New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. 
Easterlin, R. A. (1975). 'An Economic Framework for Fertility Analysis. ' Studies in Family Planning, 
6, pp. 54-63. 
- (1978). 'The Economics and Sociology of Fertility: A Synthesis. ' In Historical Studies of 
Changing Fertility (ed. C. Tilly), pp. 57-134. Princeton : Princeton University Press. 
Economist newspaper. (1994). 3 September, pp. 21-23. 
Egerö, B. (1994). 'Reproductive Change is a Social Process. ' In Understanding Reproductive Change: 
Kenya, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Costa Rica (eds. B. Egerö and M. Hammarskjöld), pp. 9-30. 
Lund: Lund University Press, 
Egerö, B. and Hammarskjöld, M. eds. (1994). Understanding Reproductive Change: Kenya, Tamil 
Nadu, Punjab, Costa Rica. Lund: Lund University Press. 
Engineer, A. A., (1984). 'Understanding Communalism. ' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XIX, 
No. 18,5 May, pp. 752-756. 
- (1986). 'Maharashtra: Engulfed in Communal Fire. ' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
XXI, No. 23,7 June, pp. 994-997. 
- (1991). 'Making of the Hyderabad Riots. ' Economic and Political Weekly Vol. XXVI, No. 
6,9 February, pp. 271-274. 
- (1993). 'Surat: Bastion of Communal Amity Crumbles, ' Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. XXVIII, No. 7,13 February, pp. 262-264. 
340 
- (1994). 'In the Shadow of Communalism. ' Seminar, 413, January. 
- (1997). 'Women in Islam: Valiant Warriors and Able Rulers. ' The Times of India, 22 
January. 
Entwisle, B., Hermalin,. A. I. and Mason, W. M. (1986). 'A Model for the Comparative Analysis of 
WFS Contraceptive Use Data. ' In Survey Analysis for the Guidance of Family Planning 
Programmes (eds. J. A. Ross and R. McNamara). Liege. 
Epstein, T. S. (1973). South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Mysore Villages Revisited. 
London: Macmillan Press. 
Ermisch, J. F. (1981). 'Economic Opportunities, Marriage Squeezes and the Propensity to Marry: An 
Economic Analysis of Period Marriage Rates in England and Wales. ' Population Studies, 3, 
pp. 347-356. 
Farid, S. (1987). 'A Review of the Fertility Situation in the Arab Countries of Western Asia and North 
Africa. ' In Fertility Behaviour in the Context of Development: Evidence from the World 
Fertility Survey. New York: U. N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Studies No. 100. 
Federici, N., Mason, K. O. and Sogner, S. eds. (1993). Women's Position and Demographic Change. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Folbre, N. (1992). "'The Improper Arts" Sex in Classical Political Economy. ' Population and 
Development Review, 18: 1, pp. 105-121. 
Frank, O. and McNicoll, G. (1987). 'An Interpretation of Fertility and Population Policy in Kenya. ' 
Population and Development Review, 13, pp. 209-243. 
Frisbie, P. (1986). 'Variation in Patterns of Marital Instability among Hispanics. ' Journal of Marriage 
and the Family, 48, pp. 99-106. 
Frisch, R. E. (1982). 'Evidence for a Secular Trend in the Age at Menarche. ' New England Journal of 
Medicine, 306, pp. 1033-1035. 
Gallagher, E., and Searle, M. (1983). 'Women's Health Care: A Study of Islamic Society. ' In Third 
World Medicine and Social Change (ed. J. H. Morgan). Lanham: University Press of 
America. 
Galloway, P. R., Hammel, E. A. and Lee, R. D. (1994). 'Fertility Decline in Prussia, 1875-1910: A 
Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Analysis. ' Population Studies, 48: 1, pp. 135-158. 
Gellner, E. (1981). Muslim Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ghallab, M. (1984). 'Population Theory and Policies in the Islamic Model. ' In Geography and 
Population: Approaches and Applications (ed. J. Clarke), pp. 232-241. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Golde, G. (1975). Catholics and Protestants: Agricultural Modernization in Two German Villages. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Goldstone, J. A. (1986). 'The Demographic Revolution in England: A Re-Examination. ' Population 
Studies, 49, pp. 5-33. 
Gopal, S. ed. (1991). Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid Issue. Delhi: 
Penguin. 
- (1989). Radhakrishnan: A Biography. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Goulet, D. (1980). 'Development Experts: The One-Eyed Giants. ' World Development, 8, pp. 481- 
489. 
Government of Karnataka. (1999). Human Development in Karnataka 1999. Bangalore: Planning 
Department, Government of Karnataka. 
Govinda Reddy, P. (1988). 'Consanguineous Marriages and Marriage Payment: A Study Among Three 
South Indian Caste Groups. ' Annals of Human Biology, 15: 4, pp. 263-268. 
Goyal, R. P. (1975). Shifts in Age at Marriage in India and Different States during 1961-71. Delhi: 
Institute of Economic Growth, mimeographed. 
- (1990). Differential Fertility by Religion in India. Delhi: Population Research Centre, 
Institute of Economic Growth, mimeographed. 
Graff, H. J. (1979). 'Literacy, Education and Fertility, Past and Present: A Critical Review. ' 
Population and Development Review, March, pp. 105-140. 
Greene, W. H. (1997). Econometric Analysis. 3rd edition. London: Prentice-Hall International. 
Guilkey, D. K. and Jayne, S. (1997). 'Fertility Transition in Zimbabwe: Determinants of 
Contraceptive Use and Method Choice. ' Population Studies, 51, pp. 173-189. 
Gulati, S. (1992). 'Developmental Determinants of Demographic Variables in India -A District Level 
Analysis. ' Journal of Quantitative Economics, 8: 1, pp. 157-172. 
Hajnal, J. (1982). 'Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household System. ' Population and Development 
Review, 8: 3, pp. 449-494. 
341 
Hammel, E. A. (1990). 'A Theory of Culture in Demography. ' Population and Development Review, 
16: 3, pp. 455-485. 
Harriss, B. (1990). 'The Intra-Family Distribution of Hunger. ' In The Political Economy of Hunger 
(ed. J. Dreze and A. Sen), 351-424. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Harvey, A. C. (1990). The Econometric Analysis of Time Series. 2nd edition. London: Philip Allan. 
Hasan, M. ed. (1981). Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India. Delhi: Manohar. 
Heer, D. M. (1966). 'Economic Development and Fertility. ' Demography, 3: 2, pp. 423-444. 
Heer, D. M. and Turner, E. (1965). 'Aerial Differences in Latin America's Fertility. ' Population 
Studies, 18: 3, pp. 279-292. 
Heer, D. M. and Youssef, N. (1977). 'Female Status among Soviet Central Asian Nationalities: The 
Melding of Islam and Marxism and its Implications for Population Increase. ' Population 
Studies, 3: 1, pp. 155-173. 
Herbert, J. (1965). An Introduction to Asia. Translated by Manu Banerji. London: George Allen and 
Unwin. 
Hern, W. M. (1992). 'Polygyny and Fertility among the Shipibo of the Peruvian Amazon. ' Population 
Studies, 46, pp. 53-64. 
Hill, P. (1982). Dry Grain Farming Families: Hausaland (Nigeria) and Karnataka (India) Compared. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hirschman, C. (1985). `Premarital Socio-Economic Roles and the Timing of Family Formation: A 
Comparative Study of Five Asian Societies. ' Demography, 22, pp. 35-59. 
Ibrahim, S. E. and Ibrahim, B. L. (1998). 'Egypt's Population Policy: The Long March of State and 
Civil Society. ' In Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya 
and Mexico (ed. A. Jain ), 19-52. New York: Population Council. 
India Population Data Sheet. (1994). April, Madras Communications Institute, Madras, India. 
Irudaya Rajan, S. (1987). 'Family Planning Programme in India: An Economic Evaluation. ' The 
Indian Economic Journal, 34: 4, pp. 79-86. 
Irudaya Rajan, S., Mishra, U. S. and Vimala, T. K. (1996). 'Choosing a Permanent Contraceptive: 
Does Son Preference Matter? ' Economic and Political Weekly, 20 July, 1980-1984. 
Iyer, S. (1994). Demographic and Economic Explanations for the Resurgence of Communalism in 
India Since 1984. Centre for History and Economics, Cambridge. 
Jaffe, A. J. and Azumi, K. (1960). 'The Birth Rate and Cottäge Industries in Underdeveloped 
Countries. ' Economic Development and Cultural Change, pp. 52-63. 
Jain, A. (1998). Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in Egypt, India, Kenya and 
Mexico. New York: Population Council. 
Janakarajan, S. and Seabright, P. (1996). 'Subjective and Objective Indicators of Welfare Change Over 
Time: Evidence from a Resurvey. ' Cambridge. 
Janakarajan, S., Olsen, N. and Seabright, P. (1996). 'The Determinants of Marriage Payments in 
Rural South India. ' Cambridge. 
Janssen, S. G. and Hauser, R. M. (1981). 'Religion, Socialisation and Fertility of Married Couples. ' 
Demography, 18, pp. 511-528. 
Jeffery, R. and Jeffery, P. (1997). Population, Gender and Politics: Demographic Change in Rural 
North India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jeffery, R. and Basu, A. M. eds. (1996). Girls' Schooling, Women's Autonomy, and Fertility Change 
in South Asia. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Jejeebhoy, S. (1992). 'Women's Education, Fertility and the Proximate Determinants of Fertility. ' 
Paper for the Expert Group Meeting on Population and Women, Gaborone, Botswana, June 
22-26, International Conference on Population and Development 1994, UNFPA, Document 
ES D/P/ICPD. 1994/EG. I II/ 13. 
Kabeer, N. (1997). 'Women, Wages and Infra-Household Power Relations in Urban Bangladesh. ' 
Development and Change, 28: 2, April, pp. 261-302. 
Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Project Report. (1995). Finance Ministry, Government 
of Karnataka and GHK/MRM International Ltd. 
Käsler, D. (1988). Max Weber: An Introduction to his Life and Work. Translated by P. Hurd. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Kay, J. A., Keen, M. J. and Morris, C. N. (1984). 'Estimating Consumption from Expenditure Data. ' 
Journal of Public Economics, 23, pp. 169-181. 
Keeley, M. C. (1977). 'The Economics of Family-Formation. ' Economic Inquiry, 15, pp. 238-250. 
342 
Kennedy, E. and Haddad, L. (1994). 'Are Pre-Schoolers from Female-headed Households less 
Malnourished? Results from Ghana and Kenya. ' Journal of Development Studies, 30: 3, 
April, pp. 680-95. 
Kennedy, E. and Peters, P. (1992). 'Household Food Security and Child Nutrition. The Interaction of 
Income and Gender of Household Head. ' World Development, 20: 8, August, pp. 1077-85. 
Ketkar, S. L. (1979): 'Determinants of Fertility in a Developing Society: The Case of Sierra Leone. ' 
Population Studies. 33: 3, pp. 479-488. 
Kelley, A. C. (1988). 'Economic Consequences of Population Change in the Third World. ' Journal of 
Economic Literature 26: 4, pp. 1685-1728. 
Kishor, S. (1994). 'Fertility Decline in Tamil Nadu. ' In Understanding Reproductive Change: Kenya, 
Tamil Nadu, Puniab, Costa Rica (eds. B. Egerö and M. Hammarskjöld), pp. 65-100. Lund: 
Lund University Press, 
Knodel, J. E. and van de Walle, E. (1986). `Lessons from the Past: Policy Implications of Historical 
Fertility Studies. ' In The Decline of Fertility in Europe (eds. A. J. Coale and S. C. Watkins), 
pp. 390-419. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Koenig, M. A., Rob, U., Ali Khan, M., Chakraborty, J. and Fauveau, V. (1992). 'Contraceptive Use in 
Matlab, Bangladesh in 1990: Levels, Trends and Explanations. ' Studies in Family Planning, 
23: 6, pp. 352-364. 
Kraft, J. M. and Coverdill, -J. E. (1994). 'Employment and the Use of Birth Control by Sexually 
Active Single Hispanic, Black and White Women. ' Demography, 31: 4, pp. 593-602. 
Kriedte, P., Medick, H. and Schlumbohm, J. (1981). Industrialization before Industrialization: Rural 
Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Landau, R. (1958). Islam and the Arabs. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Landes, D. S. (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. London: Little, Brown and Company. 
Laslett, P. (1988). ' The European Family and Early Industrialisation. ' In Europe and the Rise of 
Capitalism (eds. J. Baechler, J. A. Hall and M. Mann), pp. 234-241. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
- (1983). 'Family and Household as 
Work Group and Kin Group: Areas of Traditional 
Europe Compared. ' In Family Forms in Historic Europe (eds. R. Wall, J. Robin and P. 
Laslett), pp. 513-563.. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 
Lee, R. D. and Miller, T. (1991). 'Population Growth, Externalities to Childbearing, and Fertility 
Policy in Developing Countries. ' Proceedings of the World Bank Conference on Development 
Economics 1990, pp. 275-297,. 
Le Mee, J. translated. (1975). Hymns from the Rig Veda. London: Jonathan Cape. 
Lesthaeghe, R. and Surkyn, J. (1988). `Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility q 
Change. ' Population and Development Review, 14: 1, March, pp. 1-45. 
Lesthaeghe, R. and Wilson, C. (1986). 'Modes of Production, Secularization and the Pace of Fertility 
Decline in Western Europe 1870-1930. ' In The Decline of Fertility in Europe (eds. A. J. 
Coale and S. C. Watkins), pp. 261-292. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ling, T. (1980). 'Buddhist Values and Development Problems: A Case Study of Sri Lanka. ' World 
Development, 8, pp. 577-586. 
Lipton, M. (1997). 'Editorial: Poverty - Are There Holes in the Consensus? ' World Development, 25: 
7, July, pp. 1003-1007. 
(1995). 'Poverty and Policy. ' In Handbook of Development Economics (eds. J. Behrman and 
T. N. Srinivasan), Vol. 3B. Handbooks in Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 2551-2657. Amsterdam, New 
York and Oxford: Elsevier Science, North Holland. 
(1992). 'Economics and Anthropology: Grounding Models in Relationships. ' World 
Development, 20: 10, October, pp. 1541-1546. 
Lipton, M. and Moore, M. (1972). 'The Methodology of Village Studies in Less Developed 
Countries. ' Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper, 10. 
Livson, N. and McNeill, D. (1962). 'The Accuracy of Recalled Age at Menarche. ' Human Biology, 
34: 3, pp. 218-221. 
Lloyd, C. B., Mensch, B. S. and Clark, W. H. (1998). 'The Effects of Primary School Quality on the 
Educational Participation and Attainment of Kenyan Girls and Boys. ' Policy Research 
Division Working Paper, 116. New York: Population Council. 
Lutz, W. (1983). 'Culture, Religion and Fertility: A Global View. ' Genus, 43: 3-4, pp. 15-35. 
Malhotra, A., Vanneman, R. and Kishor, S. (1995). 'Fertility Dimensions of Patriarchy and 
Development in India. ' Population and Development Review, 21: 2, pp. 281-305. 
343 
eý 
Malthus, T. R. (1817). An Essay on the Principle of Population. Fifth edition, Vol. III. London: John 
Murray. 
Mamdani, M. (1972). The Myth of Population Control. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Mandelbaum, D. G. (1974). Human Fertility in India: Social Components and Policy Perspectives. 
California: Berkeley Press. 
Mason, K. O. (1993). 'The Impact of Women's Position on Demographic Change During the Course 
of Development. ' In Women's Position and Demographic Change (eds. N. Federici, K. O. 
Mason and S. Sogner), pp. 19-42. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Mason, K. M. and Taj, A. M. (1987). 'Differences between Women's and Men's Reproductive Goals 
in Developing Countries. ' Population and Development Review, 13: 4, pp. 611-638. 
May, D. A. and Heer, D. M. (1968). 'Son Survivorship Motivation and Family Size in India: A 
Computer Simulation. ' Population Studies, 22, pp. 199-210. 
McNay, K., Humphries, J. and Klasen, S. (1997). 'Death and Gender in Victorian England and 
Wales. Comparisons with Contemporary Developing Countries. ' Department of Applied 
Economics Working Paper, 9801. University of Cambridge. 
McNicoll, G. (1984). 'Consequences of Rapid Population Growth: An Overview and Assessment. ' 
Population and Development Review, 10: 2, pp. 177-240. 
- (1980). 'Institutional Determinants of Fertility. ' Population and Development Review, 6: 3, 
pp. 441-462. 
Mcquillon, K. (1989). 'Economic Structure, Religion and Age at Marriage - Some Evidence from 
Alsace. ' Journal of Family History, 14: 4, pp. 331-346. 
Michael, M. and Tuma, N. (1985). 'Entry into Marriage and Parenthood by Young Men and Women: 
the Influence of Family Background. ' Demography, 22, pp. 515-544. 
Miller, P. W. (1988). 'Economic Models of Fertility Behaviour in Australia. ' Australian Economic 
Papers, pp. 65-79. 
Mosher, W. D.. and Hendershot, G. E. (1984). 'Religion and Fertility: A Replication. ' Demography, 
21: 2, pp. 185-191. 
- (1984). 'Religious Affiliation and Fertility of Married Couples. ' Journal of Marriage and 
the Family, 46, pp. 671-677. 
Mosher, W. D., Johnson, D. P. and Horn, H. C. (1986). 'Religion and Fertility in the United States: 
The Importance of Marriage Patterns and Hispanic Origin. ' Demography, 23, pp. 367-379. 
Muhuri, P. K. and Menken, J. (1997). 'Adverse Effects of Next Birth, Gender and Family 
Composition on Child Survival in Rural Bangladesh. ' Population Studies, 51: 3, pp. 279- 294. 
Murthi, M., Guio, A. C. and Dri ze, J. (1995). 'Mortality, Fertility and Gender Bias in India: A 
District- Level Analysis. ' Population and Development Review, pp. 745-782. 
Mysore Population Study. (1961). New York: United Nations Department of Social and Economic 
Affairs. 
Nag, M. (1983). 'The Impact of Sociocultural Factors on Breastfeeding and Sexual Behaviour. ' In 
Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries (eds. R. A. Bulatao and R. D. Lee), pp. 163- 
198. New York: Academic Press. 
- (1984). 'Some Cultural Factors Affecting the Costs of Fertility Regulation. ' Population 
Bulletin of the United Nations. 17, pp. 17-38. 
Nag, M. and Kak, N. (1984). 'Demographic Transition in a Punjab Village. ' Population and 
Development Review, 10: 4, pp: 661-678. 
Nagi, M. (1984). 'Trends and Differentials in Moslem fertility. ' Journal of Biosocial Science, 16, pp. 
189-204. 
Narasimaiah, C. V. (1994). N for Nobody. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Nash, M. (1980). 'Islam in Iran: Turmoil, Transformation or Transcendence? ' World Development, 
8, pp. 555-561. 
National Family Health Survey 1992-93: Karnataka. (1995). Institute of Social and Economic 
Growth, Bangalore and International Institute of Population Sciences, Mumbai. 
Niraula, B. B. and Morgan, S. P. (1996). 'Marriage Formation, Post-Marital Contact with Natal Kin 
and Autonomy of Women: Evidence from Two Nepali Settings. ' Population Studies, 50, pp. 
35-50. 
Notestein, F. W. (1953). The Economics of Population and Food Supplies. ' In Proceedings of the 
Eighth International Conference of Agricultural Economists, pp. 13-31. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Obermeyer, C. M. (1992). 'Islam, Women and Politics: The Demography of Arab Countries. ' 
Population and Development Review, 18: 1, pp. 33-60. 
344 
Office of the Registrar-General, Demography Division. (1988). Census of India 1981: Fertility in India. 
An Analysis of 1981 Census Data. V. S. Verma, Series 1, India: Occasional Paper 13 of 1988. 
Delhi: Controller of Publications. 
- (1991). Census of India 1991: Provisional Population Totals. A. R. Nanda, Series 1, India, 
Paper 1 of 1991. New Delhi: Registrar General. 
- (1995). Census of India 1991: Paper I on Religion. New Delhi: Registrar General. 
Ogilvie, S. C. (1997). State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: The Württemberg Black Forest 1580 - 
1797. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ogilvie, S. C. and Cerman, M. eds. (1996). European Proto-Industrialization. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Olsen, R. J. (1987). 'Cross-Sectional Methods for Estimating the Replacement of Infant Deaths. ' In 
Research in Population Economics, (ed. T. P. Schultz. ). Connecticut. 
Omondi-Odhiambo, M. (1997). 'Men's Participation in Family Planning Decisions in Kenya. ' 
Population Studies, pp. 29-40. 
Omran, A. (1980). Population in the Arab world: Problems and Prospects. London: Croom Helm. 
Oppong, C. (1983). 'Women's Roles, Opportunity Costs, and Fertility. ' In Determinants of Fertility in 
Developing Countries (eds. R. A. Bulatao and R. D. Lee), pp. 547-589. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Ostersehlt, D. and Dankerhopfe, H. (1991). 'Changes in Age at Menarche in Germany - Evidence for 
a Continuing Decline, ' American Journal of Human Biology, 3: 6, pp. 647-654. 
Outline Structure Plan for Ramanagaram, Final Report. (1995). Bangalore: Government of 
Karnataka. 
Pandey, G. (1990). The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
- (1991). 'In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about 
Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today. ' 
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 11 and 12, Annual Number, pp. 559-572. 
Parker Mauldin, W. 'Population Programs and Fertility Regulation. ' In Determinants of Fertility in 
Developing Countries (eds. R. A. Bulatao and R. D. Lee), Vol. 2, pp. 267-294. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Philip Morgan, S. and Niraula, B. B. (1995). 'Gender Inequality and Fertility in Two Nepali 
Villages. ' Population and Development Review, 21: 3, pp. 541-561. 
Preston, S. H. and Mari Bhat, P. N. (1984). 'New Evidence on Fertility and Mortality Trends in 
India. ' Population and Development Review, pp. 481-503. 
Pritchett, L. H. (1994). 'Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies. ' Population and 
Development Review, 20: 1, pp. 1-55. 
Qureshi, S. (1980). 'Islam and Development: The Zia Regime in Pakistan. ' World Development, 8, 
pp. 563-575. 
Radhakrishnan, S. (1927). The Hindu View of Life. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
- (1939). Eastern Religions and Western Thought. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
-(19 47). Religion and Society. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Ragab, I. A. (1980). 'Islam and Development. ' World Development, 8, pp. 513-521. 
Rao, P. S. S., Inbaraj, S. G. and Jesudian, G. (1972). 'Rural-Urban Differentials in Consanguinity. ' 
Journal of Medical Genetics, 9, pp. 174-178. 
Rao, P. S. S. and Inbaraj, S. G. (1977). 'Inbreeding in Tamil Nadu, South India. ' SDCia1 Biology, 24, 
pp. 281-288. 
Rao, V. (1993). 'The Rising Price of Husbands: A Hedonic Analysis of Dowry Increases in Rural 
India. ' Journal of Political Economy, 101, pp. 666-677. 
Retherford, R. D. and Ramesh, B. M. (1996). 'Fertility and Contraceptive Use in Tamil Nadu, Andhra 
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. ' National Family Health Survey Bulletin, 4: 3, ISSN 1083-8678. 
Riccio, J. A. (1979). 'Religious Affiliation and Socioeconomic Achievement. ' In The Religious 
Dimension: New Directions in Quantitative Research (ed. R. Wuthnow), pp. 199-228. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Rosenzweig, M. R. (1985). 'The Demand for and Supply of Births: Fertility and its Life Cycle 
Consequences. ' American Economic Review, 75, pp. 992-1015. 
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Schultz, T. P. (1982). 'Market Opportunities, Genetic Endowments, and 
Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India. ' American Economic 
Review, 72: 4, pp. 803-815. 
- (1989). 'Schooling, Information and Nonmarket Productivity: Contraceptive Use and its 
Effectiveness. ' International Economic Review, 30: 2, pp. 457-477. 
345 
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Stark, O. (1989). 'Consumption Smoothing, Migration and Marriage: 
Evidence from Rural India. ' Journal of Political Economy 97: 4, pp. 905-926. 
Sarkar, T. (1981). 'Communal Riots in Bengal. ' In Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial 
India (ed. M. Hasan), pp. 284-301. Delhi: Manohar. 
Sathar, Z. A. and Casterline, J. B. (1998). 'The Onset of Fertility Transition in Pakistan. ' Policy 
Research Division Working Paper, 112. New York: Population Council. 
Sander, W. (1995). The Catholic Family. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1976). 'Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement. ' Econometrica, 44, pp. 219-23 1. 
- (1994). 'Population: Delusion and Reality. ' The New York Review of Books, Vol. XLI: No. 
15,22 September. 
Schuler, S. R., Hashemi, S. M. and Riley, A. P. (1997). 'The Influence of Women's Changing Roles 
and Status in Bangladesh's Fertility Transition: Evidence from a Study of Credit Programmes 
and Contraceptive Use. ' World Development, 25: 4, pp. 563-575. 
Schull, W. J., Yanase, T. and Nemoto, H. (1966). 'Kuroshima: The Impact of Religion on an Island's 
Genetic Heritage. ' Human Biology, 34: 4, pp. 271-298. 
Schultz, T. P. (1982). 'Family Composition and Income Inequality. ' Population and Development 
Review Supplement, pp. 137-150. 
- (1990). 'Testing the Neo-Classical Model of Family Labour Supply and Fertility. ' Journal 
of Human Resources, 25: 4, pp. 599-634. 
Scrimshaw, S. C. M. (1978). 'Infant Mortality and Behaviour in the Regulation of Family Size. ' 
Population and Development Review, pp. 383-403. 
Sharif, A. (1993). Some Socio-Economic and Demographic Aspects of Population According to 
Religion in India. Bombay: Centre for the Study of Society and Secularism. 
(1999). India Human Development Report: A Profile of Indian States in the 1990s. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shapiro, D. (1996). 'Fertility Decline in Kinshasa. ' Population Studies, 50, pp. 89-103. 
Shapiro, D. and Tambashe, O. (1994). 'Education, Employment and Fertility in Kinshasa and 
Prospects for Changes in Reproductive Behaviour. ' Penn State Department of Economics 
Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University. 
Singer, M. (1966). 'Religion and Social Change in India: The Max Weber Thesis, Phase Three. ' 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, pp. 497-505. 
Singh, M. (1992). 'Changes in Age at Marriage of Women in Rural North India. ' Journal of Biosocial 
Science, 24: 1, pp. 123-130. 
Singh, S., Casterline, B. and Cleland, J. G. (1985). 'The Proximate Determinants of Fertility: Sub- 
National Variations. ' 'Population Studies , 
39: 1, pp. 113-135. 
Sopher, D. E. ed. (1980). An Exploration of India: Geographic Perspectives on Society and Culture. 
Chapter 10, pp. 289-327. London: Longman. 
Srinivas, M. N. (1989). 'Culture and Human Fertility in India. ' In The Cohesive Role of 
Sanskritisation and Other Essays, pp. 123-144. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- (1976). The Remembered Village. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
- (1965). 'The Cult of the Okka. ' In Religion and Society Among the Coorgs of South India, 
Chapter 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- (1994). The Dominant Caste and Other Essays. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Srinivasan, K. (1995). 'Recent Fertility Trends and Prospects in India. ' Current Science, 69: 7,10 
October, pp. 577-586. 
- (1998). Basic Demographic Techniques and Applications. Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Srinivasan, K. and Jejeebhoy, S. (1981). In Dynamics of Population and Family Welfare (eds. K. 
Srinivasan and S. Mukherji), pp. 91-117. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. 
Standing, G. (1983). `Women's Work Activity and Fertility. ' In Determinants of Fertility in 
Developing Countries (eds. R. A. Bulatao and R. D. Lee), pp. 517-546. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Stark, O. (1981). 'The Asset Demand for Children During Agricultural Modernisation. ' Population and 
Development Review, 7: 4, pp. 671-675. 
Steele, F., Amin, S. and Naved, R. T. (1998). 'The Impact of an Integrated Micro-Credit Program on 
Women's Empowerment and Fertility Behaviour in Rural Bangladesh. ' Policy Research 
Division Working Paper, 115, New York: Population Council. 
Stigler, G. J. (1993). 'Economic Competition and Political Competition. ' In Public Choice Theory (ed. 
C. K. Rowley), pp. 258-273. Aldershot: Elgar. 
346 
Stinner, W. F. and Mader, P. D. (1975). `Government Policy and Personal Family Planning Approval 
in Conflict Settings: The Case. of the Muslim Minority in Southern Philippines. ' Population 
Studies, 29: 1, pp. 53-59. 
Subbamma, M. (1988). Islam and Women, translated by M. V. Ramamurthy. New Delhi: Stirling 
Publishers. 
Summers, L. H. (1994). 'Investing in All the People. ' EDI Seminar Paper, 45, The World Bank. 
Taft Morris, C. and Adelman, I. (1980). 'The Religious Factor in Economic Development. ' World 
Development, 8, pp. 491-501. 
Tambiah, S. J. (1973). 'Dowry and Bridewealth, and the Property Rights of Women in South Asia. ' In 
Bridewealth and Dowry. (eds. J. Goody and S. J. Tambiah ), pp. 100-110. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 
Tanner, M. J. (1973). 'Trend toward Earlier Menarche in London, Oslo, Copenhagen, the Netherlands 
and Hungary. ' Nature, 243, pp. 95-96. 
Tey N. P., Tan, P. C., Ng, S. T., Kuppusamy, S. and Wan Sabri, W. H. (1995). Contraceptive Choices 
in the Rural Areas of Peninsular Malaysia: Determinants and Change, University of Malaya. 
Thapa, M. (1993). 'Women's Concerns in Relation to Contraceptive Methods Currently Used in the 
SAARC Region. '' Resource Paper No. WG 111/2, SAARC Ministerial Conference on Women 
and Family Health, 21-23 November, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
Thimmaiah, G. (1977). 'Inequality of Income and Poverty in Karnataka (A Socio-economic Profile). ' 
Indian Economic Journal, 25: 2, pp. 119-129. 
Thomas, N. (1993). 'Economic Security, Culture and Fertility: A Reply to Cleland. ' Population 
Studies, 47, pp. 353-359. 
Thorner, D., Kerblay, B. and Smith, R. E. F. ed. (1986). A. V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant 
Economy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Thornton, A. (1979). 'Religion and Fertility: The Case of Mormonism. ' Journal of Marriage and the 
Family, pp. 131-142. 
Uppal, J. S. (1986). 'Hinduism and Economic Development in South Asia. ' International Journal of 
Social Economics. 13: 3, pp. 20-30. 
Van de Kaa, D. J. (1996). 'Anchored Narratives: The Story and Findings of Half a Century of 
Research Into the Determinants of Fertility. ' Population Studies, 50, pp. 389-432. 
Van Heck, F. (1966). 'Roman Catholicism and Fertility in the Netherlands: Demographic Aspects of 
Minority Status. ' Population Studies, 20, pp. 125-138. 
Vanaik, A. (1991). 'Examining the Ayodhya Conflict, ' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXVI, 
No. 17,27 April, pp. 1099-1101. 
Visaria, P., Visaria, L. and Jain, A. (1995). Contraceptive Use and Fertility in India: A Case Study of 
Gujarat. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Visaria, P. and Chari, V. (1998). 'India's Population Policy and Family Planning Program: 
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. ' In Do Population Policies Matter? Fertility and Politics in 
Egypt, India, Kenya and Mexico (ed. A. Jain), pp. 53-112. New York: Population Council. 
Vlassoff, C. (1992). `Progress and Stagnation: Changes in Fertility and Women's Position in an 
Indian Village. ' Population Studies, 46, pp. 195-212. 
Vlassoff, M. (1979). 'Labour Demand and Economic Utility of Children: A Case Study in Rural 
India. ' Population Studies, 33: 3, pp. 487-499. 
- (1982). 'Economic Utility of Children and Fertility in Rural India. ' Population Studies, 36: 
1, pp. 45-59. 
Vlassoff, M. and Vlassoff, C. (1980). 'Old-Age Security and the Utility of Children in Rural India. ' 
Population Studies, 34, pp. 487-499. 
Weber, M. (1992). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by T. Parsons, 
introduced by A. Giddens. London: Unwin. 
Westoff, C. F. (1988). "Is the KAP-Gap Real? ' Population and Development Review, 14: 2, pp. 225- 
232. 
- (1979). 'The Blending of Catholic Reproductive Behaviour. ' In The Religious Dimension: 
New Directions in Quantitative Research (ed. R. Wuthnow), pp. 231-240. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Westoff, C. F. and Ryder, N. B. (1977). The Contraceptive Revolution. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
- (1977). 'The Predictive Validity of Reproductive Intentions. ' Demography, 14: 4, pp. 431- 
453. 
347 
Westoff, C. F. and Jones, E. F. (1979). `The End of "Catholic Fertility". ' Demography, 16: 2, pp. 209- 
217. 
Wilber, C. K. and Jameson, K. P. (1980). `Religious Values and Social Limits to Development. ' World 
Development, 8, pp. 467-479. 
White, E. (1978). `Legal Reforms as an Indicator of Women's Status in Muslim Nations. ' In Women in 
the Muslim World (eds. L. Beck and N. Keddie), pp. 52-68. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
World Bank. (1991). Social Indicators of Development. Washington: World Bank. 
Wrigley, E. A. and Schofield, R. S. (1981). The Population History of England 1541-1871: A 
Reconstruction. Cambridge: Edward Arnold. 
Wyon, J. B. and Gordon, J. E. (1971). The Khanna Study: Population Problems in Rural Punjab. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Youssef, N. H. (1978). 'The Status and Fertility Patterns of Muslim Women. ' In Women in the Muslim 
World (eds. L. Beck and N. Keddie), pp. 69-99. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
348 
UNIVERSITY 
LIBRARY 
CAMBRIDGE 
